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ABSTRACT 
 
The therapeutic alliance in mental health services has been researched extensively 
especially with regards to care provider and care receiver characteristics that may 
affect therapeutic outcomes. In the literature, it seems to be commonly assumed that 
the alliance has an inherent power imbalance in favour of the professional. Beyond 
this assumption, research on the knowledge-power balance in the alliance is limited.   
 
The aim of the study was to explore the dominant discourses related to the balance of 
knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance in mental health services. An 
additional interest was the role that these identified discourses may play in the 
positions occupied by care providers and care receivers in the alliance. A final 
objective was the identification of care provider and care receiver knowledge needs 
in relation to the management of the knowledge-power balance in the alliance in a 
manner that may enhance therapeutic effects. 
 
Ten semi-structured interviews were conducted involving individuals who were 
receiving psychiatric care in the inpatient setting at the state psychiatric hospital in 
Malta. The second phase of this study involved the analysis of the Medical and 
Nursing records that pertained to the ten participants who had been interviewed. A 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework was used to guide the study and 
Foucault’s concepts of knowledge and power served as the theoretical underpinning 
of the study. 
 
The care receivers’ contribution to the discourses pertaining to the knowledge-power 
balance in the alliance led to the identification of four different types of alliances 
with distinguishable knowledge-power characteristics. Three discursive themes were 
identified from the Medical and Nursing records and these were perceived as being 
complementary to the findings that emerged from the care receivers’ interviews. 
Finally information related to the potential knowledge required by care receivers and 
care providers in order to manage the knowledge-power balance in an effective 
manner was extracted from the data and presented together with recommendations. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The therapeutic working alliance in mental health services is one of the most 
important tools used in addressing mental health challenges and facilitating recovery 
(Castonguay, Constantino & Holtforth, 2006; Johannson & Eklund, 2003). Research 
around this area seems to focus on the theoretical structure of the alliance and on the 
impact of care provider and care receiver personal characteristics on the nature of the 
alliance. Although the dominant discourses that have affected the evolution of 
psychiatry have been explored, it seems as if this research may have not been 
extensively applied to the therapeutic alliance in practice. In this thesis, it is 
hypothesised that the identification and exploration of dominant discourses in mental 
health may shed light on how they influence the behaviour of the care provider and 
care receiver in the therapeutic alliance. Furthermore, this process may illuminate the 
types of knowledge that care providers and care receivers need in order to steer the 
knowledge-power balance in a manner that facilitates a care receiver-friendly 
therapeutic destination and plots the best route to it. 
1.2 Reflections on the personal rationale for the study 
As a way of explaining my personal rationale for the study, I would like to present a 
brief introduction of myself. During the past ten years, I have been involved in 
mental health and psychiatry. I spent the first six years working as a nurse in a 
psychiatric setting, first in an acute ward and then as a team leader in a psychiatric 
outreach team. Four years ago, I left the clinical setting and took on a lecturing role 
in mental health nursing at the University of Malta. However, I still maintain contact 
with the clinical setting, mostly through student-related responsibilities. During this 
decade, I have directly experienced many positive changes in mental health services, 
especially in my country. This was particularly brought about by the drive to 
downsize the inpatient setting whilst optimising community services. On a parallel 
level, specialist psychiatric training was enhanced especially with regards to doctors 
2 
 
and nurses who work in these services. Despite these clear advances, I often have 
doubts about the depth of these changes in relation to patient empowerment, 
autonomy and self-determination in state psychiatric care. On the basis of my 
experience in the local clinical setting, I feel that it is indeed soul lifting to observe 
professionals who provide care receivers with treatment options and structured care 
in the local setting. Contrastingly, to me, it is painful and alarming to realise that in 
some of the areas, care receivers are still experiencing sub-standard care especially 
due to limited treatment options, a very limited amount of structured therapeutic 
activities and worst of all, a lack of basic respect. In brief, these were the main 
factors which prompted me to explore that which I regard as being the core of mental 
health services – the therapeutic alliance.  I wanted to approach this area by 
specifically exploring the dominant discourses and other factors that may affect the 
management of the knowledge-power balance in the alliance. I believe that this may 
help me to understand why things are as they are - the status quo - the reason why 
the knowledge-power nexus may be quite balanced in some therapeutic alliances but 
so skewed in others. Moreover, as a consequence of enhancing my understanding in 
this area, I also wished to develop a better perspective of the knowledge or training 
needs that may be required by care providers and care receivers. I believe that as a 
lecturer, I am in a position which can help me to bring about change especially due 
to my input in the guidance of students, who are the future psychiatric care 
providers.  Furthermore, I feel that my clinical and academic experiences give me 
the opportunity to focus on pragmatism especially on the application of academic 
knowledge to actual clinical practice.  One of my inspirational figures, Dr. Shaun 
Grech, who is a researcher on issues related to disability and poverty, may have 
captured the essence of my vision, when he said: 
I do what I do because there are already too many sedentary academics who 
make a career out of detachment and talking about the reality ‘out there’ from 
the safe and sometimes ever so arrogant distance of their comfortable, 
Western offices. There are also too many do-gooders trying to save the world 
by imposing their own values, beliefs and ways, without listening, without 
learning, without research…this is the little contribution I want to give in this 
life (Grech, 2012 a,b). 
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At this point, I would like to state that despite the measures that I took to increase the 
trustworthiness of this study (as described in Chapter 3), I was not free from bias. I 
have strong feelings about the area of study especially when addressing issues 
related to care receiver respect and self-determination. However, whilst 
acknowledging this bias, I also chose to perceive it as a strength because it may have 
allowed me to relate to my participants and to understand the findings in a 
comprehensive manner - this may have been more challenging had I been a complete 
outsider. 
1.3 Background 
A glance at the literature dedicated to the therapeutic alliance reveals that the 
concept has been practically raised to deity status. This is due to the fact that 
numerous studies have routinely revealed that the quality of the working alliance 
between a care provider and a care receiver is directly linked to treatment outcomes 
and is thus a highly important factor in an individual’s recovery journey (Gilburt, 
Rose & Slade, 2008, p.1). 
Undeniably, the underlying current beneath this concept has been linked to the latent 
issues of knowledge and power within the alliance and this has been subsequently 
explored by several theorists such as Brown (2003, p.231), Foucault (1995, p.214) 
and Flaskas and Humphreys (1993, p.35). These issues have molded psychiatric 
practice and may have been influential in the move from oppressive psychiatry that 
featured an all knowing professional to enhanced mental health services that regard 
the patient and the professional as both being partial knowers (Brown, 2007, p.4). In 
mental health, recovery is sometimes metaphorically described as a journey (Barker 
& Buchanan-Parker, 2005). In a continuation to this metaphor, a road mapping 
analogy shows both entities within the therapeutic alliance attempting to manage the 
knowledge-power balance in order to collaboratively identify a destination (this 
being the ultimate goal of the alliance) and map the road to it (that is, by forming a 
care plan). Apart from the personal attributes and characteristics inherent in the care 
giver and care receiver, Hinshelwood (2001) suggested that psychiatry and by 
default, the therapeutic alliance, have been predominantly influenced by dominant 
discourses on the subject (p.286). This implies that external ideas about the alliance 
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in mental health services may affect the nature of the relationship between the care 
provider and receiver. Theorists such as Foucault (1979/1995) paid homage to this 
subject by depicting how ideological beliefs pertaining to a specific field form 
bodies of formal knowledge (episteme), be it erroneous or accurate (p.218). This 
may give rise to power relations since subjects who dissent from this knowledge 
may be regarded as deviant and even punished. As an example, in his postmodern 
view of the social construction of mental illness, Walker (2006) implied that 
dominant discourses related to mental illness may have been majorly responsible for 
the barbaric historic psychiatric practices which darken the history of this discipline 
(p.31).  
The main interest in my study was to identify the discourses which affect modern-
day psychiatry and their role in the knowledge-power balance management in the 
contemporary therapeutic alliance. Current research in this area focuses mostly on 
care provider and care receiver personal characteristics and not specifically on 
dominant discourses. Thus, my study attempted to address this gap and to add an 
additional piece to the rich knowledge base that can be found in relation to this area. 
There is research which indicates that factors such as care provider empathy, 
genuineness and other factors may be beneficial to therapeutic outcomes related to 
the alliance. To a much lesser extent, care receivers’ characteristics have also been 
explored although this part of the literature seems to center on pathological factors 
that may have implications on the alliance. This may point towards an observation 
made by Zur (2009) who noted that very limited research has been carried out 
beyond the seemingly accepted view of an omnipotent professional (who has to use 
skills to steer the alliance) and a helpless (ill) patient. According to him, a 
fundamental mistake is being made when one assumes that a therapeutic alliance is 
inherently and inevitably characterized by a power imbalance (p.161).  
Year 2013 marked the 40th anniversary of Being Sane in Insane Places - a study 
carried out by Rosenhan (1973) which featured a group of ‘normal’ people who 
managed to gain admission into a psychiatric hospital in order to go through the 
experience of being a patient in such a setting. The most prominent finding was 
related to the fact that the pseudopatients were diagnosed as suffering from 
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schizophrenia and discharged only after an average period of 19 days (with the label 
of schizophrenia in remission) even though their pseudosymptoms had disappeared 
immediately following admission. These findings were perceived as placing serious 
doubts on the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. The study by Rosenhan had an 
additional objective which was that of exploring the interactions between the 
pseudopatients and the staff. In this regard, the pseudopatients noted the way that 
they were treated by different staff members by recording activities such as eye 
contact and meaningful interactions.  The findings implied a power differential that 
was clearly in favour of the professionals in a way that may have indicated abuse of 
professional power.  
Forty years later, the field of mental health and psychiatry is still characterized by 
debates that range from issues as basic as whether the field actually exists to the 
various perceptions regarding its evidence base and that of the treatment on offer. 
Rosenhan’s findings served as the fuel for my curiosity with regards to the nexus of 
knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance. Thus my interest lay in exploring 
the different ways that the therapeutic alliance is spoken about and how spoken 
words and perceptions may affect the actions of the care providers and receivers 
within the alliance. Foucault’s work helped to shape the queries that I had in a way 
that allows a structured exploration by means of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis.  
As a result, the main research question guiding this study was: 
What is the nature of the combination of knowledge and power in therapeutic 
alliances in a mental health in-patient setting in Malta?  
This was accompanied by two sub-questions, namely: 
What role do dominant discourses play in the positions occupied by care 
providers and care receivers in therapeutic alliances in a mental health in-
patient setting in Malta? 
What type of knowledge is required by care providers and care receivers for 
power to be managed in a manner that may enhance therapeutic effects in this 
setting? 
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1.4 The setting of the study 
The study was carried out in Malta, which is one of the main three islands that make 
up the Maltese archipelago. The islands are situated in the Mediterranean Sea 
between Sicily and Libya.  The main island, Malta, has a population of 417,000 and 
an area of 316 square kilometres (Government of Malta, 2013, sec.2).  Having been 
governed by various nationalities, the Maltese culture is made up of a rich mixture of 
styles and traditions. The official languages are Maltese and English and the 
predominant religion is Roman Catholic. The archipelago has been a European 
Union member state since 2004. Malta has a free public healthcare system which 
includes one main general hospital, a smaller general hospital on the sister island of 
Gozo and separate hospitals dedicated to oncology, geriatric care, rehabilitation and 
psychiatry.  There is also a primary healthcare system and a number of private 
clinics and hospitals that offer a variety of services (Government of Malta, 2013, 
sec.1-8).   
The setting of this study was the state psychiatric hospital in Malta. Although a 
range of private psychiatric services are available, the state psychiatric service is the 
only one to offer a range of specialist services and inpatient facilities on the island.  
Prior to the construction of this hospital, mental health care in Malta was targeted at 
containment and restraint rather than treatment (Mental Health Services, 2011, p.2). 
In his review about mental health care in Malta, Savona Ventura (2004) described 
how between 1574 and 1835, people who suffered from mental distress were kept in 
a number of places which were mostly located in the capital city of the island, 
Valletta and its neighbouring town, Floriana. Within these different places, patients 
were kept in inhumane conditions, most often chained to walls, exposed to physical 
abuse and left in their own dirt until they died. 
 
In 1835, a knight of the Order of St.John, Bali Fra Fabrizio Franconi donated his 
residence for use as an asylum. The residence, named Villa Franconi, was 
characterised by the same poor living conditions that had been previously found in 
the other psychiatry settings. However, the appointment of a new visiting physician, 
Dr. T. Chetcuti, was influential in an improvement of conditions. This physician who 
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remained known as the ‘father of psychiatry in Malta’ succeeded in releasing 
patients from their chains, limiting the use of seclusion and began using the straight 
jacket only in those cases where patients became irritable and dangerous.  He also 
attempted to stop the carers (known as attendants) from using the term ‘mad’, 
maltreating the patients, swearing and stealing food or other supplies. By increasing 
the number of attendants, he tried to ensure better supervision of the patients in the 
asylum. By 1859, the place was very overcrowded and the overall condition had 
deteriorated to such an extent that it was decided to build a new mental hospital as an 
attempt to improve care. This led to the construction of the hospital that is still in use 
today. 
This institution was opened in 1861 to accommodate 248 patients from Villa 
Franconi who were transferred during the night to the new hospital. To this very day, 
the term ‘Ta’ Frankuni’ is still used amongst lay people to refer to this hospital even 
though the official name of the hospital is Mount Carmel Hospital. Although this 
building already had structural problems and obsolete systems, the ordered 
atmosphere and organisation impressed foreign visitors at the time of its opening. 
Unfortunately the attendants continued to constantly create problems because of lack 
of discipline, knowledge and respect – most of them were orphan girls who were 
forced to work in the asylum and they went about in bare feet and dressed in tatters. 
 
It was at the beginning of the last century that the nursing situation regarding 
educational standards and number of staff began to improve. In 1995, the first 
community services were introduced and in 2008, a plan was made to offer 
community psychiatric services all over the island. Nowadays these include an 
Outreach Team and Crisis Intervention Service, Primary and Secondary Teams 
mostly situated in primary care health units, psychiatric day centres and hostels.    
The state mental health service includes inpatient facilities and community services 
all of which fall underneath the responsibility of one management structure. All 
services are provided by multidisciplinary teams mostly led by a consultant 
psychiatrist (Mental Health Services, 2011, p.24). The inpatient setting is mainly 
situated in the psychiatric hospital (with a capacity of 581 beds) with a smaller unit 
on the sister island of Gozo. Services cater for general psychiatry and specialist areas 
such as dual diagnosis, forensic psychiatry, learning disability, rehabilitation, 
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psychogeriatrics and paediatric/adolescent psychiatry. Liaison psychiatry and joint 
clinics such as Neuropsychiatry and Perinatal Psychiatric clinics are found at the 
general hospital (Mater Dei Hospital). Outpatient facilities are also provided at the 
general hospital and within the primary healthcare centres scattered around the 
island.  The private sector has also been involved in offering a number of community 
services such as hostels and employment support for individuals with mental health 
difficulties. 
 
Since 1995, the local political agenda has been giving more prominence to mental 
health. Service provision is based on The National Policy on Mental Health Services 
which was published in 1995. This policy focuses on promotion and prevention as 
well as treatment and rehabilitation.  The National Health Systems Strategy for 
Malta 2014 – 2020 listed mental health as one of the main target area for the 
allocation of resources (Ministry for Health, 2014, p. 39). At the moment, there is an 
ongoing transition from the old Mental Health Act enacted in 1976 to a new one. The 
emphasis of the new act is the provision of holistic care and enhanced service-user 
autonomy. Although this is indeed an important step for mental health care in Malta, 
I feel that there are a number of cracks beneath the smooth façade that is being 
projected. For instance, a survey carried out by the Maltese Association of 
Psychiatric Nurses (2013) showed that only 4% of nurses stated that they have 
adequate information about the new law, with 80% of them believing that they have 
been poorly informed about it. My concern is that these nurses are the frontline 
professionals who have to implement the act in actual practice and so it is worrying 
that they may not really know what they need to be implementing. On a similar note, 
it seems as if though several consultations groups were carried out in the 
construction of the new Mental Health Act, only two service users contributed to the 
process (R.Xerri, personal communication, December 9, 2014). It seems to me then 
as if, with regards to service users: we have been doing things for them and about 
them but perhaps it is high time that we start doing things with them. 
 
On a personal note, I feel that in Malta, the mental health area, especially the 
psychiatric hospital that features in the historical description that I have provided and 
that is still in use today, is viewed as somewhat inferior to the rest of the health-
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related areas and institutions on the island. Thus for example, it is an open 
undocumented secret that a good number of individuals who work in psychiatry in 
Malta are not there due to their passionate interest in the subject but due to the fact 
that they could not get into other branches or have been involuntarily transferred 
from other areas for a variety of reasons. I believe that this may pose difficulties 
related to the initial level of motivation that they may then have when it comes to 
offering good quality care. However, it is good to note that some of these individuals 
eventually develop an interest in the area and remain there, even seeking further 
specialised education.    
 
Although there is no empirical evidence to confirm this, I feel as if the image of 
mental health in Malta has improved over the last fifteen years. Whereas before the 
area had been regarded as mystic and somewhat dark and taboo-like, now it seems to 
be portrayed as a group of disorders, not unlike medical disorders, that mostly 
belongs to the poor and uneducated – the lower class in society.  Perhaps this change 
has been brought about by better representation of mental health/distress on local 
media which seems to be currently more neutral in the reporting of events especially 
by reporting both positive and negative events (rather than negative ones only) when 
it comes to mental health. The commitment towards the professional development of 
professionals who work in the state mental health services has also shifted the image 
to a more academic, professional and clinical one where now it is clearer that 
individuals who are suffering from mental distress need specific professional help 
rather than punishment, scorn or custodial care. This is a great step for an island 
which until the past decade, was considered as quite conservatist and practically 
dominated by the Catholic Church which worked in close partnership with the 
political and education leads of the state. This was a time when the main teachings of 
the church were aimed at controlling individuals by instilling in them a deep fear of 
an afterlife in hell if they stray from the moral teachings of the Roman Catholic 
religion. This implied that a number of areas such as sex (especially extramarital and 
homosexuality issues) and non-mainstream ideas (such as the practice of spirituality 
in a non-religious way) were moral sins that had to be confessed to a priest who 
would then recommend a process of penitence.  Mental distress was viewed by the 
church as a mixture of pathological ailments that had to be corrected by prayer and 
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medical help. I do not remember a time when the church perceived mental distress as 
being a direct punishment for immoral behaviour. However, I do remember being 
subjected to Sunday sermons where the priest actively encouraged individuals who 
had mental distress to throw away psychiatric drugs since their only salvation lies in 
having a better relationship with the Heavenly Father. To this day, there still seems 
to be a belief that praying (using the Roman Catholic technique) may be the magic 
bullet to address all concerns including mental distress. Whereas this seems to instil 
hope in some people, it can also have negative consequences especially for non-
believers (who may still feel cultural pressure to conform to the mainstream religion) 
or even for believers (who may potentially benefit from alternative options but fear 
to do so because of religious teachings). Saying this, I cannot negate the Maltese 
church’s immense effort to offer material resources and comfort to people in need 
(including those suffering from mental distress) – oftentimes, this served as a safe 
haven for these individuals especially during a time when state community 
psychiatric services had not yet been introduced. Lately Malta has undergone many 
interesting changes such as becoming an EU member state, introducing the legal 
right to apply for divorce (introduced following a national referendum) and the legal 
right for same-sex marriages. These were giant steps which left the island partially 
divided and some institutions (such as the church) with a feeling of instability and 
unsettlement. It is no wonder since behaviours that have been considered a sin (and 
abnormal behaviour) for so long are now legally accepted by the state. I feel that 
these are all changes that have the potential to shift that which Foucault referred to as 
the episteme - the accepted manner of obtaining and arranging knowledge in a given 
era (Fendler, 2010, p.39). I also feel that it is an interesting era for one to be working 
in the mental health setting in my country since these changes in the cultural system 
will inevitably affect how things are done in many aspects of life including the 
perception and management of normality and abnormality.  
1.5 Method 
The first phase of the study involved the interviewing of ten individuals who were 
receiving psychiatric/ mental health care in the inpatient setting at the psychiatric 
hospital. The focus of the interview was to listen to each individual’s account of 
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his/her experience of knowledge and power in the relationships that s/he has with the 
different members in the multidisciplinary team. The second phase of this study 
involved the analysis of the medical and nursing records that pertained to the 
participants in Phase 1. A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework was used to 
guide the study in both phases. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to gain further understanding of the dominant discourses 
pertaining to the balance of knowledge and power between the care provider and 
care receiver as well as the role that these discourses play in the therapeutic alliance. 
Furthermore, this exploration helped to identify the type of knowledge that may be 
required by both parties in order for power to be managed in a manner that enhances 
therapeutic effects. In addition to addressing an area that is characterized by a local 
dearth of research, I feel that this study has also given a voice to some care receivers 
as they shared their experience in this hospital in Malta.  
Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter involves a review and appraisal 
of the research and theoretical work that can be found in the literature as well as a 
contemporary view of the subject. It also facilitates the identification of research 
gaps in relation to the potential contribution of this study. Areas included are: a 
review of the concept of knowledge, an exploration of some of the perceptions on 
mental health and psychiatry and a culmination in the discussion of the therapeutic 
alliance in mental health. Chapter 3 consists of a description of the research method 
followed. This includes the justification of the method in question followed by 
presenting the actual blueprint of the study, in other terms, the actual design that 
guided the process. The findings of the study as well as the process of data analysis 
are presented in Chapter 4. The analytical discussion in Chapter 5 presents an 
attempt at interpreting these findings and their relation and relevance to the existing 
literature as well as to the local situation. Recommendations are also provided in 
view of the findings that emerged. The final chapter serves as a last opportunity to 
revisit the research questions and to reflect on how these have been addressed by the 
information generated from the study.  Additionally, the final part includes the 
recognition of the strengths and limitations of the study as well as final thoughts and 
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reflections. During this thesis, the terms patient, client, service user and care 
receiver have been used interchangeably. The same applies for the terms 
professional, practitioner and care provider. My preferred terms are care provider 
and care receiver as to me these represent neutrality and equality between the two 
entities. However, the terms patient and professional were the ones that featured the 
most during the interviews with the care receivers and in the medical/nursing records 
that were analysed. In faithfulness to the data sources, I have used the same terms 
that were originally used by the participants in the excerpts that I have included in 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The area of interest in this thesis is the therapeutic alliance and its inherent balance 
of knowledge and power. It may seem controversial that only one part of this review 
(Part 3) has been wholly and specifically dedicated to an overview of the alliance. 
This is not through sheer carelessness by neglecting to avoid paying homage to the 
very core subject of this study.  It is rather attributed to my belief that this alliance, 
which refers to the bond that is formed between a service provider and receiver in 
order to reach therapeutic goals, is not a standalone phenomenon.  Here it is being 
contended that the alliance does not start with a rendezvous and end when the set 
goals are met.  On the contrary, my postulation is that even before the care provider 
and receiver become acquainted, a number of parameters for their alliance have 
already been invariably set. This is partly by virtue of the role of discourse in the 
mental health field – not necessarily specific discourse on the therapeutic alliance 
but on the wider concept of mental health and its related services.   
 
This literature review is not about the provision of concrete answers or the 
construction of a linear development. It is also not about addressing the immediate 
front line characteristics of the therapeutic alliance – these have been already 
addressed by a plethora of research which shall be referred to in the final part of the 
review. Instead, as based on a Foucauldian approach, the aim is to explore some of 
the historical factors pertaining to knowledge and power issues in society and mental 
health and their influence on the perceived truth. It is a tribute to the discourse that 
characterised the evolution of the therapeutic alliance through the passing of the 
years. Finally, it concerns an epistemological process through the ongoing 
investigation of the nature and scope of knowledge in society and in the mental 
health world.  As explained in a latter part of this review, I do not profess to be 
completely free from any bias. Thus, I acknowledge that despite my effort to make 
this review as exhaustive and as comprehensive as possible, the selection of topics to 
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explore has been invariably influenced by my own subjectivity.  In an additional 
confession, a further intention of undertaking this review was that of challenging my 
own assumptions which knowingly or unknowingly influence my perceptions and 
decisions. This characterises a process of growth – a learning curve that is hoped to 
extend till the conclusion of this research study, and then move beyond. In 
Foucault’s terms: “I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The 
main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the 
beginning” (Foucault, 1982, p.9). 
 
This chapter has been divided into three parts. As an introduction to each part, I have 
written a short fictitious story that is intended to set the scene as well as to 
communicate my thoughts, feelings and position in the debates within that specific 
part of the review. The first part has been dedicated to a broad examination of the 
concept of knowledge and its relation to reality, truth and power. My decision to 
explore this concept has been based on one of the aims of this study, which involves 
the identification of the type of knowledge required by care providers and receivers 
for power to be managed in a manner that enhances therapeutic effects. 
 
This leads to the subsequent part which involves a detailed critical investigation of 
some of the discourses in mental health – it is not identical to, but yet not unlike 
Foucault’s archaeology, which generally refers to the philosophical evaluation of the 
methodological assumptions in the thinking of different cultures, ages and historical 
periods (Foucault, 1972, p.131).  This section has been included in the review in an 
attempt to generate background information related to the other aims of this study, 
namely the identification and role of the dominant discursive themes pertaining to 
the balance of knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance. 
 
The concluding part of the literature review has been devoted to the therapeutic 
alliance itself, in relation to its origins, principal characteristics and the issues of 
knowledge and power that are intertwined in it. The aim of this final part is to place 
the discursive object (the therapeutic alliance) within the backdrop set by the first 
two parts of this review. 
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2.2 Knowledge 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In the stillness of the night, she could not stop the torrent of thoughts as she gazed at 
the twinkling lights scattered across the dark sky. Was it possible that some of those 
tiny twinkling stars were inhabited by other creatures who, at that very moment, 
could be similarly viewing the Earth as a speck…one of many?   It was a thought 
that instilled an uncomfortable feeling in her as she wondered about the possibility 
of another life, another reality, way up above the Earth, as perceived and 
experienced by another life form akin to humans. But then what is reality? And what 
makes it true? She thought about the knowledge that she had acquired in her school 
days about various facts, phenomena, mathematical problems and common sense 
stuff. She had always taken that as being true steadfast knowledge but now she could 
not help thinking about the possibility that that knowledge could have been relative 
rather than real.  The shrill of the pill reminder dragged her unceremoniously from 
her dream world as her gaze shifted upon the two tiny pink pills on the nearby table. 
They would control her thinking – the nurse had called it ‘flight of ideas’. Sometimes 
she was told that she suffered from delusions too. But there again, she wondered, on 
what basis was this knowledge founded? Was it real or was it simply relative? Her 
thoughts drifted away as she reached for the pills and waited patiently until the loud 
thoughts in her head were converted to mere whispers. 
      Author’s own 
 
In this thesis, knowledge is one of the key actors, in particular by virtue of its link to 
power within the therapeutic alliance. Furthermore, one of the aims of my study was 
to explore the knowledge required by care providers and receivers to manage the 
knowledge-power balance within the therapeutic alliance in an effective manner.  
Thus, I feel that it would be fruitful to start this review of the literature by exploring 
the concept of knowledge.  On the basis of a philosophical approach, I feel that this 
can be followed more effectively if I attempt to question pre-existing notions about 
knowledge. This relates to all those syntheses, traditions and notions that may have 
been previously accepted as a definite fact or as the ultimate truth. This does not 
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refer to a process of metaphorically re-inventing the whole wheel – but perhaps 
exploring how ‘the wheel’ was invented and the gaps prior to and after its invention.  
Foucault (1981) contended that: 
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. 
It consists in seeing on just what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of 
established and unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are 
based...to do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy 
(p.456).  
In this manner, the actual question of how much one knows and the actual doubting 
of the nature of knowledge is hoped to help with the progression into a discernment 
of the concept of knowledge. 
 
This part of the review has been divided into three sections. The first section 
concerns an epistemological exploration of the concept of knowledge. The word 
epistemology originated from the Greek language: episteme = knowledge and logos 
= study (Miller, 2010, para.1). Thus, epistemology refers to the study of knowledge 
in terms of its nature, acquisition and measurement. The second section explores the 
ontological perspective. Ontology is another term that has Greek roots: ontos = being 
and logos = study, thereby referring to the study of being and the reality base of 
knowledge (Truncellito, 2007, sec.1). The final section in Part 1 of this literature 
review examines the link between knowledge, power and truth with specific 
reference to the ideas of Michel Foucault, whose philosophy underlies this research 
study. 
2.2.2 The concept of knowledge – an epistemological perspective 
Epistemological enquiries as to the nature of knowledge are described by 
Heterington (2012) as “...a history of theses and theories; but no less of questions, 
concepts, distinctions, syntheses, and taxonomies” (p.1). 
 
This part of the review presents an overview of some of the contentions that have 
been made about the nature of knowledge and its constituents.  As a starting point, 
we may reflect upon the different kinds of knowledge that have been identified and 
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presented in the literature. Primarily, the awareness that knowledge can be explicit 
and attributed to known facts, such as knowing that a week consists of seven days, 
has led to categorising this particular form under knowledge that, as elaborately 
described in the works of Ryle (1949, p.32). One particular epistemological stance 
argued by Polanyi (1958) centred on the distinction between knowledge what and 
another form of knowledge that deals with knowing how. This is also termed tacit 
knowledge (p.58). A typical example of the latter would be the knowledge pertaining 
to driving a car or knowing how to arrive at a set destination. A fourth category of 
knowledge was identified by the logician Bertrand Russell (1959/2008) as 
knowledge by acquaintance which involves a subject being in direct contact with a 
fact, such as knowing that one is in pain because of the direct contact with the 
sensation of pain (p.30). This is suggestive of knowledge that is obtained by the act 
of experiencing. Still, Russell (1959/2008) argued that another form of knowledge – 
knowledge by description, may also exist and allows an individual to have 
knowledge about that which has been described to him/her even if it has not been 
directly experienced by the same individual (p.31). 
 
In epistemology, it seems as if one of the basic questions to be answered is if there is 
such a concept as true or false knowledge and if so, how to distinguish between the 
two. This path has been followed by key figures in history as outlined by Louis 
Pojman’s comprehensive works in his contemporary account (Pojman, 2002). On the 
existence of true knowledge, Schafer (2013) described how “the idea that a belief 
can count as knowledge only if its truth is not merely a happy accident, goes back at 
least to Plato” (p.1). 
 
Similarly, in his paper titled Unreliable Knowledge, Turri (2013) explored some of 
the prominent historical epistemological debates evolving around the complex nature 
of knowledge in relation to truth and reliability.  On reviewing modern works such 
as those by Pojman and Turri as well as older ones dating to Socrates and Plato, it 
seems as if there is a pattern: basic theories of knowledge have attempted to identify 
static boundaries around the concept of knowledge, by defining it in an absolute, 
rigid and permanent manner. Conversely, later theories about knowledge recognized 
its relativity to different situations, its various facets as well as its ongoing change 
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and evolution. The whole trend seemed to move from a static, passive view of 
knowledge towards a more adaptive and dynamic one. However, Schafer (2013) 
contested this observed pattern that I have mentioned by noting that “a good deal of 
the contemporary discussion of these issues proceeds as if there is a single more or 
less unified, variety of accidental truth” (p.2). This may imply that in Schafer’s view, 
modern philosophical discussions about knowledge may still be characterised by the 
tendency to move towards a unified rigid view of the constituents of knowledge. 
Perhaps the following journey through some of the works in this area may shed more 
light on these debates. 
 
In Theaetetus, Plato (c360 B.C./1997) presented one of the first important 
explorations of knowledge when he argued that a statement could be considered as 
knowledge, if it fulfils the criteria of being justified, true and believed. In his attempt 
to define knowledge, Theaetetus, a young man who featured in this dialogue along 
with Socrates, asserted that one knows when one believes that something is true.  
Socrates questioned this statement by picturing a scenario where a lawyer persuades 
the jury that a person is innocent.  In this case, the jury believe (or know) that the 
person is innocent (the perceived truth) even if they have been convinced by 
dishonest means.  This led Theaetetus to conclude that knowledge is a true belief that 
must be accompanied by a third condition, that of justification: 
Theaetetus: Oh, yes, Socrates, that’s just what I once heard a man say; I had 
forgotten but it is now coming back to me. He said that it is true judgement 
with an account that is knowledge; true judgment without an account falls 
outside of knowledge (Plato, c360 B.C./1997, p.223). 
However, Socrates rejected this definition by concluding that: 
And it is surely just silly to tell us, when we are trying to discover what 
knowledge is, that it is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge, 
whether of differentness or of anything else? And so, Theaetetus, knowledge 
is neither perception nor true judgment, nor an account added to true 
judgment (Plato, c360 B.C./1997, p.233). 
However, as Appaih (2003) noted, the justified-true-belief remains a central 
philosophical claim of the western tradition (p.41). This view, although still popular 
in nature, is not totally endorsed and it is often criticized as being insufficient in 
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addressing the true flexible nature of knowledge. One of the most controversial 
critical arguments was compiled by Edmund Gettier, who with the introduction of 
Gettier problems described situations in which a belief may be justified and true but 
may still not be considered as actual knowledge (Gettier, 1963). Gettier (1963) based 
his case on counterexamples of the justified-true-belief contention. For instance, in 
his first case, the author described a situation in which a man, Smith, applied for a 
job but believed that another individual, Jones, would be getting the job. Smith had a 
justified belief that Jones had 10 coins in his pocket and so he concluded the man 
who would get the job, had 10 coins in his pocket. It so happened that Jones did not 
get the job and that unknowingly, Smith had 10 coins in his pocket too. So although 
Smith’s belief that the man who would get the job had 10 coins in his pocket was 
justified and true, it was in fact not knowledge (p.123).  
 
In Greek philosophy, reference was often made to a process of anamnesis, meaning, 
the doctrine of recollection - this refers to an individual being born with a pre-loaded 
source of innate knowledge that can be recalled or remembered by overcoming the 
physical body and following a process of discernment, often under the guidance of 
an interrogator (Treanor, 2001, p.313). This doctrine implies that knowledge is a 
process of developing ideas that are buried within each being and thus, there is no 
notion such as learning new information, as this data is simply being recalled or 
remembered rather than generated. In Metaphysics, one of Plato’s students, Aristotle, 
famously disagreed with his mentor on most concepts and criticized the abstract 
picture of the world as portrayed by Plato. He essentially believed that knowledge 
was acquired through detailed observation and the classification of phenomena. This 
rendered the acquisition of knowledge as a purely empirical process, in which 
experience and the use of our senses serve as the primary source: 
All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for 
the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and 
most of all the sense of sight. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight 
best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions (Aristotle c384–
322 B.C. / 1989, sec. 980a). 
Essentially, Greek philosophy was concerned with certainty; how could one be 
certain that knowledge is not simply an illusion? Aristotle attempted to resolve this 
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doubt by classifying different types of knowledge into categories, this being 
especially captured in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle c350 
B.C./1999).  Primarily, he addressed that form of knowledge which is characterized 
by facts and a high degree of certainty, such as mathematical equations.  This class 
of knowledge is shaped by precise rules and explanations.  Conversely, the other 
type of knowledge identified by Aristotle is the kind that cannot be captured and 
explained in an easily predictable way.  Examples of the latter category of 
knowledge may be related to the fields of human behaviour, psychology and ethics. 
In Metaphysics, the philosopher elaborated further by introducing a thought 
provoking tangent - the need for evidence in determining the validity of knowledge. 
He went on to describe how this evidence may be produced in the scientific world 
where science can be practical (ethics and politics), poetical (art) or theoretical 
(mathematics, physics and metaphysics) (Aristotle c384–322 B.C./1989, sec. 
1025b25). In a paper about knowledge management, Richter (2010) probed the 
Aristotelian concept of evidence that is brought about by a process of inductive 
reasoning, which still characterizes modern research (p.2).  Briefly, this logical 
process appears to involve an examination of what had been previously discussed or 
written about the issue, an exploration of general consensus on the subject and 
finally the carrying out of a systematic study on all components of the area involved.  
 
As portrayed by Markie (2013), during the post-Renaissance period, epistemology 
was dominated by the two main positions of empiricism and rationalism. In his 
article, empiricism is described as encompassing the school of thought that portrays 
knowledge as being solely produced by sensory perception. This is actualised by 
observation of the external world as perceived by the senses. Markie (2013) 
summarised this view as: “We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts 
we use in S other than sense experience” (sec.1). 
 
As a result, a cognitive mapping process occurs within the being, where connections 
are made and new information is born. Incidentally, this is often described by the 
tabula rasa metaphor – commonly used to depict the void state of the human mind at 
birth – likened to a blank document, which is gradually scribbled upon by the 
experiences of life that the being is subjected to (Locke, 1960/1999, p.35). Central to 
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empiricism, lies the assertion that knowledge can only be attained after a relevant 
sensory experience and interaction with reality — this is referred to as a posteriori 
knowledge. 
 
This view is contradicted by the rationalistic approach where followers argue that it 
is possible for the apprehension of truth without relying on the senses and to have 
knowledge before undergoing a real experience of the phenomena being explored. 
This stance depicts a picture of a priori knowledge. It is a position that implies that 
sometimes, knowledge and truth can be explored through reason and logical 
thinking. To this effect, Markie (2013) asserted that “Some propositions in a 
particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition alone. We have knowledge 
of some truths in a particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature” (sec.1.1). 
 
Nelson (2005) elaborated on how rationalism embraces the principles of 
Mathematics as a convincing evidential source of rationalism, and it is not by mere 
chance that most of the rationalist philosophers were mathematicians by background 
(p.XV). Indeed a simple argument would revolve on how by using logic, it can be 
stated that in all cases, even those that have not been examined, 2+2 = 4. This is 
what constitutes the rules of pure metaphysics, where it is postulated that objects, 
people, relationships and causality of phenomena can be explored through non-
empirical philosophical discourse.  A colourful history of the philosophy of 
knowledge, as painted by Bennett (2001), portrays an eighteenth century picture of 
scholars being strictly divided into two opposing camps: the Rationalists (Leibniz, 
Descartes and Spinoza) and the followers of Empiricism, namely, Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume.  Furthermore, empiricism and rationalism were both notorious as being 
exclusive, in the sense that both branches strongly contended that  knowledge 
acquisition could only be described by either of the two theories, with no possibility 
of a third option.   
 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant’s work hypothesized a 
synthesis of the two opposing traditions. Amongst his speculations, Kant 
(1781/2010) argued that sensory experiences (empiricism) do not provide valuable 
knowledge if they are not processed by logical reasoning (rationalism).  
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Concurrently, logical reason only serves as a theoretical possibility unless it is 
merged with and applied to actual sensory experience. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant (1781/2010) described how: 
Sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain elements of a 
priori cognition, and this cognition may stand in a twofold relation to its 
object. Either it may have to determine the conception of the object—which 
must be supplied extraneously, or it may have to establish its reality. The 
former is theoretical, the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure 
or a priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished 
from that which is supplied from other sources. Any other method can only 
lead to irremediable confusion (p.11). 
The connection between sensory experiences and reasoning was followed up by the 
theories of constructivism.   A psychological perspective that is also felt to have 
philosophical implications shows Piaget and Inhelder (1969/2005) as notable 
contributors within this field by articulating how during infancy, human beings 
internalize knowledge by linking experiences and reflexes (p.9).  Thus, at this early 
phase of life, the young being develops schemata which store information related to 
every experience that the person is subjected to.  The theorists further outlined how 
this stored information is then used every time that the person undergoes another 
experience whereby, through a process of assimilation or accommodation, a schema 
adapts to incorporate new knowledge. When a human being assimilates, the new 
data is simply fitted into an existing framework with no major changes.  However, 
when an experience is completely new and cannot be incorporated within an existing 
schema, one has to reframe the mental framework in order to fit the new experience 
taking place in the outside world.  The later process is referred to as accommodation.  
Ackermann (2001) provided a vivid description of that which he referred to as 
Piaget’s child, featuring as: 
A young Robinson Crusoe in the conquest of an unpopulated yet naturally 
rich island. Robinson's conquest is solitary yet extremely exciting since the 
explorer himself is an inner-driven, very curious, and independent character. 
The ultimate goal of his adventure is not the exploration as such, but the joy 
of stepping back and being able to build maps and other useful tools in order 
to better master and control the territory under exploration (p.438). 
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In this section of the review, the journey of knowledge has been traced from the 
Platonic hypothesis about an immutable source of knowledge to modern ideas which 
address knowledge in a less absolute manner and allow for flexibility and diverging 
definitions. It can be noted that knowledge has constantly been under examination 
and a myriad of speculations arising from various disciplines and school of thoughts 
shroud this concept. It would be bold to state that this historical review and 
exploration of the definition and nature of knowledge is comprehensive and has 
given answers. Conversely, it has prompted even more questions and has instilled a 
greater sense of caution in attempting to address a concept that clearly has as many 
angles as it has different applications.  
 
It is clear that there has been a radical shift from theories that strongly advocate a 
single-sided  flat approach to understanding knowledge, to ones that encourage the 
merging of ideas and factors in a three dimensional manner. Maybe at this stage, the 
danger faced by epistemology would be that of losing grasp of the concept and 
becoming entangled within the seemingly endless quest of the exploration of the 
different aspects of knowledge.  The risk of entering into an anarchical state where 
any definition is accepted without any clear defining criteria, may also hinder the 
progression of our understanding.  Despite the varying postulations about 
knowledge, it is central that not every piece of information, event or statement can 
be classified as being knowledge and thus I believe that inclusion and exclusion 
criteria hold importance, despite being difficult to establish.  
2.2.3 Relativism, realism and critical realism – an ontological 
perspective 
The epistemological journey that has been undertaken in the first part of the review 
has provided a glimpse of some of the constituents of knowledge in relation to 
different understandings across disciplines and historical periods. As I reflect upon 
the various viewpoints discussed, I can note that knowledge seems to be strongly 
intertwined and based upon the concept of reality. Consequently, I ask: What is 
reality?  To myself, the concept of knowledge based on reality is as unsettling as it is 
intriguing on the realisation that a degree of what we think we know may actually be 
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relative to the meaning of our existence and to our subjective interpretation of 
reality.  On side-stepping into existentialism, I sympathise with Merali’s concern as 
she questioned reality by reporting that “as fanciful as it sounds, some philosophers 
have long argued that we’re actually more likely to be artificial intelligences trapped 
in a fake universe than we are organic minds in the ‘real’ one” (Merali, 2013, 
para.3). 
 
At this point, it may also be worthwhile to consider the experiences of Victor of 
Aveyron, as well as Amala and Kamala.  These were feral children who serve as 
living examples of how the perception of reality and knowledge can be altered 
dramatically, simply by twisting the variables that characterize the typical childhood 
of an individual. In an intriguing narrative, Newton (2004) described how these 
children, who were raised by wild animals instead of by their blood parents, 
perceptualised a reality of their own, which shaped their behaviour, expectations and 
way of life (p.16). Like other similar cases in Newton’s book, their reality was so 
utterly convincing that when they were taken back to the civilized world, they could 
not cope and longed to return to the familiarity of their known reality in the wild. 
Their knowledge in relation to their reality was too different. Thus, it is no wonder 
that reality and the knowledge attributed to it are guarded fervently, to the extent that 
diverging perceptions and behaviour can be frowned upon, as they can shatter an 
otherwise clear and logical picture of our world and existence.  My reflections on the 
validity of knowledge in relation to reality forms the basis of the realism and 
relativism debate that has troubled philosophers from the Platonian period and 
persisted through the years by prevailing across various disciplines such as 
philosophy and psychology.  Derksen (2010) described the realistic (pertaining to the 
field of realism) approach as an indulgence in experimentation in order to prove or 
disprove facts and then form a body of truth which shapes reality. This places 
emphasis on the authentic reality of the world and its use in experiments that 
endeavour to discover and establish facts (p.469).  According to Derksen (2010), 
“the realist is willing to concede that some things may be socially constructed, 
culturally specific, subjective, or otherwise relative, but, surely, there is a bottom 
line, a foundation of objective reality, that cannot be relativised” (p.469). 
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The discourse of advocates for realism, such as Haig (2005), tends to centre on the 
notion of proof as a criterion for the acceptance of reality. In contrast, relativists tend 
to resist the perceived importance of hard proof and facts and instead adopt a 
preference for discussing relativity to context (Bilgrami, 2002). Hyman (2005) 
defined relativism as “the simplest alternative to the monistic idea that there is a 
single model of truth and perfection” (p.50). Davidson (1973) elaborated further by 
contending that beliefs or propositions are relative to conceptual schemes pertaining 
to different points of view (p.11). 
 
In his regard for realism, Putnam addressed the question of whether or not the 
surrounding physical environment exists in an objective manner which is 
independent of the human mind.  In his famous Twin-Earth experiment that featured 
in a paper termed Meaning and Reference, Putnam (1973) asked the reader to think 
about a scenario where a traveller lands on a planet that looks like Earth and 
encounters a liquid that looks like water. Putnam contended that the traveller would 
be right in assuming that the substance is indeed water if its molecular constitution is 
H2O but would be wrong if not.  According to the philosopher, this is evidence that 
an object is real if it adheres to a set of criteria that are discovered through empirical 
investigation. This implies that irrelevant of the subjective opinion on the perception 
of an object, it is rendered real by the knowledge that it is the same sort of stuff and 
characterised by the same properties and atomic construction (p.699). Over the 
years, Putnam’s outlook has shifted away from a strong realist stance to an internal 
realist position.  The latter view suggests that although truth and reality exist, they 
do so in relation to other concepts and not as standalone entities - this is thoroughly 
discussed in the book Realism With a Human Face (Putnam, 1990). 
 
A clear argument in favour of realism and which shares the foundations of Putnam’s 
beliefs was presented by Sankey as articulated through his discussion of the physical 
world. Sankey (2008) expressed surprise and exasperation at the relativistic approach 
that doubts the existence of that which we touch and interact with on a daily basis. 
He explained how it is unadvisable to doubt the very existence of the physical 
environment that we live in and that any philosophy that encourages this practice is 
committing an anthropocentric error (p.23). The author did not deny the phenomena 
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of mental representations but reduced their role to a small part in the objective reality 
of the world surrounding us.  He appealed to the plea of common sense which 
indicates that reality is usually as robust as it seems and this sustains a practical and 
shared way of experiencing life in this world. For the realist, material objects that 
characterise our environment are not subject to arguments entailing their reality 
because it is taken for granted through common sense that they are part of reality.  
Subsequently, Sankey (2008) asserted that: 
The scientific realist who takes common sense as a starting-point is thereby 
justified in assuming that there is an ordinary, everyday world of material 
objects, with which we interact causally and to which we have epistemic 
access by means of our senses (p.24). 
On this contention, the scientific realist is then allowed to construct theories based 
on this level of accepted reality.  For instance, science has shown that the Earth is 
spherical and this knowledge has now made its entry into common sense. Thus, 
according to Sankey, the scientist does not have to question this fact but may regard 
it as definite knowledge. In his terms, “there is no need for the scientific realist to 
argue for the reality of ordinary, everyday material objects, since commitment to 
such entities has already been established at the level of common sense” (Sankey, 
2008, p.24). It is interesting to note that Sankey himself mentioned the concept of 
anthropocentrism and perhaps this is one of the points that may counter argue his 
contentions about realism - Sankey’s view indicates his common sense acceptance 
that that which is seen is that which constitutes reality. In this contention, Sankey 
seemed to be assuming that humans are the ones who see and who therefore shape 
reality according to how they see it. In my opinion, the primary problem with this 
notion is that although humans seem to share a common view of certain aspects of 
reality, they tend to differ diversely on other issues. The very existence of these 
opposing viewpoints is based on the main fact that different groups of citizens in 
society may, at times, be experiencing a reality which is different than that of others 
who live in the same environment as they do.  Death and Furniture is one of the 
papers that has been commonly cited during debates related to realism and 
relativism.  The article by Edwards, Ashmore and Potter (1995) conveyed a skilful 
portrait of the arguments that attempt to undermine relativism. This was done by 
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using the two emblems:  death and furniture.  In a witty summary of the main 
arguments that characterise this field, the authors described how opponents to 
relativism often try to emphasise their argument by hitting a table or other furniture 
so as to point out the reality of that object.  
 
However, the authors suggested that what this action simply implies is that whilst the 
table does have physical properties, it is still socially constructed and experienced as 
real only by the person who is hitting it.  Furthermore, this does not provide 
evidence that can be applied to confirming the existence of other objects in the 
world. Death is the other example which realists tend to use in emphasising the real 
existence of this phenomenon. Yet again, Edwards et al. (1995) introduced an 
interesting tangent by elaborating on the various controversies surrounding the issue 
of death, particularly, speculations regarding the belief in an afterlife or 
reincarnation. As a conclusion, the authors  concurred in the realisation that hitting 
tables and alleging that death is a confirmation of realism, is shorthand, rhetoric and 
ignorant.  This is due to the fact that the way that these arguments are deployed is 
simply based on the same relative base that it attempts to disproof. On a final 
reflection on realism, the authors concluded that: 
In its tropes of Death and Furniture we see a rhetoric that refuses to 
acknowledge its own existence; a politics that can claim a critical-radical 
credibility only by the selective use of its opponents' analytic tools; and a 
theology which is deeply conservative and seeks nothing less than the death 
of disruptive, disturbing inquiry (Edwards et al., 1995, p.42). 
At this point, I would like to make a number of observations, not as a way of 
concluding the debate but as an attempt to make more sense of the literature. In fact, 
my first observation is that the various perceptions that have shaped these fierce 
debates do not seem to be subsiding or arriving at a mediation point. However, as 
illustrated by Cacioppo, Semin and Bertson (2004), it is becoming progressively 
clearer that sharp distinctions between the preference for realism or relativism are 
becoming blurred.  Reference to works by key figures in this area has shown how 
realism and relativism tend to be complementary rather than opposing schools of 
thought.  It may also be noted that perhaps it is the ultimate objective of both 
approaches that needs to be reviewed and altered. It seems as if the main energy and 
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effort behind both approaches is either to describe an ultimate truth or else to view 
the world as being socially constructed. Perhaps this same positive energy can be 
more effectively devoted to an integrated approach that respects diverse approaches 
and aims at predicting consequences.  It may also be more fruitful to acknowledge 
that whilst reality may seem very real, there is the possibility that during some 
instances, this reality is not shared by all and this may not necessarily be a negative 
realisation.  
 
Perhaps an answer to this debate may be found in the post-positivist philosophical 
field of critical realism. A distinctive belief of this form of realism holds that as 
individuals, we cannot have a complete lack of objectivity or knowledge about the 
world that is certain and unarguable. This means that in addition to our perception 
about any phenomenon, we need to accept the fact that there may be others which 
are equally valid.  Consequently, Maxwell (2012) asserted that “all theories of the 
world are seen as grounded in a particular perspective and worldview, and all 
knowledge is partial, incomplete and fallible”  (p.5). In this manner, critical realism 
is often viewed as bridging the gap between realism and relativism: 
Critical realists thus retain an ontological realism (there is a real world that 
exists independently of our perceptions, theories and constructions) while 
accepting a form of epistemological constructivism and relativism (our 
understanding of this world is inevitably a construction from our own 
perspectives and standpoint)…there is no possibility of attaining a single, 
“correct” understanding of the world, what Putnam (1999) describes as a 
“God’s eye view” that is independent of any particular viewpoint (Maxwell, 
2012, p.5). 
Since its conception, critical realism has passed through different phases which can 
be traced in Roy Bhaskar’s book series on the subject. In his introductory book: A 
Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar (1975/2008a) viewed reality as being stratified 
by consisting of three layers, these being “the real, the actual and the empirical” 
(p.2). The real consists of those mechanisms, events or experiences that give rise to 
phenomena that can be observed. However the real cannot be observed or directly 
sensed in any way.  An example would be the concept of gravity which cannot be 
sensed but which has effects that can be tested and observed (Foster, 2013). This 
view is synonymous to positivism and naïve realism (as opposed to critical realism) 
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where the main contention holds that there is a basic reality which is mostly 
independent of subjectivity and relativity. The next stratum in reality is the actual 
which refers to the observable events that are caused by the real. Using gravity as an 
example of the real, in this case, the actual would be objects in a vacuum which 
have an increase in free fall velocity of 9.81 metres per second every second (Foster, 
2013). This effect is constant and predictable and has been attributed to the concept 
of gravity. The final layer, which is the empirical, refers to the experience of the 
individual who is observing the actual and making speculations about the real. The 
critical realistic approach goes further by adding that whilst the many different views 
of reality do not prove that there are multiple realities, they serve to highlight the 
inherent human limitation in the inability to understand what is real.  In view of this 
stratification of reality, Bhaskar (1975/2008a) concluded that in our quest to explore 
knowledge and reality, we may be making an epistemic fallacy, which is: 
the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms 
of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be 
transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being can always be 
analysed in terms of our knowledge of being (p.26). 
As alluded to earlier, the main tenet held by the critical realist is the fact that 
observations may not always be clear or definite but are subject to error and so can 
be revised. In this view, the role of science is not to uncover the truth but to engage 
in an ongoing attempt to explore the various perspectives related to reality. This 
involves the use of triangulation by including different measures and sources each of 
which may be characterised by different limitations (Trochim, 2006, para.6).  The 
critical realist claims that by addressing these multiple sources and their inherent 
biases, there is a better chance of understanding what is happening in reality since no 
single individual or school of thought can solely see reality as it really is.  However 
the fact that different experiences, cultures and personalities may give rise to 
numerous perspectives is in fact a powerful tool as it prompts the critique of work 
carried out by others. This may enhance objectivity and may be a process that brings 
one closer to understand reality.  
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Bhaskar’s earlier writings have been described as being exemplary in rigour and 
coherence. Indeed, I feel that his description of reality and the role of science is stark 
clear and particularly intriguing: 
The world consists of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine to 
generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and 
happenings of the world. They may be said to be real, though it is rarely that 
they are actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified 
by men. They are not unknowable, although knowledge of them depends 
upon a rare blending of intellectual, practice-technical and perceptual skills. 
Thus we are not imprisoned in caves, either of our own or of nature’s 
making. We are not doomed to ignorance. But neither are we spontaneously 
free. This is the arduous task of science: the production of the knowledge of 
those enduring and continually active mechanisms of nature that produce the 
phenomena of our world (Bhaskar 1975/2008a, p.37). 
Further to his views on the role of science, Bhaskar (1975/2008a) differentiated 
between the intransitive and transitive dimensions where the former refers to the 
object of scientific enquiry whereas the latter consists of our conceptions of that 
object (p.48).  In The Possibility of Naturalism, Bhaskar (1979/1998) attempted to 
address that which he regards as “the primal problem of the philosophy of social 
sciences” (p.1). This refers to the extent to which society can be explored and 
studied in the same way as nature.  In his quest, Bhaskar engaged the reader in a 
discussion of three existing models of the connection between the individual and 
society. The first model which features the main contentions of Durkheim’s work, 
views social objects as having a separate existence that is external to the individual 
(Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p.31). In the second model, which is represented by Weber, 
social objects are seen as being dependant on and the result of human behaviour 
(Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p.33). In the third model, which is stereotyped by Berger, 
Luckmann and Gidens, society and the individual are seen as being interlinked by 
being both the product and the cause of each other through a continuous dialect 
(Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p.35). In contrast to all three approaches, critical realism puts 
forward a Transformational Model of Social Activity (Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p.37). 
Whilst acknowledging the mutual relationship between the individual and society, 
Bhaskar (1979/1998) identified an “ontological hiatus” between society and the 
individual (p.40). This is brought about by the realisation that since individuals are 
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born in a pre-existing social context, then it cannot be said that s/he can create 
society but that s/he can transform it: 
People do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary 
condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble 
of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or 
transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not 
exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not 
the product of it (the error of voluntarism) (Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p.39).  
The conclusion that emerged was that the proper way to study social structures is to 
focus on the various relationships that are present between societal positions and 
practices (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005, p.16). In other words, 
social structures cannot be studied as a standalone entity but in their natural context 
where they are enmeshed with different processes and situations which may be 
producing that very object: 
Thus, whereas, in general, in the natural world the objects of knowledge exist 
and act independently of the process of the production of the knowledge of 
which they are the objects, in the social arena this is not so. For the process 
of knowledge-production may be causally, and internally, related to the 
process of the production of the objects concerned (Bhaskar, 1979/1998, 
p.51). 
Bhaskar described his view on the relationship between social sciences and natural 
sciences as being a critical naturalistic one; being critical by virtue of rejecting the 
reduction of the social to the natural and being naturalistic by not accepting that 
there is a sharp division between the two (Gorski, 2013, p.665). In Dialectic: The 
Pulse of Freedom and Plato Etcetera, Bhaskar (2008b) proceeded into the second 
phase of critical realism, that which has been termed Dialectical Critical Realism 
(International Centre for Critical Realism, n.d.). Bhaskar’s dialectic concerns the 
ontology of change by analysing the world in terms of discrete structures and their 
interaction with each other and with our thoughts and actions. This process involves 
four domains, these being: non-identity, negativity, totality and praxis. Gorski (2013) 
described the process of Bhaskar’s dialect by using an atomic particle as an example 
(p.668). Starting from the domain of “non-identity”, an attempt to study this particle 
may initially be characterised by the intransitive/transitive distinction and by the 
awareness of the real, actual and empirical layers of reality that have been described 
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earlier. Subsequently, we may consider how an atomic particle may be changed.  It 
can be noted that this change may be brought about in three ways, these being: a 
change in its properties (such as a change in motion), dissolution of the structure or 
the production of a new structure (such as in a chemical reaction).  Knowledge about 
these three types of changes may be applied to both the social and the natural world 
and constitute the Bhaskarian “negativity” domain. On further reflection, it can be 
noted that the production of new structures highlights the fact that “structures exist 
in systems” and the dissolution of the old structures shows that “structures are 
themselves systems” (Gorski, 2013, p.668).  Bhaskar termed this ontological stage as 
the moment of “totality” which is then followed by “praxis” (or “transformative 
agency”) (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. xii). The latter refers to reflection on the knowledge 
obtained and planning on the best way of action. 
 
In 2000, Bhaskar took a spiritual turn which resulted in the third phase of Critical 
Realism and the Philosophy of Meta-Reality (Bhaskar, 2002).  In an attempt to study 
reality on a deeper level, Bhaskar postulated that reality has at least two layers; these 
being the Cosmic Envelope (Co-presence) and a lower level of Demi-Reality. Co-
presence refers to the layer of reality where the human being is aware that s/he is 
present with other people whereas Demi-reality is characterised by alienation and 
social disorganisation. In this third phase of Critical Realism, Co-presence is viewed 
as the ultimate goal of emancipation by recognition of our unity (Bhaskar, 2002, 
p.91). Whilst the core messages in Bhaskar’s later writings are powerful, I feel that 
at times, they are hampered by obfuscation to an extent that it may be quite tedious 
to access the meaning. This, as well as the spiritual focus with a lack of 
philosophical backbone, constituted the main criticism of this most recent phase of 
Critical Realism especially by some adherents of this movement (Creaven, 2010). 
 
On concluding, it is hoped that by acting as an apprentice and raising these questions 
about the nature of knowledge, a learning process can be followed on the acceptance 
that no one single view or theory can effectively explain such a complex concept as 
knowledge. Perhaps Critical Realism may serve as a valuable guide or source in a 
deeper ontological understanding of knowledge and reality and so it may be useful to 
further explore the application of the tenets of this movement. In respect to the area 
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of interest in this study, I believe that absolute realism or relativism may be 
dangerous in mental health and psychiatry. This is because absolute realism may be 
too rigid and may result in shunning alternative experiences, perceptions and ideas 
due to the adherence to one solid truth and reality. Contrastingly, absolute relativism 
may lead to a state where the main aim is to “place objectivity in parenthesis; all 
views, all verses in the multiverse are equally valid” (Maturana, 1985, para.1). This 
may be detrimental since it seems to refer to a complete endorsement of any 
worldview.  Since I am not willing to accept certain perspectives such as coercive 
psychiatric practices, I would be reluctant to abide for an absolute relativistic 
position. This is the rationale behind my belief that Critical Realism may offer 
important contributions to mental health and psychiatry especially in view of the fact 
that so many different perspectives on this field have prevailed since its conception.  
In my description of Critical Realism, I have discussed the idea of a stratified reality, 
the relationship between natural and social sciences, the use of triangulation in 
exploring reality and the use of Dialectical Critical Realism. I believe that these main 
concepts may act as the main guides in mental health care as well as in research on 
this area. Some work has already been carried out in this regard. For instance, Sims-
Schouten, Riley and Willig (2007) presented an example of how critical realism can 
be used in discourse analysis by following a systematic method which addresses the 
dilemma of how “to distinguish between the real and the constructed” (p.118). The 
result of this endeavour was termed by the authors as “a systematic empirical critical 
realist discourse analysis” and the method proposed may hold promise to application 
to other fields (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007, p.119). 
2.2.4 The link between knowledge, power and truth: a Foucauldian 
view 
The concluding section of this part of the review further explores the relationship 
between knowledge and truth but here in relation to power.  
 
That knowledge is a source of power is not a novel discovery but one that has 
characterised social arrangement.  Knowledge has tended to belong to the elite few 
and has been furiously guarded by this class (Rothkopf, 2008, p.xx). Knowledge has 
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been managed as part of the structure of power and commonly linked to a central 
source, such as a religious or political leader. A glance at state politics may be 
influential in acknowledging that in a perhaps subtler tone, this observation may ring 
true for the contemporary world, sometimes successfully concealed under the image 
of democracy. Let us, however, examine the knowledge - power link by looking at a 
religious scenario as exemplified by 2 giants: Islam and Christianity. In Islam, it is 
strongly believed that: 
The very first man received revealed knowledge from Allah Himself, and 
was told the correct way to live. This code of life was Islam, the attitude of 
complete submission to Allah, the Creator of man and the whole universe 
(Maududi, Mawdudi, Muran & Ahmad, 1986, 1.1.3). 
Notably, merging Islamic religion with the law formed the main components of the 
regulatory body of Sharia which governs states from their very micro level. It is 
therefore evident that the initial knowledge handed to man by the mystical Allah 
figure is the rule; that which justifies and enforces power based on this transferred 
knowledge. In the same tone, in Christianity, one of the crucial events portrayed in 
the Bible is the inscription of the ten commandments – carried out by God and 
conveyed through Moses (Bible Study Tools, 2014, 9:10). These inscriptions 
constitute the basic rules of life and sharply delineate that which is considered to be 
morally undesirable behaviour. Barclay (2001) discussed how unlike Sharia-Islam, 
these biblical laws do not specify that punishment has to be used in the event of 
violation (para.4). However, the Roman Catholic Church and The Eastern Orthodox 
Church employ the practice of confession which entails a process of penitence 
related to breaking one of these commandments (Hanna, 1911, para.1).  Although 
this practice does not usually involve any physical hardship, it does point towards 
the instilment of moral guilt – a practice which has been perceived by intellectuals 
such as Foucault as a subtle act of a ruling force who is attempting to enforce control 
(Foucault, 1979/ 1995, p.246). This notion is discussed in detail by Cervellati and 
Vanin (2013) who postulated that: 
A peculiar feature of moral sanctions is that they are not (or not only) 
inflicted by external parties but are associated to negative (self-regulative) 
emotions like guilt. The experience of morally induced emotions is generally 
the result of extensive periods of moral education during young ages and 
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tends to be persistent in time, thereby influencing individual behaviour and 
attitudes later on in life (p.15). 
The extent of this control is felt to be amplified since in certain countries such as 
Malta, religion, tradition and constitutional law are thoroughly enmeshed. For many 
Maltese people, the very act of being born may subject the individual to Roman 
Catholic values. Notably, up to the age of 16 (minimum legal age for compulsory 
education), Roman Catholic studies form part of the non-optional academic subjects 
unless the child’s parents do not adhere to this faith (Government of Malta, 1964, 
p.7). Interestingly, this core academic subject is referred to as Religious Studies - 
which may be understood as referring to a subject that addresses different religions 
and their respective dogmata with a dash of ethics and spirituality. Here is where one 
would realise that s/he is wrong because in reality, evidence has shown that other 
religions are not promoted in this subject (Vallejo & Dooly, 2008, p.5). Instead, 10-
year old students engage in biblical research and learn about events described in this 
same book (Calleja, 2012, para.3). Moreover, it is the Roman Catholic church that 
governs the content of religion lessons in schools (Debono, 2013, para.21). A wedge 
in this argument may revolve around the young adult’s ultimate freedom to make 
religious choices. Still, it has to be pointed out that by this lifestage, the individual 
would have already been exposed to a minimum of 16 years of the same doctrine, 
with deeply ingrained fears of hell – the ultimate outcome for those who fail to 
follow the moral codes of this religion.   
 
At this point, a simple yet pertinent line of questioning would centre on the actual 
degree of our proclaimed freedom in society - a complex area to elaborate on, 
especially, in the realisation that freedom has to be accompanied by a degree of 
responsibility. To this extent, Foucault and Gordon (1980) contended that: 
The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of 
power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of 
a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, 
forces (p.74). 
Reflections on the knowledge-power link have been articulated extensively by 
Foucault.  In a similar way to Nietzsche, Foucault took a position where the role of 
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historiography is afforded less importance as a means of illuminating the origin and 
meaning of truth. Rather than exploring the origin of truth, Foucault instead 
preferred to study the link between knowledge and power. Fendler (2010) 
distinguished between genealogy and archaeology - processes which structure 
Foucault’s exploration of most of the concepts in his books.  She stated that “while 
archaeology works to understand how artefacts fit together in a historical moment, 
genealogy works to figure out what kind of people would fit into that set of 
artefacts” (Fendler, 2010, p.39). This implies an investigation of the forces which 
shape our current existence. Foucault’s focus was not on a traditional historical 
narrative of events but on the concept of discourse.  This entails a scrutiny of 
historical periods based on the theory that discourse and its associated perceived 
truth were modified in accordance to each period’s episteme (the accepted manner of 
obtaining and arranging knowledge in a given era.) In The Order of Things, Foucault 
(1966/ 1973) described how: “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is 
always only one ‘episteme’ that defines the conditions of possibility of all 
knowledge, whether expressed in theory or silently invested in a practice” (p.168). 
A similar pattern of investigation characterises Foucault’s doctoral thesis which was 
eventually published under the title of Madness and Civilisation.  Contrary to 
common beliefs such as those expressed by the liberal and Marxist positions, 
Foucault refused to perceive power as a system of oppression or as simply being 
overtly exercised by sovereigns. Instead, the philosopher attested that power is a 
network or a matrix - it “comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1978/1990, p.93). 
 
In his works, Foucault contended that accepted knowledge and scientific evidence 
are the influential factors that form an absolute truth and this is what in turn leads to 
the subtle exertion of power in everyday life (Foucault 1978/1990, p.93). Here, the 
philosopher pointed out that truth however, is not a source that has to be discovered. 
Rather, it is produced by a particular society’s acceptance of a certain type of 
discourse and its usage to sanction information and declare it as true or false 
(Rabinow, 1991, p.7). This type of power fascinated Foucault and on further 
elaboration, in the book Discipline and Punish, he introduced the concept of 
surveillance through the powerful example of the architectural Panopticon model 
(Foucault, 1979/1995, p.204). This features an institutional design which allows a 
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watchman to observe the inmates without them knowing if or when they are being 
watched or not.  Due to their lack of knowledge, inmates must constantly act as if 
they are being watched and this results in effective control of their behaviour. 
Foucault (1979/1995) regarded this structure as “a privileged place for experiments 
on men and for analysing with complete certainty the transformations that may be 
obtained from them” (p.204). 
 
In a similar way that this mid-19th century structure allowed constant observation of 
segregated individuals in a prison, factory or a psychiatric asylum, Foucault 
theorised that observation, as an action, functions as the weaving tool of knowledge, 
power and truth. This system does not necessitate overtly violent coercive means of 
controlling behaviour in society.  Instead, the direct feedback and knowledge from 
the observation process feeds power to the observer. Foucault (1979/1995) 
contended that the simultaneous application of knowledge and power in the world, 
has the ability to turn that knowledge into truth – hence converting it into reality and 
a means of disciplining and shaping the conduct and behaviour of other beings. This 
refers to a circular dynamic process whereas power, knowledge and truth are 
entwined and reinforced (p.195).  The philosopher added that in addition to the type 
of power which is actualised by the act of observation, another form of control is in 
play. This refers to self-regulation – a continuous internal control process within 
individuals who can never be entirely sure if they are actually being watched or not.  
It may result in the self-monitoring of behaviour so that it is concordant with the 
expectations of society.  In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1984/1992) described 
this as the concept of techniques of the self, which involves: 
Those reflective and voluntary practices by which men not only set 
themselves rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, to change 
themselves in their singular being, and to make of their life into an ‘oeuvre’ 
that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria (p.10). 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979/ 1995, p.170) predicated the presence of 
three leading tenets in the exertion of power, these being: 
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- Hierarchical Observation 
- Normalization and Judgment 
- Examination 
 
The philosopher noted that power and the three tenets outlined above are inherent in 
mechanisms of surveillance in prison, law, education and psychiatry as well as in 
promoting societal norms. 
 
A Foucauldian perspective would suggest that every individual is under constant 
observation, wilfully and sometimes not so, and that according to the Panopticon 
principle, individuals are constantly being checked upon and are always subjected to 
the possibility of being exposed, should one’s conduct be determined as 
unacceptable and deviant. The open architectural structure of buildings, surveillance 
cameras, mobile phones, journalists, blogs and social networking portals are 
examples of the ways in which we are scrutinised. Whilst this points towards a 
somewhat paranoid and claustrophobic view of the world that we are living in, 
realistically, we are often accustomed to these concealed forms of control and accept 
them as part of life and a means of ensuring our safety by enhancing the chance that 
dangerous activity is detected and subsequently addressed by the observers.  Thus 
the impact of the system is not uni-directional or necessarily oppressive. 
 
Foucault (1979/1995) recognised that whilst such societal views may seem 
hazardous, power is not necessarily exclusive, coercive or repressive: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains 
of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained from him belong to this production (p.194). 
Later he also claimed that “power traverses and produces things; it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, and produces discourse” (Foucault, 1980, p.119). 
 
Whilst concurring with Foucault’s view, I add that the potential danger in the 
application of this concept is if there is withholding of knowledge by the elite few. 
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Visibly, the 21st century individual is becoming aware of the latent power of 
knowledge and the possibility of knowledge being rendered accessible to all. This is 
a vital step in empowering individuals to take actions towards liberation from 
subjugation and oppression. One of the forces behind this change is the revolution of 
electronic communication which has brought the monopolization of information to a 
striking halt. The political writer El-Shinqiti (2010) suggested that humanity has now 
progressed to the next historic era – that of the sharing of information, where a single 
motivated individual can share information and perceptions to millions of people in a 
matter of minutes. 
Criticism 
Amongst the main criticisms of Foucault’s views lies that of his rejection of liberal 
philosophy whilst simultaneously basing the contentions of his arguments on the 
same values.  It can be noted that critics may be right in stating that Foucault’s 
questioning of tradition and faith echoes liberal views. However, there are definite 
divergences. For instance, the Age of Enlightenment, which saw the origins of the 
liberal movement, promoted science and its dominance. It is clear that Foucault is 
not very sympathetic to this era as he contended that values imposed by science may 
not necessarily be ideal (Kumar, 2007, p.11). Another point of criticism has been 
Foucault’s inaccuracy of recounted historical events. For example, historians 
asserted that the Great Confinement described by Foucault in Madness and 
Civilization occurred in the nineteenth century rather than in the seventeenth 
century, as indicated in the book. Although this may be considered as sheer 
carelessness on Foucault’s part, it has alternatively been regarded as arrogant 
disregard for meticulous work carried out by historians (Scull, 1990, p.57). Finally, 
it was Foucault himself who engaged in self-criticism by noting, for example, that 
although he had initially believed that most of his work consisted of an exploration 
of power, it was in fact an analysis of experience (Lemke, 2011, p.26). 
In this review and study, Foucault’s arguments in relation to the knowledge-power 
link, especially his direct adaptation of this concept to psychiatry are considered as 
the guiding fundamental theoretical principles. 
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2.2.5 Conclusion 
The act of exploring the general concept of knowledge was intended to allow the 
embarkation onto this study from a broad stance. Additionally, this part of the 
review acted as a catalyst for reflection upon existential issues as well as other 
concepts that have eventually been shaped as being facts and constituting the truth. 
Having now examined the platform upon which the other structures lie, the 
subsequent step affords a more focussed lens on the mental health field and the 
specific knowledge that has been attributed to it through the evolution of the 
mankind.  
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2.3 Mental health and psychiatric control 
2.3.1 Introduction 
He ran amok in the cobbled street, dirty and naked. There was no stopping him…his 
imaginary foes were so close, too close. He had to keep running to get away. His 
eyes were glazed with fear and his screams were heart wrenching.  They laughed  at 
him – women on their way to the bakery stopped and whispered to each other; 
schoolchildren threw chunks of dirt at him and the men laughed heartily as they 
enjoyed what, in their eyes, was nothing more than a live circus act.  Two sturdy 
policemen ran after him, blowing their whistles and shouting orders. He stumbled 
and fell as one of the men pounced on him and held him tight. The screaming 
became louder as he was dragged away to the confines of the dark room in the 
asylum. There he stayed, for the rest of his life – a mad life haunted by imaginary 
demons.  
      Author’s own 
 
This part of the review has been divided into three sections. The first section reviews 
parts of the history of psychiatry and diagnosis. Originating from the Greek 
language: psych = soul and iatry = medical treatment (Athanasiadis, 1997, p.781). 
Thus, psychiatry refers to medical treatment of the soul – a statement that has given 
rise to various debates and contrasting views as shall be explored in this section of 
the review.  The second section has been dedicated to psychiatric treatment. This 
involves a critical review of treatment modalities that have been used in psychiatry, 
in particular the asylum system, psychiatric drugs and contemporary alternative 
approaches. The section concludes with an exploration of evidence and the 
determination of its constituents. The final section in this part of the review 
addresses societal control and third party interests in the psychiatric discipline. This 
discussion is based on the works of key figures such as Szasz, Laing, Basaglia and 
Foucault. 
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2.3.2 What is mental illness? Opposing views and diagnostic 
ambiguity 
This section is intended to trace the origins of mental illness and psychiatry with a 
focus on the concept of psychiatric diagnosis. It has been divided into two parts – the 
first part (i) is dedicated to a historical review of psychiatric diagnosis with particular 
emphasis on kraepelinian dichotomy and the neo-kraepelinians.  The second part (ii) 
is constituted by a critical discussion of opposing views in relation to the validity and 
benefit of a psychiatric diagnostic system – here reference is made to various 
movements such as anti-psychiatry and critical psychiatry as well as the User 
Movement. 
i). A brief history of psychiatric diagnosis 
Psychoanalysis, psychodynamics and Kraepelinian  dichotomy 
The status of mental illness during the Middle Ages and prior to the 18th century is 
one that triggered many questions and contemporary debates. Psychiatry has 
attempted to provide various explanations to that which had been perceived as 
mystical and bizarre.  Finally, it has resulted in the structuring of clinical categories 
and management pathways that dictate treatment and care. Today’s psychiatry may 
resemble a phoenix rising from the ashes – a novice creature that has the wisdom of 
its predecessors yet the knowledge and the aptitude that may promise better 
outcomes.   It cannot be negated though that one resemblance between the new bird 
and the old one is the rulemaking characteristic – the privilege attributed to 
psychiatry to distinguish the normal and acceptable from that which is regarded as 
abnormal and treatable. 
 
The fundamental debate and the foundations of the psychiatric discipline are rooted 
in the quest to define and conceptualise mental illness in an attempt to erect clear 
boundaries between normality and madness (Unger, 2013). In his comprehensive 
work about the history of psychiatry, Shorter (1997) recounted how psychoanalytic 
and psychotherapuetic theories dominated the post-asylum era and the biological 
approaches that featured in the 19th century. For more than half a century, Freud’s 
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ideas, in particular, were at the forefront of explanations that tended to focus on 
social and non-biological explanations of symptoms related to mental illness. This 
approach centred around the contention that actions and thoughts are often controlled 
by forces that can only be explored through a process of psychoanalysis.  Although 
the profound effect of Freud has seeped into today’s psychiatry, the major critique 
surrounding this school of thought is that Freud’s theories were simply his, because 
they could not be studied empirically and so lack scientific validity (Brace, 2006). 
 
Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, was one of the critics who shunned Freud’s 
psychoanalytic postulations, in favour of biological and pathological understandings 
of mental illnesses (Kraepelin & Diefendorf, 1902). In this way, he opted to consider 
mental illness as a state of predisposition to stressful events in life. This led him to 
contend that “so-called psychic causes – unhappy love, failure in business, overwork 
– are the product rather than the cause of the disease, that they are but the outward 
manifestation of a pre-existing condition” (Kraepelin, 1962, p.132).  In addition to 
his studies about the use of psychiatric drugs for treatment of disorders related to the 
nervous system (pharmacopsychology), Kraepelin’s pioneer work lies in his 
classification of mental illness.  The first form of a classification and diagnostic 
system - which ultimately led to the American Psychiatric Association (APA)’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) is still widely in use today (Hacking, 
2013). This was fuelled by Kraepelin’s interest in using empirical methods in the 
exploration and description of mental disorders. Following years of observing 
patients and recording symptoms related to mental illness,  Kraepelin introduced the 
innovative Kraepelinian dichotomy which initially constituted two main divisions:  
manic-depressive psychosis (nowadays termed bipolar disorder) and dementia 
praecox (later renamed as schizophrenia) (Kraepelin, 1962, p.131). 
 
In a critical appraisal of the history of psychiatry, Decker (2007) highlighted the 
events that took place during the 1880 s and 1890 s, when Kraepelin slowly grouped 
symptoms and categorised them for publication in Compendium der Psychiatrie 
(Kraepelin, 1883). One of Krapelin’s main strengths was his prowess as a descriptive 
author, as seen by the colourful manner by which he described the symptoms.  
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Although one of the main criticisms of Kraepelin’s work centres around observer 
bias and the validity of preconceived notions, one must note that Kraepelin was 
aware of the importance of experimental psychiatry and he had designed his own 
methods of testing mental reactions to various substances and external factors, as 
guided by Wundt (Ebert & Bar, 2010, p.191).  
 
Notably, Kraepelin advised that psychiatrists should refrain from focusing on the 
origins of illness and from postulating a diagnosis but should instead focus on the 
observation of the symptoms and description of the manifestations (Decker, 2007, 
p.340). To me, this bears resemblance to one of the pillars of contemporary 
psychiatry - the Recovery Movement - which affords more consideration to 
addressing and describing symptoms rather than placing diagnosis at the hub of care 
(Roberts, 2011).  
 
Decker commented that Kraepelin’s view point seemed to change over time since in 
the fifth edition of his book Psychiatrie, he indulged in the aetiology of dementia 
praecox.  A notable aspect about Kraepelin is that throughout the course of his life, 
he often reflected upon his work and even admitted that his proposed nosology was 
not definite and subject to scrutiny. In response to critique by Meyer, Kraepelin 
acknowledged a further shortcoming in that he did not review existing literature in 
order to substantiate his work (Hippius, Peters & Ploog, 1987, p.159). Following the 
second world war, Kraepelin´s approach waned in popularity in favour of 
environmental and psychological movements. In particular, psychologists were 
required in the treatment of shell shock especially in view of the fact that 
psychiatrists were short in supply (Reisman, 1991, pp.100-102) and soon after, 
psychotherapy was added to the discipline (Routh, 2000, p.236). 
The Neo-Kraepelinians 
The psychoanalytic and psychodynamic thinking that dominated the scene in the 
1940 s was characterised by a negative perception of psychiatric diagnosis in that it 
could be harmful to patients (Kendler, Munoz & Murphy, 2009, p.134). For instance, 
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Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock and Erbaugh (1962) reviewed systematic studies of 
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis and reported an agreement of only 54 percent 
for specific diagnoses (p.351). Similarly, studies by Sandifer, Pettus & Quade (1964, 
p.355) and Schmidt & Fonda (1956, p.266) revealed agreement in just half of the 
cases between two independent opinions on diagnosis of a group of patients. Kendel 
et al. (2009) narrated how during the same period, a group of psychiatrists at 
Washington University were preoccupied with the fact that the psychological 
approach that had gained popularity lacked a scientific base (p.135). In the 1960s 
and early 1970s, these psychiatrists, who became known as the neo-kraepelins 
expressed their dissatisfaction with a discipline that seemed to be unstructured, non-
medical and non-scientific. Their preoccupation with these flaws led to an echo of 
Kraepelin’s fundamental belief that only an empirical, biologically-based evidence 
base can improve the outcomes for those who exhibited symptoms related to mental 
illness (Decker, 2007, p.348).  Once again, a cautionary note against over-emphasis 
on aetiology was made due to the lack of knowledge about the origin and causation 
of most psychiatric disorders. 
 
The culmination of these hypotheses and assumptions led to a paper published in the 
Archives of General Psychiatry (Feighner, Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & 
Munoz, 1972). The paper outlined a review of 1000 articles which formed the 
background of a proposal for new criteria for psychiatric disorders. The objective of 
such an extensive review was to present a diagnostic system that was based on 
evidence as opposed to “opinion or tradition” and described by the authors of the 
paper as “the most efficient currently available”  (Feighner et al., 1972, p.62). In 
agreement, Macalpine and Hunter (1974) stated that: 
The lesson of the history of psychiatry is that progress is inevitable and 
irrevocable from psychology to neurology, from mind to brain, never the 
other way round. Every medical advance adds to the list of diseases which 
may cause mental derangement.  The abnormal mental state is not the 
disease, nor its essence or determinant but an epiphenomenon. This is why 
psychological theories and therapies, which held out such promise at the turn 
of the century when so much less was known of localisation of function in 
the brain, have added so little to the treatment understanding of mental illness 
despite all the effort devoted to them (p. 256). 
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Furthermore, the new categorisation was fuelled by the follow up of case studies and 
rigorous observation of the course of psychiatric illness. This was a sharp contrast to 
the DSM-II which centred around psychoanalysis as well as a committee’s 
judgement and experience (Spitzer & Fleiss, 1974).  
 
Klerman (1978, pp.104-105) suggested nine tenets as the basis of the neo-
Kraepelinian movement: 
 
- Psychiatry is a branch of medicine. 
- Psychiatry should utilize modern scientific methodologies and base its 
practice on scientific knowledge. 
- Psychiatry treats people who are sick and who require treatment. 
- There is a boundary between the normal and the sick. 
- There are discrete mental illnesses.  They are not myths, and there are many 
of them. 
- The focus of psychiatric physicians should be on the biological aspects of 
illness. 
- There should be an explicit and intentional concern with diagnosis and 
classification. 
- Diagnostic criteria should be codified, and a legitimate and valued area of 
research should be to validate them. 
- Statistical techniques should be used to improve reliability and validity. 
 
As a result of this movement, the DSM-II was revised and its revolutionary sequel 
was produced as directed by the influential psychiatrist Robert Spitzer (Decker, 
2007, p.351). The DSM system has paved the way for a modern diagnostic system 
and its use has spread widely in the field of psychiatry. However, subsequent 
publications were characterised by opposing views that challenge validity and 
reliability, especially in the recent launch of the DSM V.  In Kendler et al.’s words: 
“There is, we suggest, a healthy dialectical tension between nomothetic (law-based) 
and ideographic (individual case) approaches to psychiatry and between scientific 
explanation and psychological understanding” (Kendler et al., 2009, p.141). 
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This tension shall be explored in the next section as part of the critique of the 
concept of a psychiatric diagnostic system and its implications. 
ii). Diagnostic criticism: a matter of pseudo-science? 
Diagnostic criteria have indeed been the subject of controversy (Summerfield, 2008). 
Diverse perceptions have ranged from an exclusively clinical psychiatric model of 
diagnosis to theorists who posited that psychiatry and its alleged ability to diagnose 
disorders is simply a fabrication or a myth. 
 
The psychiatric model proposed by Spitzer and colleagues that has been described in 
the previous section has found some acceptance and the DSM series has now reached 
its fifth publication (APA, 2013). Similarly, the psychiatric diagnostic system 
proposed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as seen in the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) manual, is undergoing its 11th revision and 
expected to be published in 2017 (WHO, 2014).   
 
The psychiatric model that features in the DSM 5 and the ICD 10 continues to have 
both critics and advocates. One of the critics - Summerfield (2008) - discussed the 
significance of culture – a case in point being the South African ailment of thinking 
too much which has similar symptoms to depressive disorder but a different meaning 
in this particular culture. This led Summerfield (2008) to state that “Western 
psychological discourse is setting out to instruct, regulate, and modernise, presenting 
as definitive the contemporary Western way of being a person. It is unclear why this 
should be good for mental health in Africa or Asia” (p.993). 
 
In an exploration of some of the debates surrounding the medical model, Szasz 
(2010) described how diagnostic subjectivity, the boundaries of normality, coercion, 
conceptual disputes about the mind and brain, freedom and other human rights have 
generated the anti-psychiatry movement that saw its rise in the 1960 s. In their 
review of critical psychiatry, Bracken and Thomas (2004) explored how the 
contradictions and disagreements in psychiatry which gave rise to the anti-psychiatry 
movement during the 1960s and 1970s, still feature in the contemporary mental 
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health field, having now progressed to a critical psychiatry perspective and most 
recently a postpsychiatry viewpoint. In a parallel fashion to this movement, groups 
of ex-patients have expressed their dissatisfaction with mainstream medicine by 
forming survivor groups. These are often characterised by a quasi-militant approach 
to the psychiatric discipline by a group of individuals who consider themselves as 
survivors of traumatic and oppressive medical practice (Wallcraft & Bryant, 2003). 
These movements and groups, as well as other prominent ones, shall be explored in 
further detail in this section. 
 
The aim of this section of the review is not that of indulging in a crusade against 
conventional psychiatry or else as a historical journey. Instead, some of the main 
debates and movements that characterise the mental health field shall be discussed 
and critiqued since I belief that these play a major part in shaping discourse on 
mental health and the therapeutic alliance.  At this point, I wish to disclose the 
knowledge that despite my effort to avoid complete bias in my writing, I do not 
adhere to a modernist view that may advocate the possibility of complete objectivity 
and non-bias. Rather than hiding beneath an objective veil, I am attempting to view a 
controlled degree of bias as fruitful since it was this very bias that initially fuelled 
my interest to undertake this research study.  My position in this argument is not one 
in favour of the medical model and yet I do not profess to be on the antipsychiatry 
pole. On reflection, I conclude that the postpsychiatry approach is the one that tends 
to attract my sympathy.  
The antipsychiatry movement 
Desai (2005) noted that despite the emphasis on regarding psychiatry as a branch of 
medicine, it is characterised by striking differences from the other areas found within 
medical practice (p.185). As a case in point, the idea of anti-cardiology, for instance, 
is not plausible, whereas the area of anti-psychiatry is a well-defined movement that 
has a definite place in society. One may relate this to the historical Cinderella status 
of psychiatry. However, on further thought, such open hostility towards psychiatry, 
such as that expressed by Thomas Szasz, may well be led by the lack of tacit 
evidence regarding the practices of this discipline: 
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This view rests on a serious, albeit simple, error: it rests on mistaking or 
confusing what is real with what is imitation; literal meaning with 
metaphorical meaning; medicine with morals. In other words, I maintain that 
mental illness is a metaphorical disease (Szasz, 2007, p.6). 
The works by Szasz and other prominent figures in the anti-psychiatry movement, 
such as R.D. Laing and David Cooper, shall be explored in further detail in a later 
part in this section of the review. 
 
In a series of papers dedicated to the evidence-base of psychiatry, critical 
psychiatrists Bracken and Thomas (1999a) scrutinised the medical model that has 
been prominent in unearthing the aetiology of a number of psychological 
disturbances. The authors postulated that an error may have been made when the 
medical model was extensively applied to all forms of psychological disturbances in 
a quest to prove that these symptoms were part of a specific mental illness that had a 
physical basis and could be treated likewise. In their publications, Bracken and 
Thomas mentioned schizophrenia as a typical example and labelled it as the raison 
d’être of psychiatry – a disorder that has been researched and stripped of human 
experience in order to form a biomedical picture. They also reasoned that although 
neuroscientific advances may fill the evidence gap, accurate and practical diagnostic 
tests are still fantasies that have yet to be actualised. Hence diagnosis is still mainly 
reliant on professional observation making it susceptible to subjective bias and 
political influence. Bracken and Thomas (1999a) identified the power imbalance that 
the medical model creates within the therapeutic alliance and stated that there is a 
need for “a fundamental shift in the power relationship between doctor and patient. 
Psychiatry has to hand over responsibility for psychosis to those who experience 
psychosis. Those who experience psychosis must be prepared to accept that 
responsibility” (para. 4). 
 
In one of his works about learning difficulties and society, Goodley (2001) 
expressed similar misgivings about the notion of power that characterises the Social 
Model of Disability and Impairment. He contended that “society creates disablement 
and is the arbiter of disciplinary powers that (re)produce pathological understandings 
of different bodies and minds” (p.210). In the same paper, Goodley (2001) 
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elaborated on support interventions found within a continuum of deficit at one end 
and capacity at the other end. This views individuals with learning difficulties in 
terms of levels of competence/ incompetence and of a model based on pathology, 
problems and incapability.   
 
The anti-psychiatry movement, which began to form in the 1960s, mirrored this 
observation and raised several questions pertaining to the perceived robustness of the 
newly constructed psychiatric discipline (Desai, 2005).  Prior to delving deeper into 
the diagnostic challenge, the history of the anti-psychiatry movement is going to be 
explored with focus on the main phases and viewpoints that characterise this 
movement. 
 
Desai (2005) described how the first of the major steps in the anti-psychiatry 
direction was taken by a science fiction writer, L. Ron Hubbard, who, in 1950, 
founded the Church of Scientology (p.185). In 1969, the Citizens Commission of 
Human Rights (CCHR) was founded by scientology in an attempt to unveil the 
perceived evils practiced by psychiatry: “to expose and eradicate the brutalization of 
patients in the name of ‘mental health’. Over the years, the Citizens Commission has 
investigated and exposed thousands upon thousands of cases of psychiatric 
negligence, abuse and brutality” (Scientology.org, 2014, para.5). 
 
Hubbard’s preoccupation with what he clearly perceived as being barbaric practice 
was communicated through a number of his publications. He believed that 
psychiatry is a worldwide conspiracy run by the Union of Soviet Socialists Republic 
(USSR) (Hubbard, 1967).  A critical point regarding these assumptions follows the 
power issues that seem to lie behind such claims. It is felt that while Hubbard’s 
attack on psychiatry’s lack of consideration for the spiritual aspect may be well 
placed, whether scientological practices have a positive outcome on the course of 
mental illnesses has yet to be proven. Cases such as the notorious one of Lisa 
McPherson who was brought dead to hospital following introspection rundown – a 
scientological spiritual technique that attempts to treat florid psychosis, fuels doubt 
in this regard (Murphy, 2012). 
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The second wave of the antipsychiatry movement saw the involvement of 
professionals such as psychiatrists and sociologists who questioned the basis of 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment as well as the coercive authority linked to it 
(Desai, 2005). Adolf Meyer had been one of the earliest 20th century leading figures 
who opposed the use of diagnostic criteria as a primary and sole means of 
diagnosing mental illness. Contrasting with similar movements that challenged 
conventional psychiatry, Meyer did not distinguish between mental disturbances that 
should be dealt with by the medical profession and those that should be treated as 
social problems (Meyer, 1952). Echoing the views of other radicalists such as Szasz 
(1974a), Meyer (1952) endeavoured to explain schizophrenia in terms of 
maladaptation to life experiences and an unhealthy lifestyle: “living in ways which 
put their mind and the entire organism and its activity in jeopardy” (p.4). 
 
One of Meyer’s concerns was that psychiatric practice lacked scientific evidence 
(Meyer, 1951).  In order to partially address this issue, he postulated reaction-type 
systems that served the purpose of a structured analysis of abnormal responses and 
remarked that psychiatry should be more organised and disciplined. He proposed a 
classification system that was “a wide range of facts usually left to untrained 
common-sense, but now available as a more and more organised body of facts, 
methods of study and methods of therapeutic procedure” (Meyer, 1951, III, 44). 
Meyer’s scepticism regarding any diagnostic system as complete or as a steadfast 
rule featured in his works - he even described his own system as not being 
“sufficiently settled for practical purposes” (vol. II, p.136).  
 
The base of Meyer’s contention, which is one of today’s debates in psychiatry, holds 
that the medical model focuses too much on bodily parts, namely the brain, and is 
generally reluctant to seek connections to the lived experience of the individual. 
Meyer (1952) shunned the over-inflated importance of statistical research techniques 
and emphasised that a higher level of insight can be obtained through person 
research (IV, 6-7). An interesting point that was specifically argued by Meyer (1951) 
was that the primary aim of the psychiatrist needs to be that of collecting the facts 
and not to produce a diagnosis: “If the facts do not constitute a diagnosis we must 
nevertheless act on the facts” (II, 146).  He cautioned against the obsession with 
52 
 
making a diagnosis that is often aimed to satisfy the psychiatrist’s craving for tying 
up the symptoms in a neatly organised parcel that is linked to a ready-made 
treatment package (Meyer, 1951, II, 136).  On reflecting upon Meyer’s main 
arguments, I believe that it is necessary to really question the significance of a 
biological diagnosis, what is says about a person’s life and what it adds to it.  
 
In view of approaches such as that articulated by Meyer, the act of diagnosing may 
be understood in terms of the application of a label, leading to an erosion of an 
individual’s identity and medicalisation of symptoms which may be caused by non-
pathological factors. Yet this voice has been subjected to counterarguments by a 
number of service users who, through the adoption of a biological model, have found 
great relief in being offered a medical reason (a diagnosis) for their symptoms 
(Huibers & Wessely, 2006, p.895). Despite the stigma and sick role attributed to 
such diagnoses, the act of having an explanation and a validation of symptoms is 
akin to other medical disorders and in itself, this has been a source of comfort for 
these individuals (Fulford, Broome, Stanghellini & Thornton, 2005, p.83). For 
instance, in an article about the consequences of diagnosis, Heitler (2012), who is a 
clinical psychologist, described how one of her patients who used to be irritated by 
her feelings of anxiety gained more control over these symptoms by becoming aware 
of the clinical label of the state of anxiety: “By clinically labelling her feeling 
anxiety, she was able to use her new knowledge of what to do in the face of specific 
emotions”  (para.20). 
This argument is also exemplified by the book An Unquiet Mind - a compelling 
memoir by Kay Jamison (1995) who described her life as characterised by bipolar 
disorder.  Jamison clearly portrayed her acceptance of her symptoms as situated in 
understandings pertaining to genetics, pathology and medical imaging results.  For 
her, the origins are solid, organic and based on scientific evidence.  This has allowed 
her to seek the necessary treatment and progress with her life – a successful life 
characterised by multiple research endeavours and a professor post at Johns Hopkins 
School of Medicine (Jamison, 1995). 
 
Although criticisms of the theory and practice of psychiatry such as those expressed 
by Meyer have been evident throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, it was 
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the South African psychoanalyst David Cooper who introduced the term anti-
psychiatry. He stated how “a more profound questioning has led some of us to 
propose conceptions and procedures that seem quite antithetic to the conventional 
ones – in fact what may be regarded as a germinal anti-psychiatry” (Cooper, 1967, 
p.ix). 
 
In a similar manner to Meyer, Cooper favoured a psychosocial approach to the origin 
of mental illness and attributed disorders to a dysfunctional family system.  He 
argued that in the family, permissible behaviour is regulated through complex 
double-binds – this is a type of political control of the members. An interesting 
tangent raised by Cooper involves his view that madness is in fact a process of 
restructuring. He argued that if this process is not interfered with, the person can 
emerge from the experience with gains above his pre-morbid level of functioning: 
“Madness is a permanent revolution in the life of a person...a deconstitution of 
oneself with the implicit promise of return to a more fully realized world” (Cooper, 
1980, pp.37,51).  
 
Cooper’s views seemed to echo in two simultaneous attacks on conventional 
psychiatry, as presented by psychoanalyst R.D. Laing and psychiatrist Thomas 
Szasz. Huddleston (2006) described how Laing’s work featured in 1960 when 
following his medical training with the army, he began to doubt the use of placing 
psychiatric patients in deep insulin comas as well as the use of electroconvulsive 
therapy.  It was instantly clear that his position was that of viewing mental illnesses 
as a normal reaction by sensitive individuals to a mad world: 
If the human race survives, future men will, I suspect, look back on our 
enlightened epoch as a veritable age of Darkness. They will presumably be 
able to savor the irony of the situation with more amusement than we can 
extract from it. They will laugh on us. They will see that what we call 
'schizophrenia' was one of the forms in which, often through quite ordinary 
people, the light began to break through the cracks in our all-too-closed 
minds (Laing, 1967, p.107). 
He also ventured into comparing determinism to the more beneficial approaches of 
subjectivity and freedom and emphasised that cure can only happen when the 
54 
 
individual is left free to choose. Laing’s first book, namely: The Divided Self  
involved case studies that were used to challenge the notion of schizophrenia. In 
doing so, Laing (1960) revolutionised the way that mental illness is perceived and 
interpreted, particularly by arguing that psychosis is not a biological ailment but a 
normal reaction in the face of ontological insecurity.  The latter term refers to 
insecurities related to one’s existence and to an individual who is not able to “take 
the realness, aliveness, autonomy and identity of himself and others for granted" and 
who then embarks on a mission to avoid “losing his self” (Laing, 1960, pp.41-3). 
Laing structured this contention on the theory that our existence in the world is 
defined by mental models carried by ourselves about those around us. He theorised 
that psychosis arises when there is tension between our private inward persona and 
the model that we present to the world, which leads to a division of the self, as a 
defence mechanism. This split is characterised by the classical symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Using his case studies and sociograms as evidence, Laing discovered 
that the bizarre and inexplicable symptoms exhibited by patients often make sense 
when they are viewed against the backdrop from which they emerge.  
 
Applying the concept of The Double Bind Theory by Bateson, Jackson, Haley and 
Weakland (1956), Laing (1960) elaborated on the fact that in malfunctioning family 
systems, a child can find himself/herself in a situation where, in order to enjoy 
parental affection and approval, s/he has to comply to a self-identity that has been 
constructed by his/her parents (p.191). This is usually different from how the child 
internally experiences himself/herself to be, which results in a dilemma and a 
potential psychotic response. 
 
In his later work Sanity, Madness and the Family, Laing and Esterson (1964) 
explored how individuals interact and how this may relate to schizophrenia.  
Essentially, this described the notion of schizophrenogenic families and included 
sharp criticism on the way in which institutions such as schools oppress individuals 
by attempting to mould their thoughts and feelings in a way that is dictated and 
accepted by society. In Self and Others, Laing (1961) discussed the terms “phantasy” 
and “unconscious experience” which refer to the latent, internal authentic lived 
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experience which cannot be observed by others but can only be inferred through 
discussion: 
I think of me being inside my body and at the same time the inside of my 
body being somehow ‘inside’ my private space. If someone comes into my 
room unasked he does not intrude upon me to the same extent as if he were to 
enter my body without permission. However since I am inside my body, my 
body is also outside me in some peculiar sense (p.18). 
The determination to challenge the validity and reliability of psychiatry was shared 
by psychologist and lawyer D.L. Rosenhan, whose 1973 sensational article, 
published in the prestigious journal Science was cited and quoted in debates that 
followed.  This article - On Being Sane in Insane Places - was intended to indicate 
that American psychiatrists did not have scientific diagnostic standards and that an 
individual’s stay in a psychiatric hospital was an irrational experience. These views 
had been tested by a fascinating observational study carried out by the researcher in 
order to demonstrate that false diagnosis is a very real possibility in psychiatric 
settings.   
 
The study featured Rosenhan and seven other ‘normal’ people who went to different 
psychiatric hospitals on an individual basis in order to attempt to be admitted. The 
reason that they gave for their admission request was that they were hearing voices 
that said “empty”, “hollow”, and “thud” (Rosenhan, 1973, p.382). These invented 
symptoms were ones that had never featured in psychiatric diagnosis, yet, in each 
case, the “pseudopatients” were falsely diagnosed as suffering from a psychiatric 
disorder which merited admission (Rosenhan, 1973, p.383). As soon as the 
pseudopatients were admitted, they started to behave ‘normally’ and did not report 
any further symptoms. The task that each individual had was to try to convince the 
staff that s/he had recovered and so could be discharged. The striking results showed 
that even though the pseudopatients had been admitted on a voluntary basis and were 
behaving in a perfectly normal manner, Rosenhan and his collaborators were 
admitted for an average of 19 days (Rosenhan, 1973, p.384). In one case, the 
admission period was nearly two months. Furthermore, upon discharge, the 12 
individuals were labelled as “schizophrenia in remission” and this was entered into 
their permanent medical record. Thus, they were never certified as having truly 
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regained their sanity (Rosenhan, 1973, p.384). Interestingly, Rosenhan asked the 
study participants to take field notes about their interactions with staff members and 
it was instantly noted that the professionals attempted to “depersonalize” patients 
and avoid significant interactions with them. For instance, the pseudopatients kept a 
count of the responses that they were given when they approached staff members to 
ask questions. It could be noted that an alarmingly high number of professionals 
refused to make eye contact when approached or spoken to (Rosenhan, 1973, p.388).  
Rosenhan’s critics outlined various limitations related to the ethical and 
methodological rigour in the study such as, for instance, Rosenhan’s possible 
inclination to inflate the negative aspects of the participants’ experiences inside the 
psychiatric hospital. Still, I feel that his study is imperative in magnifying one 
recurrent crucial question:  How accurate, valid and reliable is a psychiatric 
diagnostic system? 
 
Simultaneously, Szasz started to harshly question the existence of mental illness in 
relation to its comparison to medical disorders. Szasz (2007) argued that the main 
difference between medicine and psychiatry can be explained by the fact that in 
generic medicine, disorders were discovered whereas it seemed that in psychiatry, 
they were simply invented (p.xv). This made them “counterfeit diseases” and “non-
diseases”: “If you talk to God, you are praying; If God talks to you, you have 
schizophrenia” (Szasz, 1973, p.101). He hypothesised that these myths were 
perpetuated by the state and by psychiatrists’ wish to safeguard their profession and 
preserve their power and control: “the state is primarily an apparatus of coercion 
with a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence”  (Szasz, 2007, p.151). 
 
Szasz’s example can be taken to a further level by noting that one of the concepts in 
psychiatry is that of insight - this refers to a person’s ability, or lack of, to recognise 
that s/he is suffering from a mental illness (Markova & Berrios, 1992, p.850). It may 
not be inaccurate to note that this does point towards a situation where a person’s 
failure to comply with mainstream psychiatric ideas may be at risk of simply being 
written off as lack of insight. On exploring the concept of insight in relation to 
recovery, Timimi (2011) noted that “paradoxically, it has been found that the 
presence of this type of “insight” (meaning accepting you are mentally ill and need 
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medical treatment) is negatively correlated with emotional well-being, economic 
satisfaction and vocational status” (sec. Prognosis). 
 
Szasz’s description of the notion that modern psychiatric experts invent diseases 
does not seem too far-fetched in view of the ever-expanding, seamless boundaries of 
the current systems of classification. This argument was one of many that were 
introduced by Frances (2009) in his criticism of the recently published DSM 5 – this 
shall be explored in more detail in a later section in this review. In what has been 
widely considered as one of the best arguments against conventional psychiatric 
practice, Szasz’s book: The Myth of Mental Illness shunned the generally accepted 
view that mental illness is like any other bodily illness and medical speciality (Szasz, 
1974a). The author’s critique revolved around the fact that symptoms attributed to 
mental illness are simply imitations due to the fact that if an ailment has to be 
classified as a true disease, then it has to be considered with and compared to the rest 
of medical practice (Szasz, 1974a, p.47).  This refers to measurement and testing in a 
scientific fashion as well as pathological demonstration at the cellular or molecular 
level.   This is a vivid contrast to how mental illnesses had been historically voted 
into existence by agreement amongst members of the APA – and the subsequent 
shaping of diagnostic labelling: 
Every science consists of classification, control, and prediction; hence to 
prove psychiatry is a science, the psychiatrist classifies, controls, predicts. 
The result is that he classifies people as mad; that he confines them as 
dangerous (to themselves or others); and that he predicts people's behaviour, 
robbing them of their free will and hence of their very humanity (Szasz, 
1973, p. 115). 
Szasz (1960) contended that although the manifestation of mental disturbances may 
resemble pathological diseases, they are simply but wholly, problems in living and in 
morality: “Our adversaries are not demons, witches, fate, or mental illness. We have 
no enemy whom we can fight, exorcise, or dispel by ‘cure’. What we do have are 
problems in living — whether these be biologic, economic, political, or 
sociopsychological” (p.115). Another area that held the focus of Szasz’s criticism 
was involuntary mental hospitalisation. In a 2006 documentary film called 
Psychiatry: An Industry of Death, Szasz emphasised that involuntary mental 
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hospitalization is a crime against humanity which can easily result in “pharmacratic” 
dictatorship (Citizens Commision for Human Rights, 2006). This view shares a 
number of similarities to Foucault’s critique of the penalty system and the self-
regulation process induced by constant supervision. Foucault’s works shall be 
explored in further detail later in this section but as a final note, it has to be added 
that Szasz’s views also resemble Foucault’s in the sociological origin of mental 
illness. For instance, Szasz (1970) discussed how “in the past, men created witches: 
now they create mental patients” (p.xxiv). Similarly, in Madness and Civilisation, 
Foucault (1961/2001) noted that: 
Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from memory; these 
structures remained. Often, in these same places, the formulas of exclusion 
would be repeated, strangely similar two or three centuries later. Poor 
vagabonds, criminals, and "deranged minds" would take the part played by 
the leper (p.5). 
It has to be noted that, as described in an article by Buchanan-Parker and Barker 
(2009), Szasz has often been misinterpreted (p.89). In fact, he has been frequently 
wrongly associated with the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Szasz (2009) himself pointed out that he is only opposed to the practice of coercive 
psychiatry – on the other hand, he is in favour of a contractual psychiatric service 
between consenting adults with no involvement of the state (p.ix). Moreover, in his 
book Antipsychiatry: Quackery Squared, he criticised the anti-psychiatry movement 
and regarded it as an imitation of psychiatry: 
Antipsychiatrists imitated psychiatrists by means of a childish negativism: 
they constructed antitheories of schizophrenia, which they called ‘existential-
phenomenological accounts of madness’, established anti-hospitals, which 
they called ‘households’ and defined as ‘ideal psychiatric communities’ and 
provided psychiatric treatment which they called ‘trips’, that often entailed 
the use of mind-altering (psychotropic) drugs (Szasz, 2009, p.4). 
As discussed by Bracken and Thomas (2010), one of the outstanding characteristics 
of Szasz’s writing is its clarity - this serves to add coherence and consistency to his 
analysis and his attempt to demystify psychiatric diagnostic labelling (p.220). On the 
other hand, his form of thinking has been criticised as being too rigid and that it may 
have been misinterpreted as being an attack on the concept of mental illness (Double 
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2010, p.5). Furthermore, Double (2010) contended that one should be careful when 
making such harsh statements against psychiatry because mental health services are 
still needed and specific diagnoses may help to address and alleviate one’s suffering 
through giving meaning  to a group of symptoms (p.5). He added that the problem 
arises when diagnostic categories are simply regarded as biomedical concepts that 
omit the psychological and social aspects during assessment and care planning. 
 
Echoing Szasz’s critics, it has to be noted that whereas some of the earlier DSM 
versions simply involved a committee’s consensus on voting psychiatric disorders 
into existence, the APA (2013) described how nowadays such illnesses are tested in 
a scientific manner that is supposedly more rigorous (para. 5). Still, it seems as if this 
scientific method itself may not be appropriate, as articulated in the response given 
by the Society for Humanistic Psychology to the publication of the DSM 5. The 
society’s view is that the proposed diagnostic criterion is largely based on social 
norms and on subjective judgments: 
The putative diagnoses presented in DSM-V are clearly based largely on 
social norms, with ‘symptoms’ that all rely on subjective judgments, with 
little confirmatory physical ‘signs’ or evidence of biological causation. The 
criteria are not value-free, but rather reflect current normative social 
expectations (Society for Humanistic Psychology, 2012, Divison 32, sec.9). 
This enhances the risk of medicalising responses that are based on normal variations 
rather than pathology – these responses may require help but not necessarily 
psychiatric help: 
Clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and 
continuous medicalization of their natural and normal responses to their 
experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences 
which demand helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so much 
as normal individual variation (Society for Humanistic Psychology, 2012, 
Divison 32, sec.9). 
The constitution of evidence that serves as the base of psychiatric knowledge shall 
be explored in further detail in a later part of this section. 
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In a counterargument that advocates the medical model, it has to be noted that the 
history of generic illnesses resembles that of mental illnesses due to the fact that 
before aetiology and treatment were understood, management was generally 
ineffective (See Loudon, 2002). This implies that psychiatric disorders are part of a 
field that is still evolving and so it may be more accurate to consider them as 
misunderstood rather than as non-existent. However opposing arguments hold that 
the problem is much more serious and related to deep cracks in the facade of modern 
psychiatry (Angell, 2011). 
 
Desai (2005) described how the third major antipsychiatry force originated from 
England in the 1970s (p.186). This was led by the Mental Patients Union which 
consisted of those who called themselves survivors of psychiatry. The union was 
also influential within a larger movement, namely the World Network of Users and 
Survivors of Psychiatry. In a similar manner to their predecessors, activists sought to 
deny the existence of mental illness and the cold and clinical manner of psychiatric 
practice. Irwin, Mitchell, Durkin and Douieb (2011) published a rare cope of The 
Fish Pamphlet which may have been the starting point of the British Survivor 
Movement in 1974: 
Psychiatry is one of the most subtle methods of repression in advanced 
capitalist society. Because of this subtlety, few recognise the dangers 
shrouded by the mystification of ‘modern medicine’. The psychiatrist has 
become the High Priest of technological society, exorcising the `devils' of 
social distress, by leucotomy (butchery of the brain), electric shock treatment 
- ECT (plugging brains into mains), and heavy use of mind-controlling drugs. 
The mental patient is a sacrifice we make whilst we continue to serve the 
Gods of the Capitalist Religion (p.23). 
Noorani (2013) explained how the movement was particularly successful in 
improving the nature of psychiatry by bridging the gap between service providers 
and service users (p.54). This shall be explored in more detail in the following 
section. 
The user movement  
Notably, over the past forty years, many critical service user/ survivor movement 
groups have emerged as a result of the antipsychiatry move (Wallcraft, Reed & 
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Sweeney, 2003, p.11).  Examples of these groups include Survivors Speak Out, Mad 
Pride, Mad Women, National Self Harm Network and the Hearing Voices Network 
(Holland & Blood, 2009). The main objectives of these groups is advocacy and to 
provide a consultancy service to mainstream mental health services. Additionally, 
they favour a political stance whereas professionals in areas of health care are urged 
to relinquish paternalistic manners of addressing mental illness and instead focus on 
sharing knowledge and power with those who seek their service (Noorani, 2013, 
p.53). The magazine Asylum serves as an exhibition of works that echo the main 
tenets of the user movement: 
A consultant once said to me that he wanted to increase my medication. I 
asked him to state his reasons: Was it to iron out or flatten highs and lows in 
my thoughts, because I could get quite manic? The doctor said that was not 
the case, and that was paranoia on my part. I replied that the reason I had said 
that was not because I knew it to be true, but that I was just speculating, to 
see if the doctor would agree or disagree, or offer another reason. In effect, it 
was playing with words or indulging in a mild form of trickery, so as to 
harmlessly get some information. It was interesting to see how quickly the 
doctor jumped to the wrong conclusion, due to the psychiatrists’ mindset 
towards their patients. I then explained what I was doing by asking him that, 
and the doctor laughed, especially when I pointed out that he may be the one 
suffering from paranoia. Of course I was joking. How many patients are 
misdiagnosed and on the wrong amounts of medication because of 
misunderstandings between them and their doctors? Many, I would suggest. 
And how many are labelled paranoid when they can’t express themselves as I 
did? Once again, many (Anonymous user in a medium-secure unit, 2011, 
p.9). 
In 2003, a report named On Our Own Terms which was based on research carried 
out by the English service user/survivor movement was published (Wallcraft, et al., 
2003). This publication consisted of a detailed survey on the consistency, operating 
procedures and future plans of the multiple groups within the movement. A number 
of findings outlined the important activities that were being undertaken by groups 
within the movement. For instance, education and training were popular activities 
within groups: 
We are going to be doing some work around relapse prevention, not a term I 
particularly like, a piece of jargon. It’s a model from the States, it’s much 
more a social model which treats people as individuals. People have their 
own plan that they go through training to develop, so it’s very much around 
self-management and taking responsibility yourself for your own signs of 
62 
 
distress and what you do about them. The person is at the centre of it, but it 
includes services as well as individual things and people’s own strategies as 
well. They will go on to train professionals in using it so it moves up from 
there (Wallcraft et al., 2003, p.16). 
The experience of being a member of this movement was explored by Knight and 
Kierans (2011) who carried out a narrative inquiry with five members of user 
movement groups in order to elicit the rationale and the meaning of participation. 
Interestingly enough, being part of a service user movement group was perceived as 
creating a sense of community and solidarity due to the experience of engaging with 
people who have had similar experiences: 
And I got on there...everybody had the same feelings as me ... ‘this is wrong, 
we’ve not been treated properly’, and for me that was so empowering 
because it was like a whole online community that was together and so there 
was this sense of community (Knight & Kierans, 2011, slide 6).  
On an individual basis, it had an additional empowering effect whereby some of the 
members who were interviewed reported that due to their participation, they became 
aware that they wanted to move out of feeling like a “user”, which is connoted to 
disenabling implications: 
Do I stay ‘user’ or this person down here, or do I make major changes, and 
start looking at this process of stopping being this disabled, disenabled 
person…and I just went for it, and became self-employed (Knight & Kierans, 
2011, slide 9).  
This consequently led to another beneficial outcome which was that of helping 
others in the same situation. Another reason was the pride experienced by being a 
change agent within a mental health system that was perceived as being harmful and 
ineffective: 
It has been a vital part of my recovery and it’s been a vital part of feeling 
something, a purpose in life, there is a purpose in my life beyond my 
immediate family and everything, that there’s, I am actually doing something 
useful, that really is very, very important (Knight & Kierans, 2011, slide 14).  
One criticism of survivor movement groups has been based on the observation that 
despite their value in giving a voice to the person who is experiencing mental 
difficulties, there may be a lack of representation. This is due to the fact that service 
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user groups seems to be mainly made up of people who have had negative 
experiences in relation to their mental health as well as to the services that they 
sought (Wallcraft et al., 2003, p.38). Anger seems to be a common catalyst within 
group members. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that other factors such as 
gender, age, sexuality and culture contribute directly to the experience of mental 
illness and these need to be adequately represented in the movement groups. 
Critical psychiatry and post psychiatry 
Alongside the emergence of the user movement, contemporary interpretations of the 
experience of mental illness have carved a competing niche to the biomedical model 
which has held prominence for countless years. These emerging viewpoints ranged 
from the logical and humane to that which is somewhat bizarre and perhaps even 
risky.  As an example, one particular explanation of mental illness by the American 
psychologist Louis A. Sass, may be seen as being particularly intriguing and 
somewhat different from the biological and sociological explanations that have been 
explored so far in this review. In his book Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the 
Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought, Sass (1992) elaborated on why 
schizophrenia remains a mysterious condition. Primarily, Sass (1992) argued that 
madness results due to “confrontation” (p.207). This confrontation entails a human’s 
realisation that his existence is a framework that facilitates interpretation of the 
world. In usual circumstances, the individual is not consciously aware of this 
phenomenon or of the fact that reality is constantly being constructed in a particular 
manner.  A state of hypersensitivity and hyperalertness, often seen in a psychotic 
state, may be symptomatic of this “confrontation”. In this sense, it is erroneous to 
view “madness” as a deficit state because it is in fact a state of “hyper-realisation” 
(Sass 1992, p.79). 
 
Interestingly, Sass (1992) pointed out that madness, specifically psychosis, bears a 
striking resemblance to art, whereas many modern artists and writers seem to be 
expressing very similar preoccupations as individuals who are understood as being 
mad (p.36). Sass progressed to list these preoccupations - these include an 
exploration of reality and relativism, defiance of authority, fragmentation and a total 
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loss of self – often exhibited in the art and literature by artists such as  Franz Kafka, 
Paul Valery, Samuel Beckett, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Giorgio de Chirico and Salvador 
Dali. Through the use of a phenomenological approach to explore the cognitive 
similarities between illness and genius, Sass (1992) referred to the tendency of both 
to deconstruct reality and human experience and so in a parallel manner, both states 
involve being in a hyperreflexive state and a sense of alienation from the world 
(p.67). 
In what feels like a sequel to this book, in The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, 
Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind, Sass (1994) presented an unorthodox view of 
the inside of the schizophrenic mind by comparing Daniel Schreber (a jurist who 
spent 13 years in asylums due to mental illness) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (a central 
philosopher in twentieth century thought).  Sass (1994) contradicted the 
conventional view of schizophrenia as a disease and pictured it as another means of 
viewing reality rather than as a treatable or suppressible condition: 
The standard conceptions, whether psychoanalytic or psychiatric have nearly 
always presupposed the Western’s enduring equation of sanity with reason, 
insanity with passion and error – as if madness were necessarily a kind of 
stupidity or dementia, or in terms of Plato’s famous metaphor, a case of the 
wild horse of instinct overwhelming the charioteer’s conscious control 
(p.10). 
Instead of interpreting the symptoms of schizophrenia through a biomedical lens, 
Sass (1994) opted for a philosophical approach that analyses subjective and objective 
realities as well as how we judge these reality types. Reflecting on Sass’ work, 
Bracken and Thomas (1999a) asserted that this is a serious contention since in 
psychiatry, schizophrenia is considered a dogma and questioning its existence as an 
illness has the potential to shake the very foundations of this discipline (para. 2).  In 
a typical postmodern view, these same authors pointed out that one has to be 
cautious when proposing the denial of the existence of psychosis or when picturing it 
as a wonderful experience of self-discovery.  This is due to the fact that reality has 
shown that oftentimes, it is an extremely distressing and debilitating condition.  
However, medicine should refrain from promoting psychiatric understandings and 
medical treatment as absolute and ideal solutions since these tend to de-humanise the 
experience: 
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Unlike the antipsychiatrists, we do not deny the existence of psychosis, nor 
do we seek to romanticise it as a journey of self-discovery. For most people 
psychosis is a terrifying, perplexing experience. But the medical model has 
failed in its task to account for psychosis, and in doing so it has wrenched the 
ownership of the experience from the sufferers, denying them their own 
attempts to make sense out of the experience (Bracken & Thomas, 1999, 
para. 3). 
Figures such as Patrick Bracken and Philip Thomas are the main protagonists in 
critical psychiatry and postpsychiatry. Other leading figures are Joanna Moncrieff, 
Duncan Double, Sami Timimi and Bradley Lewis (Kecmanovic, 2009). 
 
A number of authors who are linked to the critical and post psychiatry period have 
been clear in their critical explanations about what constitutes the recent progress in 
psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2001). In fact, most of this progress is mainly 
related to the development of new drugs, neuroscience, molecular genetics and 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). The main concern here is that the 
components of this progress are based on assumptions that may or may not be 
accurate. Whilst a number of diagnostic endeavours and treatment approaches are a 
direct branch of the medical model, other therapies such as CBT are still rigidly 
rooted in beliefs about the nature of self, the environment and the construction of 
reality (House & Loewenthal, 2008, p.11). 
 
At times, it is quite clear that unlike antipsychiatry, critical and postpsychiatry are 
not a blatant attack on anything related to medicine and conventional psychiatry 
(Lewis, 2006). Alternatively, the main philosophy shifts towards respecting human 
autonomy and the right for choice and freedom - it is not to say that mainstream 
psychiatric services are not useful, desirable and effective in some cases. However, it 
is about the need to widen the horizon and partake a humble approach by realising 
that for the time being, diagnostic labelling and the explanation as well as the 
treatment options that it provides, are simple hypothesis and not facts; it is one way 
of looking at reality or rather, one way of describing reality.  Thus, assuming that it 
is the only way or the best description of reality would be subject to error (Bracken 
& Thomas, 2001, p.727).  Having its philosophical roots in a postmodern approach, 
critical and postpsychiatry encompass a more holistic way of addressing madness 
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and distress. The main ideas are drawn from philosophers such as Foucault, 
Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 
 
Despite their common goal that psychiatry needs to be practiced without the 
underpinning foundation in terms of brain pathology, postpsychiatry and critical 
psychiatry differ in a number of ways. In brief, the main difference lies in that 
critical psychiatry is mostly concerned with the politics and ethics of psychiatry as 
well as encompassing a number of philosophical positions (Thomas, 2013, para.4).  
In contrast, in his book Moving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New Psychiatry: The 
Birth of Postpsychiatry, Lewis (2006) described how postpsychiatry is more 
focussed on postmodernism and concerned with the modernist’s tendency to look for 
technical solutions to address life’s problems.  According to postpsychiatry 
advocates, progress can be achieved by engaging with the service users in a creative 
manner rather than by imposing psychiatric rules on those who we call patients: 
“Contemporary psychiatry tends to focus on neurochemical and genetic 
explanations, to place technological solutions over ethical and human considerations, 
and to use forced treatment methods to resolve clinical controversy. By contrast, 
postpsychiatry works to counter these trends” (Lewis, 2006, p.x). 
 
Some of the advocates of critical and postpsychiatry such as Phil Thomas, Patrick 
Bracken, Duncan Double and Joanna Moncrieff formed critical psychiatry/ 
psychology groups such as The Critical Psychiatry Network (UK).  Originating from 
England, this network has spread internationally and includes multiple philosophical 
positions which may not all be conceptually linked to postmodernism. Activists are 
mainly preoccupied with the political and ethical aspects of clinical psychiatric 
practice as well as an effort to limit the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on 
psychiatry and mental health care (Double, 2002, p.324).  The views on the impact 
of the pharmacological industry shall be discussed in a later section of this review. 
 
An article by Kecmanovic (2009), bearing the notable title of Postpsychiatry: How 
to throw out the baby with the bathwater, challenged the fundamental concepts of 
the postpsychiatry movement.  Primarily, the author argued against the insistence of 
advocates of postpsychiatry in de-prioritising traditional psychiatric diagnosis as this 
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risks a distraction from understanding the problem in a holistic person-centred 
approach: 
For example, frontal lobe tumor may underlie someone’s low energy levels, 
depression, confusion, forgetfulness, lack of initiative and loss of interest in 
people and matters. Should psychiatrists first look for the meaning of such 
symptoms in the patient’s social context, and thereby let his or her mental 
and most likely physical state as well deteriorate; or should they first rule out 
any possible physical-biological cause of the said symptoms? (Kecmanovich, 
2009, p.278). 
In the subsequent argument, the author reasoned that with the exception of 
involuntary treatment, the psychiatrist does not attempt to impose a diagnosis on a 
patient but simply provides advice to someone who has voluntarily sought the 
psychiatrist’s opinion: 
In a good number of cases patients do not have their own view of where their 
mental problems came from. (After all, that is why they look for professional 
assistance.) They can accept or reject the psychiatrist’s interpretation, or 
might be indifferent towards it. If they accept it, and the results of the 
treatment turns out to be below the patients’ expectations, patients are free to 
seek assistance from another psychiatrist who follows the principles of 
another psychiatric model (Kecmanovic, 2009, p.279). 
Although these words ring true, it is felt that such a view may be too rosy and 
generalisable since advice constitutes “guidance or recommendations” (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2013, p.67) and not the moulding and presentation of information as a 
certain and absolute fact as may happen in recorded cases of coercion (See Caplan, 
2012). 
 
In the cases of more severe conditions such as psychosis, which may lead to 
involuntary treatment, Kecmanovic (2009) then justified the imposition of the 
psychiatrist’s diagnosis due to the fact that the patient’s mental pathology may limit 
his/her ability to interpret his/her symptoms correctly. He argued in favour of this 
practice by describing it as being: “The same right mutatis mutandis a physician has 
to impose on a patient an explanation for his or her for example jaundice or bleeding, 
or impaired sighting that may conflict with the patient’s reading of these troubles” 
(p.279). Taking on a postmodern stance, once again, I feel that this (psychiatric 
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symptom interpretation) may sometimes be a question of perception rather than an 
absolute fact. Hence in psychiatry, the value and ethical correctness of imposing an 
interpretation onto an individual is dubious.  
 
Finally, Kecmanovic (2009) used Spitzer’s words as the last say in this argument by 
sharing his view that a proposal of a joint diagnostic system between the service 
provider and the service user is not practical or necessary (p.279). On a critical note, 
it has to be said that since Spitzer was the leading figure in the production of the new 
DSM versions, it is hardly surprising that he seems to prefer a psychiatrist’s 
diagnostic monopoly. Thus, I feel that Kecmanovic’s citation of Spitzer’s words may 
not be an adequate justification for his argument about psychiatric diagnosis. In fact 
his words seem to be justifying the notion of disciplinary power which featured in 
Foucault’s ideas about psychiatric power and the state: 
We can say that disciplinary power…fabricates subjected bodies; it pins the 
subject-function exactly to the body. It fabricates and distributes subjected 
bodies; it is individualising…the individual is nothing other than the 
subjected body. All this constitutes the disciplinary individual and finally fits 
somatic singularity with political power (Foucault, 1973/2008, p.55). 
In the second part of his article, Kecmanovic (2009) addressed the issue of treatment 
and recovery (p.280). The author accurately described how generally, 
postpsychiatrists argue against the proven effectiveness of pharmacotherapy. He also 
elaborated on the postpsychiatry view that the term recovery is not synonymous to 
treatment and it does not imply a complete resolution of symptoms. Rather, it is 
applied to a state of being where the individual is enjoying a good quality of life 
enhanced by a sense of freedom and the ability to “speak out”. It is rather 
disappointing that the building of these arguments led to a rather abrupt and short 
counter-argument by the author where he simply stated that experience has shown 
that psychosis triggers hostile reactions from society and so it has to be treated 
professionally.   I view the conclusion of this article as being the most valuable 
section since the author refrained from taking sides and alternatively reflected on a 
recommendation by Jakovljevic. This refers to the suggested use of pluralist and 
integrated approaches as these may be the most promising contemporary concepts of 
psychiatric practice (Jakovljevic, 2007 as cited in Kecmanovic, 2009). 
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Multiple fronts and no man’s land 
On further personal reflection, I perceive the mental health domain as a tug of war of 
opposing viewpoints with illness on one side of the spectrum, genius on the other, 
and  reactions to problems in living featuring somewhere in between. It cannot be 
denied that opposing mainstream and radical views add fascinating dimensions to 
this area. However I feel as if excessive effort has been and perhaps is still being 
devoted to proving or disproving mental illnesses and their management, in other 
words, to being pro- or against psychiatry. 
 
The startling realisation here is that without questioning any side’s honest intentions, 
it may be the case that the person who is experiencing mental illness, may be losing 
his/her status as a keyplayer and is being overruled in a struggle for power brought 
about by owning a monopoly in the knowledge pertaining to this field.  If this is the 
case, it may be that we are at risk of restricting the person to wander in no-man’s 
land whilst each front focuses on the next plan of action to shape current knowledge 
and maintain power. It is felt that the important question that needs to be re-shifted 
into focus centers on how these debates are going to help the person who is passing 
through the experience of that which may be perceived as a mental illness. 
 
My belief is that perhaps the answer may not be so dependent on whether one 
embraces a medical/ psychiatric view, or indeed an anti- or a critical psychiatry one,  
but on the ability to be receptive to different theories of knowledge and on having 
the practical intelligence to apply them appropriately in different circumstances. 
Without attempting to introduce yet another movement, these thoughts, which are 
similar to those expressed by Jakovljevic (2013), may serve for the future of the 
mental health field. Notably, Jakovljevic (2013) added that in psychiatry, there is no 
one unified theory and practice, but a plethora of theories and practices that range 
from pharmacotherapy, electrical stimulation, psychological therapies, education and 
life coaching: 
Different schools of thought assessing mental health and mental disorders 
have given rise to different perspectives of psychiatry: the medical or disease 
perspective, and the dimensional, cognitive, behavioural, narrative, spiritual 
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and systems perspectives. Each of these perspectives tends to analyze, 
understand, define and treat mental disorders in different ways, each with 
their own merits, albeit without enough success (p.203).  
Unfortunately, this loose assembly of approaches has been the target of criticism in 
relation to a lack of clear pathways (Jakovljevic, 2013, p.203). However, it may also 
be viewed as a strength since it provides service providers and service users with 
various options that can be explored and tested as a matter of personal preference 
and effectiveness. Only, of course, if the person is provided with different options 
and encouraged to utilise any resources that for him/her, may be meaningful in 
making sense of his/her experience. 
2.3.3 The treatment debate 
The previous section has involved an exploration of the history of mental illness 
with a focus on the various understandings and debates that have characterised 
psychiatric diagnosis. The aim of this section is to explore some of the perceptions 
related to the treatment of symptoms that are supposedly caused by a mental illness. 
The section has been divided into three parts – the first part (i) takes the reader 
through a brief history of treatment-related views.  The subsequent part (ii) concerns 
opposing views of the appropriateness and effectiveness of psychiatric treatment. 
The third part explores some contemporary alternative approaches in mental health 
as exemplified by the symptom that is medically termed as psychosis. Finally, this 
section of the review concludes with part (iv) that attempts to critically question and 
address the constitution of evidence. 
i). A brief history of treatment-related views 
Advances in psychopharmacology and psychological therapies have been significant 
in improving the quality of life of some of the individuals who were experiencing 
symptoms synonymous to mental illness (Psychiatry Central, 2006, para.2). A 
multitude of clinical trials as well as convincing patient narratives have shown that 
mainstream psychiatric treatment, mainly drugs such as antipsychotics, 
antidepressants, anxiolytics and mood stabilisers have a significant beneficial effect 
(See Reid, 2013; Leucht, Hierl, Kissling, Dold & Davies, 2012; Jamison, 1995).  
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Medical guidelines, such as those issued by the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE), recommend and guide the use of drugs and psychological 
therapies in most of the psychiatric conditions found in the DSM and ICD. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus that the move in psychiatry is towards 
less restrictive community care with hospitalisation being left as a last resort (WHO, 
2007). 
 
Still, in a similar manner to the diagnostic debate, psychiatric treatment has been 
characterised by a history of opposing views, debates and a confusing and non-
conclusive ocean of clinical trials. In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault 
(1961/2001) carried out a philosophical examination of psychiatric treatment. As a 
point of origin, he described how initially, madness had been seen as something that 
had to be restricted rather than treated, although later, the idea of treating mental 
illness gradually became accepted. Still, as Foucault pointed out, treatment was not 
based on medical contentions but was rooted in morality and body-soul links: 
To the moral world, also, belongs the madness of just punishment, which 
chastises, along with the disorders of the mind, those of the heart. But it has 
still other powers: the punishment it inflicts multiplies by nature insofar as, 
by punishing itself, it unveils the truth (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.26). 
In the same book, Foucault (1961/2001) differentiated between behavioural 
treatment techniques used in the nineteenth century which were based on morality 
and earlier bodily techniques such as purification, immersion and movement 
regulation which were still aimed at purifying the soul (p.232). The main difference 
here is that nineteenth century techniques did not restrain the madman, however they 
made him fear his carers and to dread the consequences of indulging in undesirable 
behaviour. 
 
Foucault chose Philippe Pinel and Samuel Tuke in order to develop his argument 
about the asylum system. Foucault (1961/2001) outlined how Tuke’s philosophy, as 
seen in the Quaker institution that he founded, was based on guiding the patients 
through a process of self examination and internal dialogue (p.234). This meant that 
the residents were not physically abused as seen in prior modes of treatment. Instead 
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the terror related to these physical methods was replaced by a method of repression 
that was focused on wakening the patient’s conscience through the instillation of 
guilt. Here Foucault (1961/2001) placed particular emphasis on the power of 
observation as a form of control and restraint (p.237).  This has to be seen in the 
view that those who were observing the patient had the power to categorise observed 
behaviour as being desirable or not and consequently actualise a judgement system.  
This is the basis of what gave power to psychiatry. Foucault’s central point, and one 
of great interest is that although psychiatry may have moved out of the years of 
visible barbaric treatment, in reality, patients have been freed from physical 
constraint but are now restrained within the chains of their conscience as guided 
through the medical discipline (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.262). This may indicate a 
change in the method of application of power – from an overt way to a covert one. 
 
Pinel’s system was also based on conscience in a time where political criminals were 
starting to be distinguished from psychiatric patients. Importantly, Pinel was not in 
favour of religious conscience or morality – his approach to the focus on conscience 
was drawn from values in the outside world and their imposition onto the patient. 
Patients were encouraged to speak about their symptoms, with the exception of 
delirious discourse (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.242). Foucault (1961/2001) related this 
theme to the use of psychological treatment, which, in his eyes, is also based on 
morality rather than on science (p.264). The philosopher devoted particular detail to 
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis – in his opinion, this type of treatment does not 
involve judgement or punishment and this means that it can explore mental illness in 
a more effective way. However, Foucault doubts its effectiveness since he theorised 
that engagement with unreason can only be achieved successfully through art and 
other modes of creativity. 
 
Another leading figure in the treatment debate was Thomas Szasz. Szasz (1974a) 
reasoned that in general medicine, if a person does not have symptoms of an 
abnormal biological condition – clear hard proof of a malfunctioning organ - then 
s/he is not usually considered as being ill and as being a patient (p.101). This is due 
to the fact that Western medicine rests on two tacit convictions: that of diagnosing 
and treating bodily disorders and doing this with the patient’s consent.  The logical 
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conclusion that follows is that psychiatry cannot really cure, if such a thing as mental 
illness does not even exist and so psychiatry is simply engaging in pseudomedical 
and “pharmacomythological” interventions: 
The war on drugs is the current psychiatric-judicial pogrom. And so is the 
war on children called “hyperactive”, poisoned in schools with the illegal 
street drug called “speed”, which, when called “Ritalin”, is a miracle cure for 
them (Szasz, 2000, sec 1).  
Notably, Szasz (2007) made use of a television set analogy where he insisted that the 
quality of a program on television cannot be improved by interfering with the set 
wiring (p.6). Therefore, a television engineer cannot address problems such as 
viewers disliking a particular program because such issues are dependent on external 
factors such as the acting and script. Similarly, “problems with living” cannot be 
addressed by interfering with physiological mechanisms and using the same logic, 
psychiatrists are not equipped to treat psychological problems. Szasz (2007) 
concluded that the act of using medical terminology to address such problems is 
detrimental to the individual and simply causes oppression and further chaos: “We 
call jokes ‘sick’, economies ‘sick’, sometimes even the whole world ‘sick’; but only 
when we call minds ‘sick’, we systematically mistake and strategically misinterpret 
metaphor for fact – and send for the doctor to ‘cure’ the ‘illness’ ” (p.6). 
 
Here, the author outlined that he is only opposed to state psychiatric services due to 
their coercive nature and the tendency to limit individual freedom. His view was that 
an individual should seek a service on his own free will, essentially without the 
involvement of the state and so treatment should never be imposed:  
If a person wants a book, he can go to a store and get it or get it on the 
internet. He ought to be able to get a drug the same way. If he doesn't know 
what to take, then he could go to a doctor or a pharmacist and ask them. And 
then he should be able to go and buy it (Szasz, 2000, sec.3). 
Other radical figures, such as Laing and Cooper also shared their views in the 
opposition to psychiatric treatment. Cooper perceived asylums as a symbol of 
political repression of the working class.  He attempted to explore other treatment 
approaches that were not based on a medical model.  In 1962, he set up an 
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antipsychiatry unit called Villa 21. The aim of the unit, (like Kingsley Hall that 
followed it), was to destructure the typical psychiatric ward environment.  Thus, 
professionals and patients did not wear a uniform and attempted to address 
emotional difficulties through non-responsive involvement (Cooper, 1967, pp.93-
94).  
 
Berlim, Fleck & Shorter (2003) summed up Laing’s views by stating that Laing 
refused to acknowledge that any professional status or knowledge is required in the 
treatment of mental illness (p.64).  According to Laing (1967), the “healer role” was 
one that could be taken up by any individual who was concerned and willing to help: 
“Psychiatrically, this would appear as ex-patients helping future patients to go mad” 
(p.128). For Laing, the role of the treatment setting was that of a sanctuary where 
individuals could be supported to go through their “process of madness”: 
The journey is experienced as going further ‘in’, as going back through one’s 
personal life, in and back and through and beyond into the experience of all 
mankind, of the primal man, of Adam and perhaps even further into the being 
of animals, vegetables and minerals (Laing, 1967, p.126). 
Furthermore, Laing asserted that psychiatrists and psychotic individuals are not all 
that different; any visible gap only exists because of the psychiatrist’s professional 
training that promotes the alienation of the care receiver. Additionally, he 
emphasized that clinicians should attempt to debunk their assumptions about reality 
and madness whilst providing care (Laing, 1960, p.33). Simultaneously, 
professionals need to realise that the patient’s perception of his/her situation is as 
valuable as that of the clinician’s. 
 
In a similar manner to Cooper, Laing’s practical contribution to this debate came in 
the form of a residential treatment community centre that was opened by this 
psychiatrist in 1965 and lasted till 1970 (O’Hagan, 2012, para.3). Five decades later, 
those who experienced this setting recall a dramatic era of discovery. The core 
leading group consisted of Laing, Cooper, Esterson, Briskin, Redler, Berke, 
Schatzman and Liss. During the existence of Kingsley Hall, there was a rapid 
turnover of therapists with Laing remaining present all throughout its existence. In 
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total, 130 patients stayed at the place (O’Hagan, 2012, para.9). The underlying 
philosophy of Kingsley Hall was that of allowing and encouraging the full force of 
the experience of episodes related to mental illness without any suppression or 
structured therapy. Resembling a subculture, therapists and patients resided 
permanently in the house and through a destructuring of the therapeutic milieu, 
several patients experienced regression and rebirth. O’Hagan (2012) described how 
the place did not have any locked doors and no anti-psychotic drugs were used 
(para.4). There was a meditation room and all-night therapy with a focus on 
regression to childhood, role-reversal sessions and planned entertainment. 
 
Although Laing’s anti-psychiatry experiment has not been thoroughly tested for 
effectiveness, Harris (2012) tracked down and interviewed 13 people who resided at 
Kingsley House during the five-year period of its existence.  The narratives that 
emerged are contradictory yet thought provoking.  For instance, Francis Gillet, one 
of the residents, recounted how: “Ronnie [Laing] said, ‘Go mad, young man’, and I 
did. I took him at his word, and I went as mad as I possibly could, and at no time did 
he try and stop me” (Harris, 2012, Interview 2). 
 
One of the most famous and successful individuals who passed through this place 
was Mary Barnes, who described how during her Kingsley stay, she had regressed to 
infancy and indulged in behaviour such as bottle feeding and crying for attention.  
Subsequently, she later emerged as a celebrity artist and poet (O’Hagan, 2012, para. 
5).   Controversially, other residents described Laing’s free distribution of high-
grade LSD which was supposed to release childhood traumas and inner evil spirits. 
Notably, one of the residents stated that Laing resembled a shaman but conflictingly 
he still worked as a psychoanalyst – something that in the resident’s opinion, made 
Laing a contradictory, difficult and irresponsible being (O’Hagan, 2012, para. 47).   
 
Berlim et al. (2003) described how in the 1960s, Laing and Szasz emerged as radical 
left figures but their effect on psychiatrists or on Health Department policies was not 
very significant. In contrast to them, Goffman presented strong arguments that in 
mental hospitals, psychiatrists held so much more power than the patients that the 
whole system was rendered anti-therapeutic. This proved to be adequate justification 
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for the closing down of many hospitals as guided by the conviction that this was in 
the patients’ interest (Berlim et al., 2003, p.65). As articulated by Eisenberg (2010), 
the process and consequences of deinstitutionalisation have shown that psychiatric 
hospitals did have some scope after all (p.97). This is because when in some 
countries psychiatric hospitals were downsized or closed, a large number of patients 
were rendered homeless – crimes ensued and this situation perpetuated the stigma 
related to mental illness. In view of these different views and approaches to treating 
individuals perceived as being mentally ill, it seems to me as if the state has a clear 
yet very complex problem: that of managing unreason.  
ii). The effectiveness of psychiatric drugs 
A crusade against drug effectiveness 
The effectiveness of psychotropic drugs has been one of the most controversial areas 
over the years. Figures like Moncrieff (2013a; 2013b), Healy (2009) and Breggin 
(2006) have presented research that contradicts the promoted and evidenced 
effectiveness of commonly used drug types in psychiatry. Bracken (2012) stated that 
over recent years, the evidence that psychiatric drugs function through a placebo 
effect cannot be contradicted. The author cited two meta-analyses carried out by 
Turner and Kirsch which have concluded that in 80% of the cases explored through 
individual studies, the improvement seen was very much comparable to that 
experienced by participants in placebo groups (p.56). 
 
Double (2001) acknowledged that reviewing the literature about the effectiveness of 
psychiatric drugs is a complex task due to the vast amount of studies, different 
methodologies and the need to appraise the quality of studies located (p.25). Several 
researchers have endeavoured to undertake this process. Double (2001) described 
how in 1974, Morris and Beck were amongst the first to synthesise the data available 
by looking at trials published over a 14-year period (p.25). Their results showed that 
in more than half the cases, antidepressants were more effective than placebo.  
However, Bracken and Thomas (2004) theorised that the main mode of function of 
antidepressants is through the generation of hope.  Since hope may be generated 
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through alternative, less invasive methods, the authors postulated that discourse in 
mental health should feature issues such as hope, meaning and values. 
 
Thase (1999) reported that the evidence for the effectiveness of antidepressants is 
not robust and it has to be acknowledged that there is a significant placebo effect 
(p.333).  Similar findings were later reported by Kirsch (2009) whose research 
showed that a significant difference between placebo and antidepressants is only 
witnessed in very severe cases of depression (p.318). In 1995, Moncrieff had also  
explored the effectiveness of the mood stabiliser lithium and expressed 
dissatisfaction due to her observation that results obtained are neither clear nor 
significantly demonstrated: 
Differences between lithium and placebo treatment in several of the trials 
were probably attributable to discontinuation of lithium increasing the 
likelihood of manic relapse in placebo treated subjects. In the largest 
prospective trial, treatment conditions for the two groups were not 
comparable (Prien et al 1973a), and in another prospective trial only a select 
group of subjects were considered and results were presented in a way which 
impedes a proper understanding of the data (Moncrieff, 1995, p.571). 
In a later trial by Bowden et al (2000), which is considered as the largest clinical trial 
in this area, there was no significant difference in the subjects’ response rates to 
lithium and to a placebo (p.485).  In addition to the fact that the effectiveness of 
drugs has been placed under scrutiny, Evans (2004) also cautioned about the 
inadequacy of the double-blind methodology that is used in many clinical trials 
(p.14). This is due to several factors. For instance, patients may note that the placebo 
tablets that they have been taking taste differently from the usual medication. Active 
medication may also be characterised by side effects which distinguishes it from 
placebo. Treatment that is regularly used to manage psychosis has also been under 
scrutiny. In 1998, Thornley and Adams explored the effectiveness of drugs used in 
the treatment of schizophrenia over the past 50 years. A total of 2000 trials were 
included in the review. The findings showed that the overall quality of the studies 
was poor and this may have led to inaccurate overly positive results in relation to the 
effectiveness of these drugs (Thornley & Adams, 1998, p.1183).  Bracken and 
Thomas (1999b) discussed how rather than viewing drugs as the medial cure, it is 
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advisable to talk and describe the experience of psychosis during a dialogue with the 
patient: 
It is often assumed that in irrational states, such as psychosis, there are 
constraints on a person's ability to act autonomously. This view may be used 
as justification by a psychiatrist to disregard the patient's treatment 
preferences. But situations in which a person is irrational in all aspects of 
thought, will and action are rare (p.328). 
In 2010, Irving Kirsch compiled his research around this area in a book called 
Antidepressants: The Emperor’s New Drugs.  His views were similar to other 
leading figures and he outlined his concern that the drug industry may be a culprit in 
promoting the pseudo-effectiveness of psychiatric drugs: 
The drug effect seemed rather small to us, considering that these medications 
had been heralded as a revolution in the treatment of depression – 
blockbuster drugs that have been prescribed to hundreds of millions of 
patients, with annual sales totalling billions of pounds (Kirsch, 2010, p.11). 
This concern echoes the thoughts of critical psychiatrists in relation to the evidence 
base underlying the biomedical model. Notably, Kirsch did not shun the use of 
medical treatment as he realised that this may be of use in particular cases. His 
perception is similar to Higgins’ (2008) who indicated that the place of medical 
treatment should be that of an “invited guest” rather than an “overarching paradigm” 
(p.11). 
 
In 2013, Peter Breggin, another prominent figure in the effort to limit the abusive 
prescription of psychotropic drugs, presented a guided system to psychiatric drug  
withdrawal in his book: Psychiatric Drug Withdrawal: A Guide for Prescribers, 
Therapists, Patients and their Families. The aim of the book was to offer guidelines  
to assist the prescriber and therapist in helping patients to withdraw from psychiatric 
drugs. Breggin (2013) elucidated how research revealed the danger of long-term 
exposure to psychiatric drugs due to their relation to obesity, diabetes, heart disease, 
abnormal movements and a detrimental effect on the quality of life (p.3). These 
dangers have led Breggin to advise that the best option in modern psychiatry is to 
encourage withdrawal from psychiatric drugs. 
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Counter arguments  
Despite the convincing nature of these arguments, which are indeed supported by 
research, it is interesting to note that the opposing side of the argument is similarly 
based on a multitude of research which seemingly demonstrates the effectiveness of 
the commonly used drug types in psychiatry (Kohler, Gaus & Bschlor, 2014; Maher 
et al., 2011; Vieta et al., 2010). Leading figures in this area, such as Leucht et al. 
(2012) have cautioned against the crusade against psychiatric drugs due to the 
consequence that it can have on patients: “In this context, many psychiatric drugs not 
only improve the acute episode but also prevent further episodes. Patients with 
severe, recurrent depression might have 20 episodes in their lifetime, which could be 
reduced by medication to 10” (p.103). They described that controversy about 
medication effectiveness can result in individuals who decide to discontinue their 
medication – this can easily be a catalyst to suicide or relapse. These researchers 
have devoted effort to proving the effectiveness of psychiatric drugs through various 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analysis. One particular study involved an 
overview of 94 meta-analyses in an attempt to demonstrate that the degree of 
effectiveness of psychiatric drugs compares well to other drugs used in general 
medicine (Leucht, et al., 2012). In an echo of Moncrieff and Cohen’s views (2009), 
it has to be said that whilst the consequence of stopping effective medication is  
acknowledged, however, it may be equally harmful to mislead patients into believing 
that psychiatric drugs are overly-effective or can provide a cure. In a chain of 
publications, Moncrieff distinguished between a drug centred model and a disease 
centred model (See Moncrieff, 2010; Moncrieff, 2009; Moncrieff 2007).  She 
described how the drug centred model may be more empowering as it views 
psychiatric medication as an extrinsic substance that mainly works through 
producing cognitive and emotional suppression:  
The disease centred model is captured by the idea that drugs act by correcting 
or partially correcting an underlying biological lesion, analogous to the way 
the action of most drugs in general medicine is understood. In contrast the 
drug centred model suggests that drugs work by inducing their own abnormal 
brain states (Moncrieff, 2007, p.296). 
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This suppressed state may be beneficial in certain circumstances, such as in acute 
psychotic states. However, in an example brought by Moncrieff and Cohen (2005), 
once the acute episode has been controlled, the person may then decide to stop 
antipsychotic drug use and instead engage in alternative forms of maintenance 
treatments (p.151). This is different and probably more beneficial than adherence to 
the disease centred model which assumes that psychiatric medication is 
physiologically corrective. 
iii). Contemporary alternative approaches 
The psychosis example 
Dutch psychiatrist Marius Romme has been one of the pioneers in developing 
alternative approaches which view symptoms characteristic of psychosis as 
meaningful and that have to be explored and understood rather than suppressed or 
disguised. He posited that accepting and coping with auditory hallucinations - a 
symptom that is often attributed to a state of psychosis - can enhance one’s quality of 
life in a better way than simply ignoring the voices (Romme, 2009, p.4). Indeed, he 
believed that struggling against the voices only causes them to become stronger. In 
his publications such as Accepting Voices (Romme & Escher, 1993) and Making 
Sense of Voices (Romme, 2000) as well as others published in the journal Mind, 
Romme described an innovative approach involving the extraction of meaning out of 
psychosis. This may be painful for patients due to the realisation and facing of 
difficulties. The aim of professionals is to facilitate this process for the patient and 
guide him/her by acknowledging that the person’s explanatory framework may be 
different from that of the professional’s as seen in the following service user 
narrative presented by Romme (2007):  
Every time, when I was released from hospital and went back to normal life, 
there was this reduction of possibilities in my life. Nearly ten years later I 
was not interested in anything anymore. It took me quite a while to see the 
relationship between my voices and my life, so I realized that when I was 
angry and did not express my anger the voices became angry at me (sec. 3-4). 
This approach is synonymous with the Hearing Voices Network, originally founded 
by Marius Romme in the Netherlands and which has been developed in other 
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countries such as the UK. These movements are concerned with the normalisation 
rather than the medicalization of the psychotic experience and are active in raising 
awareness of alternative ways of coping: “So, accepting is not concretely accepting 
everything of the voices as they are perceived, but is the beginning of looking 
differently at them; normalising them; being with many others who hear voices; 
creating hope and opening personal possibilities” (Romme, 2007, sec.3). 
 
A similar approach is advocated by psychologist Rufus May whose main focus is to 
introduce alternatives to medical labelling and management of psychiatric 
symptoms, particularly, psychosis.  In the documentary The Doctor who Hears 
Voices produced by Wade (2008), May provided an overview of the voice dialogue 
technique that can be used to engage in a therapeutic relationship with a person who 
is experiencing auditory command hallucinations.  He explained that “supporting 
people in a force free way through their spiritual and emotional crises takes 
resources.  Not more resources, just a different emphasis in how they are used.” 
(May, 2005, para.21).  Such symptoms would normally probably merit an admission 
to a psychiatric hospital if a mainstream approach was to be applied: 
In terms of care for psychosis, force is at the centre of the state’s approach to 
treatment.  Neuroleptic drug treatment (under the pseudonym anti-psychotic 
medication) is presented as the treatment of choice for people with unusual 
beliefs behaviours or experiences; Treatment of choice for those who have no 
choice.  Most first admissions to psychiatric hospital are characterised by a 
‘try this medication or if you don’t we’ll have to force you to take it’ 
approach.  Maybe we should rename mental health services ‘psychiatric 
drugging services’! (May, 2005, para.18). 
Other leading figures in this area are Sandra Escher (See Escher, Delespaul, Romme, 
Buiks & Van Os, 2003) who has worked with Marius Romme to produce various 
publications, Pat Deegan (See Deegan, 2007), Tamsin Knight (See Knight, 2006) 
and Peter Lehmann (See Lehmann, 2009).  
 
Bracken et al. (2012) noted that these controversial approaches may bring about 
changes in the way that psychiatrists and other professionals are trained since it 
seems as if the only skill that is needed to engage with psychiatric patients is 
willingness to listen and to respect the individual (p.432). One of the most powerful 
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contemporary movements, which may be viewed as lying midway between the 
critical psychiatry model and conventional psychiatry is the Recovery Model.  
Warner (2010) explained that this refers to a focus on self-determination, 
empowerment and interpersonal support – a focus on collaboration rather than 
adherence and compliance (p.3).  Lieberman et al. (2008) added that educational 
programmes as well as structures such as user-run services and peer support are 
important concepts in the recovery model, which is a bio-psycho-social-spiritual 
model of care (p.487). As stated by Deegan (1996): 
The recovery model is rooted in the simple yet profound realization that 
people who have been diagnosed with mental illness are human beings. 
Those of us who have been diagnosed are not objects to be acted upon. We 
are fully human subjects who can act and in acting, change our situation. We 
are human beings and we can speak for ourselves. We have a voice and can 
learn to use it. We have the right to be heard and listened to. We can become 
self-determining. We can take a stand toward what is distressing to us and 
need not be passive victims of an illness. We can become experts in our own 
journey of recovery (p.92). 
(iv). The constitution of evidence 
On reflection, it appears as if the alternative approaches to biomedical psychiatry 
that have just been described may add an interesting tangent to the range of 
psychiatric services and treatment options available in the twenty first century.  
However, there seems to be a paucity in the empirical evidence base related to a 
number of these approaches especially when compared to mainstream treatment 
options such as pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy. Interestingly, it also appears as 
if in cases where empirical research was in fact carried out, a naturalistic approach 
tended to be favoured over positivist research that features clinical trials and 
statistical data. This leads me to wonder about what determines the decision to 
consider a piece of information as evidence. The quest for evidence-based medicine 
originated from the need to close the gap between practice and research. More 
importantly, a parallel goal was the generation of proof that would inform practice, 
allow evaluation and dictate which approaches are effective and therefore 
encouraged (Eddy, 2005, p.16). In the same manner, practices that are not 
characterised by sufficient evidence in terms of effectiveness may be harder to 
justify and to fund (Children’s Services Council, 2007, p.1). I do not perceive the 
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move towards research based interventions to be problematic. In contrast, a medical 
field which is only based on opinions may lead to dangerous practice and a return to 
the dark ages of inhumane and bizarre treatment. However, I cannot fail to note that 
in an effort to delineate safe and effective practice, most ethics committees and 
clinical excellence reviewers seem to regard specific types of research designs as 
being the gold standard in the generation of evidence. In terms of medications and 
interventions, meta-analyses of triple-blind randomized controlled trials (with 
concealment of allocation and low attrition) are commonly placed on top of the 
hierarchy of evidence whilst naturalistic and anecdotal research may be placed at 
lower levels (Guyatt, Sackett, Sinclair, Hayward, Cook & Cook, 1995, p.1802). This 
is where I question the validity of considering any particular evidence-type as the 
sole dictator of effectiveness of treatment. 
 
Moncrieff and Timimi (2013) explored the dilemma of the validity of empirical 
positivist research in great detail by an analysis of NICE guidelines on Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and depression.  The authors referred to the 
evidence base of clinical trials that informed these guidelines – studies that may be 
characterised by a number of limitations such as publication bias, conflict of interest 
by authors, incomplete information and other methodological problems:  
NICE guidelines are not unbiased, value-free accounts that arise unaided 
from the data. They represent a particular position rooted in a technological 
understanding of the problems concerned, a position that guided and shaped 
the selection and interpretation of evidence and excluded or ignored evidence 
that was contradictory (Moncrieff & Timimi, 2013, p.68). 
Moncrieff and Timimi (2013) added that this psychiatric knowledge seems to be 
contaminated with third party interests and power dynamics and in this sense, this 
resembles a Foucauldian knowledge-power symbiosis: “the authority of medicine 
operates to promote a technological view of the nature of certain human problems, 
which in turn strengthens medical hegemony over these areas” (p.60). 
 
Thomas, Bracken and Timimi (2012) expressed similar views about the concept of 
Evidence Based Medicine, which they defined as “an attempt to identify the most 
successful technical interventions for discretely defined medical conditions” (p.295). 
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In their article, the authors’ main focus was on exploring the interpretation (or 
misinterpretation) of findings from positivist research as well as the use of these 
interpretations in guiding treatment.  As an example, the authors explored the 
pharmacological treatment and psychotherapeutic approaches used in depression. 
Consequently, they reached similar conclusions to Moncrieff and Timimi (2013): in 
relation to anti-depressants, the authors noted that in the majority of clinical trials 
carried out, placebo has been shown to be effective in alleviating symptoms. 
Similarly, in psychotherapy, it seems as if it is quality of the therapeutic alliance that 
influences outcomes rather than the specific type of therapy that is used.  To this 
extent the authors described how research has indicated that the quality of the 
therapeutic alliance has been shown to be “up to seven times more influential in 
promoting change than treatment model” (Thomas et al., 2012, p.299). In relation to 
these findings, the authors claimed that this highlights the importance of respecting 
the patient’s values and preferences rather than rigidly adhering to one professional 
approach and using it to steer the alliance. Furthermore, the complexity and diversity 
of human needs may also call for the incorporation of rationalism – a perspective 
that is often shunned by empirical research (Thomas et al., 2012, p.305). 
 
Whilst sympathising with the arguments presented by Thomas et al. (2012), I have 
an additional difficulty which is that of the seemingly accepted definition of the term 
Evidence Based Model. This is due to the fact that in the medical world, there often 
seems to be the automatic right to equate the term evidence with a number of criteria 
that are mostly based on positivism – a practice that seems to characterise the 
Evidence Based Model. In my opinion, this feels like the act of hijacking of what 
would have otherwise been a more comprehensive term. My perception is similar to 
that presented by Hjorland (2011) who concluded that: 
Given this one-sidedness of EBP, it would be better to speak of research-
based practice (RBP), because no such one-sidedness is connected with this 
term. I suggest that EBP should be understood as the tradition in which a 
fixed hierarchy of research methods is applied in research synthesis and in 
guidelines for decisions for practitioners (p.1308). 
Whilst agreeing with most of Hjorland’s arguments against the one-sidedness of the 
Evidence Based Model, I do not subscribe to using research-based practice as a new 
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term. This is because this may act as an acceptance that the term evidence is indeed 
synonymous to positivist research to such an extent that a new term - research-based 
practice - had to be invented so as to enhance the significance of naturalistic 
research and rationalism. In my opinion, the term evidence based practice can still 
be used but an effort needs to be made to reverse the restriction of its definition to 
positivist research. This is not to imply that empirical research, in particular 
positivist research, should be debunked.  In contrast, my contention is that there is a 
need for both interpretivist and positivist types of empirical research as well as 
knowledge arising from rationalism since ascribing to a sole type of approach may 
not be in the best interest of the service user: “The need to encompass evidence not 
only of effectiveness, but also of feasibility, appropriateness, and meaningfulness in 
order to achieve evidence-based healthcare practice” (Pearson, Wiechula, Court & 
Lockwood, 2007, p.88). 
2.3.4 Societal control, labelling, psychiatric power and third party 
interests 
The final section in this part of the review addresses political issues with relevance 
to the mesh of societal control and third party interests in the psychiatric discipline. 
This exploration is undertaken by reference to the works of key figures such as 
Szasz, Laing, Basaglia and Foucault. 
 
Pilgrim and Rogers (2005) described how the relationship between psychiatry and 
social science has been characterised by a longstanding tension during the past half-
century. The main stereotypical distinctions lie in the tendency to adhere to the 
medical model (focusing on individual physiological dysfunction)  and the social 
care model (which is based on acknowledging the root of the problem as being social 
causes and consequences whilst affording focus on the individual’s phenomenology) 
(Middleton & Shaw, 2007, p.291). 
Reference to the medical model and societal effects was also made by Szasz (1974b) 
who, in his book Ceremonial Chemistry, illustrated how the historical witches and 
gypsies were today’s drug addicts and insane people – the scapegoats of society 
(p.xv). He elaborated on the fact that society has a compulsive need to medicalise 
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and label challenging behaviour, as has happened in the case of obesity or as it is 
medically known, “hypernutrition” – a category created by medicine for those who 
have the wrong weight. This classification is similar to the concept of 
“drogophobia”, which involves a specialisation dealing with “substance misuse” – a 
medical label for those who take the wrong drugs: 
The manufacture of the drug problem does, however, generate certain 
phenomena which could be discussed and dealt with in a number of ways.  
Many of these phenomena – especially the prohibition of certain substances 
called “dangerous drugs” and their use called ‘drug use” or “drug addiction” 
– are now discussed in textbooks of pharmacology.  This is as if the use of 
holy water were discussed in textbooks of inorganic chemistry.  For if the 
study of drug addiction belongs to pharmacology because addiction has to do 
with drugs, then the study of baptism belongs to inorganic chemistry because 
this ceremony has to do with water (Szasz, 1974b, p.xvi). 
In a similar manner to Pilgrim and Rogers (2005), Szasz’s line of thought traced the 
creation of psychiatry as a form of control for those who deviated from normal social 
behaviour. Amongst Szasz’s central arguments lies the individual’s right to commit 
suicide (Szasz, 2006), the abolition of court insanity testaments as a circumvention 
of punishment and the coercion related to involuntary hospitalisation (Szasz, 1998). 
 
With a less radical approach than Szasz, Italian psychiatrist Basaglia shared the view 
that mental illness and diagnosis are linked to societal control (Basaglia, 1968).  
However, he did recognise and outline the role of the medical profession in 
addressing these symptoms. As a starting point, Basaglia (1964) recognised that 
many of the characteristics of mental illness that he observed in his patients seemed 
to subside as soon as they left from the asylum. From these observations, Basaglia 
(1964) concluded that the culture of the asylum was limiting our knowledge on 
mental illness and on the consequences of individuals suffering from these ailments 
(p.5). He was concerned that unless asylums were closed down, the culture within 
these settings would be unknowingly reconstructed by mental health professionals in 
community services. In his view, as long as confinement remained a possibility, 
professionals would continue to embrace the self-perception of being the responsible 
and knowledgeable entity and patients’ freedom would still be controlled by the 
doctor.  Basaglia (1979) considered mental illness as the product of societal 
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exclusion. He deemed that psychiatry was the provider of scientific support for 
societal control: 
I said I do not know what madness is. It can be all or nothing. It is a human 
condition. In our world, madness exists and is present as is reason. The 
problem is that society, to be called civil, should accept madness as it accepts 
reason. Instead, this society recognizes madness as part of reason, and a 
science that is responsible for unreason. The asylum has its reason to be, 
because it makes the rational irrational. When someone is crazy and goes into 
an insane asylum, he ceases to be crazy and becomes ill (Basaglia, 1979, 
p.18). 
This line of thought may resemble that of Laing’s, whose ideas, as based on the 
works of Marx and Sartre, viewed society as being the culprit of shackling the 
individual unwillingly and limiting his/her freedom (Laing, 1960). In this manner, 
individuals who are labelled as being mentally ill are just healthy people who have 
deviated from their natural state and are trying to return back to it. Huddleston 
(2006) noted a clear trend in Laing’s writings in that he depicted his existential quest 
to challenge dictated definitions of normality (sec.3). Using his personal and clinical 
experience, children’s stories and other literature, Laing illustrated how reality and 
normality are created by authority figures who in turn judge others who do not 
conform to this picture.   In an attempt to question the concept of normality, Laing 
(1967) presented a series of reflections such as the sanity of supposedly ‘normal’ 
men who have killed others during justified acts of violence such as wars (p.64). It 
has to be noted that Laing could afford to understand and portray an insider 
perspective of the world of schizophrenia since he was a sufferer himself. Moreover 
his contributions paved the way for the concept of recovery as based on his 
articulation that symptoms of mental illness are often transient. This implies that 
with the appropriate support, an individual can gain insight of his place in the world 
and attain a higher level of existence (Kallista, 2004, p.1). 
 
During the twentieth-century, sociologists such as Thomas Scheff and Erving 
Goffman worked in a parallel manner to the critical psychiatry movement in their 
quest to explore hazardous power issues in society. In 1966, the Labelling Theory 
was first applied to psychiatry in Scheff’s book: Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological 
Theory. In this publication, Scheff (1966) challenged the accepted perceptions of 
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mental illness by arguing that these disorders are manifested through the effect of the 
influence and power exerted by society on individuals (p.44).  In a similar way to 
that portrayed earlier by Goffman, Scheff (1966) discussed how society draws a 
perimeter around that which is considered as normal and views anything outside this 
boundary as being deviant or mentally abnormal (p.54). As a consequence, subtle 
pressure is placed on the individuals exhibiting this behaviour and gradually, they 
are guided into joining the mainstream population by modifying their undesirable 
behaviour. In this manner, Scheff concluded that a diagnosis of mental illness simply 
reflects that society does not accept a certain behaviour and has thus labelled it as 
unacceptable and treatable. 
 
Becker’s work is also consistent with this view.  In his book Outsiders, Becker 
(1991) provided a fictitious example of a boy who was falsely accused and classified 
as a delinquent simply because he happened to be near a delinquent group (p.21). 
This illustrated the main principle of the Labelling Theory: “it's not what you do, but 
how others define you that makes you socially deviant” (Orcutt, 2012, Unit 6). 
 
On reflecting on Scheff’s main contentions, it may be noted that the hazardous 
power of societal control may be a reality which is often taken for granted.  However 
I feel that an important point may be missing here in that sometimes, individuals 
who are experiencing symptoms akin to those described in a diagnosis of mental 
illness, may not be showing any deviant behaviour or experiencing any feelings of 
imposition by society. As a practical example, the concept of smiling depression is 
nowadays gaining recognition although it has not yet been attributed to a formal 
diagnosis in diagnostic manuals. This refers to a person who is experiencing 
prolonged overwhelming feelings of sadness but manages to contain these behind a 
smiling and perfectly functioning appearance (Labeaune, 2012). In this case, the 
behaviour of this person may remain undetected and it is usually not considered as 
deviant or overtly disruptive to the rest of society.  This means that society does not 
attach a label to this individual or attempt to impose any compulsory treatment onto 
him. However, this person may still need help and the rationale behind the need for 
support is not related to society’s need to control his/her behaviour but to the 
person’s need to enhance his/her life quality.  
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The role of societal power is an essential theme throughout the most cited psychiatric 
discourse and has been particularly influenced by Michel Foucault. In Madness and 
Civilization, Foucault (1961/2001) explored the dynamic relationship between 
madness and unreason, which are both viewed as irregular and abnormal states 
(p.73). Historically, these conditions were attributed to the lower class citizens of 
society who were perceived as being odd by society but who were not necessarily 
inherently odd.  At this instance, Foucault (1961/2001) alleged that a split was 
evident between unreason and madness. Unreason, which exhibited itself through 
crimes and pornography, was hidden away by society, as a protection for that very 
same society (p.74). On the other hand, madness was allowed and indeed encouraged 
to become visible so that it could be observed: “Madness had become a thing to look 
at: no longer a monster inside oneself, but an animal with strange mechanisms, a 
bestiality from which man had long since been suppressed”  Foucault (1961/2001, 
p.66).  Foucault noted that the process of observation served as a form of control – a 
theme that runs through the philosopher’s later work.  The relationship between 
observation and control allowed the parameters of normality to be established and 
this in turn allowed the imposition of rules and violence onto the mad man/woman in 
order to set him/her into place: 
Sufferers were generally chained to the walls and to beds. At Bethlehem, 
violent madwomen were chained by the ankles to the wall of a long gallery; 
their only garment was a homespun dress. At another hospital, in Benthal 
Green, a woman subject to violent seizures was placed in a pigsty, feet and 
fists bound (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.67). 
In a narrated journey through historical epochs, Foucault traced the history of 
madness through three periods: the Renaissance, the Classical Age (the later 
seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries) and the Modern Era.  One notable 
observation portrayed by Foucault (1961/2001) is that when leprosy disappeared, a 
societal vacuum was created – this vacuum can be interpreted as a space that society 
needs to fill with a condition that merits social exclusion (p.5). In this case, madness 
occupied this available void, or rather brought about a shift from a focus on a 
diseased body, as in the case of the leper, to emphasis on the abnormal mind. 
Foucault then introduced the Renaissance period. During this era, madness was 
perceived as a source of wisdom, which delineated worldly limits and which was 
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presented in literature as the difference between what man really is and what he 
pretends to be (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.21). During the Enlightenment, a sharp 
distinction between rationality and irrationality was made. Another distinction was 
also made between unreason due to madness and that originating from other sources: 
We can see why the scandal of madness could be exalted, while that of the 
other forms of unreason was concealed with so much care.  The scandal of 
unreason produced only the contagious example of transgression and 
immorality; the scandal of madness showed men how close to animality their 
Fall could bring them (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.76/77). 
In the modern world, unreason is still not allowed to be present at the surface 
societal level and is only understandable through art (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.272). 
Contrastingly, madness, as a separate concept, has been adopted by the medical field 
and is controlled by the experts in this discipline. The appearance of the doctor 
figure – the psychiatrist – supported this new system of observation and repression. 
In this way, madness was adopted by the medical discipline and the authority of 
scientific knowledge backed any decisions and actions (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.261). 
This added power to the discipline until nowadays, this power is almost regarded as 
an automatic professional right. Foucault’s exploration of the knowledge and power 
issues in the field of psychiatry runs through the therapeutic alliance between the 
professional and the patient and the exchange of knowledge and power in this 
microsystem: 
As positivism imposes itself upon medicine and psychiatry, this practice 
becomes more and more obscure, the psychiatrist’s power more and more 
miraculous, and the doctor-patient couple sinks deeper into a strange world.  
In the patient’s eyes, the doctor becomes a thaumaturge: the authority he has 
borrowed from order, morality…it is because he is a doctor that he is 
believed to possess these powers (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.261). 
Foucault’s genealogy led to his insistence that madness is neither natural not static. 
This is because it depends on the meaning attributed to it by the society within which 
it exists.  As evidenced through the passage of time, madness and unreason were 
characterised by diverse and at times, even opposing, facets. For instance, in one era, 
madness and unreason were perceived as being related whilst in another, they were 
distinguished from one another. On the same note, madness was at times considered 
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to be shameful whereas during other periods, it was prompted to the forefront.  The 
same opposing views characterise the asylum whose function has ranged from 
separation and discipline to healing and rehabilitation. 
 
This can be attributed to the concept of discourse which is one of the major themes 
in most of Foucault’s works.  Discourse refers to a system of knowledge that 
dominates truth, morality, meaning and normality: “systems of thoughts composed 
of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically 
construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006, p.285).  
Foucault’s quest was to explore the various factors that influenced the discourse on 
madness and its construction. 
 
In a similar manner to Foucault, Coulter (1979) contended that the label of insanity 
is assigned when an individual’s behaviour steps beyond social norms rather than 
when a pathological pattern is scientifically identified.  He argued that the body of 
normality is controlled by social groups and that this may be problematic since in 
contrast to scientific evidence, subjective judgments are context-dependent.  In order 
to delineate his argument, Coulter proceeded to say that in fact, oftentimes, 
ascriptions of psychiatric behaviour is often made by the individual himself or by his 
social network - this usually happens much before psychiatric support is elicited. 
Coulter (1979) used this example to indicate that the psychiatrist’s diagnosis is thus 
a label attached to that type of behaviour that has already been viewed as 
problematic: “[a] response to mundane social and moral requirements, and not to the 
development of some esoteric branch of knowledge” (p.147). 
 
A counter argument to Coulter’s view may compare his example to symptoms 
related to a general medical problem, such as a cardiac problem. In a similar manner 
to the situation recounted by Coulter, a person who is experiencing symptoms 
related to a cardiac problem, for instance, shortness of breath, may often conclude 
that his/her symptom is problematic. This view may also be shared by his/her social 
network.  This takes place a priori a pathological diagnosis by a cardiac specialist. 
Thus, in the same way as in psychiatry, the specialist’s diagnosis is also merely a 
label placed onto a problematic symptom. Thus, it seems as if irrelevant of whether a 
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symptom or behaviour has a scientific or a societal basis or not, diagnosis always 
constitutes the application of a label.  As already discussed in an earlier part of this 
review, this may not be necessarily linked to negative consequences and in fact, at 
times it may provide relief for the individual. By the term relief, I am referring to 
that comfort that may be found when one is given a name and a meaning for his/her 
symptoms thus showing him/her that the symptoms are known, explainable and may 
even be treated. 
 
However, to me, the main ethical problems arise in relation to what happens after a 
diagnosis is made. This is because in a contrasting way to general medicine, 
psychiatry has been provided with the power to control its patient and restrict his/her 
freedom. Ingleby (1981) asserted that the problem with a psychiatric diagnosis is 
that by allowing a particular behaviour to be construed within a medical framework, 
the individual is subjected to the disorder management package which forms part of 
that framework (p.23). In Ingleby’s opinion, this is erroneous because psychiatric 
treatment  and psychiatry are based on positivism and so cultural judgements related 
to health or illness are presented, perhaps mistakenly, as empirical truths (Ingleby, 
1981, p.24). 
2.3.5 Conclusion 
As we entered the “Decade of the Brain” (Jones & Lorne, 1999, p.739), the debates 
on the mental health field continued to shape the discourse that characterises this 
area. During this second part of the review, an attempt was made to address the 
major themes of discourse pertaining to mental health. In my view, the discourses 
explored ranged from the strangely simplistic to those which are highly methodical 
and complex. Echoing Foucault’s contentions, I feel that this combination of 
discourses may be that which ultimately influences the basic nature of the 
therapeutic alliance - the way in which different forms of knowledge and power are 
embedded in each of the singular bonds formed between each professional and the 
person who is receiving care.  This leads to the final part of this review which is a 
concluding exploration of the origins and characteristics of the alliance, as explored 
in view of the concepts that have been examined so far. 
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2.4 The therapeutic alliance 
2.4.1 Introduction 
I walk into the brightly lit waiting area and sit on one of the chairs as my eyes 
wander to the firmly closed door. The label reads your name and lists your 
qualifications – they look alien to me but at the same time, they also make me feel 
safe – as if they are telling me: “You are doing the right thing, you are seeking 
professional help”.  
But then again, I wonder. I have no doubt that you have the ability to give a meaning 
to my feelings, to my disturbing thoughts and to my behaviour. Yet, is it possible to 
fit me and my baggage in a standard box that you fit other patients in? This is ME, 
my whole life, my choices, my successes, my failures, my ideas. I need to share a 
whole life story with you so that you may get to know me as much as I know myself. I 
chuckle as I realise that the idea that I have verges on the absurd – I am asking for a 
therapist who can become ‘me’ and then merge that knowledge about myself with his 
skills.  As the door opens and I stand up, I instantly forget the introductory speech 
that I had prepared for this first session. “Have a seat”, you say, and our journey 
begins.  
      Author’s own 
 
This part of the review has been divided into three sections. The first section 
explores the concept of the therapeutic alliance in healthcare professions as well as 
its history. The second section is dedicated to a review of research that has been 
carried out in relation to care receiver and care provider characteristics in the alliance 
concluding in a critical discussion about emotional and multiple intelligences as 
applied to healthcare. The third section builds upon previous parts in the literature 
review in relation to the knowledge-power symbiosis within the therapeutic alliance.  
2.4.2 The therapeutic alliance: an overview of a concept 
At times they are called patients because they are in need of medical care. At others, 
they are referred to as service users or clients because professionals are offering a 
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service and these individuals are making use of it. During instances of reflection, the 
term they becomes us and then we speak about the statistical “one in four” chance of 
any individual suffering from a mental  disorder during his lifetime (Alonso et al., 
2004, p.21). Irrelevant of the nomenclature used, it is these individuals who form a 
vital part of the basic treatment modality in the mental health area – the therapeutic 
alliance - also known as the “helping alliance” or “working alliance” (Howgego, 
Yellowlees, Owen, Meldrum & Dark, 2003, p.170). 
 
This section traces the origin of the therapeutic alliance as well as its changes 
through history. The concept of the therapeutic alliance is believed to have its roots 
within the Freudian school of thought, particularly in relation to the theory of 
transference (Howgego et al., 2003, p.171).  Transference and countertransference, 
which typically refer to redirection of feelings between individuals in a therapeutic 
relationship, were originally perceived by Freud as being the patient’s resistance to 
therapy but later he asserted that “the transference, which, whether affectionate or 
hostile, seemed in every case to constitute the greatest threat to the treatment, 
becomes its best tool” (Freud, 1915/1989, p.496). Thus, it became more evident that 
if transference is managed in a professional manner, then it can serve as a powerful 
vehicle in engaging with individuals who are seeking care.  
 
Rogers (1961) proposed three fundamental constructs of the therapeutic alliance, 
these being empathy, unconditional positive regard and congruence (p.285). He also 
devoted effort to identifying the role of the therapist in the relationship – he 
contended that the primary value of the professional is that of providing a 
“scaffolding” structure for the patient so that the latter could increase reflective 
capacity in a supported manner: 
In my early professional years I was asking the question: How can I treat, or 
cure, or change this person? Now I would phrase the question in this way: 
How can I provide a relationship which this person may use for his own 
personal growth? (Rogers, 1961, p.32). 
In 1979, Bordin developed a working theory about the relationship and noted that the 
alliance involves three predominant phases: goal agreement, establishing tasks and 
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forming a positive bond between the professional and the client. Furthermore, the 
author elicited the importance of the patient’s belief that the therapist is willing to 
support him/her. On the same lines, the therapist’s confidence in the patient’s ability 
to use his/her resources is equally essential. In this manner, the nature of the alliance 
influences therapy outcome, not because of specialised healing powers in its own 
right, but as a platform that supports the patient and that enhances his/her potential to 
accept treatment and believe in it (Bordin, 1979, p.252). This alternative definition is 
a divergence from the earlier dichotomy that featured an interdependent therapeutic 
process and intervention procedures.  
 
Later, the alliance was portrayed by Hougaard (1994) as engaging two mutual and 
complementary concepts.  The first component consists of an alliance which tends to 
be task-based. This entails a shared agreement regarding the purpose of the alliance 
as well as the goals to be set. The second concept is characterised by a relationship 
whereas a bond based on trust is formed between the client and the professional 
(p.67). This marked the difference between the therapeutic alliance and the 
therapeutic relationship – terms which are often used interchangeably but which are 
sometimes posited to be theoretically different.  Baldwin, Wampold and Imel (2007) 
referred to the alliance as a part of the therapeutic relationship and described it as the 
mutual collaboration between the professional and the patient. Arising from a rather 
mystical and romantic origin, the therapeutic alliance has been well explored through 
multiple approaches incorporating positivist and interpretivist research methods. The 
consensus is that the alliance is statistically significant in influencing care outcome: 
There is evidence that a positive therapeutic alliance is associated with better 
outcomes.  The temporal relationship between alliance and symptomatic 
improvement is probably rather complex.  However it seems reasonable to 
suggest that in the absence of a positive alliance, specific technical 
interventions are unlikely to be effective (Fonagy & Roth, 2005, p.131). 
Evidence for this has been consistently presented in many research reports (See 
Fonagy & Roth, 2005; Orlinsky, Ronnestad & Willutzki, 2004; Duncan et al., 2003; 
Gaston, 1990). Exhaustive meta-analytic reviews such as that carried out by Martin, 
Gaske and Davis (2000) presented an important observation by noting that the 
positive effect of the alliance on care outcome is unaffected by the variables present 
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in the different studies explored (p.438). Neuroscience is similarly in accordance 
with this assertion: field findings have depicted higher neuro-plasticity in patients as 
a consequence of a positive relationship (e.g. Barletta & Fuller, 2002; Schore, 2002).  
 
In a parallel manner to the psychological discipline, the therapeutic alliance has been 
of particular interest to several nursing researchers and authors. Amongst the most 
influential ones, extensive work was carried out by Peplau (1952), Forchuk (1995), 
Barker (2001) and Dziopa & Ahern (2009). 
2.4.3 Personality characteristics and skills in the alliance 
This section explores literature that has been dedicated to care receiver and care 
provider characteristics in the alliance. This concerns a discussion of skills and 
personality traits as well as an exploration of the concepts of emotional and multiple 
intelligences as applied to healthcare.  
(i). Carer and patient characteristics  
A multitude of studies have explored the variables that are pertinent to the formation 
of an effective therapeutic alliance (Norcross, 2002; Hersoug, Hoglend, Monsen & 
Havik, 2001). Ackerman and Hilsenroth (2003) as well as Dziopa and Ahern (2009) 
identified a number of specific qualities that may enhance the bond between the 
professional and the patient. Amongst the comprehensive list found in their 
respective articles, notable care provider traits such as understanding and empathy, 
genuineness, dependability, benevolence, responsiveness, and self-awareness were 
predominant.  In their conclusion, Dziopa and Ahern (2009) identified an interesting 
finding where they postulated that some of the therapeutic relationship attributes that 
were indicated were self-contradictory. In order to exemplify their point, they cited 
Scanlon (2006) who noted that in the process of being non-judgmental, nurses may 
not be genuine as they are sacrificing their own beliefs (Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, 
sec.13). Certain care provider characteristics may also have a negative impact on the 
therapeutic alliance (e.g. rigidity, criticalness, inappropriate self-disclosure: see 
Verhaagen, 2010, p.45). 
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Since the care receiver is the other important entity in the working alliance, it may be 
naturally assumed that there is a counterpart body of research that has been devoted 
to elicit the care receiver characteristics that may play an influential role in the 
alliance. In fact, prominent research such as that by Boswell et al. (2013) and Smith-
Hansen (2008) has depicted clusters of patient characteristics and behaviour such as 
openness to discuss problems, predisposition to change and motivation.  However it 
can be noted that studies that have endeavoured to explore the care receiver side of 
this subject are limited in number.  It is felt that this indicates a vital research gap 
that needs to be addressed in an era where the patient needs to be perceived as an 
important stakeholder in care. 
 
On revisiting the care provider characteristics that have been identified as affecting 
the nature of the alliance, it can be noted that in my opinion, most of the qualities 
may not necessarily be related to the professional’s perceived knowledge, expertise 
and amount of qualifications. This is in disagreement with one of the conclusions 
made by Dziopa and Ahern (2009): 
The ability to understand a patient’s needs from non-verbal cues and to 
ascribe meanings to behaviours requires the sophisticated skill of the 
advanced practice psychiatric/ mental health nurse. Furthermore, the 
interface of certain attributes with others requires the psychiatric/ mental 
health nurse to have specialized skills (sec.13). 
Here I am not negating the importance and value of training and the practice of 
advanced learning skills – if I were to do that, I would be carrying out a self-
disservice since I am a mental health nursing lecturer. My point is that claims such 
as the one presented by Dziopa and Ahern (2009) may be overinflating and 
mystifying the importance of advanced “sophisticated” and “specialised” skills. This 
is because I feel that the main player in the picture is probably emotional intelligence 
and its various constituents. In this regard, I believe that Goleman’s ideas may offer 
valuable guidance: “A prerequisite to empathy is simply paying attention to the 
person in pain” (Goleman, 2013, para.5). In this excerpt from Goleman’s work, the 
correlation and similarity between empathy (which is often regarded as an academic 
skill) and the layman behaviour of simply paying attention (which is a non-specialist 
and non-advanced skill) can be noted. 
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This line of thought is supported by a number of theorists and researchers who 
endeavoured to apply the principles of the Emotional Intelligence Theory to the 
therapeutic alliance (Pearson, 2011, p.1).  It is felt that a brief stroll through the main 
tenets of this work may be useful and may provoke further reflection on the nature of 
the alliance concept. 
ii). Emotional intelligence and multiple intelligences 
In his article about the effect of power in military mental health nursing 
relationships, Cole (2006) elaborated on the concept of emotional intelligence and 
the vital role that it plays in the therapeutic alliance. He cited classic work such as 
that by Goleman who authored Emotional Intelligence – a ground breaking 
publication that explored the role of emotional intelligence and its equal importance 
to conventional intelligence (IQ) (Cole, 2006, p.28). A brief review of emotional 
intelligence shows the origin of this term in the 1970s and 80s as illustrated by the 
writings of psychologists Gardner (1983) and Mayer & Salovey (1997). The tenets 
of the concept of emotional intelligence feature the theory that traditional 
intelligence constitutes only one part of the intelligence spectrum and other 
intelligence forms are equally required and vital for an individual’s success.  This 
implies that there is the need for an increased focus on behaviour and personality 
traits rather than a preoccupation with academic excellence only: 
In the last decade or so, science has discovered a tremendous amount about 
the role emotions play in our lives. Researchers have found that even more 
than IQ, your emotional awareness and abilities to handle feelings will 
determine your success and happiness in all walks of life, including family 
relationships (Gottman & DeClaire, 1997, p.20). 
The main argument in favour of the role of emotional intelligence is the knowledge 
that an individual who is brilliant in academia may not necessarily be similarly good 
in maintaining effective inter-personal interactions. 
 
The four branch model of emotional intelligence as described by Mayer and Salovey 
(1997, p.10/11) defines emotional intelligence as the ability to: 
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- accurately perceive emotions in oneself and others 
- use emotions to facilitate thinking 
- understand emotional meanings 
- manage emotions 
 
The application of emotional intelligence to the therapeutic alliance has been 
discussed by Poullis (2007) who noted that there is a paucity of research that relates 
emotional intelligence to overarching issues in the subject of the therapeutic alliance 
(p.5). He subsequently explored how intelligence and emotions may feature in the 
development of the therapeutic relationship. Poullis (2007) elaborated on the 
competencies that may be needed by therapists in order to use emotions in an 
intelligent manner (p.5). He contended that the competencies identified are similar to 
those discussed by Goleman (2005) and Bar-On (1997) and include intrapersonal 
skills (e.g. self-awareness, self-regulation, stress management, adaptability, ability to 
manage heavy feelings and motivation) and interpersonal skills (e.g. empathy and 
social skills) (Poullis, 2007, p.110). In a similar exploration by Pearson (2011), the 
author’s position went beyond that of abiding to only one type of intelligence, be it 
emotional intelligence or otherwise.  Instead he contended that rather than the sole 
use of emotional intelligence or IQ, it would serve to reflect upon a pluralistic 
approach - the concept of Multiple Intelligences (MI) – an area that is predominant in 
Gardner’s work (Pearson, 2011, p.2). It is worthwhile noting that whilst the Multiple 
Intelligences Theory was introduced within various disciplines over the last decade, 
it is still finding its way into adult counselling (Pearson, 2011, p.2).  Importantly, the 
focus on multiple intelligences has been linked to favourable outcomes and in terms 
of the therapeutic alliance, it may enhance flexibility and better representation of the 
patient’s preferences.  At this point, it is worthwhile to revisit a contention made in 
an earlier part of this review, where it was stated that there seems to be general 
consensus that the therapeutic alliance provides the basic framework that determines 
care outcomes.  Rivett (2008) noted that traditional research focused on comparing 
the effectiveness of psychological therapies and general meta-analytic results show 
that most approaches are equally effective.  As a result, it is now being 
recommended that rather than religiously adhering to one therapy approach or 
practice, an eclectic use may be more appropriate.   
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Consequently, the current research trend has now shifted to exploring effective 
characteristics that form the denominator for therapy effectiveness across all 
approaches (Rivett, 2008, p.102). Pearson (2011) paid homage to this research and 
posited that the Multiple Intelligences Theory can be used as the theoretical 
underpinning – the denominator - for this integrated approach. He presented 
practical examples of how each intelligence type manifests in different therapies.  A 
typical example is musical intelligence which, in the form of music therapy; may be 
ideal for those patients who show appreciation for music. Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy is another widely used approach and one that can be linked to a care 
receiver’s preference for logical/ mathematical intelligence (p.10). Knowing that MI 
is an area that can be enhanced by training, Pearson’s recommendation for therapist 
training in the self-use and assessment of MI in therapy is felt to be an urgent need. 
2.4.4 Knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance 
In this literature review, several sections have been dedicated to an exploration of the 
knowledge-power relationship in healthcare professions. These culminate in this 
final section which builds upon previous arguments and attempts to place the 
alliance within the knowledge-power nexus. 
 
In one of his articles about power in psychotherapy and counselling, Zur (2009) 
noted that it seems as if the general consensus in the literature is that power in the 
therapeutic alliance is unidirectional and features a professional in control of a 
vulnerable patient (p.160). This perception is perpetuated by a number of factors, 
with the concept of transference being at the forefront. Zur (2009) added that the 
idea of a “slippery slope” and “power differential” has been another major 
contributor to the perception of power as being monolithic and held by the 
professional (p.161). He referred to the overemphasis on boundaries in therapy to 
such an extreme that natural and potentially therapeutic gestures such as touch, self-
disclosure and gifts may be pictured as demonic and as leading to a slippery slope in 
the alliance: 
This rather paranoid view asserts that due to the client’s inability to resist 
their omnipotent therapists, a routine hug is likely to lead to sexual 
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relationships and a simple social encounter in the community to intricate 
relationships (Zur, 2009, p.161).  
On sympathising with Zur’s view, I feel that whilst at times, an activity may clearly 
indicate a boundary violation, at others it may not be so clear and perhaps not 
detrimental or even beneficial to the alliance. For instance, in certain circumstances, 
a degree of self-disclosure may be helpful especially in an alliance such as the 
therapeutic one, where the care receiver is expected to disclose personal and 
sensitive issues to a professional who may be no more than a stranger.  Similarly, a 
hug may introduce elements of humanism and sympathy which may be useful during 
certain instances in therapy. The danger lies if one is not able to gauge the probable 
outcome of engaging in such activities during different situations. I believe that as a 
professional, this ability requires that which I call professional common sense, which 
arises from a combination of experience, professional knowledge and emotional or 
multiple intelligences. 
 
Zur (2009) proceeded to discuss how in relation to the consensus on the presence of 
a power imbalance in the alliance, literature on the topic can be classified in three 
categories (p.161). One of these categories or approaches is composed by those who 
are highly critical of psychiatry and mental illness especially with regards to power 
abuse and negative consequences on service users. These views are consistent with 
those seen in the anti-psychiatry movement that has been described in an earlier part 
of this chapter.  The second group of scholars who explored the power imbalance in 
the therapeutic alliance held that power is not necessarily abusive but warned that it 
can be detrimental if misused. Zur (2009) mentioned the works of Gutheil and 
Brodsky (2008), Celenza (2007) and Brown (1994) amongst examples of authors 
who presented this perception (p.161).  Another group who contributed to literature 
related to the power imbalance in the alliance is composed of feminists, humanists, 
existentialists and postmodern academics. Their main efforts are dedicated to 
reducing the power imbalance in order to create therapeutic relationships that are 
egalitarian and mutually respectful. Moreover, they claim that negating the presence 
of a power differential in alliance is harmful and an act of denial. Sutherland (2007) 
and Proctor (2002) are some of the works cited by Zur (2009) as an example of this 
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type of approach (p.161). In an addition to works that feature this approach, I include 
the psychiatric nursing research carried out by Dziopa and Ahern (2009) in which 
the “promotion of equality” has been shown to be one of the prominent attributes of 
an effective therapeutic alliance.  In their article, the authors initiated the discussion 
about this area by stating that the relationship between a psychiatric nurse and a 
patient is intrinsically imbalanced. This is supported by the fact that the “helper” role 
of the nurse is inherently linked to power (Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, sec.9). I view this 
quasi-assumption about the seemingly unavoidable existence of a power imbalance 
in the therapeutic alliance as being disturbing and questionable.  It seems as if the 
suggestion here is that the natural state of the therapeutic alliance is characterised by 
a power imbalance. In line with this “natural” imbalance, Dziopa and her colleague 
elaborated on a number of power skills that the nurse has the right to use. These 
include “offering expert knowledge through teaching…‘mothering’ or protecting 
vulnerable patients, through actions such as disciplining medication compliance and 
making sure patients eat” (Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, sec.9). 
 
Later on, the researcher clearly depicted the specific psychiatric nursing skills that 
facilitate equality in the relationship. These include “casual conversations, allowing 
time to inquire how patients are doing, creating the illusion of choice and allowing 
the patient to speak and to be heard” (Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, sec.9). Despite the 
benevolent intention of these listed activities, this perception of the nurse-patient 
alliance is felt to pose a major ethical and philosophical difficulty. At this point, my 
counterargument is that the natural state of the alliance does not need to constitute a 
power imbalance that the nurse attempts to amend by using special skills. Let us 
instead perceive this argument from a care receiver’s point of view.  I cannot profess 
to knowing what it feels like to be a care receiver within a therapeutic alliance and 
even if I did, each individual is unique so generalizability is beyond the scope of this 
argument.  However, it does seem that being a care receiver and knowing a priori 
that you are entering into an alliance which is naturally and inevitably characterised 
by a power imbalance may feel disempowering. It does point towards a helpless 
patient who is then at the mercy of the knowledgeable nurse. On referring back to 
approaches that supposedly diminish the power gap in the alliance, it may also be 
worthwhile to reflect on the discourse being used in the above excerpt by Dziopa and 
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her colleague. Wording used includes: “expert knowledge”, “teaching”, 
“mothering”, “compliance” and finally and perhaps the most controversial of all, at 
least to myself: the provision of an “illusion of choice” to the care receiver.   As used 
in the latter example, the word “illusion”, which may be defined as “something that 
is not really what it seems to be” (Cambridge Dictionaries, 2014), instils a sense of 
apprehension in me. Consequently, I wonder why choice needs to be presented as an 
illusion because this seems as if the care receiver does not really have a choice but 
needs to be tricked into perceiving that s/he has a choice. 
 
If this is the case, I feel that the advocacy for these approaches seems to counteract 
the rooting for a power balance as it is evident that the professional and his/her skills 
still constitute the major body of expertise in the alliance.  Foucault (1961/ 2001) 
may have touched upon the concept of illusions when he described the dinner parties 
that Tuke (a philanthropist and mental-health reformer) used to hold for patients in 
his asylum. The aim of these parties was to provide the opportunity for the inmates 
to interact with ‘normal’ people in a setting of respect and etiquette (p.236). Foucault 
(1961/ 2001) described how despite the apparent therapeutic purpose of these 
parties, in reality, they did not do much for the “madman” as they were simply an 
illusion – a re-creation of a reality where the mad man was seen as being accepted 
and given choices: “It is the organisation around the mad man of a world where 
everything would be like and near him, but in which he himself would remain a 
stranger, the stranger par excellence” (p.237). 
 
On reverting back to the article by Dziopa and Ahern (2009), it has to be 
acknowledged that the authors concluded their discussion by stating that equality is 
grounded in acknowledging that the patient and the nurse have equally important 
roles and knowledge-bodies (sec. 9).  Still, some of the approaches mentioned earlier 
in the article may not be ideal suggestions for nurses as potential pitfalls may stem 
from such perceptions. My view is similar to that expressed by Zur (2009) who 
cautioned about the perception of an inherent “power differential” in the therapeutic 
alliance – a phenomenon which he perceives as being a misconception (p.160). He 
claimed that scholars have pictured the relationship between a care provider and a 
care receiver as a parent-child relationship, with the consequence of depicting the 
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client as helpless and vulnerable. In my view, some of the excerpts discussed from 
the study carried out Dziopa and Ahern (2009) seem to be an example of Zur’s 
contention.  
 
As already mentioned earlier, a modernist approach challenged the concept of an  
all-knowing professional and brought with it a shift to the other side of the pole by 
highlighting the need of the professional to deny his/her knowledge and 
acknowledge the patient as the only expert in the alliance – the expert by experience 
(Brown, 2007, p.4).  The stance taken through this approach portrays power as being 
negative and repressive.  In Foucauldian terms, this practice may not be effective 
because primarily, it functions on the premise that complete professional objectivity 
is desirable.  This implies a perceived absence of power in the therapeutic alliance.  
According to Foucault (1978/1990), such a position is not possible because “there is 
no escaping power…it is always-ready present, constituting the very thing that one 
attempts to counter it with” (p.82). 
 
Realistically, it is very likely that the application of a modernist approach to the 
therapeutic alliance may result in the very phenomenon described by Foucault.  This 
is attributed to the fact that ironically, although a modernist view rebukes expert 
power, it does not succeed in eradicating its presence within the therapeutic alliance 
– it simply transfers it from one side of the equilibrium (the care provider side) to the 
other (the care receiver domain).  It is thus clear that power is still present in the 
alliance – it has simply shifted poles. Here I argue that the request for a power shift 
by the modernist is neither justified nor ethical. My view is concurrent with that of 
Zur’s (2009) who elaborated on the fact that clients come in all shapes and sizes and 
it is erroneous to assume that clients are always the underdogs in the alliance 
(p.161). He exemplified this by one of his personal experiences with a client: 
One day she said to me: You shrinks seem to think you are these powerful 
beings. Your literature paints images of clients as helpless, vulnerable, 
pliable, weak creatures at the mercy of you omnipotent people. Well, let me 
tell you something about power. With my J.D. and Ph.D., I am better 
educated than you are, which gives me more power than you have with your 
Ph.D. I am an attractive woman, which gives me the undeniable power that 
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sexy women have over men. So much for your illusion of power (Zur, 2009, 
p.161). 
In view of this example, the author urged for the exploration of knowledge and 
power in therapeutic alliances to move beyond a view of power as being rigid and in 
the hands of a professional because the presence of a power differential may not 
always be the case. In a recent publication, Zur (2014) exemplified this by 
identifying various ways of how knowledge and power may manifest both on the 
care receiver’s side as well as on the care provider’s side of the therapeutic alliance 
(sec.5). As a summary of his ideas, the care provider’s knowledge and power may be 
brought about by the following: 
 
- Expert-knowledge power e.g. through experience in the professional field 
and training – “Aesculapian power” (Brody, 1992, p.16) 
 
- Power arising from societal respect for the healer’s role  
 
- Positional power: setting the time and place for therapy, setting the stage 
such as the seating arrangement, the right to ask questions but not necessarily 
answer questions, the act of not disclosing personal information to the service 
user, the act of diagnosing and forcing hospitalisation and the authority to 
determine the rules of the relationship 
 
- Reward power related to some care receivers’ need for their carer’s approval 
and to the carer’s ability to give permissions and rewards e.g. a nurse can 
report that a hospitalised patient’s behaviour has improved which may lead 
the doctor to grant the patient permission to leave from the hospital  
 
- The use of professional jargon and the ability to describe the care receiver’s 
behaviour by terms like “resistance to treatment” (implying placement of 
blame on the care receiver for ineffectiveness of the alliance). Note: Here I 
also add another term: “insight” (indicating a care receiver’s readiness to 
accept a diagnostic label and professional help) 
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Similarly, knowledge and power on behalf of the care receiver may manifest as 
follows:  
 
- Expert-knowledge power e.g. through self-experience and general knowledge 
 
- Positional power: time control (arriving late or early for a session), space 
control (sitting too close or too far away from the therapist), decision to 
answer or refuse to answer questions as well as answering them truthfully or 
untruthfully, the use of fear e.g. by service users who have a history of being 
violent and who may attempt to instil fear in therapists, sexual seduction and 
legal violation e.g. false accusations  
 
- The choice to talk or to remain silent  
 
- Use of language e.g. violent, vulgar or threatening language  
 
- Dominating the conversation  
 
- Inappropriate gifts or incentives  
 
- Making enquiries about therapist  
 
- Reward power related to a therapist’s seek for client approval and job 
satisfaction  
 
On a similar note, Brown (2007) argued that an alliance constituting an “all-
knowing’ side and a “no-knowing” side may not be beneficial for the future of the 
therapeutic alliance in mental health services (p.8). Hence, asking the professional to 
denounce knowledge and power in an attempt to balance power in alliances may not 
be fruitful just as much as it is not fruitful to consider the care receiver as being 
powerless (Brown, 2007, p.12).  The author cited White (1994) in her conclusion 
that such a stance implies an attempt to escape power and simultaneously risking the 
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assumption of a comfortable passive professional position that may jeopardise the 
framework of the therapeutic alliance.   Here it can also be acknowledged that 
expecting the professional to deny his expertise may be rather disempowering and 
probably unethical for the professional in question.  Instead, in a similar way  to Zur 
(2009, p.163), the author predicated that a modernist-postmodernist merge that 
claims “partial-knowing” may be a more appropriate tool kit for the mental health 
discipline (Brown, 2007, p.12).  The argument culminated in the question of how 
this principle can be applied in practice. Brown’s answer featured the unpacking and 
re-authoring of patients’ narratives in order to unearth oppressive dominant 
discourses which are often internalised and lead to resistance (Brown, 2007, p.11). 
As acknowledged by the author, this is different than the approach advocated by 
Anderson and Goolishian (1992) who cautioned against a professional attempt to re-
write patients’ stories because it is only the patient who is the master story teller. 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
This final part in the review has been directed at the focal subject area of this study, 
specifically the knowledge and power constructs in the therapeutic alliance between 
the service provider and the receiver. Literature related to research about the alliance 
was cited in order to attempt to understand the origin, meaning, necessity and 
structure of the therapeutic alliance as well as challenges related to its composition 
and outcomes. In conjunction with the other two parts of this review, it is hoped that 
this part will enrich my study by facilitating the discussion of my findings in light of 
the existing literature about the knowledge-power interface in the therapeutic 
alliance. 
108 
 
2.5 Chapter conclusion 
The process of carrying out a review of prominent literature surrounding the area of 
interest has felt akin to peeling the layers of an onion.  In the same token, all of the 
concepts that have been examined in the review have added a piece to the jigsaw 
puzzle that totals as the therapeutic alliance picture. In true Foucauldian nature, this 
resembles a quest which does not attempt to arrive at one definite truth. Indeed, as it 
has been emphasised throughout the review, the controversial debates that surround 
the mental health field are in fact based on the simple concept that different entities 
attribute different meanings to truth. At this point, it would be difficult to ascertain 
whether there is one single truth that has yet to be attained.  However, what can be 
realised without a shadow of a doubt is that even if there is one truth, this only 
guarantees that it will be perceived in a multitude of ways by different entities. As a 
concluding note, this is why this journey was not particularly concerned with 
validating different perceptions of truth. On the contrary, the preoccupation of this 
study is to understand circumstances and discourses that may lead to various 
perceptions of truth and the manner that these are managed when they translate to 
knowledge and power.  
In this light, the main research question guiding this study was: 
What is the nature of the combination of knowledge and power in therapeutic 
alliances in a mental health in-patient setting in Malta?  
This was accompanied by two sub-questions, namely: 
What role do dominant discourses play in the positions occupied by care 
providers and care receivers in therapeutic alliances in a mental health in-
patient setting in Malta? 
What type of knowledge is required by care providers and care receivers for 
power to be managed in a manner that may enhance therapeutic effects in this 
setting? 
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Chapter 3 
METHOD 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
Research evolves from an inherent human curiosity centering on the desire to gain 
knowledge about a phenomenon. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept 
of knowledge is a multifactorial one with a myriad of views about its meaning and 
attainment.  In a similar way, research methods are as diverse as the different 
approaches to knowledge and one’s approach to setting and answering research 
questions may depend not only on the nature of the questions themselves but also on 
one’s beliefs, knowledge, perception of events and personal characteristics.  Hence, 
any particular research method offers one way, out of other possible ways, of 
revealing new knowledge - a step forward to getting closer to the truth as defined by 
that researcher. Hence, by relating to a particular formal paradigm, a researcher 
identifies himself/herself with a larger group of individuals who form a school of 
thought which encourages the use of a systematic and tested pattern to answer 
research questions (May, 2001, p.8).   
3.2 The research method  
3.2.1 Selection of research approach 
A broad based question related to a specific area is usually the first raw form of what 
would be gradually preened to a more specific inquisitive statement that identifies 
the phenomenon under study.  If one were to use a funnel analogy, in my research 
process, the broader part of the funnel was practically occupied by my quest to 
explore the constructs of the balance of knowledge and power in the alliance 
between the care provider and the care receiver in psychiatry. In addition to this 
primary focal point, I also wished to explore the potential implications of these 
constructs to education, which is an area to which I can perhaps offer a direct 
contribution in view of my professional role in academia as well as my link with the 
clinical setting. This involved the exploration of the taught and experiential 
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knowledge required by both the care provider and care receiver in order for both 
parties to manage the knowledge-power balance in the therapeutic alliance in a 
manner that enhances the therapeutic effect. Graduating from the broader part of the 
funnel to its narrow neck requires the researcher to mould the multiple broad 
questions into a central structured one. This may then be followed by sub questions 
that include other key variables and the relationship between them, as advised by 
Creswell (2003, p.106). In my study, this process resulted in one central question and 
two sub-questions – these have been presented in the previous chapter. 
The next step involved the selection of a methodological approach.  At this stage, the 
guidance provided by Blaikie (2000) in asking oneself about the type of questions 
being set, proved valuable in identifying the how, what and why elements of my 
queries (p.61). On reflecting on the nature of these questions, I acknowledged the 
interpretivist undertones underlying the area of interest. Additionally, the literature 
search that I have undertaken, which was described in Chapter 2, has shown that the 
subject matter of this study remains to be further explored and may primarily require 
critical exploration, understanding and description.  Hence, it would not be illogical 
to note that there seems to be a greater need to focus on induction and interpretation 
rather than on attempting to explore the subject in a quantitative and statistical 
manner, as typified by a positivist stance. I feel that the latter approach would have 
been limited in its potential to provide an in-depth answer to the research questions 
set.  These reflections led to my decision to opt for a purely interpretivist approach.  
I believe that in this study, the use of this approach has been beneficial in the 
exploration of general concepts as well as in the facilitation of the identification of 
patterns. It has also been useful in guiding me into a deeply focused and intense 
enquiry leading to a comprehensive description of the phenomenon under study. 
Whilst acknowledging the strength that this approach has added to my investigation, 
it is not to say that it was not characterised by any limitations. In fact, these will be 
duly identified and addressed in the concluding part of the thesis. In a concise and  
factual manner, Geertz (1973) outlined that which may still be one of the main 
challenges in interpretivist research, by asserting that “what we call our data are 
really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their 
compatriots are up to” (p.9). It is acknowledged that this detraction has invariably 
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featured in my study. In an attempt to partially address this challenge, as a 
researcher, I sought to continuously engage in mindfulness and reflexivity during the 
gathering, analysis and interpretation of data. Furthermore, following the interviews 
with the care receivers, transcripts were analysed by the participants so as to enhance 
the likelihood that what has been understood by the researcher actually reflected the 
perception of the participant at that particular point in time. 
3.2.2 Selection of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
The research questions, the objectives of the study and the literature revolving round 
the area of interest were integrated and themed by common underlying trends in the 
study. As contended by Willig and Stainton-Rogers (2008), reflexivity is a crucial 
dimension in interpretivist research (p.6). It is through the reflective process depicted 
in Figure 1 that the treads weaving themselves throughout the length of the area of 
interest could be extracted. 
 
Figure 1: Steps guiding the reflective exercise (author’s own) 
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Using discourse as a departure point, the interest in this particular study was not only 
to describe a reality but to additionally analyse and appraise the world that has been 
gradually constructed through discourse.  Having in the first instance set my position 
of alignment with the interpretivist approach, several qualitative methods could have 
lent themselves to the investigation of this topic.  Utilising a discourse analysis 
approach was probably an effective tool for critique in order to elicit a deeper critical 
understanding of how different stakeholders in this particular area of interest speak 
about and make sense of the reality around them (Taylor, 2004, p.436). Furthermore 
the various effects of discourse on the subjects within the field were explored with a 
particular emphasis on dominant discourses. The ideas of Foucault served as the base 
of the critical approach since, in a similar way to the proposed study, a Foucauldian 
approach is accurately described by Graham (2005), as being primarily led by the 
exploration of power and knowledge relationships enacted through discourse (p.3). 
Having already referred to the work of Foucault and his understanding of concepts 
such as power and truth, it seemed natural to follow the same model in the gathering, 
analysis and interpretation of data.  Hence following a Foucauldian approach in all 
phases of the study, may have facilitated the maintenance of an integrative and 
continuous approach throughout.   
In a faithful manner to the philosopher himself, Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 
(2008) discussed how in the Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, it is 
customary to contend that there are no hard rules but only guidelines (p.91). 
However, they proposed three dimensions that may serve as the basis of a 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis: 
Firstly, the analysis of discourse entails historical enquiry…secondly, 
analysis attends to mechanisms of power and offers a description of their 
functioning.  And lastly, analysis is directed to subjectification – the material 
signifying practices in which subjects are made up (Arribas-Ayllon and 
Walkerdine, 2008, p.91). 
The method of research in this study has been broadly based upon the broad 
guidelines discussed by the mentioned authors but custom modified according to the 
needs arising from the study – this will be discussed in further detail in section 3.3.3. 
113 
 
3.3 The research design 
The study consisted of two phases, as depicted in Figure 2. Each of the phases was 
aimed at collecting data from different sources in order to enable the gathering of 
data that is holistic and comprehensive in nature.  
 Study plan 
 
Figure 2: The research plan 
 
Research Method: Interpretivist approach: Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Research Design: 
Phase 1: Semi-structured interviews 
Aim : 
 
To explore the experience and 
perception of care receivers 
 
Data collection and analysis: 
 
a).Ten psychiatric care receivers were 
recruited from the state psychiatric 
hospital through a purposeful random 
sampling technique 
 
b).Each subject was interviewed 
Phase 2: Document analysis 
Aim : 
 
To explore: 
 
1). Medical records 
2). Nursing records 
 
 
Data collection and analysis: 
 
a).The medical and nursing records 
(files) related to the ten care 
receivers interviewed were located 
 
b).The last three pages from each 
medical and nursing file were 
extracted 
 
c).These documents were evaluated  
systematically through a process of 
skimming, reading and interpretation 
Themes generated from Phases 1 & 2 were critically analysed using Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis 
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The aim of the first phase of the study was to interview care receivers in order to 
explore their perception regarding the area of the knowledge-power balance in the 
psychiatric therapeutic alliance. The second phase consisted of a data collection 
process by means of exploring and analysing the medical and nursing records of the 
ten participants interviewed in Phase 1. In this manner, Phase 1 of the study involved 
the recruitment of human subjects in order to collect verbal data, as opposed to, but 
also complementing the collection of written data from existing documents, which 
was carried out in Phase 2. Essentially, the involvement of two phases was targeted 
at allowing data and methodological triangulation, by the use of a different data 
source and method during each phase.   
As encompassed by Thurmond (2001), triangulation offers multiple benefits, the 
outstanding ones being: the contribution to the researcher’s confidence level in the 
collected data, the identification of discrepancies as well as enhanced understanding 
of the area under investigation (p.253). In view of this, the use of a multiple-strategy 
method in this study was intended to contribute to the aspects of utility and validity.  
It has to be noted that triangulation is time-consuming and requires more resources. 
This challenge was addressed by planning and organising the research timeline in the 
best way possible to the knowledge of the researcher and as guided by the 
supervisor. Further challenges associated with this technique include: investigator 
bias resulting in data disharmony and conflicting data collecting methods (Thurmond 
2001, p.256). During each step of the research process, the researcher sought advice 
from knowledgeable individuals in the field so as to counter-check processes such as 
sampling and analysis in an attempt to lower the incidence of investigator bias or 
oversight. Each of the two phases of the study shall be described in more detail in the 
following section. 
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3.3.1 Phase 1 – Semi-structured interviews 
Selection of participants 
A vast amount of literature related to the area of interest in this study involves the 
perceptions of professionals in the field of psychiatry. These works are of utmost 
important in answering the set research questions and have been integrated with the 
analysis and discussion of the findings. However, current trends fuelled by evidence-
based reasoning, depict the care receiver as being an expert by experience – placing 
him/her in the central, active position of the treatment programme (McLaughlin, 
2009, p.1111). Hence in this study, I wished to give care receivers a direct voice and 
to have the opportunity to enquire about and endeavour to partly understand the 
knowledge-power construct from a care receiver’s point of view.   
Additionally, it is widely agreed that the philosophy at the heart of the therapeutic 
alliance is to promote and enhance the therapeutic effect. On further thought, it can 
be realised that the measurement of the perceived effectiveness of the alliance is 
subjective – a case in point is a scenario where the care receiver is compliant, 
submissive and passive – characteristics which may be regarded by the professional 
as beneficial and even ideal in maintaining a smooth relationship. However, these 
characteristics may be masking a helpless and frustrated patient, which may be 
detrimental to the recovery process. This emphasises the importance of exploring the 
care receiver’s view in addition to the care provider’s perception. For this reason, it 
was eventually concluded that Phase 1 of the study was to be entirely dedicated to 
listening to care receivers. 
Sample size determination 
As postulated by Creswell (2003), in interpretivist research, sample sizes need to be 
small in order to allow the researcher to collect comprehensive detail about the 
subject and the scenario where the study is being carried out (p.222). This implies 
that representativeness and generalisability may be sacrificed in the process - 
however, these two factors do not usually feature in the aims of research that has a 
qualitative nature.  The determination of the sample size is an important decision that 
has to be made by the researcher and it is one which is not characterised by a 
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standard rule in interpretivist research. In this study, it has been reasoned that having 
just one or two individuals would not have sufficed in answering the research 
questions comprehensively. Contrastingly, involving a large number of participants 
may have resulted in an overwhelming amount of data which in turn, may have 
deterred the researcher from fully immersing in the deep understanding and analysis 
of the data collected. The final number of ten participants was selected on the virtue 
that it is a compromise based on the argument that has just been put forward. 
Sampling technique 
Selecting a sample in a random fashion is a well-defined and rigorous approach, 
commonly used in positivist studies (Blaxer, Huges & Tight, 2006, p.163).  In order 
to use a random method of sampling, ideally, there is some knowledge about the 
whole population in relation to the area being studied, as well as the assumption of a 
normal distribution of similar trends within the said population. This tends to defy 
the aim of the interpretivist approach used in this study, which revolved around the 
desire to focus on a specific area that has not yet been thoroughly explored. 
Furthermore, the area holds significance and interest for a selective and limited 
group of individuals and thus it was probably more productive to gather data from 
these sources rather than randomly selecting potential participants. Selection by 
virtue of convenience was avoided due to widespread criticism revolving around the 
lack of rigour and intellectual credibility, albeit being a tempting sampling technique 
with minimal costs in terms of time and effort (Offredy & Vickers, 2010, p.139).  It 
was consequently decided to use a purposeful random sampling technique. Teddlie 
and Yu (2007, p.90) described how this involves two steps: the first step consists of 
selecting a specific subset of individuals, as happens in purposeful sampling.   
Subsequently, a random sample is selected from that sub-group. The strength of this 
method is that it combines some of the advantages of random sampling and 
purposeful sampling.  In this study, the sample was selected by: 
- Selecting those participants who were currently making use of inpatient state 
psychiatric services and who fell under the responsibility of those consultant 
psychiatrists who gave their permission for the care receiver interviews and 
for accessing medical and nursing records. 
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- Involving knowledgeable professionals (multidisciplinary team members) to 
determine which of the individuals selected satisfied the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. 
 
- Selecting a random subset of eleven participants from the list that resulted. 
One of the participants was selected for potential participation in a pilot study 
whilst the remaining ten participated in the actual data collection process. 
The following exclusion criteria were applied during recruitment: 
(i). Children under 18 years of age  
(ii). Individuals who have been legally incapacitated  
(iii). Individuals with temporary, borderline, fluctuating or unclear incapacity to 
consent and participate due to the nature of psychiatric symptoms  
(iv). Individuals whose current or partially predictable (arising from familiarity with 
the potential participant and his/her history) psychological state may have: 
- Impaired the individual from providing informed consent and participate 
meaningfully in the study (for the purpose of criterion (iii)) or;   
- Be affected negatively as a result of participating in the study  
 
The participants who were selected for potential inclusion consisted of five males 
and six females within acute, chronic and rehabilitation wards. One of the female 
participants participated in the pilot study which rendered the actual study sample to 
be made up of a balance of males and females.  
Once the potential participants were identified, the nurse in charge of the unit where 
each participant was situated was contacted. Information about the study procedure 
was provided and the nurse was then asked to approach the potential participants to 
ask them whether they wished to participate in the study. A recruitment form was 
provided with instructions on the process that the nurse needed to undertake as well 
as the ethical considerations that had to be followed by the nurse during and after 
this process. Subsequently, the nurses in charge of the respective unit approached the 
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potential participant and explained about the study process as well as presenting the 
individual with the information sheet. If the participant approved, I was contacted 
and could then proceed to make contact with the individual. During this meeting 
with the potential participant, I described the study procedure, clarified any 
difficulties and then presented the consent form. The interview could then be carried 
out. 
Data collection method 
In order to determine the data collection method, various research tools and 
techniques were evaluated and rated on their potential for providing the richest data. 
During this phase, data collection could have been carried out through a myriad of 
possibilities. A semi-structured interview technique was conclusively chosen to 
collect data from the participants (Please refer to Figure 4 on p.124 for the interview 
guide). If one were to take a critical stance, it can be argued that this data collection 
method is mainly limited by its time consumption since the varied and free nature of 
the questions and answers necessitates lengthy interviews followed by analysis 
(Gillam, 2000, p.9).  In any research study, the researcher is inevitably faced with the 
constant struggle between effectiveness and efficiency. In view of Phase 1 of this 
research study, it was deliberately decided to tip the scales towards the 
‘effectiveness’ side.  As elaborated in previous sections, one cannot ignore the fact 
that the specific area of the study has not been thoroughly researched. This implies 
that this subject needs detailed exploration as well as possible clarification and 
explanation to the participants during the data collection period. Hence, a semi-
structured interviewing technique may have had a higher probability of being 
effective in comparison to other methods of data collection (Barroso, 2009, p.119).  
This originates from the knowledge that a semi-structured interview may transcend 
other techniques in that it allows the fieldworker to use an interviewing structure 
which allows a degree of freedom. This gives the researcher the license to explore 
emerging data in a fashion that depends solely on the direction that each interview 
takes.  Essentially, initial responses can be probed and the respondents are enabled to 
talk freely, in the strive to gain further detail and clear answers (Creswell, 2003, 
p.190). The semi-structured interview schedule was based on the research questions 
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leading the study and guided by literature on the topic. Appendix 1 shows the link 
between each interview question and the main/sub research questions posed at the 
beginning of the study. Prior to the actual study, a pilot study was carried out in 
order to test the interview guide as well as to practice my interviewing skills. 
Following the pilot interview, changes to the guide were made according to feedback 
from the care receiver involved and based on self-reflection. 
3.3.2 Phase 2 – Document analysis of medical and nursing records 
Following the interviews with the participants, the study proceeded to the second 
phase which involved the review and analysis of professional records pertaining to 
the participants who were interviewed in the first phase. The decision to use records 
as a data source was based on the fact that records are an important means of 
professional communication and contain feedback that may delineate care (Berman 
& Snyder, 2007, p.252). More importantly, records contain information about the 
nature of the therapeutic alliance and the care process. The documents chosen for 
inclusion were medical and nursing records. Medical records consist of a specific 
handwritten file that contains reports about a particular care receiver as written by 
the doctor only whereas nursing records are compiled by nurses and can be found in 
a separate handwritten file.  The rationale for choosing records written by doctors 
and nurses was based on the knowledge that during a care receiver’s stay in the 
psychiatric hospital, s/he inevitably has contact with these two types of professionals 
but not necessarily with other professionals such as social workers and occupational 
therapists. Thus it was reasoned that each care receiver who participated in the study 
had to have a medical and nursing file which could then be used as a data source for 
the second phase of the study.  
During this phase, I wished to obtain data entries that were as close as possible to the 
interviews that I had had with the care receiver. This was deemed as desirable in 
order to obtain Phase 1 and Phase 2 data within the same cross section in time. In 
this manner, the two data sources could be compared and cross-related to each other. 
Thus, the last three pages of entries in each medical and nursing file dated before 
each care receiver’s interview were selected. 
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3.3.3 Data analysis 
The interviews were transcribed by the researcher using a denaturalised verbatim 
technique. Oliver, Serovich and Mason (2006) described how this technique is 
particularly used in critical discourse analysis as well as in grounded theory and 
ethnography. On explaining how to use this transcription method, the authors 
emphasised that “accuracy concerns the substance of the interview” (p.1276). This is 
brought about by a researcher who focuses on the meanings and perceptions that are 
shared during the interview rather than on emphasising accents, minor non-verbal 
details or involuntary verbal sounds.   
At times, during the interview, the participants mentioned others by their name – in 
these cases, the names have been changed in order to maintain anonymity.  Eight of 
the participants preferred to have the interview in Maltese whilst two of them opted 
to use the English Language. The Maltese interviews were transcribed in the Maltese 
language and then translated to English. Back translation was then carried out in 
order to attempt to ensure that the meaning conveyed by the participants was 
retained following the translation process. The pages extracted from the medical and 
nursing records were inputted into a word processor by the researcher. The records 
had been originally written in English and so no translation was required. 
At this stage, the transcripts and the typed records were ready to undergo analysis. 
When it comes to performing Foucauldian Discourse Analysis,  a number of guiding 
frameworks have been proposed in an attempt to lend structure to a type of analysis 
that can be quite complex to address (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p.95).  
On a parallel note, general guidance on the subject offers the luxury of a freehand 
approach that allows the researcher to be creative and to borrow Foucault’s methods 
without adhering religiously to any existing framework.  Despite the fact that this 
latter advice held considerable attraction, the fact that I am a novice researcher led 
me to consider the structured models that have been proposed by experienced others.  
The principle authors in the field of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis frameworks are 
Willig (2008), Parker (1994; 1992), Burman (1996; 1992), Kendall & Wickham 
(1999), Hall (2001) and Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008). On reviewing each of 
their methods, the ones by Willig (2008), Parker (1994; 1992), Burman (1996; 1992) 
121 
 
and Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) emerged as being the most appropriate in 
terms of their faithfulness to the main contentions of the Foucauldian philosophy as 
well as their simplicity and applicability to the current study. Furthermore, some of 
the steps of the thematic analysis framework proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006) 
were seen as potentially useful in the initial stages of analysis that constituted the 
organisation of the data collected in the study. The dilemma faced was that whilst 
there was some overlap between the steps described in the different frameworks, 
each of these methods had some useful individual differences – this rendered it 
difficult to decide upon a single method for use. In an attempt to address this issue, 
the steps of these five frameworks were merged, synthesised and adapted for use into 
a new model that is, by nature, based on an eclectic approach.  This seemed like a 
good compromise and one that led to the new framework that is depicted in the next 
page (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Steps in carrying out Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Explanation 
1). Data acquaintance 
 
A process of becoming familiar with 
the data by multiple reviews and 
ongoing reflection about connotations 
and meanings.  
2). Primary analysis: General 
thematic coding 
Codes are generated by a process of 
open coding which involves the 
coding of data chunks based on the 
meaning that emerges from the data. 
Codes are then collapsed and listed. 
They are then analysed for possible 
further reduction or addition of new 
codes. At this stage, codes are of a 
generic nature and not exclusively 
related to knowledge-power. 
3). Secondary analysis: Main 
discursive themes related to 
knowledge-power 
A process of scrutinising the data and 
the codes that emerged from the 
primary analysis. This is done in order 
to identify themes based on the 
knowledge-power interface in relation 
to the discursive object, which is the 
therapeutic alliance. 
4). Discursive constructions All instances of reference to the 
discursive object including both 
implicit and explicit ones. 
What is the discursive object 
according to the text? 
5). Dominant Discourses This entails reflection on the 
discursive constructions and their 
location within wider discourse-types.  
6). Subject positions 
 
These are positions offered by the 
dominant discourses on the discursive 
object. 
7). Subjectivity and Technologies 
 
Consequences of taking up various 
subject positions for the participants’ 
subjective experience.  This includes, 
feelings, thoughts and experiences as 
well as potential gains and losses 
within various subject positions. 
Technologies are forms of rationality 
for the government of self 
(technologies of self) or others 
(technologies of power) (Foucault, 
1982, p.18). 
8). Effects of discourses on practice The possibilities and rules for action 
mapped by the dominant discourses. 
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The framework that has just been described was not intended to serve as a stepwise 
structure that had to be rigidly adhered to during data analysis. This would have 
risked the reduction of this analysis to a simple set of steps that would have probably 
not done any justice to the discursive object. Conversely, these steps were intended 
to act as a rough guidance to the process in an attempt to enhance comprehension 
and flow of the arguments. It is hoped that this also facilitated the undertaking of 
Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical analyses of the therapeutic alliance in 
contemporary mental health services. The framework described was used to guide 
both the analysis of the data as well as the discussion presented in Chapter 4 -  in this 
subsequent chapter, further detail and data examples of the steps carried out in 
accordance with this framework will be provided. 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
3.4.1 Ethical approval 
Prior to the data collection process, a research proposal was submitted for review 
and approval by the ethics committees at the University of Malta and University of 
Sheffield.  
3.4.2 Informed consent 
In order to limit the possibility of influencing or pressuring potential participants, the 
initial invitation for participation in the study was not made by the researcher but by 
the nurse in charge of each respective unit. The nurse was provided with information 
about the study procedure, instructions on the process that s/he needed to undertake 
as well as the ethical considerations that had to be followed by the nurse during and 
after this process. The nurse was then requested to approach the potential participant 
and explain about the study process as well as presenting the individual with the 
information sheet. It was only if and when the subject approved, that the researcher 
was informed. Following this, the researcher proceeded to make contact with the 
individual. During this meeting, the researcher once again explained about the study 
procedure, clarified any difficulties and then presented the consent form.  The 
consent form included permission requests for an interview and for accessing 
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medical and nursing records pertaining to the care receiver. Participants were asked 
for their permission to record the interview and to take field notes.  With regards to 
accessing the medical /nursing records, the following measures were taken: 
- The patient's information letter and consent request his/ her permission for 
access to the records. This also included the rationale behind the need to use 
this information. 
- Only information that was directly relevant to the study was included. 
- The medical records and nursing reports were not removed from the 
hospital grounds and the soft copies (typed by the researcher) were not 
shared with anyone else. 
Permission and consent forms were also obtained from the responsible institutional 
bodies such as the general hospital management, the national and hospital data 
protection officers, the medical and nursing management as well as the consultant 
psychiatrists in the hospital.   
3.4.3 Anonymity and confidentiality 
During the interviewing process, complete anonymity could not be achieved since I 
carried out the interviews myself.  However, the use of coding instead of actual 
names in the study report limited the chance of the participants’ identity being 
revealed.  The information disclosed by the participants during the interview was 
kept confidential.  Moreover, data that contained direct clues to revealing the 
identification of the participants, was omitted. In this way, the individual’s privacy 
and dignity were sought to be ensured at all times.   Hard data, involving recordings 
and transcriptions, was stored securely in a locked environment whilst soft data was 
password protected.  All data was destroyed on completion of the study. 
3.4.4 Protection from discomfort and harm 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the self-designed interview questions 
were formed in such a way that should not evoke harmful emotions and were 
discussed with the supervisor. However, if during the interview, the researcher had 
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been aware that such harmful reactions were nonetheless being evoked, the interview 
would have been terminated immediately and the participant supported as necessary. 
After the interview, each participant was once again provided with the researcher's 
contact details and informed to make contact if s/he would like to discuss any issue.  
A clinical psychologist was also identified for the individual to contact, in the 
eventuality that psychological support would have been needed. 
 
3.5 Chapter conclusion 
During the design phase of the study, the priority was to select a method that 
enhances the trustworthiness and the quality of the research that was going to be 
undertaken. Shenton (2004) discussed general factors that may be considered by a 
qualitative researcher in order to enhance trustworthiness. Additionally, Parker 
(2005) and Yardley (2000) outlined other criteria that characterise good research – 
the criteria discussed by these two authors apply more specifically to Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis. The following table depicts factors and measures taken during 
the current study in order to enhance the quality, in relation to the guidelines 
provided by Shenton (2004), Parker (2005) and Yardley (2000). 
Table 1: Measures taken to enhance quality 
Quality 
criterion 
Suggested provisions by Shenton (2004, p.73), 
Parker (2005, p.142) & Yardley (2000, p.219) 
Provisions made 
during the current 
study 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adoption of appropriate, well recognised research 
methods 
 
Development of early familiarity with culture of 
participating organisations 
 
 
 
Triangulation via use of different methods, different 
types of informants and different 
sites 
 
 
Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants 
 
 
 
Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis  
 
Researcher’s 
professional 
background 
 
 
Two study phases with 
different participant-
types and data 
collection methods 
 
Emphasised right to 
refuse participation/ 
withdraw from the 
study 
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Credibility 
contd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iterative questioning in data collection dialogues 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative case analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing sessions between researcher and 
superiors + Peer scrutiny of project 
 
 
Use of “reflective commentary” 
 
 
 
Description of background, qualifications and 
experience of the researcher 
 
 
 
Member checks of data collected and 
interpretations/theories formed 
 
 
Thick description of phenomenon under scrutiny 
 
 
 
Examination of previous research to frame findings 
 
 
Reassured about 
anonymity and the fact 
that there are no right 
or wrong answers 
 
Questions were 
rephrased and probing 
was used in cases 
where interview data 
was unclear 
 
Codes and themes 
were analysed and re-
analysed in order to  
 
detect possible errors 
in classification 
 
Carried out with 
clinical and academic 
colleagues 
 
A reflective diary was 
kept throughout the 
study 
 
These have been 
provided in the 
introductory section of 
this thesis 
 
The data collected was 
verified and checked 
with the participants 
 
An attempt was done 
to address this in 
Chapter 4 
 
An attempt was done 
to address this in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 
4 
Transferability Provision of background data to establish context of 
study and detailed description of phenomena in 
question to allow comparisons to be made 
An attempt was made 
to address this in 
Chapters 1,2 and 4 
Dependability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment of “overlapping methods” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The medical and 
nursing records 
included in Phase 2 of 
the study pertained to 
the care receivers 
interviewed in Phase 1 
in an attempt to 
overlap data related to 
the same set of 
therapeutic alliances 
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Dependability 
contd. 
 
In-depth methodological description to allow study 
to be repeated 
 
An attempt was made 
to address this in the 
current chapter and 
chapter 4 
Confirmability 
& Objectivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Triangulation to reduce effect of investigator bias 
 
 
 
 
Admission of researcher’s beliefs and assumptions 
 
 
 
Recognition of shortcomings in study’s methods and 
their potential effects 
 
 
 
 
In-depth methodological description to allow 
integrity of research results to be scrutinised 
 
 
 
Use of diagrams to demonstrate “audit trail” 
 
Two different data 
sources and data 
collection methods 
were employed 
 
An attempt was made 
to address this in 
Chapters 1,2 and 4 
 
An attempt was made 
to address this in  
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
An attempt was made 
to address this in the 
current chapter and 
Chapter 4 
 
An attempt was made 
to address this in 
Chapter 4 
Transparency 
& Coherence 
Clarity in the presentation of method and data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a fit between the theory and method used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use of reflexivity 
A descriptive account 
and diagrams were 
used to depict the 
research method and 
design in Chapter 3 
and the findings in 
Chapter 4 
 
Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis was used as 
it complements the 
theories of Foucault 
which underpin this 
thesis 
 
A reflective diary was 
kept during the 
process. Instances of 
reflection can be noted 
in the written account 
especially in Chapter 4 
Sensitivity to 
context 
The method chosen is appropriate to the 
sociocultural setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethical issues are considered in detail 
Foucault’s contentions 
about knowledge-
power may offer 
insight about the area 
and the situation in the 
local setting 
 
Ethical issues have 
been described in 
detail in this chapter 
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Accessibility Presentation of the method and data needs to be as 
simple as possible to allow access to those inside 
and outside the discipline 
Ornate descriptions 
and complex layouts 
have been avoided as 
much as possible. The 
use of technical jargon 
has been limited and 
explanations have 
been provided when 
complex terms were 
used 
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Figure 4: Guide for semi–structured interviews with care receivers 
 
Semi-structured interview guide 
 
Please describe the events that led to your first contact with mental health services.  
Did you decide that you needed psychiatric help or was this decided by someone else? 
 
If this was decided by someone else: How did you feel? What did you think? How were you 
informed – what did they tell you? 
 
Did you choose the type of mental health service?  e.g. admission to psychiatric hospital, 
psychiatric outpatients appointment or community services    
 
On which basis did you make this choice?  
 
If someone else made the choice for you, did you agree with this decision?  
 
What do you know about your symptoms?  
 
Where did you get this knowledge from?  
 
What kind of information regarding your symptoms have you been given by the 
professionals that you have been involved with in the hospital?  
 
Do you feel as if you know enough about your symptoms?  
 
If not, what kind of knowledge do you think you need?  
 
What is the plan for your care and how was it formed?  
 
Were you involved in the formation of this plan?  
 
If not, did you wish to be involved? Why?   
 
What treatment are you receiving? (Here referring to psychological, complementary & 
alternative or pharmacological interventions)  
 
Have you been provided with available treatment options?  
 
How is the final choice of treatment done?  
 
What information were you given about the treatment from the person who prescribed it? 
 
Are you satisfied with your treatment?  
 
If you were ever unsatisfied, what would you do? Why would you do this?  
How easy is it for you to understand the meaning of the language of your care providers?  
 
Describe your perception of your role within the multidisciplinary team.  
 
What influences the way that you perceive your role in this team?  
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What are the professions of the psychiatric care-providers that you have a working 
relationship with? (emphasis on no need to mention actual name)   
 
How do you feel when you are with ______________ ? (to fill in blank with each 
professional type consecutively e.g. with your psychologist)   
 
Describe what happens in a typical session with __________________(to fill in blank with 
each professional type consecutively).   
 
What happens/ think would happen, if /when you give feedback and suggestions to 
______________ (to fill in blank with each professional consecutively) regarding your 
treatment and care plan?   
 
Do you feel as if you have less, equal or more power/say in your relationship with 
______________ ? (to fill in blank with each professional consecutively)   
 
Are you satisfied with the balance of power in your relationship with ______________? (to 
fill in blank with each professional consecutively) Why?  
 
If not, what would you change?  
 
What do you think are the factors that make this power balance as it is?  
 
In general, do you feel as if your suggestions and feedback are considered and used to 
change your care plan if necessary?   
 
You are the expert of your own care. What do you think about this? (Or: Do you see 
yourself as having knowledge about your response to the symptoms and then using this 
knowledge to work with your care providers?  
 
Do you think that your care providers can learn from you?   
 
If yes, what type of knowledge do they need to obtain from you?  
 
Do you think that your care providers wish to learn from you? How do you know this?   
 
How comfortable would you feel in sharing your knowledge with ______________ (to fill 
in blank with each professional type consecutively?)   
 
What kind of knowledge do you think a care receiver needs in order to be able to manage 
power effectively with a care provider in a professional relationship?   
 
What kind of support do you think a care receiver needs in order to be able to manage power 
effectively with a care provider in a professional relationship?    
 
What kind of knowledge do you think a care provider needs in order to be able to manage 
power effectively with a care receiver in a professional relationship?     
 
What kind of support do you think a care provider needs in order to be able to manage 
power effectively with a care receiver in a professional relationship?     
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Chapter 4 
ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION 
OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
In this chapter, the analysis and discussion of the findings and their implications 
shall be presented. Data excerpts shall accompany the discussion in an attempt to 
remain as faithful as possible to the original sources.  Excerpts are coded so as to 
facilitate their location in the transcript/record from which they emerged – the letters 
in the code refer to the source type: CR [Care Receiver interview], MR [Medical 
Record] or NR [Nursing Record] followed by a number which indicates the specific 
interview transcript or record. This is then followed with the exact location within 
the specific source. As an example, [CR1:56] translates to Care Receiver 1, quote 56 
whereas [MR3:E4] refers to Medical Record 3, entry 4. In some of the excerpts, 
there are words that have been italicised and bracketed - these indicate explanations 
that I have provided in order to clarify that particular excerpt. Each of the interview 
transcripts and medical and nursing records are found on the DVD that accompanies 
this thesis. 
 
In order to ascertain that the research questions are being addressed, the structure of 
this chapter has been set according to the three questions leading the study. In this 
regard, the chapter has been divided into three parts: 
 
4.2 Analysis and discussion of the interviews with care receiver participants 
 
4.3 Analysis and discussion of the medical and nursing records 
 
4.4 Developing the effectiveness of the therapeutic alliance 
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Sections 4.2 and 4.3 individually address the main question and first sub question, 
namely: 
 What is the nature of the combination of knowledge and power in therapeutic 
alliances in a mental health in-patient setting in Malta?  
 What role do the dominant discourses play in the positions occupied by care 
providers and care receivers in therapeutic alliances in a mental health in-
patient setting in Malta? 
  
Section 4.4 addresses the second sub question, namely: 
 What type of knowledge is required by care providers and care receivers for 
power to be managed in a manner that may enhance therapeutic effects in this 
setting? 
 
 
As discussed previously, there were two data sources feeding this study - the first 
source was mental health service users and the other was medical and nursing 
records written by professionals pertaining to the same service users who were 
interviewed.  Although initially each of these two data sources was treated 
individually and separately for each service user, they were then also reviewed as a 
whole unit specific to that service user. This enabled the formation of a more holistic 
picture and better identification of patterns within each therapeutic alliance. Thus, 
although Section 4.2 (Care receivers’ interviews) and Section 4.3 (Medical and 
Nursing records) specifically address each of the data sources of the study, cross-
references will also be made between the two parts in instances when it is felt that 
there may be a possible link between the two data types.  
 
It is hoped that in this manner, the constructs of the balance of knowledge and power 
in the alliance between the care provider and care receiver in mental health services 
will be adequately analysed and critiqued as guided by the Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis framework which was discussed in Chapter 3 and presented again in the 
next page (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Steps in carrying out Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Explanation 
1). Data acquaintance 
 
A process of becoming familiar with 
the data by multiple reviews and 
ongoing reflection about connotations 
and meanings.  
2). Primary analysis: General 
thematic coding 
Codes are generated by a process of 
open coding which involves the 
coding of data chunks based on the 
meaning that emerges from the data. 
Codes are then collapsed and listed. 
They are then analysed for possible 
further reduction or addition of new 
codes. At this stage, codes are of a  
generic nature and not necessarily 
related to knowledge-power. 
3). Secondary analysis: Main 
discursive themes related to 
knowledge-power 
A process of scrutinising the data and 
the codes that emerged from the 
primary analysis. This is done in order 
to identify themes based on the 
knowledge-power interface in relation 
to the discursive object, which is the 
therapeutic alliance. 
4). Discursive constructions All instances of reference to the 
discursive object including both 
implicit and explicit ones. 
What is the discursive object 
according to the text? 
5). Dominant Discourses This entails reflection on the 
discursive constructions and their 
location within wider discourse-types.  
6). Subject positions 
 
These are positions offered by the 
dominant discourses on the discursive 
object. 
7). Subjectivity and Technologies 
 
Consequences of taking up various 
subject positions for the participants’ 
subjective experience.  This includes, 
feelings, thoughts and experiences as 
well as potential gains and losses 
within various subject positions. 
Technologies are forms of rationality 
for the government of self 
(technologies of self) or others 
(technologies of power) (Foucault, 
1982, p.18). 
8). Effects of discourses on practice The possibilities and rules for action 
mapped by the dominant discourses. 
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4.2 Analysis and discussion of the interviews with care 
receivers 
4.2.1 Introduction  
This section of the chapter is primarily concerned with the analysis and critical 
discussion of the interviews with the care receivers who took part in this study.  
My experience of participating in the interviews was an unforgettable one. The raw 
emotions and perceptions that my participants shared with me were extremely 
touching to the point of being overwhelming and the words that they used were 
characterised by tremendous insight and power. Some of the experiences that they 
described instilled in me a mixture of long lasting sadness and deep rage, yet, at 
times, I found myself cheering along the more positives narratives that I was 
presented with.  Initially I had approached the data collection process with 
confidence based on the fact that I was familiar with the setting and the area of 
research. At that point, little did I know that I would soon be finding myself in a 
whirlpool of emotions and in a challenge to distinguish between my role as a 
researcher and a clinician. On several occasions, especially during the interviews, I 
was clearly aware of a strong temptation to switch into the clinician mode. On 
reflection, I now realise that probably, this had been due to my automatic reaction to 
the realisation that some of the participants were using the interview as a therapeutic 
opportunity.  I cannot help but wonder whether this was a direct result of the lack of 
attention and therapeutic opportunities within the psychiatric setting which was 
highlighted by some of the participants during the interviews. At the risk of inflating 
my importance, it seems to me as if the interviews may have given some of the 
participants a much needed and awaited opportunity to talk and to shine but most of 
all to be the main focus of another person’s attention. During most of the interviews, 
I felt as if I had opened the gates of a dam and the water burst out with such a 
powerful force that it tended to topple me over.  Yet, my initial shock led to a lot of 
reflection and to my recommendations for a new way of practice as identified by the 
care receivers. 
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Whilst analysing and discussing the findings, I was faced with yet another challenge 
due to my urgent need to present my participants’ voice in the most faithful and 
comprehensive manner possible. For me, the process of writing this chapter was 
cathartic as it served as a channel to convey my feelings. At the same time, I am 
painfully aware that as powerful as writing can be, in this case, I feel that is still falls 
short in representing the actual interview experience. In an attempt to enhance 
representativeness, I have included several excerpts since I feel that these convey the 
most powerful message of all. From the very beginning, I became increasingly aware 
that I needed to contain my emotions and structure my presentation.  Thus, I decided 
to develop and use the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework that has been 
described earlier (Refer to Figure 5 – p.128). Perhaps the use of such a framework 
may appear as robotic or rigid. Yet, to me, it proved to be a useful guide that helped 
me to stay on track especially when my personal position tempted me to stray. 
The first step in the framework involved Data Acquaintance. During this process, 
the main aim was to attain a general feel of the data, particularly that related to the 
nature of the interview pertaining to each service user who participated in the study. 
At this point, certain patterns or characteristics began to emerge.  In fact, this led to 
one striking finding which indicates that while some service users have the same 
type of alliance with all health care professionals, others have different types of 
alliances with different workers.   
Following this immersion in the data, the next step involved primary analysis by 
means of thematic coding, as facilitated by the qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti.  
This process involved the assignment of words or phrases to data excerpts in order to 
sum up or capture the understood meaning of the participants’ words. During this 
process of primary analysis, some of the codes assigned were not necessarily specific 
to knowledge-power issues within the data. This is because at this stage, the 
objectives were to organise the raw data, clarify the findings, facilitate the initial 
identification of patterns and allow the preparation of data for secondary analysis. 
This led to the third step in the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis process which 
entailed secondary analysis with identification of the main themes as based on the 
knowledge-power nexus. On carrying out this process, it became evident to me that 
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from a Foucauldian perspective, there seem to be four main distinctive themes 
related to the therapeutic alliance.  Each of these themes is characterised by a 
discursive nature that may be quite clear - in other words, a distinguished way in 
which care receivers talk about the knowledge-power balance in the therapeutic 
alliance and behave in its context. In fact, it is being postulated that each of these 
discursive natures mould the alliance. Hence, these four identified themes serve not 
only as a classification of the different discourses encountered during the interviews 
but also as a knowledge-power classification of the types of therapeutic alliances.  
In this chapter, the discussion related to Section 4.2 has been structured and 
presented according to each of these four themes, as the main headings in the 
discussion.  The critical description pertaining to each item has been guided by steps 
4-8 of the eclectic Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework that has been 
described earlier. In this manner, each discursive theme has been first presented and 
described, followed by the constructions of the therapeutic alliance within this 
theme. This leads to the identification of the dominant discourses and their related 
subject positions as well as potential consequences for different parties within the 
alliance and for practice.  
Before exploring these four discursive themes in detail, an overview and 
presentation of the analysis (based on steps 1-3 of the Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis framework) shall be presented as follows in order to depict the main results 
and lead the way to the discussion that entails (based on steps 4-8 of the same 
framework). 
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4.2.2 Analysis of the interviews with care receivers 
Introduction 
The first step undertaken during the analysis of the interview transcripts was the 
reading and re-reading of the transcripts as well as listening to the audio recordings. 
This process of data immersion was necessary so that I could become familiar with 
the data and reflect upon the specific meaning of particular words and phrases as 
well as the overarching nature of each interview.  
Primary analysis: general thematic coding 
As already indicated, this process involved the assignment of codes to data. This was 
carried out so as to attempt to provide order to the raw data in order to enhance 
clarity. Furthermore, it also facilitated the initial identification of patterns and 
allowed the preparation of data for the next step - secondary analysis.  Inductive 
coding was undertaken and the resulting codes were reviewed and amended 
repeatedly in order to allow reduction and refinement of the code list that was 
compiled. A worked example and a list of primary codes that resulted from the 
process of thematic coding is found in Appendix 3.  
Secondary analysis: main discursive themes related to knowledge-power 
Following the primary analysis process, the interview transcripts and the assigned 
codes were reviewed again. At this stage, the aim was to further categorise and 
reduce the coded data underneath main themes related to knowledge and power.   
This process led to the identification of four main discursive themes in relation to the 
knowledge-power interface within the therapeutic alliances explored in this study.  
As already alluded to in the introduction, each of these themes describes a particular 
manner of how the care receivers spoke about and were understood to perceive each 
of their different alliances with various professionals. This implies that each of the 
four themes describes a particular and specific type of alliance, as depicted in Table 
2. It could be noted that during some instances, care receivers identified and 
discussed a particular individual care provider e.g. the psychiatrist. On other 
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occasions, they referred to a specific professional group e.g. the nurses, and 
proceeded to describe the alliance with this group as if it were an alliance with one 
individual rather than many.   
During the interviews, the participants provided information about a total of 27 
therapeutic alliances that they have with different professionals.  Each of these 
alliances has been categorised underneath one of the four identified themes as 
follows: 
Table 2: Frequency of the four alliance types (Note: The text in brackets indicates 
the professional/s with whom the care receiver is in a therapeutic alliance) 
Participant 
number 
 
Alliance type 
 Satisfaction- 
Acceptance 
Dissatisfaction- 
Compliance 
Resentment- 
Opposition 
 
Collaboration 
1  1 (Nurses) 1 (Psychiatrist)  
2 1 (Psychiatrist) 1(Nurses)   
3    3 (Nurses, 
social worker, 
psychiatrist) 
4 1 (Nurses)  1 (Psychiatrist)  
5 2 (Occupational 
Therapist [OT], social 
worker) 
2 (Psychiatrist, 
nurses) 
  
6 1 (Psychiatrist)  1 (Nurses)  
7 1 (Nurses)  1 (Psychologist) 2 
(Psychiatrist, 
OT) 
8    3 (Nurses, 
occupational 
therapist, 
psychiatrist,) 
9 1 (Nurses)  1 (Psychiatrist) 1 (OT) 
10 1 (Psychiatrist) 1 (Nurses)   
Totals: 8 5 5 9 
 
Table 3 summarises the whole analysis process. It presents the codes that emerged 
from the primary analysis and how they were categorised into themes during 
secondary analysis.  These themes were then further explored to identify the 
discursive constructions of the therapeutic alliances and the dominant discourses.
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Table 3: The analysis process (care receivers’ interview transcripts)  
Primary analysis: codes Secondary analysis: 
main discursive themes 
Discursive 
constructions (of the 
therapeutic alliance) 
Dominant 
discourses 
Subject positions 
Perceived power imbalance in alliance 
Acceptance 
Satisfaction with power-balance type in 
alliance 
Active involvement in care 
Reference to Traditional Medical Hierarchy 
Determination 
Expression of trust in professionals 
Perceived subjection to expected 
submission 
Ready to address disagreement/ give 
feedback 
Satisfaction-Acceptance 
 
 
Key features: 
 
Knowledge-Power imbalance 
Acceptance of imbalance 
Overall satisfaction 
Some degree of care receiver 
independence 
Life-line 
Clinical tool 
Loving bond 
Compliance Discourse 
Romantic Discourse 
Affinity for tradition 
Partial submission 
Self-induced 
paternalism 
Professional love 
Excitement and purpose 
Perceived power imbalance in alliance 
Compliance 
Displeasure 
Hopelessness 
Fear 
Perceived subjection to expected 
submission 
Disagreement with professionals/care plan 
Reference to Traditional Medical Hierarchy 
Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
 
Key features: 
 
Knowledge-Power imbalance 
Acceptance of imbalance 
Overall displeasure  
Moderate-high dependence 
on care provider 
A means of care receiver 
obedience 
A medium of fear 
A catalyst to the 
employment of sanctions 
Related to displeasure or 
discomfort 
 
Discontentment 
Discourse 
Compliance Discourse 
Affinity for tradition 
Submission 
Fear 
Dissatisfaction 
Sick role 
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In the next four pages, Figures 6-9 present a concise view of the four main discursive themes with their respective codes. In every diagram, a 
description of each of the four themes has been provided and a number of excerpts which describe each of the themes have also been included.  
Perceived power imbalance in alliance 
Resistance 
Dissatisfaction with power balance type in 
alliance 
Anger 
Displeasure 
Discomfort 
Perceived subjection to 
patronising/paternalistic attitudes 
Exclusion 
Disagreements with professionals and/or 
care plan 
Perceived subjection to expected 
submission 
Perceived subjection to discrediting 
attitude 
Resentment-Opposition 
 
Key features: 
 
Mostly one-sided 
Unacceptance of imbalance 
An angry/irritated care 
receiver  
A struggle 
A punishment tool 
A mystery 
An unwanted burden 
A non-therapeutic 
temporary relationship 
Discontentment Discourse 
Anarchist Discourse 
A survivor role 
Rebellion 
Resistance 
Oppression 
Displeasure and anger 
Perceived power balance in alliance 
Satisfaction with power-balance in alliance 
Assertive behaviour 
Ready to address disagreement/give 
feedback 
Determination 
Active involvement in care 
Collaboration 
 
Key features: 
 
Knowledge-Power balance 
Both entities on same plane 
Mutual contribution 
A collaborative 
agreement (partnership) 
A beneficial and gainful 
system 
A system that needs to 
be managed by the care 
receiver 
Assertiveness Discourse 
Equality Discourse 
Pride 
Satisfaction 
Involvement 
A balanced, two-way 
position 
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Figure 6: Theme 1 – The Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance-type 
 
Description: 
This theme features an alliance where the care receiver perceives the professional as being 
the entity in the lead and of creating a power imbalance within the alliance. Most of the 
participants appear to be satisfied with the alliance and seem to be accepting the power 
imbalance as an automatic and even welcomed state. These individuals often seek active 
involvement and are ready to provide feedback in the context of the alliance. 
 
Excerpts that describe the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance: 
Care Receiver 4 – Therapeutic alliance with the Nurses 
 
With the nurses, I feel good. Sometimes I buy things for them too. There are some nurses who give 
you psychological therapy themselves because they explain to you, speak to you gently and make sure 
that you understand. Even during their break time. I would speak up if I did not agree with anything 
that they said. [CR4: 23] 
 
This morning I was given a punishment for not taking the pills - I was not allowed to go to mass. 
Mass is my religious belief. [CR4:36] 
 
 
Care Receiver 5 – Therapeutic alliances with the Occupational Therapist and Social worker 
 
I feel quite ok when I am with the social worker. I feel safe. And with her help, I have organised my 
wardrobe. I wish that the occupational therapist would accompany me home again. I would let the 
social worker know sometimes if I do not agree with what she says or if I have any feedback. 
Sometimes I tell her, sometimes I don´t. She tells me things for my own benefit. I cannot do without 
my social worker, she is like a daughter to me.  She has other people though, not just me. [CR5:28] 
 
I feel very good when I am with the occupational therapist. I open up when I am with her, tell her how 
helpless I feel and how can I actually manage to do the bed and the other work when I do not have the 
will to.  If I disagreed with something that she said, or had any feedback to give her, I would do so. 
[CR5:29] 
 
 
Care Receiver 6 – Therapeutic alliance with the Psychiatrist 
 
I feel calm when I am with the psychiatrist, if I am pain free. First he asks you how you feel. So you 
have to answer in a way that you tell him everything in those few minutes: "I feel this, this and that." 
Because when you stop talking, he starts. If I do not agree with something that he says, I let him 
know. [CR6:25] 
 
I am satisfied that I am at a lower level than the consultant psychiatrist. The most important thing is 
that he understands my problem and helps me. [CR6:32] 
 
 
Care Receiver 7 – Therapeutic alliance with the Nurses 
 
Regarding the balance of power with the nurses: I feel as if I am less than them. I have less power 
than they do. That is quite clear. It has to be like that otherwise we would become friends with the 
nurses and it would all get mixed up. [CR7:30] 
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Figure 7: Theme 2 – The Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance-type 
 
Description: 
This theme depicts an alliance perceived by the care receiver as being characterised by a 
leading professional and a power imbalance. Most of the participants appear to accept the 
power imbalance. However, in contrast to theme 1, they seem to communicate a degree of 
dissatisfaction with certain features within the alliance.  Most of these individuals seem to be 
reluctant to be actively involved in care and may prefer to depend on the professional.  
 
Excerpts that describe the Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance: 
Care Receiver 10 – Therapeutic alliance with the Nurses 
 
They are ok but I think that most of them are not really interested..you sort of realise when they speak 
to you..even the way they speak, the tone of voice. Like I am bothering them and they want me to 
leave them in peace. That is not nice, it makes me feel uncomfortable. [CR10:33] 
 
With the nurses, I am down there, one of many. It is the system. It is the way it has to be. [CR10:33] 
 
 
Care Receiver 2 – Therapeutic alliance with the Nurses  
 
If I do not agree with something that the nurses say, I do not always tell them because I am afraid.  I 
am afraid that they will stop something - stop one of the permissions. It has never happened to me but 
I have seen it happen to other patients. [CR2:28] 
 
I have less power than the psychiatrist in our relationship. Same applies for my relationship with the 
nurses. [CR2:30] 
 
 
Care Receiver 5 – Therapeutic alliances with the Nurses and Psychiatrist 
 
When I am with the nurses, I feel quite ok. Not with all of them though.  Mostly it is ´´Hello´´ and 
´´Thank you´´ with the nurses. Sometimes I open up with them but they say: ´´You will get better. 
You have a husband who loves you and respects you.  Be brave so that you get out of here. ´´ I do not 
think I would tell the nurses if I disagreed with what they said. [CR5:31] 
 
I am scared when I am with the psychiatrist. I am scared about what he is going to tell me. He tells me 
what is needed and I try to do what he says. What he says goes because it is for my own benefit. 
[CR5:27] 
 
Same with the nurses - the nurse always has to be on top and so has the psychiatrist. Because they 
studied to be like that. I believe that they should be on top and I just trust in them. [CR5:40] 
 
I do not know whether anyone had given me information about the pills. Sometimes the nurses 
explain to me though - they tell me what each pill is for.  But sometimes when I ask, they say: "That´s 
what the doctor has prescribed!" [CR5:22] 
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Figure 8: Theme 3 – The Resentment-Opposition alliance-type 
 
Description: 
This theme depicts a group of individuals who seem to be displeased due to the perceived 
power imbalance in their alliances with some of the professionals. Most of these individuals 
show clear disagreement with the professional involved in the alliance and feel as if their 
rights are not being respected. Resistance and anger were commonly identified as a result of 
this alliance-type.  
 
Excerpts that describe the Resentment-Opposition alliance: 
Care Receiver 1 – Therapeutic alliance with the Psychiatrist 
 
I was not involved in the care plan.  Actually, he just changed my pills without informing me about it. 
I wish that I´m involved. Because they think that you do not know how to do anything. They decide 
everything for you. That’s not right. First of all, I wish that he (the consultant psychiatrist) had not 
stopped the Seroxat because I had been doing quite well on it.  And perhaps they should accept that I 
can go home again. [CR1:32] 
 
They throw you into this room, as if you are in prison – seclusion - and you feel even more down than 
you already are. [CR1:18] 
 
Care Receiver 4 – Therapeutic alliance with the Psychiatrist 
 
I am not satisfied with the treatment that I am receiving here.  I try to speak to the doctor about it but 
he ignores me. He does not wish to speak to me. Nothing. He does not pay attention. The junior 
doctors visit but they say that they cannot give me any permissions because they speak to the 
consultant psychiatrist and he does not wish to give me permissions. He does not even come to see me 
once weekly. I speak to his doctors. They tell me that they speak to him about me. Now I do not know 
if they really do. [CR4:15,16] 
 
Care Receiver 6 – Therapeutic alliance with the Nurses 
 
I am not satisfied with the power balance in my relationship with the nurses. This is because they are 
not people who interact with care receivers in a gentle manner rather than a savage-like manner.  This 
is my opinion, although I know that some others share the same opinion as I do.  You cannot speak – 
only what they say is right. Mind you there are some nurses who are nice, if you ask them to give you 
X, they would try to give that to you. I think this is caused by the fact that they become big-headed. 
[CR6:33] 
 
Care Receiver 7 – Therapeutic alliance with the Psychologist 
 
The psychologist does not help me. I feel embarrassed when I am with her.  Because I know that she 
doesn’t want to deal with me, you know.  I feel it strongly. Very very embarrassed, I hope I do not see 
her again. It is ok if she is on the line but I do not want to be accompanied by her because I feel hurt.  
[CR7:28] 
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Figure 9: Theme 4 – The Collaboration alliance-type 
 
Description: 
This theme presents an alliance where the care providers and care receivers seem to be 
engaged in a partnership that, to an extent, may be characterised by dialogue and shared 
decision making. As a result, the care receiver perceives a satisfactory balance of power and 
there seems to be consideration for ‘expertise by profession’ and ‘expertise by experience’.  
 
Excerpts that describe the Collaboration alliance: 
Care Receiver 3 – Therapeutic alliances with the Nurses and Social Worker 
 
In the relationships that I have with the professionals, the power is positive.  Whenever I asked for 
something, it was ok. Like reasonable things - if I ask for four Valium pills instead of one, they 
obviously cannot meet my demand! But the professionals and I always got along. The power is shared 
in the relationships. We are equal. [CR3:33] 
 
Like he (one of the nurses) said: “You have relapsed AGAIN?” And my answer was: “Don’t you 
think that it is a good thing that I came here for treatment instead of staying outside in a bad way?” I 
did not answer rudely or whatever. I do not want to be rude. I wish to be good mannered. [CR3:31] 
 
Listen, I may look ‘soft’ but I stand up for myself - what’s right is right, what’s wrong is wrong. 
[CR3:26] 
 
When I am with the social worker, I feel very comfortable. In a typical session, she comes here to see 
me, asks me how I am, what is going on. I tell her about what is going on, what I am feeling, what I 
wish and don’t wish. If I give suggestions, I get feedback, good, bad - it was never bad. Then I have to 
accept. Not ‘accept’ because ‘accept’ can imply that I just submit to everything but in the situation of 
a patient, she is not going to say something that will hurt me. She will lay out the options and 
feedback and ask me what I think about it. I have time to discuss. I am not presented with a rigid 
answer. [CR3:30] 
 
Care Receiver 7 – Therapeutic alliance with the Psychiatrist and Occupational Therapist 
 
This (alliance with nurses) is not the same as the occupational therapists – they (the occupational 
therapists) are more like pals, you know. They say: “When you are ready, just come over and you can 
speak to me if you like.” [CR7:35] 
 
I feel as if I am on the same level as the psychiatrist too. I do, somehow I do. The way I see it, in a 
few years my mother will not be here. So I have to get on my feet and deal with my doctor.  If I 
cannot deal with my doctor, how am I ever going to deal with anybody else?  [CR7:33] 
 
Care Receiver 8 – Therapeutic alliances with the Nurses and Occupational Therapist 
 
I feel very good when I am with the occupational therapist. She tells me what I’m doing wrong, tells 
me what’s going to happen. She’s always there for me. If I have problems, I speak to her. She’s 
always there for me. If I disagreed with something that she said, I would go and talk to her. [CR8:24] 
 
I feel ok with the nurses. They talk to me, about my problems. If I am not feeling well, I have to go to 
talk to them. If I disagreed with something that they said or wanted to give suggestions and feedback, 
I would do that to the nurses. [CR8:26]
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Conclusion 
Following the presentation of the analysis, the next section consists of a discussion 
related to the dominant discourses, subject positions and consequences of the four 
discursive themes that emerged from the interviews with the care receivers. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion of the interviews with care receivers 
Introduction 
Analysis of the data collected from the interviews with the care receivers has 
culminated in four discursive themes/ alliance types, namely: 
 
- Theme 1: Satisfaction-Acceptance 
- Theme 2: Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
- Theme 3: Resentment-Opposition 
- Theme 4: Collaboration 
 
In this section, these discursive themes shall be discussed in detail in the above order 
and as guided by steps 3-8 in the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework that 
has been used in this study. This involves a description of each of the discursive 
themes and an examination of the ways through which the discursive object has been 
constructed within the theme. Subsequently, the dominant discourses are identified 
as well as the subject positions that they give rise to. Subjectivities and technologies 
and the effect of the dominant discourses on practice are discussed throughout the 
theme, especially in the conclusion. Here I would like to note that for the sake of 
clarity, in this academic exercise, I have presented and described each of the four 
discursive themes as separate approaches or types of alliances based on a 
knowledge-power classification. However, in practice, each of these alliance types 
may be seen as being found on a continuum with possible overlapping and so they 
may not be as clearly distinguishable as they are in theory.  
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Theme 1: The Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance-type 
Introduction 
Eight of the 27 identified therapeutic alliances in the study were mainly characterised 
by this alliance-type or theme.  
 
This theme features an alliance where the professional seems to be the entity in the 
lead, as a result visibly creating an imbalance within the same alliance. Interestingly, 
all the participants who were identified as being within such an alliance-type, appear 
to be considerably satisfied with the power imbalance and with the overall nature of 
the alliance. Concurrently, it can be noted that most of the participants exhibit trust 
in the professional who they are working with and hence view the interactions and 
the care that they receive from that particular professional in a positive light.  It 
seems as if in this type of alliance, most of the care receivers are allowing 
themselves to be guided by the professional and trust that the alliance will reach its 
therapeutic purpose.  Interestingly, most of the participants in this alliance-type seem 
eager to be active within the alliance as exemplified, for instance, by their readiness 
to provide feedback to the professional. This is in contrast with the Dissatisfaction-
Compliance alliance-type where most of the care receivers seem to be quite passive 
and mostly dependent on their care providers.  
Discussion 
In this discursive theme, the alliance is constructed in various ways by the care 
receivers who were interviewed. Primarily, the alliance is constructed by some of the 
care receivers as a life-line: a source of hope for recovery. In this regard, Care 
Receiver 5 gave a general description of her alliance with the occupational therapists 
by describing how: 
They (the occupational therapists) tell you what you can do too.  They help 
me a lot, they even used to come to my house to help me there. [CR5:20] 
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This is similar to Care Receiver 6’s perception when she stated that: 
They help me, the professionals and the consultant psychiatrist, they always 
try to make things better. They (the professionals) are there, and in certain 
situations you´ll be needing them, they are there. [CR6:23] 
This group of care receivers sometimes regard the therapeutic alliance as a clinical 
tool that is managed by the health professionals who are the experts in the recovery 
process.  For instance, Care Receiver 7 emphasised that: 
The nurses are very good, very nice. Apart from  the odd one here and there. 
They try to discipline you slightly. And they are right, you know. Nurse X 
tries to do it. We hate it but at the same time it is good, you know. She tells 
us to get the heck out of our bed and we’re all trying to find our way around. 
She helps us to get our act together. So she’s good, you know. [CR7:25] 
Finally, it can be noted that the care receivers construct the alliance as that loving 
bond between a vulnerable person and his/her helper. In particular, this image was 
conjured during the interview with Care Receiver 5 who referred to her social 
worker in the following terms: 
She tells me things for my own benefit. I cannot do without my social 
worker, she is like a daughter to me.  [CR5:28] 
On reflecting on the various discursive constructions of the therapeutic alliance 
within this theme, it can be noted that a number of discourses may be playing a 
major role. The first discourse-type that could be perceived from the very start of the 
interview with this group of care receivers can be labelled as compliance discourse. 
Primarily, this is a group of care receivers who seem to be satisfied with the alliances 
that they have with particular professionals and who seem to be quite determined to 
actively engage in the particular alliance in order to improve their current situation 
and enhance recovery. However, despite evidence that the participants are ‘on track’, 
up-to-date with their care plan and mostly motivated, they seem to be equally 
adamant that the knowledge and power is in the hands of the professionals within the 
alliance in focus – it is implied that the professionals are the experts and that this 
should be an accepted fact.  Similarly, the need for the care receiver to follow the 
care provider’s wishes or commands – which is the essence of compliance - may also 
148 
 
be viewed as acceptable and necessary by most of the care receivers in this type of 
alliance.  For instance, Care Receiver 6 stated that: 
I am satisfied that I am at a lower level than the consultant psychiatrist. The 
most important thing is that he understands my problem and helps me. 
[CR6:32] 
It has to be acknowledged that I was surprised by this finding – here I was being 
presented with these individuals who are seemingly content, active within the 
alliance and considerably interested in their care plan but yet hold such a conservatist 
view of the psychiatric system. In this aspect, the care receiver participants may be 
showing loyalty to the traditional hierarchical system in psychiatry where the 
consultant psychiatrist is placed at the top, the rest of the professionals occupying the 
step below and the service users lying at the bottom as recipients of care. For 
instance, Care Receiver 4 described how: 
When I speak to the nurses about my medication, they inform me that they 
have to do what the doctor says. They say that the doctor wants me to have it 
and so they will give it to me even if I do not want to. [CR4:22] 
Finally the construction of the relationship in terms of a vulnerable care receiver and 
a heroic professional may be classified as romantic discourse. The narratives 
elicited by the care receivers whose discourses form part of the Satisfaction-
Acceptance theme, were, in certain instances characterised by a rosy picture where 
the professional was seen as gentle and benevolent. During the interviews, it could 
be noted that when care receivers engaged in romantic discourse, they communicated 
affection and satisfaction in terms of the Satisfaction-Acceptance therapeutic alliance 
and the professional within it.  Although fondness and respect was perceived when 
all care-giver types were discussed in this alliance-type, it was clear that the doctor 
was seen as the most knowledgeable and powerful figure in the system. As an 
example, when Care Receiver 2 was talking about his consultant psychiatrist, he 
stated that: 
If one disagrees with the psychiatrist, I think that the psychiatrist would say: 
“I am the one in command here”. But my psychiatrist is not like that...he is 
nice. [CR2:27] 
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The dominant discourses that have been identified in the care receivers’ narratives 
present a number of subject positions within this discursive theme. As a starting 
point, the compliance discourse that emerged from the care receivers’ words may 
offer a subject position characterised by affinity for traditional norms, values and 
practices as well as partial submission. Care Receiver 4 provided a good example of 
this by stating that: 
With the nurses: I have less power than they do. They are in command here. 
[CR4:26] 
This morning I was given a punishment (by the nurses) for not taking the 
pills - I was not allowed to go to mass. Mass is my religious belief. [CR4:36] 
Later, the same care receiver followed up the above statement by saying that: 
With the nurses, I feel good. Sometimes I buy things for  them  too. [CR4:23] 
This description of events provided by Care Receiver 4 resembles the three leading 
tenants in the exertion of power as identified by Foucault (1979/1995, p.170). In this 
instance it seems as if the care receiver was first observed – Hierarchical 
Observation (noted to be refusing the pills). This was followed by punishment – 
Judgement (by the professionals who decided that it is wrong to refuse pills) and 
Normalisation (not allowed to go to mass in order to force him to normalise his 
behaviour). During the same process, he was also being assessed – Examination 
(classified as ‘behaving badly’ and punished). 
 
In view of the fact that the interview with this particular care receiver was 
characterised by general anger brought about by feeling oppressed by the 
psychiatrist, the above excerpts come across as surprising. This is due to the fact that 
the care receiver is aware of the power imbalance within the alliance that he has with 
the nurses. Yet, unlike his attitude towards his alliance with the psychiatrist, he 
seems ready to accept this fact and is still satisfied with his alliance with the nurses. 
As already alluded to, it is quite striking that in a Maltese health care system where 
the move is towards less restrictive care and service user involvement, most of the 
care receivers who were engaged in Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance-types seem to 
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prefer the time-tested ways of practice, with little regard for their effectiveness. 
However, on reflection, this stance may lead to an important gain, namely, the 
feeling of security.  One can identify with this need for feeling safe especially in the 
case of a person whose life may have been affected by the unpredictability of mental 
illness and its consequences. It is not surprising that this has been addressed in detail 
in existing literature on the experience of symptoms related to mental illness. User 
narratives such as those presented in the book Unquiet Mind by Jamison (1995) 
clearly depicted the devastation that mental illness can cause in a person’s life. 
Additionally, the author of this book asserted how a psychiatric and pathological 
understanding helped her to feel secure. I feel that this can be related to possible 
feelings experienced by care receivers in the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance-type:  
a constant and predictable environment may be safe and in the same manner, 
tradition and a rigid hierarchical system may also provide security for these 
individuals. This postulation reflects the feeling that I had during the interviews, 
which mainly revolved around the observation that this group of care receivers seem 
to feel safe and that this safety plays a major role in their perception of the alliance. 
However, one needs to ask: what are the care receivers trading for the acquisition of 
this security? In reality, it seems as if the main compromise that is being made from 
the care receiver’s part is the right to be an equal partner within the alliance as well 
as the acknowledgment that s/he may be the holder of expertise knowledge that may 
benefit care. It is wondered then: does this mean that the care receiver is being 
oppressed? It is not easy to obtain a simple answer to this query, however, it is clear 
that there are probably other mechanisms that are in action and oppression may not 
necessarily form part of the equation. For instance, one such tangent may view the 
care receiver as being knowledgeable and motivated but has simply decided to exert 
his power on maintaining tradition.  Hence, this may prompt the revision of the word 
‘compromise’ that has been mentioned earlier in this argument. Perhaps that which 
appears as a ‘compromise’ is in fact a wise choice based on a different kind of 
knowledge that has guided the care receiver to simply strive for long-term security 
and satisfaction rather than equal partnership within the alliance. For instance, in the 
following excerpt, Care Receiver 7 discussed how a power imbalance within the 
alliance enhances clarity and possibly maximises therapeutic outcomes within the 
alliance: 
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I feel as if I am less than them (the nurses). I have less power than they do. 
That is quite clear. It has to be like that otherwise we would become friends 
with the nurses and it would all get mixed up. [CR7:30] 
Indeed, during the interview, there was no hint of the care receivers feeling as if they 
were undertaking any major compromises or of being overly passive. On the 
contrary, all the care receivers who had Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance types 
viewed their readiness to participate in the alliance and to provide feedback to the 
professional, by stating that: 
If I disagreed with something that she said, or had  any feedback to give her, I 
would do so. Like this morning, as a case in point – she (the occupational 
therapist) asked me to wash a few clothes and I reasoned that when you go 
home, they are not the only things that you have to wash. [CR5:29] 
I would speak up if I did not agree with anything that they (the nurses) said. 
[CR4:23] 
So I discussed this with my therapist and asked  her to forward my opinion to 
the consultant psychiatrist. [CR6:17] 
I am sorry about what I did yesterday. But it was necessary because they 
were mocking me. I wouldn’t have thrown anything at them - just at the 
cooker. They were nice to me afterwards. [CR7:25] 
Nevertheless, the care receivers’ insistence that the steering wheel remains in the 
professional\s hands was clearly enmeshed within this readiness to be an active 
participant within the alliance. In this light, it may serve to examine whether in the 
same instance as security is being offered to subjects in this position, it may also be 
giving the care receivers an element of control. This type of control arises from the 
familiarity and predictability of a rigid traditional system as opposed to one that is 
characterised by change and flexibility. 
 
Another perhaps less complex angle related to the position created through the use of 
compliance discourse is that this type of discourse is brought about by the possibility 
that care receivers have simply become used to the traditional ways of practice as 
dictated by a medical model. This implies that, for instance, the care receivers expect 
the doctor to be the withholder of power in the medical hierarchy and that other 
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members of the multidisciplinary team occupy lower levels but still have the 
knowledge and authority to manage the life of care receivers under their care. This is 
to say that care receivers may not know any system other than this and so they are 
accepting, living and practicing that which to them feels as being ‘the norm’ within 
that particular alliance. In simple terms, ignorance is bliss. In particular, this was 
exemplified by Care Receiver 9 who described how: 
The nurses have to obey the psychiatrist - it is protocol; they cannot do 
anything else. If the psychiatrist says that I can only go out with my husband 
for a few hours, then this is what they are going to do. It is useless me asking 
them if I can go out with my daughter. The nurses do not have any say. 
[CR9:31] 
It may be particularly useful to view this against the backdrop of cultural traditions 
in which this study took place. As discussed in the introductory part of the thesis, 
this is an island which is inherently quite conservatist in nature and this includes a 
tendency to abide to power hierarchies that are rigid and clearly structured. Thus, for 
example, the doctor figure holds a lot of respect, power and importance not only in 
professional practice but also in everyday life. Perhaps then it is not a wonder that 
this group of care receivers seem to be satisfied with trusting all aspects of care in 
the hands of the professionals.  In his genealogical process undertaken in Madness 
and Civilisation, Foucault (1961/2001) discussed this notion when he mentioned the 
appearance of the doctor figure (p.261). He contended that in this manner, madness 
was adopted by the medical discipline and the authority of scientific power 
normalised the fact that the doctor is the most powerful figure in the hierarchy. 
 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that this position may also offer a shift in the loci of 
responsibility. This refers to the perception that since the professional is the leading 
figure in the alliance, s/he is also the entity which is mainly responsible for decision 
making and for care outcomes. Simultaneously, this may conveniently free the care 
receivers from taking responsibility in their own recovery. Here, it has to be 
mentioned that it appears as if this responsibility shift is partial and not complete, as 
indicated by the motivation and semi-autonomy exhibited by most the care receivers 
who have one or multiple Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance types.  
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This can be contrasted with the moderate-to-high care receiver passivity and 
dependence that is evident within most of the alliances in the Dissatisfaction-
Compliance alliance-type which will be explored in the subsequent theme and which 
mainly leads to one-sided responsibility within the alliance.  Still, this willingness to 
regard the professional as the leading figure in the alliance feels similar to something 
which I am calling self-induced paternalism. In their article about advocacy and 
paternalism, Thomas and Bracken (1999) asserted that “the days when patients 
gratefully tugged their forelocks and deferred to the doctor's superior knowledge and 
social status have gone.” (p.327). 
 
Apparently not - at least not in my study. Thomas and Bracken (1999) proceeded to 
describe how paternalism may be beneficial if it is in the care receiver’s best 
interests (p.327). However this may introduce the risk of confusing the 
professional’s wishes and expectations with those of the care receiver’s, which may 
not be similar. Perhaps this self-induced paternalism is also akin to Foucault’s 
contention that it is possible for an individual to both have power and yet be 
constrained by it (Foucault & Gordon, 1980, p.98). Thus in this case, a predictable 
system with a responsible medical figure in the lead may be a source of power for 
the care receiver within a Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance.  At the same time, the 
care receiver may also be constrained by this power due to the accepted position of 
being somewhat unequal to the professional. 
 
The second discourse identified – that of romantic discourse, may give rise to a 
position that introduces an element of hope and the concept of ‘love’ within the 
realms of the therapeutic alliance. It has to be noted that this does not necessarily 
refer to love that originates out of sexual attraction or infatuation but rather to a kind 
of professional love in an alliance that is characterised by warmth and serenity. Here 
the care receiver seems keen to attest that the therapeutic alliance is a special and 
unique bond in which the professional features as a wise and loving individual who 
makes an extraordinary effort to offer protection, as exemplified by the following 
excerpts: 
With the nurses, I feel good. Sometimes I buy things for them  too. [CR4:23] 
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But my psychiatrist is not like that...he is nice. [CR2:27] 
He (the psychiatrist) is like a father to me. He guides me and  makes 
decisions that will help me to get better. [CR10:30] 
They help me, the professionals and the consultant psychiatrist, they always 
try to make things better. [CR6:23] 
In this type of alliance, the professional is often attributed the value of a family 
member or significant other. Primarily, it is felt that in this position, the care receiver 
may harbour an element of excitement and purpose. This may be fuelled by viewing 
the recovery process as an adventure in which each interaction within the therapeutic 
alliance is awaited with a degree of expectation, as one would if s/he were 
interacting with a loved family member or friend.   
 
It is not hard to unearth the possible rationale beneath this viewpoint when 
considering the positive feelings that romantic discourse may instil within the care 
receiver. By placing the knowledge-power bundle within the professional’s hands, 
the care receiver may simply be attempting to secure unconditional love and 
protection.  In a similar manner to the compliance discourse that has been discussed 
previously, perhaps this care receiver attitude is related to the cultural tendency to 
view professionals, in particular the doctor figure, as individuals who are complete 
experts and who have all the knowledge that is needed to protect individuals under 
their care from the distress that they may be experiencing. As already discussed 
beforehand, there is no hint within the care receivers’ narratives that indicates that 
the care receivers feel as if they are being compromised. Conversely, the participants 
appear to be at ease with allowing the professionals to dictate care and guide the 
way. Foucault (1961/2001) attributed this type of discourse to the influence of 
positivism in medicine:  
As positivism imposes itself upon medicine and psychiatry, this practice 
becomes more and more obscure, the psychiatrist’s power more and more 
miraculous, and the doctor-patient couple sinks deeper into a strange world.  
In the care receiver’s eyes, the doctor becomes a thaumaturge: the authority 
he has borrowed from order, morality…it is because he is a doctor that he is 
believed to possess these powers (p.261). 
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Despite the positive aspects that characterise this scenario, one cannot help but to 
speculate on two major potential losses for care receivers. The first query revolves 
around the notion of transference and the possibility that the care receiver may be 
attempting to fill significant voids in his/her life by shining a romantic light onto the 
therapeutic alliance and the professional within it. However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, Freud (1915/1989) believed that transference may not necessarily 
be a drawback in therapy if it is managed in a professional manner (p.496). This 
leads us to the second dilemma which acknowledges that the professional is a human 
being and not a hero. At this point, I feel that a glance at the conceptual analysis 
carried out about heroism by Franco, Blau and Zimbardo (2011) may be insightful. 
Following exploration of the concept of heroism, the authors defined heroism as a 
social activity that is: 
(a) in service to others in need—be it a person, group, or community, or in 
defence of socially sanctioned ideals, or new social standard; (b) engaged in 
voluntarily; (c) with recognition of possible risks/costs; (d) in which the actor 
is willing to accept anticipated sacrifice, and (e) without external gain 
anticipated at the time of the act (Franco et al., 2011, p.3). 
In view of this definition in the context of a therapeutic alliance, I am concerned by a 
number of challenges that may be encountered. The first problem that I foresee arises 
from the fact that the therapeutic alliance is a working tool and the professional in it 
may not be situated there by choice – this is in agreement with points (a) and (c) 
identified in Franco et al.’s definition but contradicts point (b). Moreover, the same 
definition outlines the willingness of the hero to accept sacrifice without external 
gain – once again, the therapeutic alliance is not felt to be necessarily linked to this 
need. Moreover, the working alliance may function against a set of rules and so it 
may be subject to changes such as, for instance, the professional changing job. This 
may lead to extreme disappointment from the care receiver’s side since the 
accompanying feeling may be that of being let down or abandoned by a heroic loved 
one. Similarly, the voluntary relinquishment of power within the alliance is felt to 
introduce a vulnerable wedge where the professional may adopt an inflated sense of 
importance - a heroic rescuer - hence failing to manage transference in a professional 
manner which may not necessarily add any benefits to practice. As contended by 
Rogers (1961) the danger is that such practice may probably be focused on treating, 
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curing or changing the person rather than allowing the alliance to be used as a 
medium for his/her personal growth (p.32).  
Conclusion 
On a final note, this theme is felt to introduce an interesting view to the analysis of 
the discursive object. This is a theme characterised by dependence on traditional 
systems of care which are not considered as ideal practice by contemporary 
standards. However, this alliance-type features a group of care receivers who are 
mostly satisfied and who view their alliances in a positive light. Perhaps here, it is 
vital to attempt to measure whether alliance satisfaction automatically translates to 
beneficial care outcomes or if this tangible serenity within the alliance is simply a 
reflection of covert institutionalisation.  
Theme 2: The Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance-type 
Introduction 
Five out of the alliances identified from the care receivers’ interviews were classified 
underneath this theme.  
 
This type of alliance shares a number of features with the Satisfaction-Acceptance 
theme. In fact, on encountering this type of alliance, it had been tempting to 
associate it with the first theme because both present a knowledge-power balance 
that is mostly shifted onto the side of the professional. However, it is felt that opting 
to merge these two themes would have resulted in the omission of a number of 
observations that came to light during the analysis of the care receivers’ narratives 
and the professionals’ texts.  
 
At first glance, the Dissatisfaction-Compliance theme depicts an alliance where the 
professional seems to be in the lead by exercising expert knowledge in the 
management of the alliance and indeed, in all aspects of care.  Although this scenario 
bears resemblance to the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance, the main difference lies in 
the care receiver’s involvement and satisfaction. Thus, the Dissatisfaction-
Compliance alliance is characterised by a care receiver who is accepting the power 
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imbalance within the alliance as it is but is simultaneously implying a degree of 
dissatisfaction with certain features in the alliance.  Moreover, the role of the care 
receiver in this scenario is an individual who seems to be mostly relinquishing active 
participation in favour of dependence on the alliance as steered by the health worker. 
Thus, for instance, all of the participants within this alliance-type portrayed their 
reluctance to provide feedback to the professional concerned in preference to follow 
his/her guidance without questioning. 
 
 
Discussion 
In order to initiate the exploration of this theme, the discursive constructions of this 
type of alliance shall first be discussed.  Notably, the primary reference to the 
alliance was made by describing a relationship where the care receiver perceives a 
powerful professional who should be obeyed: 
I do not think I would tell the nurses if I disagreed with what they said. 
[CR5:31] 
He (the psychiatrist) tells me what is needed and I try to do what he says. 
What he says goes because it is for my own benefit. [CR5:27] 
The alliance is at times viewed as being a medium of fear and sometimes a catalyst 
to the employment of sanctions such as: 
If I do not agree with something that the nurses say, I do not always tell them 
because I am afraid.  I am afraid that they will stop something - stop one of 
the permissions. It has never happened to me but I have seen it happen to 
other care receivers. [CR2:28] 
What can I do? I had said something to the nurses and  they said that I have 
to take it unless I wish to stay  here forever. That scared me and I was also 
scared that they would give bad feedback to the doctor.  [CR10:23] 
I am scared when I am with the psychiatrist. I am scared about what he is 
going to tell me. [CR5:27] 
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Finally, some of the participants who are part of Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
alliances, seem to construct the relationship in terms of outcomes that can instil 
displeasure or discomfort. For instance, Care Receiver 1 described how: 
There are two nurses here whom I do not really like but the rest are fine.  
Because sometimes they joke with me but I would not be in the mood for 
joking. And I do not realize that it is a joke. [CR1:57] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 5 spoke about her alliance with the psychiatrist and stated 
that: 
The  psychiatrist decided  about  the care  plan. Only the doctor decided. And 
when  they tell  me that  the doctor has decided that I should go home for an 
extra day, I get a shock. [CR5:17] 
This journey through the different discursive constructions of the alliance as 
portrayed by the participants, shows that a number of discourses are visibly 
contributing to the nature of this type of alliance. Following the same pattern in the 
other themes, one may first consider the discourse-types that are being employed by 
the care receivers. As already indicated by the discursive constructions that have 
been presented, the picture is partly dominated by apparent passivity and 
dependence.  This is felt to be directly linked to compliance discourse, which is 
depicted as a high degree of submission to the traditional and hierarchical medical 
model.  In a similar manner as that seen within the Satisfaction-Acceptance theme, a 
number of care receivers viewed their perception on the psychiatric system by stating 
that: 
The professor decides about the pills, he gives them to you  eh. He is there to 
help you. You have to take them as they give them to you. [CR5:18] 
But sometimes when I ask, they (the nurses) say: "That´s what the doctor has 
prescribed!" [CR5:22] 
But I guess it is the way the system works, the way it has always worked. So 
I do not really question but go along with it. [CR10:14] 
Additionally, it seems as if the participants are engaging in another discourse type 
that is here being termed as discontentment discourse. This features as a direct or 
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implied reference to not being satisfied and comfortable with certain aspects of the 
alliance. For instance, Care Receiver 5 made a reference to her displeasure at the 
feedback that was given about her by the nurse: 
Yesterday there was this nurse who asked  who is going to lay the table and I 
volunteered. Then  she told  my  husband  that I am  trying, I do the  effort. 
But slowly.  And I hate ´slowly´. Always slowly. [CR5:32] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 2 clearly outlined his perceived lack of fulfilment in his 
alliance with the nurses: 
I relate to nurses when for instance, I ask them for some hot water to make 
coffee. Nothing special. Nurses do not offer any treatment or try to help with 
the symptoms. I never had any relationship with any nurse where I disclosed 
my feelings or talked about my symptoms. We just speak about stuff related 
to computers. [CR1:59] 
The discourses that care receivers in this type of alliance engage in, offer particular 
subject positions to these participants. The positions that are created through 
compliance discourse have already been elaborated on in relation to the Satisfaction-
Acceptance theme. On a brief recollection of what was discussed in this previous 
theme, this is a position related to strict adherence to traditional view points and 
practice from the care receiver’s side. Complementing tradition, this is also a 
position that dictates acceptance of a perceived or actual hierarchy. In this case, the 
participants who are found within this position view their interactions with the 
psychiatric system as being shaped and needing to be religiously guided by the 
medical model.  This latter model portrays the medics as the experts who withhold 
the superior knowledge and exercise the power that this knowledge lends to them 
(Szasz, 2010, pp.18-19). Moreover, the individual seems to be lacking the 
acknowledgment that s/he has the potential to offer any contribution within the 
alliance or that s/he possess a different kind of knowledge that is as valuable as that 
possessed by the professional.  Consequently, Laing (1960) asserted that this is 
commonly engrained within a mechanism or care system where the care receiver’s 
preferences and knowledge do not hold a key role in the therapeutic alliances that the 
care plan is based upon (pp. 41-43). In a similar manner to the Satisfaction-
Acceptance theme, this type of discourse may give rise to a package of feelings and a 
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roadmap to actions and behaviour within the therapeutic alliance. The main feelings 
identified within the participants’ discourses are that of security and stability as 
based on an attitude of high dependence on the psychiatric system and the expert 
professional.  Here I feel that the ‘sick role’ may be another discursive position that 
is created by compliance discourse – an examination of the narratives of participants 
who are part of this alliance-type features common references to feeling sick, weak 
and helpless. For instance, Care Receiver 1 stated: 
Then I lose hope. I lose heart a lot. [CR1:51] 
Care Receiver 5 also confessed that: 
If at the time that I had that beach incident, I would have known about all the 
admissions that I would eventually have, I would have tried to drown  
myself. Because you get fed up of being admitted one time after the other.  
Even people with physical disabilities seem to be able to do things whilst I 
can´t. It is like someone is stopping me from doing things. [CR5:11] 
The sick role - a concept formulated by Parsons (1951) is a role in life that is 
governed by one’s illness and its actual or perceived consequences (p.452). On 
referring to the participants of the study, it can be noted that in a therapeutic alliance 
where the care receiver is in the sick role position, it implies that s/he needs constant 
support. This support may be particularly but not exclusively from expert 
professionals who can offer and confirm an explanation in relation to the symptoms 
and prescribe treatment.  Invariably, this creates a degree of dependence on those 
who deliver the needed care and support.  
 
On reflecting upon this position, it can be noted that identifying oneself with 
sickness may be linked to the care receiver making use of superior knowledge that 
leads to latent power and gains within the system. As an example, Parsons (1951) 
explained how the knowledge that sickness usually attracts pity and sympathy, can 
motivate a person to remain fixed and inactive within this role due to the person’s 
appreciation of the reactions and support being offered in terms of his/her illness 
(p.452). Similarly, the sick role may also offer the opportunity of acquitting 
responsibility for actions and behaviour that would otherwise be less tolerated.  
Hence, in this scenario, it can be observed that power may be fuelled by the 
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knowledge about the gains related to mental illness and to the therapeutic alliance. 
This phenomenon can also be understood in terms of dependence and care receiver 
passivity in the context of the therapeutic alliance – this is because decision-making 
equates to responsibility. On the other hand, if the other party in the alliance is the 
sole entity engaged in decision making, this may automatically imply that it is also 
this same entity which is ultimately responsible for the outcome of decisions. 
Foucault (1982) attributed this to what he called techniques of the self.  This refers to 
the fact that an individual may not simply be a passive product of power relations but 
he may also be choosing how to act and thus exerting power upon himself/herself: 
“techniques that permit individuals to effect, by their own means, or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and the way of being, so as to transform themselves” (p.18). 
 
Discontentment discourse outlines a number of subject positions which are centred 
around the fact that the care receivers within this alliance type feel as if the alliance 
is lacking in one way or another. As a case in point, Care Receiver 5’s experience of 
being in this discursive position is linked to a feeling of patronisation as implied by 
the following excerpt: 
Mostly it is “Hello” and “Thank you” with the nurses. Sometimes I open up 
with them but they say: “You will get better. You have a husband who loves 
you and respects you.  Be brave so that you get out of here.” [CR5:31] 
Contrastingly, Care Receiver 1 communicated an aura of detachment within the 
alliance by describing how: 
At the moment, I have a nurse who is with me all the time because I told 
them that I wish to die. Sometimes I would not even know who the nurse 
allocated  to me  is. They do not let you know, they do not say anything. 
Then I realise who it is because this nurse keeps following me. [CR1:58] 
As previously exemplified by Care Receivers 2 and 10, the feeling of being scared 
can also be part of the experience of discontentment discourse. In these care 
receivers’ case, their fear arises from their perception that professionals may punish 
them and so, as a preventive measure, they choose to be compliant within therapeutic 
alliances. Foucault’s ideas on the notion of punishment may shed light on this 
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finding. In Madness and Civilisation, the philosopher compared the behavioural 
treatment techniques used in the nineteenth century (such as the ‘stopping of 
permissions’ mentioned by Care Receiver 2 in this study) and the physical 
punishment that had been popular in earlier practice (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.262). 
Foucault’s conclusion highlighted the fact that despite the difference in nature, both 
techniques concurred with control and restraint: the main change was in the 
application of power: from overt to covert. 
 
On taking a collective glance at these two discourse-types and the subject positions 
that they offer, a number of points call for attention. The first observation is linked to 
that which is felt to be the main loss for care receivers who are part of a 
Dissatisfaction-Compliance type of alliance. Whilst relinquishing the responsibility 
related to decision-making and active participation, it seems as if care receivers are 
giving up their independence, their autonomy and their appreciation of self-worth. 
Incessantly it feels as if in these alliances, care receivers are acting on a self-label 
that reads: No knowledge, no worth, no power, no say.  Moreover and more of a 
concern is the realization that in this alliance-type, care receivers are particularly 
vulnerable since they do not have the shield of autonomy and dignity which may 
otherwise lend an element of protection. Funnily enough, despite the fact that the 
participants are not overall satisfied with some of the elements in the alliance and in 
their care, they seem to accept this situation and do not have any particular desire for 
change. This was specifically inquired for during the interviews and two notable 
replies were: 
I am fine with the idea that I have less power than they (the nurses) do. It is 
how things should be. This is because they are the ones in charge and know 
how things should be done, not me. [CR1:67] 
The nurse always has to be on top and so has the psychiatrist. Because they 
studied to be like that. I believe that they should be on top and I just trust in 
them. [CR5:40] 
Perhaps it is not surprising then that within this alliance, this group of participants 
unanimously agree that they would not forward feedback to the professional even if 
they disagreed with aspects of care such as treatment decisions. In the case of this 
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theme, this apparent acceptance and lack of readiness for change does not 
automatically translate to the same satisfaction and peacefulness that was evident in 
the Satisfaction-Acceptance theme. Contrastingly, the feeling that I had during the 
interview when participants were engaging in discourse related to the 
Dissatisfaction-Compliance theme was one of passivity, pessimism and dependence, 
falling underneath an umbrella of institutionalisation and adherence to tradition.  On 
reflection, it becomes apparent that this type of alliance may be a direct creation of a 
system that is still rooted in medical monopoly and which may not be particularly 
effective in preventing institutionalisation in those who are at the receiving end of 
the services. It may also be linked to the cultural tendency in Malta to protect the 
vulnerable and to reach out to those in need. Oftentimes, this features as a 
paternalistic attitude which, albeit being benevolent in its intention, may at times 
harbour an element of helplessness and inability in those at the receiving end. It is 
perhaps then not surprising that this group of care receivers may be perceiving 
themselves and their situation in a passive and negative light but yet do not show any 
strong will to change the status quo. 
 
In view of this possibility, I am reminded of the television set analogy made by 
Szasz (2007) when he contested the idea that psychiatry can treat psychological 
problems (p.6). In Szasz’s opinion, state services (such as those offered by the 
hospital involved in my study) are ineffective and undesirable because they tend to 
limit the individual’s freedom (Szasz, 2000, sec.3). This may be surprising in view 
of the trend towards community care as a mainstream service in lieu of inpatient 
psychiatric care. However, it has to be noted that whilst the idea of a community care 
model is in itself, a promise for higher regard for care receiver autonomy and 
probably a more balanced alliance-type, the effectiveness of this model is highly 
dependent on a number of factors. Prominently, the perceptions and attitude of the 
care giver and care receiver in therapeutic alliances in community services may be 
vital in the practice of recovery-based ‘community psychiatry’ as opposed to the 
formation of a ‘psychiatric community’. The latter term points towards an extension 
of the institutionalization process seen in some inpatient settings – an approach that 
defies the very scope and perceived value of offering care outside the psychiatric 
hospital. This phenomenon was given prominence by Basaglia (1964) who was 
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particularly concerned that the beliefs, attitudes and culture of the asylum may be 
easily reconstructed in community services under total control by the doctor (p.5). 
 
On reverting once again to a collective glance at this theme, the second observation 
that has emerged involves that which is felt to be another crucial difference between 
the Dissatisfaction-Compliance and the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance-types. A 
look at the former type of alliance highlights the fact that here, the care receiver and 
the alliance itself may be quite highly dependent on energy input from the 
professional.  On the other hand, a Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance involves a care 
receiver who albeit exhibiting trust and a level of dependence on the professionals, 
may still embrace and enjoy a degree of autonomy and independence. Thus this may 
indicate a difference in the energy source between the two alliances – main reliance 
on the professional as an external energy source (in the Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
alliance); a tendency to contribute to the momentum of the alliance (in the 
Satisfaction-Acceptance type). 
Conclusion 
Since this study was not a longitudinal one, the long-term outcomes of the 
Dissatisfaction-Compliance type of alliance could not be adequately explored. 
However there seems to be a clear possibility that such an alliance may eventually 
lead to chronic care and institutionalisation brought about by overly dependent states 
such as those seen in the ‘revolving door syndrome’ or ‘psychiatric communities’. 
 
Theme 3: The Resentment-Opposition alliance-type 
Introduction 
This type of therapeutic alliance was linked to five alliances which were perceived 
and talked about by means of consistent discourse-types falling underneath this 
theme.  
 
This therapeutic alliance-type is mainly characterised by a one-sided alliance where 
the care receiver perceives the professional to be on the upper side of the knowledge-
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power interface within the alliance. Consequently, it feels as if this alliance type may 
be dominated by a continuous power game between the care provider and the 
receiver.  
Discussion 
This theme is very distinguished from the rest in that it has very specific 
characteristics. On shifting the light on the interviews that were carried out with the 
care receivers, the emotion felt was strong, highly tangible and unpleasant. It was 
evident that the most of the participants’ demeanour was one of anger and 
discomfort brought about by a power imbalance in favour of the professional within 
the alliance. These were individuals who at times showed clear disagreement with 
care plans and felt as if their rights were not being respected. As a result, some of the 
participants actively chose to resist care in their determination to not let the system 
get them down - self-declared fighters: 
I had permission to go to the main garden accompanied.  But I refused  to 
take the injection and he (the psychiatrist) stopped my permission. He 
wanted to give it to me against my will. [CR4:16] 
Contradictingly, some of these care receivers were also felt to convey a sense of 
hopelessness in the face of a care system that was perceived as oppressive and even 
harmful.   As Care Receiver 1 commented: 
I am not happy with the care that I am being given. I am not happy with this 
environment either. I cannot do anything about this – I just want to go home 
for some peace. [CR1:39-41] 
On reviewing the narratives produced, it is almost as if the whole experience of 
mental illness, hospitalisation and the process of being in an alliance with different 
professionals is at times constructed as a struggle - a challenge and a power game 
that seems to favour the professionals. In Care Receiver 4’s terms: 
Here it is always a struggle with the doctor because I do not want the 
medication because it harms me. [CR4:31] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 9 shared her experience of her alliance with the 
psychiatrist: 
166 
 
My psychiatrist does not give me enough information on my symptoms. Now 
just this morning he told me: “We’re not going to do the ECT and we’re 
going to stay without the pills and you need to make an effort.” TELL ME 
WHAT I HAVE! [CR9:10] 
On the same lines, the alliance is at times perceived as being a punishment tool – a 
medium that strips away the care receiver’s rights and allows the enforcement of 
oppressive measures. Care Receiver 4 exemplified this by describing how: 
The junior doctors visit but they say that they cannot give me any 
permissions because they speak to the consultant psychiatrist and he does not 
wish to give me permissions. He does not even come to see me once weekly. 
I speak to his doctors. [CR4:16] 
In the same manner, some participants constructed the alliance as being a mystery – 
a set of interactions that are shrouded by unexplained events, unanswered questions 
and strange decisions. Care Receiver 9 spoke in detail about this and at one point, 
she exclaimed: 
But then, provide me with someone who can help, someone who can say: 
“You are doing this and that which are not right and if you do this, it will 
help you.” Guide me eh. Because I do not know what I need to do. [CR9:17] 
A final discursive construction that was evident in this theme paints the therapeutic 
alliance perceived by the care receivers as being an unwanted burden and one that is 
definitely there on a temporary basis without any evidence of therapeutic outcomes.  
During her description of the alliance with the psychologist, Care Receiver 7 
provided a good example of this by stating that: 
The psychologist does not help me. I feel embarrassed when I am with her.  
Because I know that she doesn’t want to deal with me, you know.  I feel it  
strongly. Very very embarrassed, I hope I do not see her again. [CR7:28] 
Along the same line, Care Receiver 6 spoke about her alliance with some of the 
nurses: 
The nurses do not give me any therapy. Patients do not speak because nurses 
snap at them and that destroys all the trust. They (the nurses) need to speak to 
you not tell you the contrary. [CR6:35] 
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On the basis of these constructions of the therapeutic alliance by the care receivers 
and their carers, it can be seen that a number of discourses are being employed. As 
already evident through the excerpts that have been included, anarchist discourse 
was the dominant discourse-type in those care receiver interviews that contributed 
towards the emergence of this theme. In this view, the care receivers are rebelling 
against authority or the perceived ‘ruling power’, which in this case, is comprised by 
the psychiatric discipline. The tone, the choice of words and the overall 
characteristics of the narratives suggest care receiver unity in a movement that 
opposes hierarchy due to the perception of this authoritarian body to be harmful and 
unnecessary.   
 
Care Receiver 1 may have provided a clear example of this phenomenon by stating 
that: 
They throw you into this room, as if you are in prison – seclusion - and you 
feel even more down than you already are. [CR1:18] 
Later he added: 
And they are totally decided that the problem is the alcohol - that irritates me. 
The real problem is the way I feel and then I drink so as to detach myself 
from reality.  I think that I had spoken about this to my psychiatrist once. But 
he just kept insisting that I need to enrol into the rehabilitation programme. 
[CR1:60] 
In this regard, resistance seems to be playing a major role within some of the 
Resentment-Opposition alliances encountered as portrayed by a care receiver who 
does not view the alliance as a basic and fundamental part of treatment but holds the 
notion that s/he needs to be vigilant and constantly ensure that s/he is not being 
abused.   
 
The discourse pertaining to this discursive theme is also akin to discontentment 
discourse which has already been encountered in the Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
alliance-type. However, in the Resentment-Opposition theme, the discourse used 
often extends beyond the expression of mild displeasure and culminates in intense 
anger or a perception of the alliance as being hopeless. Thus, unlike the 
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Dissatisfaction-Compliance theme, most care receivers in a Resentment-Opposition 
alliance-type do not simply express displeasure at aspects of the alliance and stop at 
that. Contrastingly, most of these care receivers resist the very alliance and the care 
that it may provide, as shall be discussed later. The following excerpt may serve as 
an example of this attitude: 
My role in the multidisciplinary team is to dread each ward round because it 
means a change in medication.  I do not have any importance within this 
team. I know how to keep myself clean and the house clean. By bringing me 
here, they have made me lose the opportunity to live my life. All my life. 
[CR4:21] 
Following the identification of the constructions of the therapeutic alliance and the 
dominant discourses within this discursive theme, the subsequent step is to reflect on 
the subject positions offered by the discursive constructions and the related 
discourse-types. Moreover, the area enclosed within these subject positions shall be 
explored in relation to the subjective experience of being within each position as 
well as the norms and values dictated in this instance. 
At this point, it is felt fruitful to commence the argument by discussing my 
subjective experience whilst participating in the interview with care receivers whose 
narratives featured the alliance-type that is being described in this theme.   Of all the 
care receivers who were interviewed, this group of care receivers were the ones who 
held my utmost interest and this led to many hours of reflection and re-listening to 
the recordings.  I have to confess that this interest was primarily fuelled by the fact 
that the main feeling that I had during the interview with this group was one of 
discomfort and unsettlement. Additionally, I also found myself in a position where I 
was vividly aware that at that moment, I had to maintain my role as a researcher and 
thus refrain from side-stepping into a clinician’s role. Afterwards, I concluded that 
these feelings were related to my perception that the participants were possibly 
utilising the interaction during the interview as an emotional purge - an opportunity 
to vent out, to make their voice heard and to possibly undergo catharsis. This led me 
to wonder what it must be like to be a care receiver within these types of discourses. 
 
Since discourses peppered by anarchism and discontentment are felt to be 
interlinked, it may be useful to consider the collective rather than the individual 
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positions that they give rise to.  On viewing the care receiver situated in these 
positions, the image that may be seen is that of a survivor. Here, this word is being 
used in the same sense as implied by the critical psychiatry survivor movement.  
This relates to service users who rebel against psychiatric practices that are mainly 
based on the medical model (Knight & Kierans, 2011).  Indeed, it has to be said that 
the care receivers’ narratives echo some of the writings of prominent figures in the 
anti-psychiatry and critical psychiatry movement, with the same vibes of anger and 
frustration at the medical world. This position may offer a sense of being active and 
fighting for one’s right as well as opposing a scientific discipline that may be 
perceived as having monopolised and pathologised the field of mental health.  The 
displeasure and discomfort that has been communicated by the care receivers during 
the interview is seen to be a dominant characteristic and particularly brought about 
by lack of care choices and participation in care. The discussions that I had with care 
receivers who were part of a Resentment-Opposition alliance featured a range of 
scenarios where the care receiver felt as if s/he were not being offered options and as 
being excluded from decision making. Prominent statements included: 
The only treatment option that they offered me at that time was admission to 
the hospital.  I did not agree with them that I needed to be admitted or with 
the way things happened. I am not sick or mental. [CR4:7] 
I am not satisfied with the treatment that I am receiving here.  I try to speak 
to the doctor about it but he ignores me. He does not wish to speak to me. 
Nothing. He does not pay attention. [CR4:15,16] 
My care plan consists of antidepressants and Valium because of the drinking 
- those basically. And you spend the day staring aimlessly and smoking. 
[CR1:26] 
Most of the discussion is not directed at me – most of the discussion is 
directed at my husband, the psychiatrist wouldn’t be speaking to me.   He 
would be speaking to my husband. So I stay there listening to them talking 
about me. [CR9:18] 
Complementing this perception, it seems as if the majority of the care receivers in 
this type of alliance feel as if they are not being respected or treated as an equal 
within the alliance. In particular, Care Receiver 1 described how: 
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They (the professionals) think that you do not know how to do anything. 
They decide everything for you. That’s not right. [CR1:32] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 4 expressed his displeasure by describing his perceived role 
in the alliance with his psychiatrist: 
With the psychiatrist, I feel like dirt. He does whatever he wants to. Even 
when I let him know that the medication is harming me. [CR4:27] 
In her Resentment-Opposition alliance with nursing staff, Care Receiver 6 
communicated her distaste with the disrespect that she felt subjected to: 
I am not satisfied with the power balance in my relationship with the nurses. 
This is because they are not people who interact with patients in a gentle 
manner rather than a savage-like manner.  This is my opinion, although I 
know that some others share the same opinion as I do.  [CR6:33] 
Interestingly, Care Receiver 7 described a situation where the perceived inequality 
and disrespect communicated by professionals took place in a more covert manner. 
In a scenario where she was describing her interaction with the psychologist, the 
participant stated: 
I have a psychologist but she doesn’t like me. I mean she is nice and would 
never insult me but I am intelligent enough to realise that she does not feel at 
ease with me. But I know from the way that she carries on that she would like 
to get rid of me. [CR7:24] 
Conclusively, perhaps Care Receiver 9’s plea can serve as a good summary of the 
general feelings reported by most of the care receivers in this type of alliance: 
But I feel as if  I am not  treated as a person.  I wish that they would speak 
TO ME. Explain TO ME. Show ME, tell ME where I’m not acting as I 
should, what I am doing that’s wrong. Not just telling me that I am doing 
wrong things but not specifying what and how. And what I need  to do things 
right. To treat me like an intelligent human being, which I think I am. 
[CR9:21] 
This latter excerpt can serve as a springboard into a deeper exploration of the 
consequences of the subjects’ feelings in the positions offered by anarchist and 
discontentment discourses. Primarily, the resulting expressed emotion during the 
interview was that of anger directed at the counterpart entity within the alliance – the 
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professionals. Once again, to me, this is reminiscent of Survivor Movement Groups 
which are often fuelled by anger at a coercive psychiatric system (Wallcraft et al., 
2003, p.38).  On further examination of these care receivers’ narratives, it is visible 
that anger seems to be having three major consequences in relation to the 
participants’ attitude and behaviour within the alliance. The first effect is that of 
resistance to care and to decisions made by the professionals. This can be seen in 
Care Receiver 1’s case when he commented that: 
I do not know anything - like when I’m going on leave, how much time I am 
spending here - I do not know anything. I am not going to do the 
rehabilitation programme. [CR1:27] 
The following excerpt from Care Receiver 7’s narrative serves as an additional 
example of resistance: 
But I know from the way that she carries on that she would like to get rid of 
me. I would like to change the psychologist. It is ok if she is on the line but I 
do not want to be accompanied by her.  [CR7:28] 
This attitude seems to be linked to the second consequence which is the perceived 
ineffectiveness of the care plan. In particular, the majority of care receivers who 
were situated within a Resentment-Opposition alliance spoke about their negative 
opinion of the care that they are receiving in the context of the alliance: 
I am not satisfied. I wish that before they prescribe medicine, they ask the 
patient whether he wants it or not.  And the patient has every right. Because 
we are in the EU. The patient can decide what type of treatment he wants to 
have and the doctor has to co-operate with him not just force him to take 
medication. [CR4:30] 
Actually, he just changed my pills without informing me about it. I wish that 
I´m involved. Because they think that you do not know how to do anything. 
They decide everything for you. That’s not right. First of all, I wish that he 
(the consultant psychiatrist) had not stopped the Seroxat because I had been 
doing quite well on it.  [CR1:32] 
Finally, it was also observed that in certain instances, the anger and resistance give 
way to hopelessness - a lack of faith and belief in one’s recovery and in the potential 
benefits of the therapeutic alliance. Care Receiver 1 made specific reference to this 
feeling by contending that: 
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When I am with the psychiatrist, I feel as if he has lost all hope in me.  Now I 
have lost all hope too, in everything. In fact he has referred me to another 
psychiatrist now. [CR1:49] 
Similar statements were observed in Care Receiver 9´s words when she concluded 
that: 
His (the psychiatrist’s) opinion is that since I did such an overdose, he cannot 
discuss with me. And so I reflect that I may have brought this onto myself 
and so I have to be submissive. [CR9:35] 
In view of the identified feelings that seem to accompany these subject positions, it 
may be useful to focus on the possible rationale behind this power game which, in 
terms of recent research on the therapeutic alliance, may be hindering recovery by 
keeping both parties in the alliance entrapped in an eternal struggle with therapeutic 
outcomes being side-tracked (Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, sec.9).  On reflection, it seems 
as if these participants are indirectly exposing that which may be one of the 
problematic issues in the system, as revealed by some of the interviews and possibly 
by the majority of the medical and nursing records reviewed during the study. This 
involves the apparent lack of attention directed at the provision of spiritual care.  In 
this regard, spirituality is being understood as the individual’s specific blue print that 
provides meaning to his/her actions, experiences and path in life (Culliford, 2002, 
p.1). It also refers to the person’s dignity, autonomy and his/her own unique identity 
(Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group 
Executive Committee, 2013, sec.2). When the participants disclosed their feelings in 
relation to the perceived disrespect, exclusion, inequality and lack of options within 
the therapeutic alliance, they could have been outlining a depersonalising and 
mechanical care system that fails to take individuality and holisticity into 
consideration. This type of care shall be examined in more detail in the section 
pertaining to the analysis of the professionals’ texts, which notably holds hints to 
what may indeed be a lack of spirituality in the care provided by some of the 
professionals involved. Possible neglect of the spiritual dimension is a worrying 
issue but more so is the realisation that a number of event descriptions by the care 
receivers hint at a striking imbalance of power within the alliance that may be 
associated with abusive professional behaviour. Examples of this kind of behaviour 
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given by some of the care receivers in Resentment-Opposition alliances mainly 
constitute patronising attitudes, overprescription of drugs and coercion. Whilst 
acknowledging that the care receivers’ narratives represent only one version of 
historical events, the following descriptions are felt to be too powerful to exclude: 
In the past, I had trusted a nurse.  And then we had an argument and she 
revealed my secrets to everyone, in front of everyone. From that moment 
onwards, I vowed that I would never again trust another single nurse. 
[CR6:27] 
If you need to speak to the nurses, they should make the time to do that. But 
if I ask to speak to them, they should not answer: “I am busy. What do you 
need now?” [CR6:34] 
 
Now the dose of Modecate that I am taking is 150mg every 2 weeks when 
normally they give 25mg every month. 150mg! [CR4:13] 
(Note: Since Care Receiver 4’s medical records were available for the purpose of this study, 
the medication dosage could be checked. In fact the records stated that the Modecate dose 
being given to the care receiver was 130mg every 2 weeks. The maximum suggested 
dose/frequency indicated by the British National Formulary is 100mg every 14 days (BMJ 
Group & Royal Pharmaceutical Company of Great Britain, 2014, p.239). In the Maudsley 
guidelines, a lower maximum dose of 50mg every 2 weeks is recommended (Taylor, Paton 
& Kapur, 2009, p.36). 
 
Echoes and implications of these descriptions provided during the interviews are felt 
to outline the crucial need for further observational research, monitoring and 
professional supervision in order to investigate alliances in more detail.  On shifting 
the focus, it may be worthwhile to consider another possible rationale for this morbid 
view of the alliance that may seem as contradictory to that just described. This refers 
to the possibility that despite the strong and aggressive front that these individuals 
exhibit to the world, they may have, for a myriad of reasons, given up on fuelling 
their energy and will on recovery. This may then be communicated through anger, 
resistance and eventual hopelessness as noted in some of the interviews transcribed. 
This postulates that these individuals may be caught in a vicious circle with recovery 
being low at the top of priorities.  In this regard, the negative scrutiny of the 
therapeutic alliance may act as a relief from boredom, as well as a scope for-, and 
motivation for survival by virtue of the alliance itself being a target for anger and 
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frustration. Thus, in this manner, the Resentment-Opposition alliance-type that 
characterises this theme may be one that adds colour to a care receiver’s life which is 
otherwise shrouded by darkness attributed to the various consequences of mental 
illness and hospitalisation.  In a narrative enquiry carried out by Knight and Kierans 
(2011), it was concluded that by rebelling against the psychiatric system, members of 
a user movement group may feel empowered: “Do I stay ‘user’ or this person down 
here, or do I make major changes, and start looking at this process of stopping being 
this disabled, disenabled person?” (slide 9).   
I feel that some of the characteristics of the care receivers in a Resentment-
Opposition alliance may be experiencing similar feelings to those identified in 
Knight and Kierans’ study. However, there is a major difference in that hopelessness 
seems to be characterising some of the care receivers in the Resentment-Opposition 
theme – this was not evident in the findings by Knight and Kierans.  
Conclusion 
As a final concluding note to the Resentment-Opposition theme, one may elaborate 
further by pondering on whether each of the parties in the therapeutic alliance are 
acting or else reacting to their counterparts.  Thus, one may ask: Are the care 
receivers reacting to an oppressive system by exhibiting anger and engaging in a 
power struggle? Or are they acting in this manner due to other reasons with the 
professionals’ actions being a direct reaction to this hostility? Although the findings 
of this study suggest a mixture of both of these possible scenarios, it is felt that there 
is no clear answer to these questions.  However, it is evident that this alliance-type 
seems to be mostly characterised by hostility and excessive focus on maintaining 
control. This suggests an unhealthy interaction and the long-term impact on recovery 
is a concern.    
Theme 4: The Collaboration alliance-type 
Introduction 
Nine of the alliances identified within this study were mainly characterised by a 
scenario where the participants perceived the knowledge and power interface within 
the alliance as being balanced. 
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Here, the care receiver and the professional seem to be engaged in a partnership that 
is mostly characterised by dialogue and shared decision making. As a result, this 
alliance-type seems to be primarily governed by the mutual appreciation of different 
knowledge types that may be potentially contributed by the two entities within it. In 
other words, this is the only alliance type where there seems to be clear respect for 
both expertise by profession and expertise by experience as well as the equal 
importance of both of these knowledge types for recovery to take place. In turn, this 
also makes it the only alliance-type where there seems to be a balance of power, as 
contented by the participants who were interviewed. This results in a group of care 
receivers who express their satisfaction with the care that they are receiving in the 
context of that particular alliance.  
Discussion 
On attending to the care receivers’ narratives, it can be noted that the alliance is 
being constructed as an agreement based on collaboration. Care Receiver 3 
highlighted this fact by his description of a typical interaction with his social worker: 
When I am with the social worker, I feel very comfortable. If I give 
suggestions, I get feedback, good, bad - it was never bad. She will lay out the 
options and feedback and ask me what I think about it. I have time to discuss. 
I am not presented with a rigid answer. [CR3:30] 
This reference to a partnership was also seen in the narrative by Care Receiver 8: 
I feel very good when I am with the occupational therapist. She tells me what 
I’m doing wrong, tells me what’s going to happen. If I disagreed with 
something that she said, I would go and talk to her. [CR8:24] 
Notably, during the interview, an observation that was particularly evident was the 
switch in the whole demeanour when a care receiver spoke about the Collaboration 
alliance-type. This could be especially noted when the participant formed part of 
other alliance types. In this instance, the care receiver often described the 
Collaboration alliance-type against a backdrop of the other alliances in order to 
demonstrate the difference. As an example, Care Receiver 9 stated that: 
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The occupational therapist is a person who is doing that work with us which 
cannot be determined by the psychiatrist. And so she can do what we suggest 
and she respects us – that is why I feel equal, she lets me decide and 
participate. With the nurses, the power imbalance is due to the system – they 
have to obey the psychiatrist. With the psychiatrist, the power imbalance is 
there because I am the crazy one with no knowledge at all, I do not know. 
[CR9:33-35] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 7 described how: 
This (alliance with nurses) is not the same as the occupational therapists – 
they (the occupational therapists) are more like pals, you know. They say: 
“When you are ready, just come over and you can speak to me if you like.” 
[CR7:35] 
In this manner, the alliance is being constructed as a beneficial and gainful system, 
especially in comparison to alternative alliance-types. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the care receivers have the same 
romantic view of the alliance as that observed in the Satisfaction-Acceptance 
alliance. Contrastingly, whereas in this latter alliance-type, the professional’s good 
qualities are at the frontline, with common attributions to a quasi-heroic professional, 
the Collaboration alliance-type is more focused on the care receiver’s method of 
managing the alliance rather than the care provider’s attitude and behaviour. As a 
case in point, Care Receiver 3’s description of his alliance with the nurses implies 
that some of these professionals are at times, far from being heroic figures: 
There are ones who say unnecessary misplaced things. Like he (one of the 
nurses) said: “You have relapsed AGAIN?” [CR3:31] 
In reply to this statement, which the care receiver perceived as being patronising, he 
said: 
“Don’t you think that it is a good thing that I came here for treatment instead 
of staying outside in a bad way?” I did not answer rudely or whatever. I do 
not want to be rude. I wish to be good mannered. [CR3:31] 
Thus, in this light, the alliance is a system that needs to be managed by the care 
receiver in order to insist on collaboration and to maintain a balance, even if the care 
provider’s attitude is not desirable. However, it has to be said that in most of the 
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Compliance alliance-types encountered in this study, the care receivers described the 
professional’s attitude as being characterised by collaboration and equality.  
Following reflection on these discursive constructions of the alliance within this 
theme, a number of main discourse-types can be identified and shall be explored. 
 
When the entities construct the alliance as a bond that is characterised by shared 
decision making and respect for different types of knowledge, this can be attributed 
to equality discourse. This advocates the importance of balance and mutuality – a 
joint effort that promises synergy and positive outcomes. Particular excerpts from the 
care receivers’ narratives indicate this: 
The power is shared in the relationships. We are equal. [CR3:33] 
I feel ok with the nurses. They talk to me, about my problems. If I am not 
feeling well, I have to go to talk to them. If I disagreed with something that 
they said or wanted to give suggestions and feedback, I would do that to the 
nurses. [CR8:26] 
During this meeting, the nurses and the occupational therapist explain about 
the regulations of the place and then involve us in a discussion about 
anything that we would like to improve. I feel good during these meetings. 
[CR9:23] 
This can be seen to lead the way to assertiveness discourse as seen by some of the 
participants’ readiness to affirm their rights, demand respect and exhibit an aura of 
non-aggressive confidence in the context of this alliance-type.  Notably, the care 
receivers’ main contentions seem to be based upon the importance of a humane 
approach that addresses the care receiver as a unique and valuable figure. In fact, in 
view of the Collaboration alliance-type, some of the care receivers were noted to be 
refreshingly eager to discuss principles of autonomy, mastery of recovery and the 
right of selecting a tailor-made treatment package: 
The way I see it, in a few years my mother will not be here. So I have to get 
on my feet and deal with my doctor.  If I cannot deal with my doctor, how am 
I ever going to deal with anybody else?  I can talk to the doctor and that does 
not affect the relationship as it may do with the nurses. [CR7:33] 
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However, if there is something that is harming me, I will speak up and refuse. 
Listen, I may look ‘soft’ but I stand up for myself - what’s right is right, 
what’s wrong is wrong. [CR3:26] 
Assertiveness discourse may be viewed as lying beneath a perception and attitude 
which gravitates towards the need of freedom of choice. This is indicative of the 
individual’s desired opportunity to pursue human rights without any encroachment 
from the state and the entities within it. On the application of a political stance, this 
may also be described as a liberal approach, with the views of the professionals and 
the care receivers running parallel to each other with a final convergence towards 
agreed-upon goals: 
I formed this care plan - this was what I had told my doctor and social worker 
- what care plan I wanted..not going out of hospital to my home and then the 
programme - I want to go to the programme directly from here. [CR3:23] 
What keeps this knowledge-power balance as it is, is that I wouldn’t be afraid 
of asking questions, whoever the professional is, it can be the prime minister! 
[CR3:35] 
The identification of these discourse types as emerging from the data collected from 
the narratives leads to a reflection on the collective positions offered to the entities 
within this type of alliance. At the forefront, the construction of the alliance through 
equality discourse subjects the professional and the care receiver to fair play as 
distinguished by the respect and positive light that the care receiver and at times, the 
professional, shed on this working relationship. In this discursive position, it seems 
as if there is acknowledgment that the other party within the alliance is as 
knowledgeable as oneself and each of the knowledge sources need to contribute 
equally in the alliance in order to allow for the maximisation of therapeutic 
outcomes. This seems to be in line with the Recovery Model which places emphasis 
on self-determination, empowerment and collaboration (Warner, 2010, p.3). On 
examining the care receiver side of this equation, a number of observations can be 
made.  
 
The first observation in this regard revolves around the care receiver’s motivation to 
be autonomous and independent. This does not point towards ignoring the guidance 
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offered by professionals – indeed, if that were to happen, it would be an act that 
defies the principle of respect for the other’s knowledge which has by now been 
witnessed to be located at the very core of this alliance-type. Contrastingly, this 
refers to a situation where the care receiver is motivated and determined enough to 
be: 
- An active participant in care 
- A learner (a quest for updating one’s knowledge) 
- A teacher (a quest for sharing one’s knowledge) 
- A pragmatist (ability to use one’s own knowledge in ‘exploiting’ the alliance 
in order to reach therapeutic goals) 
 
This is felt to be a tangent to the second observation which holds that in order for 
this alliance to be really and truly modelled on collaboration, the care receiver needs 
to be willing to ‘manage’ the knowledge-power interface within the alliance. In this 
regard, effective management may be described as being shaped by the assertiveness 
discourse that most of the participants in this alliance-type engaged in. This is due to 
the fact that it is felt that in the absence of such an attitude, the knowledge-power 
balance in the alliance may inevitably shift the alliance towards another mechanism 
and covert it into any of the other alliance-types that have been described earlier on 
in this chapter.  This point is felt to have particular importance attached to it because 
it is especially evident that even in the light of adversity (such as a professional who 
insistently promotes pathological/clinical discourse), the care receiver in the 
Collaboration alliance-type has the ability to stand firm and guide recovery. 
Importantly, the interview with care receivers who are in this type of alliance and 
who are subject to this type of adversity seem adamant to respond in a manner that is 
shaped by assertiveness discourse. This places the care receiver in a position where 
s/he acknowledges his/her right for a type of care that is more holistic and that 
maximises the possibility for freedom of choice. This includes the opportunity for 
selection of the best care package that is not necessarily one that is based on the 
medical model. The works by Romme and Escher (2000; 1993) and May (2005) 
placed the concept of treatment choice at the forefront of care by emphasising that 
spiritual and emotional crises need to be addressed by offering care options that do 
not force medicine onto the individual. At the same time, the care receiver in the 
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Collaboration alliance-type may find himself/herself in a position of resistance 
whereby s/he is assertively refusing to be shaped by traditional notions that may act 
to limit his/her choices.  One may wonder how easy it is to be in this situation – what 
can be said is that most of the care receivers who were seen to employ this type of 
discourse did not seem to be particularly unsettled by the position offered to them.  
Contrarily, they seemed to take the medical model in their stride whilst striving to 
strike a balance within the alliance that still enabled them to use their knowledge and 
power in shaping the recovery process.  The following narration by Care Receiver 3 
is felt to demonstrate this: 
But the professionals and I always got along. The power is shared in the 
relationships. We are equal. Like let me give you a real example: This 
morning I was going to mass and I had forgotten that you were going to 
interview me. And I told one of the nurses: “I am going to mass. And he said: 
“But now you have the interview and you need to speak to her.” And I 
replied: “But she has other people to interview, not just myself, so she can 
wait for 20 minutes or half an hour whilst I attend mass.” And he said: “Oh 
come on, what difference is it going to make to you if instead of going to 
mass, you stay here watching TV?” And that sparked me off. Now this is a 
nurse who sometimes says things in a jokey manner - he does this all the 
time. Like I wouldn’t know what he is referring to. Then I told him: “Please 
do not speak to me in this manner because it irritates me and also because 
this is not the same manner as I speak to you. I wish to go to mass. The 
researcher can wait or afterall, I have a right to opt out of the interview. End 
of story.” [CR3:33] 
Here it is worthwhile to compare this attitude as shaped by assertiveness discourse to 
that exhibited by care receivers in the three other themes as a response or counterpart 
attitude to clinical/pathological discourse.  It can be instantly observed that whilst in 
the Collaboration alliance-type, care receivers seem to practice assertiveness, in 
other alliance-types they tend to exhibit passive aggressiveness, acceptance or 
dependence in the face of discourse that promotes the medical model. The rationale 
for this difference may be based on various contentions. Probably it constitutes an 
eclectic mix that features the care receiver’s and professional’s personality, the 
mental state of the care receiver, the influence of other discourses on the therapeutic 
alliance as well as the wider discourses employed within the health system and 
society.  
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So how does it feel to be a care receiver in the discursive positions created through 
the practice of equality discourse?  During my interview, it seemed as if the care 
receivers were satisfied and proud to be part of this alliance. This is not a surprising 
finding in relation to the clear gains that may be attributed to respect for equality, not 
necessarily when viewing this concept in terms of mental health or psychiatry only 
but even when looking at the wider practice of equality in society.  
 
By now, it is fairly evident that the knowledge-power nexus in the Collaboration 
alliance-type is one which can be described as being based on an even balance. This 
is mainly catalysed by the focus on the sharing of knowledge which facilitates active 
participation and collaboration by both parties. The transparent evaluation and 
application of suitable knowledge is subsequently fundamental in the equal 
distribution of power within this type of alliance.  In turn, this power balance creates 
even more space for dialogue and collaboration which serves to facilitate the 
constant generation of knowledge. Contrary to what has been traditionally perceived 
as being one-way, this view of the therapeutic alliance depicts a partnership with 
possible gains for both sides. The main gain may be the feeling of unity and 
teamwork on working towards a common goal – an aspect that was visibly 
emphasised by the care receivers during my interview with them. The other gain is 
the growth that may be potentially experienced by both entities on gaining access to 
the other’s knowledge and on travelling along the recovery journey.  This contention 
is supported by Brown (2007) who used a Foucauldian approach to explore the 
concept of knowing, not knowing and partial knowing in relation to the 
professional’s status of knowledge in the alliance. The author recognised that 
knowledge and power cannot be separated in the context of the alliance and 
dominant discourses can only be rectified if both entities within the alliance 
contribute actively and share knowledge (Brown, 2007, p.12). Perhaps the main loss 
here may be viewed in terms of the extinction of the medical monopoly due to its 
replacement by a vision where the professional is an apprentice within every 
therapeutic alliance that s/he is part of.  One may argue that this does not really 
constitute a tragic loss – however, advocates of a purely medical approach may 
disagree. 
182 
 
Conclusion 
As a final note to this theme, it may be worth to pay a degree of consideration to the 
effectiveness of this type of alliance. As discussed, it would not be erroneous to state 
that if this alliance-type is viewed against a postmodern background and an approach 
based on the contemporary meaning of recovery, then it would probably be an ideal 
template. It can be noted that the Collaboration alliance-type shares similar 
characteristics to those advocated in the Recovery Model, especially due to the fact 
that this alliance is coloured by hope – by a perception that the recovery journey is 
being viewed in a positive light. Although it was not the scope of my study to 
measure the outcomes of the different alliance-forms, it is interesting to note that the 
effectiveness of the Recovery Model has been studied extensively.  For instance, 
Warner (2010) carried out a review of published outcome studies and depicted the 
effectiveness of approaches based on the philosophy of the Recovery Model (p.5). In 
their 3-year follow up study about outcomes in schizophrenia, Lambert, Naber, 
Schacht, Wager, Hundemer and Karow (2008) provided further compelling evidence 
of the benefits of this model. In another study that may have important implications 
for my study, Tilsen and Nylund (2008) described how the effectiveness of the 
recovery model is strongly dependent on the therapeutic alliance (p.340). To this 
extent, they identified a meta-analysis by Wampold (2001) which showed that 54% 
of therapy variance was accounted for by the alliance (p.345). This led the authors to 
conclude that care providers must be flexible to care receivers’ needs in a 
collaborative alliance in order to facilitate recovery. Interpretivist research such as 
that carried out by Dziopa & Ahern (2009) and Ackermann & Hilsenroth (2003) 
presented similar findings and suggestions in promoting the use of a recovery 
approach. Thus it seems as if the Collaboration alliance-type may be one that leads 
to positive care outcomes. 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The analysis and discussion of the service users’ interviews led to the identification 
of the four main discursive themes that have been presented.  A number of important 
findings have been portrayed. At the forefront lies the conclusion that discourse may 
be playing an important part in shaping specific alliances that featured in this study. 
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In this regard, the findings show that commonly, the way that the service users in the 
study spoke about and perceived the knowledge-power balance in different alliances 
may be related to the way that they act within the perimeters of the same alliance. 
Thus, for example, the Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance may be negatively 
perceived by the service user as being characterised by a power differential in favour 
of the professional. This may then be related to service user anger and resistance. In 
contrast, the service user in a Collaboration alliance may be satisfied with the 
perceived balance of knowledge and power within the alliance. Consequently, this 
may be related to assertive behaviour and active involvement in care.  In my view, 
the findings are a good practical example of the Foucault’s explanation of discourse 
and its effects, which can be summarised as: “systems of thoughts composed of 
ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct 
the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006, p.285). The findings 
that emerged from this part of the study may also show that service users come in all 
shapes and sizes and the knowledge-power balance in the alliance is not always 
necessarily unidirectional, rigid and in favour of the professional. On the basis of this 
finding, I concur with Zur (2009) who contended that the therapeutic alliance may 
not necessarily be characterised by a power differential and in fact, power may 
manifest both on the care receiver’s side as well as on the care provider’s side of the 
therapeutic alliance (p.160). Finally, the interviews with the service users provided a 
first-hand account of the experience of being in a psychiatric hospital and part of 
various therapeutic alliances. Some of the experiences recounted were pleasant and 
appealing such as those that featured the service users engaging in assertiveness 
discourse in the context of a Collaborative alliance. In contrast, other stories that 
were narrated were unsettling such as those characterised by compliance discourse in 
the Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance or the anger that characterised the 
Resentment-Opposition alliance. Whilst this part of the study is felt to have 
generated important information, it is hoped that in combination with the findings 
that emerged from the professionals’ written records, a more comprehensive view of 
the knowledge-power balance in the alliance can be attained. 
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4.3 Analysis and discussion of the medical and nursing 
records 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section of the chapter is primarily concerned with an in-depth analysis and 
critical discussion of the medical and nursing records that were included in this 
study.  
 
In a similar manner to the analysis of the interviews with the care receiver 
participants, the analysis of the medical and nursing records has been carried out as 
guided by the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework developed for the purpose 
of this study.  In this section of the chapter, there are several references to the term 
‘medical and nursing records’.  In an attempt to enhance clarity, it serves to note that 
the term medical records refers to a file that holds reports written by doctors only 
whereas nursing reports are maintained by nursing staff only.  
 
The first step followed during analysis was that of Data Acquaintance. During this 
process, certain trends or characteristics were immediately evident such as, for 
instance, the technical and minimalistic writing style noted in the majority of entries 
in the records. In particular, this feature guided me into longer periods of reflexivity 
since a void - that which is not written - may not necessarily facilitate and hasten the 
analysis process but may lead, as in this case, to deeper curiosity and speculation 
about the blanks as well as the written words. This is in line with Foucault’s 
perspective when he emphasised that rather than trying “to write the history of [the 
language of psychiatry]”, his interest lay in exploring “the archaeology of that 
silence” (Foucault, 1961/ 2001, p.xii). 
 
The subsequent step was the process of general Thematic Analysis which led to the 
assignment of codes to data excerpts, as facilitated by the qualitative analysis 
software Atlas.ti.  Following a process of reduction and refinement, a list of codes 
was compiled.  
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Following this primary analysis of the data, a more detailed exploration of the 
knowledge-power interface within the texts could be pursued.  As guided by the 
third step in the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework used, the main 
discursive themes could then be identified. Three such themes emerged from the data 
and have been used to structure this section of the chapter. 
 
In each of the three discursive themes that form this section, an introductory 
description of the theme is first provided followed by the discursive constructions of 
the therapeutic alliance as shaped by the dominant discourses within the theme (Step 
4 of the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework). This leads into a deeper 
exploration by identification and analysis of the dominant discourses and the subject 
positions that they offer with the associated consequences for parties within these 
positions. Finally the effect of discourses on practice is ascribed to (Steps 5-8 of the 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework).   
 
Prior to delving into an exploration of each of these themes, an overview and 
presentation of the analysis shall be provided in order to depict a summative picture 
of the process and the final product. 
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4.3.2 Analysis of the medical and nursing records 
Introduction 
The first step of the analysis consisted of reading and re-reading the medical and 
nursing records that were included in the study. This was undertaken so that I could 
familiarise myself with the data and reflect upon the written words and their 
meaning.  
Primary analysis: general thematic coding 
The subsequent step involved a process of inductive coding whereby descriptive 
codes were assigned to the data.  This was carried out so as to organise the data into 
manageable chunks and allow for further detailed analysis. A worked example and a 
list of primary codes that resulted from the process of thematic coding are found in 
Appendix 4.  
Secondary analysis: main discursive themes related to knowledge-power 
Following the primary analysis process, the coded medical and nursing records were 
reviewed again. At this stage, the aim was to identify main themes related to 
knowledge and power.  This process led to the identification of three main discursive 
themes in relation to the knowledge-power interface within the therapeutic alliance.  
Table 4 summarises the whole analysis process by showing the general codes that 
emerged from the primary analysis and how they were categorised into themes 
during secondary analysis.  These themes were then further explored to identify the 
discursive constructions of the therapeutic alliances and the dominant discourses. 
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Table 4: The analysis process (medical and nursing records) 
  
Primary 
analysis: 
codes 
Secondary 
analysis: main 
discursive 
themes 
Discursive 
constructions 
(of the 
therapeutic 
alliance) 
Dominant 
discourses 
Subject 
positions 
Medical 
terminology 
 
Automatic 
wording 
 
Custodial 
approach 
 
Authoritative 
terminology 
A Pathological 
Lens 
 
Key features: 
Use of the medical 
model as the sole 
explanatory 
framework  
 
The authority of 
the professional as 
the “gatekeeper” 
of the normal and 
the acceptable 
 
A clinical package 
 
A serious of 
professionally 
determined 
interactions 
 
A gauge of the 
care receiver’s 
readiness to 
behave and 
follow orders 
Pathological 
Discourse 
 
Conservatist 
Discourse 
 
Authoritarian 
Discourse 
Authority 
 
Safety/ self-
protection 
 
Expertise 
Task 
orientation 
 
Automatic 
wording 
 
Medical 
terminology 
Depersonalisation 
 
Key feature: 
Removing the 
person from the 
patient 
 
 
 
One-way 
nonparticipant 
observation 
 
Task oriented  
Minimalistic 
Discourse 
 
Depersonalising 
Discourse 
Authority 
 
Ethical 
uniformity 
 
Safety/ self-
protection 
 
Patient 
involvement 
 
Patient-
oriented 
approach 
 
Use of the 
patient’s 
actual name 
 
Use of the 
patient’s 
actual words 
Humanism 
 
Key features: 
 
Mutual 
involvement  
 
Collaboration 
 
 
A medium for 
collaboration  
 
A method of 
mutual 
involvement 
 
Patient focused 
   
Humanistic 
Discourse 
 
Equality 
Discourse 
 
Recovery 
Discourse 
 
A holistic 
viewpoint 
 
Partial 
Knower 
 
Humbleness 
 
Partnership 
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In the following pages, Figures 10 - 12 present a concise view of the three main 
discursive themes with their respective codes. A brief description of each of the three 
themes has been provided and a number of excerpts which describe each of the 
themes have also been included in each diagram.  
 
Figure 10: Theme 1 - A Pathological Lens 
 
Description: 
 
This refers to discourse that is mainly dominated by the use of technical or 
pathological terms. 
Excerpt examples related to this theme – A Pathological Lens: 
 
(Care receiver) grandiose [MR2:E4] 
 
Denies auditory or visual hallucinations [MR4:E2] 
 
(Care receiver) not overly psychotic [MR5:E2] 
 
(Care receiver) compliant to treatment [NR8:15] 
 
Not clinically depressed [MR3:E1] 
Calm and co-operative [MR3:E3] 
 
When (care receiver) was confronted re stalking another patient, blames another 
woman. Attention seeking [NR6:11] 
 
Level 1 supervision maintained by Nurse X. [NR1:4]  
Took his treatment as prescribed [NR1:12] 
 
Main garden leave permission – accompanied [MR1:E6] 
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Figure 11: Theme 2 – Depersonalisation  
 
Description: 
 
This features a way of referring to the therapeutic alliance in terms that tend to 
mechanicalise the interactions and the entities within it.  As a direct consequence, it 
is felt that the person factor is being removed from the equation by excluding the 
specific qualities, experiences and other characteristics that contribute to the 
uniqueness of each individual. 
 
Excerpt examples related to this theme - Depersonalisation: 
 
House chores done. Treatment given as prescribed. [NR5:2] 
 
Patient found in ward. Treatment given and taken as per chart. Calm and co-
operative. Slept. [NR9:18] 
 
Day report: Level 1 not covered. Treatment refused am and pm. Comfortable day. 
[NR1:19] 
 
Day report: Treatment given as prescribed. Level 1 converted to level 2 - covered by 
Nurse X. Passed a good day. Treatment refused throughout the day. [NR1:17] 
 
Increased appetite. Feels irritable. Claims that she has been sleeping more. 
[MR7:E5] 
 
Discussed with husband - he wishes to have patient home to support family. [NR6:4] 
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Figure 12: Theme 3 – Humanism 
 
Description: 
 
This describes a professional’s approach which, to an extent, places emphasis on the 
value of individuality, person involvement, personal meaning and holistic care. 
 
Excerpt examples related to this theme - Humanism: 
 
Plan: Patient agreed to above plan - leave for 1 week from today. To come next 
Wednesday evening and to sleep here. To give feedback on Thursday to firm. 
[NR6:4] 
 
Claims that she has been having very bad days as well as days when she feels well 
but not elated. Patient complaining of lethargy. No change in appetite.  Patient feels 
anxious over minor things and feels that she cannot open up with anyone even 
though she has a good relationship with her husband. [MR9:7-9] 
 
Feedback psychologist: Would like to go back home although unsure. Talks about 
her husband, hurt that he threw away her things but then justified his actions and 
anger. When he brought her home, his friends were telling him: ´´Ghalfejn gibtha 
lura? Ghax ma hallejtiex fejn kienet?´´ (Why have you brought her back? Why didn´t 
you leave her where she was?)  When she envisions her future going back home, she 
feels anxious. [MR5:E3] 
 
Conclusion 
Following the presentation of the analysis, the next section consists of a discussion 
related to the dominant discourses, subject positions and consequences of the 
discursive themes that emerged from the medical and nursing records that were 
included in the study.
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4.3.3 Discussion of the medical and nursing records 
Introduction 
Analysis of the data collected from the medical and nursing records has culminated 
in three discursive themes, namely: 
 
- Theme 1: A Pathological Lens 
- Theme 2: Depersonalisation 
- Theme 3: Humanism 
 
In this section, these discursive themes shall be discussed in the above order as 
guided by steps 4-8 of the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis framework that has been 
used.  
 
For each theme, this involves an exploration of the theme, the constructions of the 
discursive object and the dominant discourses. Furthermore subject positions as well 
as the consequences of these positions on the subjects and on practice shall be 
examined.  
 
Theme 1: A Pathological Lens  
Introduction 
This discursive theme involves text excerpts which were dominated by the use of 
technical or pathological terms.  This medical manner of describing the interactions 
between the care provider and care receiver seems to be a popular approach in the 
majority of the nursing and medical records reviewed. Here, the alliance is 
constructed in various ways pertaining to the medical world. It has to be noted that 
the terminology that is being considered as being pathological/medical/psychiatric in 
nature, is not simply the type that is found in text books but also includes other terms 
or phrases that have found their way into the psychiatric system and may feature 
routinely in written records. Two leading examples of the latter in most of the 
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medical and nursing records in this study are: “(Care receiver) doing well” and 
“Treatment taken as prescribed”. This phenomenon, that I shall be referring to as 
automatic wording shall be explored at a later stage in this section. 
Discussion 
Primarily, an exploration of the descriptions of the care receiver’s state by 
professionals whose texts were dominated by medical terminology shows references 
to the alliance by terms such as: 
(Care receiver) slightly elated, overtalkative with paranoid ideation 
[MR2:E2] 
(Care receiver) verbally aggressive; shouting ++ {MR1:E6] 
(Care receiver) grandiose [MR2:E4] 
(Care receiver) not overtly psychotic [MR5:E2] 
In this way, the alliance is being constructed in terms of a clinical package 
characterised by an identified text-book symptom (or set of symptoms) associated 
with a particular diagnosis and standard ways of offering treatment or care in this 
regard. This seems to be the driving mechanism in the therapeutic alliance and that 
which governs the recovery process. 
 
The description of the care receiver’s progress is also a powerful ingredient in the 
view of the alliance in pathological terms. In this instance, the care receiver was 
described as being:  
(Care receiver) compliant to treatment [NR8:15] 
Calm and co-operative [MR3:E3] 
Feedback from nurse this morning: (care receiver) threw a battle since she 
wasn’t given attention [MR7:E5] 
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Here it feels as if the alliance is based and gauged upon the care receiver’s readiness 
to behave and follow orders from the professionals. The care receiver’s actions were 
also enmeshed within medical references where, for instance: 
(Care receiver) proceeded on leave [NR6:12] 
Patient went out on day leave under father’s responsibility and as advised by 
Medical Officer [NR1:1] 
When patient was confronted re stalking another patient, blames another 
woman. Attention seeking [NR6:11] 
This may imply a construction of the alliance as a series of interactions where most 
of the care receiver’s actions, or at least the ones that have been documented, are 
professionally determined and described in medical or technical terms. 
 
The treatment/care description was particularly deeply ingrained in psychiatric 
language by references such as: 
Level 1 supervision maintained by Nurse X [NR1:E4]  
Main garden leave permission – accompanied [MR1:E6] 
Took his treatment as prescribed [NR1:12] 
Treatment given as per chart [NR2:10] 
May be transferred back to Rehabilitation Unit [MR6:E2] 
Similar to the previous constructions identified, it is here being indicated that the 
alliance is predominantly based upon a set of clear clinical instructions that need to 
be implemented if the alliance is to have therapeutic outcomes. 
 
The feedback given by the care receivers as documented by this group of 
professionals is also shaped by medical terminology such as: 
Denying auditory or visual hallucinations [MR4:E2] 
Not clinically depressed [MR3:E1] 
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Moreover, in another instance, the feedback provided by the care receiver led the 
nurse to write that: 
(The care receiver has) good insight – willing to accept treatment [MR9:51]  
The same clinical reconstruction is applied to feedback from the care receivers’ 
significant others where, for instance, one care receiver’s parents were reported to 
have said that:  
(The care receiver) was verbally aggressive; shouting ++, threatening ++ 
[MR1:E6]  
A husband was also reported as having described his wife as being: 
 Agitated at home..depressed, crying …no paranoia [MR6:E1] 
A general look at feedback from the care receivers and their significant others as 
encountered in the written texts, may be portraying an alliance that does endeavour 
to take feedback into consideration -  this feedback is then medically reconstructed 
and used as an evaluation of the medical care plan and the alliance. In this manner, 
the alliance seems to resemble a medical trampoline that serves as the base of 
various entities whose feedback undergoes a medical metamorphosis and is then 
used to shape the alliance and care.   
 
Upon reflection on these multiple constructions of the alliance, it can be noted that 
the primary dominant discourse that governs this particular writing manner is 
pathological discourse. As already alluded to, this is evidenced through the use of 
clinical or psychiatric terminology to an extent that in certain cases, it is almost 
exclusively the sole way of writing about interactions within the alliance. The 
medical and nursing reports of Care Receiver 2 may be referred to as exemplars of 
this (Refer to the medical/ nursing records related to Care Receiver 2 on the DVD). 
 
On reflection, it can be recognized that the rigid use of impersonal and clinical 
wording may be partly attributed to a traditional psychiatric (medical) model which 
places care receiver insight and decision-making capacity at the forefront of the 
clinical picture and the care plan. In one of his lectures about psychiatric power, 
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Foucault (1973/2008) discussed how the birth of the asylum led to the formation of 
“a certain type of discourse of truth” (p.93). The pathological discourse that I have 
encountered in my study may be a reflection of this discourse identified by Foucault 
where the truth is seen to lie within a pathological understanding. Subsequently this 
‘truth’ - this pathological explanation - may dictate what the care receiver needs and 
what s/he is capable and incapable of doing. In fact, as an adjunct to the primary 
discourse-type, conservatist discourse occasionally weaves its way into the written 
words of the professionals. This is exhibited through the use of certain terms and 
phrases that are rooted in traditional psychiatry and may hold echoes of the 
somewhat morbid, coercive and custodial history that dominates this medical field. 
This is the type of psychiatry that Szasz (2000) often spoke about and perceived as 
being coercive in nature due to its tendency to limit the individual’s freedom.  It is 
the “regime” identified by Foucault (1974/2008) - a constraining force that 
subjugates the care receiver - it may have changed its shape but it is in fact 
conservative in nature and still clings to the eighteenth century philosophy of 
disciplining the ‘mad’ (p.179). For instance, this type of discourse can be seen when 
one of the professionals in my study described the care receiver’s care plan as 
consisting of: 
Permission for main garden accompanied only. To arrange to transfer his 
belongings to hospital or to his house. No permission to go out. [MR4:E3] 
Another professional’s summary of his interaction with the care receiver concluded 
that: 
Patient can continue same treatment and can go to mass and main garden 
accompanied. [NR4:16] 
At one point, Care Receiver 9 was: 
 Granted leave under full responsibility of her husband. [NR9:19] 
 Similarly, in another report about the alliance with Care Receiver 8, the professional 
justified the withholding of information by stating that: 
This information (about the care receiver´s potential discharge from 
hospital) was not given to her not to give her false hopes. [NR8:24] 
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A first glance at this latter excerpt possibly indicates a kind and caring professional 
who in his/her goodness, is attempting to protect the care receiver from 
disappointment. Still, I wonder, how therapeutic can an alliance be if it is mainly 
being used as a baby cot - a safe haven that keeps out the dangers and 
disappointments of life? Perhaps if this were a care receiver in the acute phase of 
mental illness, such a protective approach may be beneficial. However, here it has to 
be noted that the care receiver in question is at the end stage of rehabilitation – 
implying that soon enough this person may be potentially facing far bigger 
disappointments and change of plans, as part of real life in society. Foucault (1961/ 
2001) alluded to a similar observation when he noted that when asylums were 
created, they attempted to transform the patients into children who needed to be 
protected and educated: “Madness is childhood…they are regarded as ‘children who 
have an overabundance of strength and make dangerous use of it’ ” (p.239). 
 
Bracken and Thomas (1999b) also identified this phenomenon by referring to 
paternalism which may be guised under the ethical concept of beneficence (p.328). 
Interestingly, the authors referred to the Hippocratic Oath which binds healthcare 
professionals into making decisions in the care receiver’s best interest during 
medical practice.  However, as the authors explained, keeping information from a 
care receiver or excluding him/her from decision making, under the mask of the 
beneficence, leads to a contradiction of this ethical concept. The same conservatist 
discourse featured in one of the professionals’ written reaction to a care receiver who 
was refusing injectable treatment: 
Dr.X contacted and informed that the patient is refusing to take depot. Dr.X 
will contact Dr.Y for further instructions. If not successful, to postpone till 
Monday. [NR4:37] 
It is interesting to note that the care receiver who features in this excerpt is one whose 
therapeutic alliance with his psychiatrist was a Resentment-Opposition type and so 
characterised by anger and resistance to care. Thus this may tentatively suggest that 
viewing the care receiver through a pathological lens may have a detrimental effect 
on the alliance by resulting in care receiver emotions that may hinder recovery. On 
encountering the above excerpts, I cannot help but ponder on a latent but very 
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powerful type of discourse that accompanies such texts – this is authoritarian 
discourse.  Let us explore this by reflecting upon the direct or implied reference to 
‘permission’, which featured commonly in the records encountered – a concept that 
may be connoted to a conservatist view of psychiatry where the professional holds the 
key to the care receiver’s very existence by controlling his/her actions in life. This is 
perhaps particularly evident in the latter excerpt included, whereas the professional 
who is writing the report contacted Dr.X who in turn intended to contact Dr.Y in 
order to get instructions on how to manage this care receiver who was refusing 
treatment. The question that springs to my mind is: Where is care receiver’s voice in 
this seemingly medical monopoly? Surprisingly, the answer to this question was 
partly presented to me during my interview with the care receiver who was being 
discussed in this latter excerpt (Care Receiver 4). Following the recording of the 
interview, this particular care receiver gave me a letter which he had written and 
insisted that I include it in my thesis (Refer to Figure 13). He went on to explain how 
during the ward round with the multidisciplinary team, he often feels confused and 
forgets that which he had intended to discuss. In order to address this, he had once 
decided to write a letter about his feelings related to medication side-effects and 
hence his adamant refusal of medication. He had then planned to discuss this letter in 
the professionals presence during the weekly ward round.  
 
Medication (Tranquillisers) 
 
Every drug is dangerous to the brain. The effects are both beneficial and detrimental.  
Psychiatric treatment that involves the use of drugs takes quite some time to start 
having beneficial effects and effectiveness is not guaranteed. 
Drugs like tranquillisers affect the human body by decreasing its immunity, altering 
its pain response pathway and much more. 
They are a nuisance to concentration ability, can turn sexual experiences into scary 
and failed adventures, may lead to blurred vision and much more. 
 
Thank you, Patient.  
Figure 13: A care receiver’s letter 
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It is a pity that this letter never made its way into the ward round. The care receiver 
explained that this was due to the fact that before the ward round, he had showed this 
letter to a nurse - the reaction of the nurse had been to mock him whilst informing 
him that the letter was full of grammatical mistakes. This disheartened and 
demotivated the care receiver who then decided to simply resume his loud and 
aggressive resistance to treatment. Here the point is not to portray an angelic care 
receiver and a demonic professional. Indeed, the real version of events remains a 
mystery in the confines of this retrospective one-sided narrative. Still, irrelevant of 
the true sequence of events, the product is an angry care receiver who is resisting 
treatment and who doubts whether the feelings that he has written down are good 
enough to merit inclusion in the ward round. In turn, I question: Does professional 
status automatically appoint one as a gatekeeper who allows good information to 
enter the alliance whilst closing the gates to bad information? And if so, what 
determines the criteria for information to be classified as good or bad? Perhaps it is 
the writing manner, the use of language that serves as one of the criteria, as implied 
in the case of the care receiver’s letter that has just been described. Perhaps in this 
same case, another criterion may have been the possible inaccuracy or political 
incorrectness of the care receiver’s words. Still, it is worthwhile to acknowledge that 
as accurate or inaccurate as the care receiver’s perception may have been, this was 
his understanding of the situation and therefore as real to him as its inaccuracy may 
be to others. Rogers (1961) placed particular emphasis on this when he stated that “It 
is the client who knows what hurts, what directions to go, what problems are crucial” 
(p.12).  Once again, I refer to Bracken and Thomas (1999b) who elaborated on the 
concept of medical paternalism which assumes that treatment can only be based on 
medical decisions and not on the person’s beliefs and personal preferences.  This 
leads to an infringement of the care receiver’s autonomy (p.238). The notion of a 
gatekeeper or “arbiter” was also mentioned by Goodley (2001) when he explored the 
social model of learning disabilities (p.210). He suggested that it is society itself that 
may be creating disabilities and acting as a gatekeeper to understandings of bodies 
and minds that differ from ‘normality’. Goodley (2011) elaborated on this by 
describing how one of the consequences of this type of social model is that the 
person may be seen in terms of “deficit” – ‘an organic impairment of intellectual 
functioning, social incompetence and maladaptive functioning’ ” (p.31). 
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A closer look at these three discourse-types reveals discursive positions that seem to 
be hosting a rather clinical and sometimes ‘cold’ set of perceptions and attitudes.  
One may wonder: what are the subjective feelings of the professionals in these 
positions and what is the rationale beneath such a demeanour?   
 
Perhaps the most obvious contention in this case is that here we are being presented 
with a care giver whose professional existence is rooted in the medical model and in 
traditional ways of authoritarian psychiatric practice.  This may be brought about by 
various factors, such as the professional’s learned ways of practice – inherited 
clinical practice that passes from one generation to another: 
The clinic is basically a staged presentation of the patient in which 
questioning the patient serves the purpose of instructing students, and in 
which the doctor operates on the double register of someone who examines 
the patient and someone who teaches the students, so that he will be both the 
person who cares and the person who possesses the master’s word (Foucault, 
1974/2008, p.185). 
In the care receivers’ interviews, the sense of professional authority was discussed 
by many of the participants. In excerpts such as the ones that have been presented in 
this theme, the authoritarian attitude may similarly be seen as being present in the 
writing of some of the professionals. Perhaps then it would help to bring the cultural 
aspect into focus once again in order to understand the driving mechanism behind 
this attitude. This study is taking place on an island where professional status has 
traditionally been attributed immense importance and power, not only in 
professional practice but also in everyday decisions in society – this is in practice till 
this very day. Thus, the act of successfully completing tertiary education may serve 
to give one a sense of authority in society. This is especially true for some 
disciplines, in particular the medical and legal fields. It is likely that this may be one 
of the influential issues on the power balance in relationships such as the ones being 
explored in this study. 
 
Alternatively the professional may be using his/her professional knowledge and 
clinical terminology as a shield within therapeutic alliances which may be 
undeniably challenging to be part of.  Here I am contending that the professional 
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knows that s/he shares one very important characteristic with the care receiver: the 
human nature. This realisation may reveal the somewhat scary truth that in reality, 
the difference between the care receiver and the professional is not so vast. Hence, 
the professional may be prone to develop the same symptoms that s/he is attempting 
to cure and thus become a care receiver. In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault 
(1961/2001) made references to this challenge – this macabre aura that may 
characterise the therapeutic alliance: “The substitution of the theme of madness for 
that of death does not mark a break, but rather a torsion within the same anxiety. 
What is in question is still the nothingness of existence” (p.13). 
 
Similarly, Laing (1960) suggested that there is no difference between the psychiatrist 
and the psychiatric care receiver – any visible gap has been brought about by the 
psychiatrist’s professional training which promotes the alienation of the care receiver 
(p.33).  In this light, the promotion of a clinical and professional front may make 
sense since it affords the professional the luxury of an arms-length distance between 
himself/herself and the care receiver within the alliance. It is an attempt to 
distinguish us (the healthy) from them (the sick) and a reassurance that afterall we 
are not so familiar to them and so we are safe from mental illness. It is also a 
distance that may keep over-familiarity and undesirable care receiver behaviour at 
bay and indeed, a powerful piece of equipment in managing difficult situations. 
Thus, the cover of academic knowledge and the authority provided by the 
professional status may very well serve as a safe haven in stormy waters.   
 
Moreover, adherence to the main contentions of the traditional psychiatric medical 
model may place the professional as the all-knowing entity who needs to hold the 
power lead in the alliance and to maintain continuity of the same form of practice: 
Take the notion of tradition: it is intended to give a special temporal status to 
a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical (or at least 
similar); it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form 
of the same (Foucault, 1972, p.21). 
This may not only serve to fuel the professional’s superior power but can also 
provide the reassurance that may be required when working in mental health – a 
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field that is cluttered with incomplete evidence, debatable areas and unclear 
treatment paths especially in comparison to other medical specialties which are more 
highly evidence-based (Szasz, 1970, p.23).  In the same token, the pathological 
discourse may then offer the professional a position where s/he can comfortably 
explain the care receiver’s undesirable (and perhaps somewhat mysterious) 
behaviour by superior scientific knowledge and diagnostic systems. Foucault 
(1961/2001) regarded this position as being extremely powerful as the professional 
figure is surrounded by an aura that verges on the supernatural – the entity who can 
provide explanations and has quasi-miraculous powers (p.261). In turn, this places 
him/her in a position of authority and confidence where s/he can manage the 
undesirable behaviour and treat the care receiver as required, on the basis of time-
tested traditional ways. However Foucault (1972) was cautious about this type of 
practice: 
We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we 
normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is 
recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by 
which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they 
must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign (p.22). 
The authoritarian position that may result from pathological discourse may be 
limited to the few and may be quite defined with set characteristics and rigid 
inclusion/exclusion criteria – for instance, for inclusion within this elite niche, it 
seems as if one has to be able to understand psychiatric language (medical jargon). 
Interestingly, some of the care receivers interviewed in this study hinted at the fact 
that professionals have a specific way of speaking/writing that may not be so easy to 
understand by those who are outside the profession. In particular, Care Receiver 3 
commented: 
I think that professionals have a language of their own. In that, if they want 
to say something about us in front of us, they know how to get around it. By 
saying certain words in another way, in the same language. [CR3:27] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 6 referred to this phenomenon by stating that: 
I do not understand the language of the professionals - their language is too 
complex.  Sometimes it is in Maltese and sometimes it is in English. But it is 
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complex. Words that I do not understand. Oftentimes, the consultant 
psychiatrist asks me if I have understood. And I reply: “As if I can 
understand what you have been saying!” He gets angry then. [CR6:21] 
At times, the consequence of the use of this exclusive psychiatric language may be 
directly detrimental to the care receiver involved as it may serve to widen the power 
gap between the two entities in the alliance.  This may be evident in the following 
narration by Care Receiver 2 which outlines a care provider attitude that may 
confuse the care receiver.  In this excerpt, the care receiver was discussing Serenace 
- this is a drug that is especially used in the treatment of psychosis. However, it 
seems as if due to incomplete/inaccurate information that may have been given by 
the doctor, the care receiver believed that he is taking this drug to enhance his 
singing voice: 
I do not understand some of the words. I do not understand the names of pills 
but I understand the rest. Serenace is a treatment used for the voice…that is 
what the doctor said. He said:  “It is ‘Serenace’ by Claudio Villa!” The song 
‘Serenata’ by the singer Claudio Villa. He did not give me any other 
information so I assumed that it is used for the voice. And so I started to sing 
during the ward round. [CR2:22] 
Here I seek to reiterate that this critique and my position in it, is not an anti-
psychiatry endeavour – my intention is not to disparage scientific evidence, 
diagnostic systems and care management pathways that are used in psychiatry. On 
the contrary, I believe that these are tools which may be incorporated within the 
therapeutic alliance and used as possible explanations or guides that may help some 
of the individuals seeking help. However, regarding these tools as the definite and 
only explanation, such as, for instance, referring to diagnostic systems like the DSM 
as the psychiatric bible (Jabr, 2012, p.1), is felt to be a claim to absolute certainty 
which may be detrimental to the therapeutic alliance: “Formerly, when religion was 
strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now when science is 
strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic” (Szasz, 1973, p.115). 
Primarily, this is because the use of the authoritarian voice, as exemplified by some 
of the texts encountered, is felt to be potentially oppressive to care receivers who 
may then be automatically considered as being less knowledgeable and less powerful 
within the alliance.  As seen from the analysis of the care receivers’ interviews, this 
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may lead to alliances characterised by power imbalances and care receiver 
dissatisfaction, such as the Resentment-Opposition type. Although the scope of this 
study was not to measure therapeutic outcomes linked with particular alliance-types, 
reference can be made to numerous studies that sought to address the association 
between care provider characteristics and therapeutic outcomes. It is not surprising 
to note that studies, such as those by Dziopa & Ahern (2009) and Ackerman & 
Hilsenroth (2003) almost invariably concluded that certain characteristics like 
promoting equality, giving options and using ordinary talk tend to enhance 
therapeutic outcomes - these very characteristics may be lacking in the Resentment-
Opposition alliance-type in particular.  
 
Secondly, it has to be acknowledged that as vast as a professional’s clinical and 
academic knowledge may be, the act of writing a report about a care receiver’s 
features such as his/her state or progress, is mostly a representation or an 
understanding of the presenting features unless the professional writes down the 
exact words uttered by the care receiver. This implies that some content of medical 
and nursing records, including most of those that feature in this study, are a 
secondary source of information – a set of objective observations within the alliance 
(Merlau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p.188). In this case, there may be a discrepancy between 
the understood and reconstructed version of events by the professional and the care 
receiver’s subjective communicated experience (Bertram and Stickley, 2005, p.389).  
This may be exemplified by an excerpt taken from one of the nursing reports: 
Ward round with Dr.X. Discussed due patient attention-seeking behaviour - 
when she does not have attention, pain of fibromyalgia seems to increase.  
[NR6:4] 
In this example, the use of the phrase “attention seeking behaviour” refers to a 
professional’s interpretation and assumption. On reflection, the only certainty in this 
case is the fact that at times, the pain of fibromyalgia seems to increase and that one 
association may be the fact that the care receiver needs attention. The difference lies 
in interpreting and presenting a situation as a dead sure fact -  “attention seeking 
behaviour” - instead of postulating tentative explanations about causality and 
associations.  The use of this type of wording is even more worrying when I realise 
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that locally, terms such as “attention-seeking behaviour” are connoted to a meaning 
that goes far beyond the direct implication of the words themselves. This is because 
this term commonly conjures an image of a problematic care receiver who is a 
nuisance to staff members due to his/her constant nagging and manipulative 
attempts. Perhaps then it is not surprising that the care receiver who features in the 
above excerpt was one who had a Resentment-Opposition therapeutic alliance with 
the nurses. During my interview with this care receiver, I was particularly struck by 
the strong wording that she used when describing her interactions with the nurses, 
going as far as to describe their [the nurses’] behaviour as ‘savage like’. Hence, I feel 
that caution must be exercised in the use of automatic heavy terms such as ‘attention 
seeking’ because they involve the application of a label to the care receiver in 
question and may contribute towards a power imbalance that irritates and frustrates 
the care receiver. 
 
I feel that this is additionally dangerous because if the reconstructed understanding is 
then used to guide treatment, then the effectiveness of such treatment may be limited 
from the very beginning. Once again, this reminds me of Szasz’s television analogy 
in his insistence that a television engineer (a professional with a medical 
understanding of mental illness) cannot address problems such as viewers disliking a 
particular programme (an individual with a different understanding of symptoms) 
(Szasz, 2007, p.6). Perhaps the application of critical realism may be beneficial in 
this situation in that the main contention in this movement holds that “all theories of 
the world are seen as grounded in a particular perspective and worldview, and all 
knowledge is partial, incomplete and fallible”  (Maxwell, 2012, p.5). I feel that this 
questions the use of authority in writing about or planning care on the care receiver’s 
behalf without considering the care receiver’s perspective. 
 
In some of the medical records, especially in the majority of the nursing reports, 
automatic wording seems to form an intricate mesh with pathological, authoritarian 
and conservatist discourse-types. Automatic wording refers to what has been earlier 
described as those terms that have found their way into the psychiatric system and 
tend to feature routinely and at times, aggressively in written records. In the written 
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records, this trend commonly featured as a chain of medical terminology that seemed 
strikingly cold and tended to de-humanise the care receiver: 
House chores done. Treatment given as prescribed. No complaints. [NR5:4] 
Perhaps at a first glance, such automatic wording may not seem particularly ill-
fitting within the alliance between a care provider and a care receiver. However, this 
viewpoint may change on realising that each of these examples was often the one 
and only statement that described a whole day in a care receiver’s life.  Moreover, in 
some cases, such as in the nursing report of Care Receiver 4, these same standalone 
statements were repeated day after day such that the only information communicated 
about a 7-day span in a care receiver’s life inside the hospital was that he had had 
comfortable days and nights. It is notable then to realise that both Care Receivers 4 
and 5 were ones who, during the interviews, spoke so much about what goes on in 
their daily life. For instance, Care Receiver 4 made a particular effort to delineate 
what he wants his life to be like and so described wishes and dreams that he would 
like to actualise. Similarly, Care Receiver 5 spoke about the deep thoughts that she 
has in relation to her current quality of life and the effect of her mental distress. To 
me, this is so different to the flat and eventless manner that these individuals’ 
existence is being recorded in the records. As a mental health professional and as a 
Maltese person who may one day be subjected to the need of state psychiatric care 
and possibly this type of descriptions, I have to confess that I feel vulnerable and 
hurt. My question is: How can you reduce a person’s seven-day existence, with all 
the thoughts, feelings and actions that inevitably characterise each passing moment 
to such simplistic statements such as the ones encountered?  
 
This, to me, resembles the act of pigeon-holing – fitting care receivers inside pre-
constructed slots which may result in the stripping of the care receiver’s identity as a 
human being and reduce him/her to a text-book diagnosis. This act of 
depersonalisation shall be further elaborated on in the subsequent theme.  
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Conclusion 
A possible implication of these discourses on practice is that in the same instance as 
providing the professional with the claim to superior knowledge and power, it may 
simultaneously place the care receiver in a vulnerable position. One may wonder 
then if such medical dominance may potentially serve as a catalyst for coercive 
practice, in particular, 21st century covert actions such as the neglect of care receiver 
rights, overprescription of psychiatric drugs and non-action/ reinforcive actions in 
light of a care receiver’s passive attitude (Szasz, 1970, p.xxvii).  On referring to 
these undesirable actions, a care giver’s custodial and patronising attitude is also 
here being considered as falling within the remit of such coercive practice.  This may 
be exemplified through written phrases such as “Patient wants to have things her 
way” [MR6:E4] – a standalone statement found in one of the professionals’ records 
with no accompanying proof or description of how this judgement was made.  Thus, 
through this lens, the care receiver may be viewed as not possessing valuable 
knowledge and is expected to practice submissiveness to the psychiatric discipline 
with an image of the world in pathological terms. This viewpoint connotes potential 
losses, especially for the care receiver who may have to compromise his/her 
independence and autonomy. In fact this was verbalised by this same care receiver 
who narrated how she feels that some professionals, especially nurses, do not treat 
patients with respect by shutting them out and treating them as inferior. Alternatively 
the pathological, authoritarian and conservatist discourses may hold special appeal 
for a care receiver whose perception of the professional alliances that s/he is part of, 
is ingrained in traditional and hierarchical discourse, such as commonly seen in the 
Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance type. In this regard, pathology and conservatism 
may offer the care receiver a position of safety – a constant, predictable and rigid 
ledge in the steep cliff that may characterise the experience of mental illness. 
Theme 2: Depersonalisation - an alliance with a non-person 
Introduction 
A particular discourse-type that was evident in some of the texts written by 
professionals contributed to the emergence of the discursive theme of 
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depersonalisation.  This features a way of referring to the therapeutic alliance in 
terms that tend to mechanicalise the interactions and the entities within it.  As a 
direct consequence, it is felt that the person factor is being removed from the 
equation by excluding the specific qualities, experiences and other characteristics 
that contribute to the uniqueness of each individual. This manner of describing the 
interactions between the care provider and care receiver seems to be particularly 
common in the majority of the nursing records reviewed whilst still featuring 
frequently but to a lower extent in the medical files. 
Discussion 
On looking at this way of writing, a vivid image of the construction of the alliance 
within this discursive theme came to my mind. Here I was viewing a one-way 
observation of the care receiver by a professional who is seemingly situated at a 
distance, peering through binoculars. This distant tone may be felt through 
standalone statements that describe the care receiver’s state, actions or progress such 
as: 
House chores done. Treatment given as prescribed. [NR5:2] 
Patient found in ward. Treatment given and taken as per chart. Calm and co-
operative. Slept. [NR9:18] 
Joking inappropriately, Grandiose. [MR2:E4] 
Night report: Stated that feels tired. Treatment given. [NR5:5] 
Simultaneously, it feels as if in this theme, the alliance is being constructed as a non-
participant observational activity where the professional is there mainly as a figure 
of authority - a spoke in the wheel that is the health care system. This complements 
the construction of the alliance described in the previous paragraph: the combination 
of the two suggests minimal involvement from the side of the professional apart 
from the basic activities that need to keep the system going. As a particular example, 
one nurse’s day report about Care Receiver 1 consisted of: 
Day report: Level 1 not covered. Treatment refused am and pm. Comfortable 
day. [NR1:19] 
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Similarly, another nurse wrote about her observations of the day activities carried out 
by Care Receiver 5:  
Day report: House chores done. Treatment given as prescribed.  No 
complaints. [NR5:4] 
Finally, it may be noted that in this instance, a task-oriented construction of the 
alliance is also in action. This refers to interventions, actions and interactions that are 
addressed as a task rather than as a part of an alliance that aims at celebrating and 
exploiting the individual qualities for therapeutic purposes. For instance, during one 
particular day, Care Receiver 6 is described as having: 
Attended to own personal hygiene. 7am and 2pm doses given as per chart. 
Rantudil Forte given at 9am as patient complaining of pain. Visited by 
husband this am. [NR6:20] 
Another nursing report, this time about Care Receiver 7, is also felt to indicate the 
focus on task orientation:  
She complained of stomach pains - Gaviscon given.  Blood pressure checked 
120/80. No more complaints. Went on leave till next Thursday. Treatment 
given till Thursday morning.  [NR7:9] 
The discursive constructions that have been described lead to the identification of 
two main discourse types, these being minimalistic discourse and depersonalising 
discourse. 
 
Minimalistic discourse may be described as a simple and abrupt way of reference.  In 
writing, this features as short, bullet-like sentences that attempt to convey 
information about a particular state, action or plan. In the medical records that are 
characterized by this discourse-type, these statements mainly concern a brief, 
minimalistic summary of the care receiver’s symptoms, progress and treatment plan.  
When minimalistic discourse features in the nursing records, the information 
conveyed is even briefer and mostly consists of descriptions of less than ten words 
that commonly cover a 12-hour span in the care receiver’s life at the psychiatric 
hospital. This discourse-type is located within the wider discourse of 
depersonalisation - in this study, this is being understood as referring to the act of 
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removing the person out of the care receiver: a process that can be likened to the 
coring of the pulp of the person and then mechanically dealing with the outer shell 
that remains. Depersonalising discourse is particularly evident in those medical and 
nursing records that are especially characterized by Pathological Discourse 
(described in the previous theme) and Minimalistic discourse. 
 
As the two dominant discourses in this theme, minimalistic and depersonalising 
discourse give rise to a number of subject positions and consequences in practice. As 
a starting point to the exploration of minimalistic discourse and its discursive 
positions, I am first going to reflect upon the purpose of medical/ nursing records 
without attempting to reflect upon knowledge-power issues.  This is going to be 
done by side-stepping into the field of nursing education and practice, which is my 
area of origin, where according to Berman and Snyder (2007, p.252), the main 
purposes of documentation are for: 
 
Care Planning: Health professionals use data generated from other professionals’ 
reports in order to evaluate care and formulate/ modify care plans. 
 
Communication: Due to the obvious inability of all health professionals to be 
present in the clinical area at all times, written records may be a good way of 
communicating events in one’s physical absence. Written words may also serve as a 
reminder/ diary of actions and events. 
 
Legal situations: Records are admissible in court as evidence. 
 
Research and Statistics: This study is a primary example of written records being 
used for research purposes. Moreover statistical data can be extracted from records 
in order to inform wider endeavours such as health care service planning on a 
national agenda.  
 
Education: Once again, using the nursing discipline as an example, students have 
placements within the clinical area and are encouraged to review records in order to 
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understand the skill of record writing as well as to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the care receiver’s recovery journey.  
 
Quality Assurance: Documented care can be used to measure the quality of care 
delivered and the competence of the care provider as measured against established 
standards. 
 
On comparing the above purposes and the minimalistic discourse encountered within 
the records encountered, I conclude that it is very hard to say that any of the above 
goals are being met by the majority of records, especially the nursing reports, 
included in this study.  This is the point where perhaps this discussion may bear 
resemblance to a clinical appraisal. Whilst the main aim of this thesis was to explore 
the knowledge-power interface within the therapeutic alliance, I feel that the data 
collected also needs to be viewed against the backdrop of the overall quality of care 
that is being offered. This is especially important in the understanding of the 
implications of my study as well as to offer recommendations on the basis of my 
research. 
 
Prior to delving into a deeper discussion, it is felt that an initial consideration that 
needs to be made is that here we are preoccupied with medical/nursing-report 
writing and not the writing of a book that may allow one to write at length and to 
make use of his/her artistic license. Hence, it is understandable and in fact, widely 
recommended that medical and nursing reports need to be concise in order to convey 
only that information which is relevant to care in a timely manner (The Ministry of 
Health and Te Ao Maramatanga, 2012, p.266). This may partly explain the brevity of 
the entries in medical and nursing files.  In this manner, the care provider’s position 
is that of a professional who is acting upon learned ways of practice and who is 
indulging in minimalistic discourse due to its perceived professionalism, 
appropriateness and effectiveness.  However, on reflecting on this writing style, it 
needs to be acknowledged that there is a clear distinction between the meaning and 
desirability of the terms conciseness and brevity. Whereas conciseness involves the 
act of providing the necessary information in a clear and comprehensive manner, 
brevity simply refers to writing in short with the possibility of omitting important 
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data.  The majority of records encountered during the study, especially the majority 
of nursing reports, are felt to be more characterised by the latter rather than the 
former. A brief reflective exercise upon the following ward round report from one of 
the medical files may highlight this point: 
 
Ward round with Consultant psychiatrist: 
Patient is doing well at rehabilitation unit 
Not psychotic 
Low mood 
Patient wants to have things her way 
Plan: Keep patient at rehab unit for now 
Continue same treatment 
To be seen by a rheumatologist [MR6:E4] 
 
On reading these words written by the professional, I ask myself whether I am 
confident about my knowledge of what actually happened during this particular ward 
round. My answer is clearly negative since many questions about this event remain 
unanswered such as: 
- What is meant by ‘doing well’? What kind of progress has been observed? 
 
- What is the nature of the ‘low mood’? What is the care receiver’s subjective 
experience? 
 
- How, why and in which context does the care receiver want to ‘have things 
her way?’ 
 
- Why is a rheumatologist needed?  
 
Moreover, the care receiver who is being described in this medical report is one who 
insisted that she feels disadvantaged in the psychiatric setting since she feels that she 
lacks power especially in the presence of nurses. She described how at times she 
feels disrespected and how once she had trusted a professional with her secrets who 
had then disclosed this information to others without the patient’s consent. Thus it 
may not be a wonder that this patient wants to ‘have things her way’ – however such 
a minimalistic statement without further explanation leaves much to question and 
makes me wonder about why such issues, which may be hindering this care 
receiver’s therapeutic alliances, do not feature in this record. Here, the problem lies 
in the fact that in addition to the recommendation for records to be concise, 
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educational and clinical stakeholders tend to advocate for completeness and accuracy 
(Dziopa & Ahern, 2009, para.4; Berman & Snyder, 2007, p.266).  When viewed 
against this backdrop, a number of clinical concerns become visible in relation to the 
majority of records located in this study. Primarily, one has to attempt to identify the 
general documentation style in use as this may help to gain understanding of what 
the health care professionals in this study are intending to communicate. On 
reverting once again to literature on medical/nursing documentation, it can be noted 
that there are several taught and practiced ways of professional documentation in 
health care.  Once an institution adopts a particular style, then it commonly adapts it 
for use in that specific culture. Berman and Snyder (2007, p.256) described the 
general types of charting cited in the literature: 
 
Source charting (such as narrative charting) – this includes a separate section in the 
file for each discipline and in the case of narrative charting, documentation includes 
routine care and care receiver problems.  The order of information is usually 
chronological. This charting style is not prominently used in contemporary health 
care.  
 
Problem-oriented medical charting – in this method, data are arranged according 
to care receiver problems with different disciplines and professionals contributing to 
the problem list, care and progress notes.  
 
Focus charting places the care receiver and his/her concerns and strengths as the 
focus of care. The focus in a particular report may be a condition, a diagnosis, a 
behavior, a sign or symptom, a status change or a care receiver strength.  
 
Charting by exception involves the documentation of exceptions or abnormalities 
only.   
 
On attempting to match the general documentation-style of the records located to the 
ones cited in the literature, the task proves to be difficult.  Perhaps the closest 
resemblance would be to narrative charting but one that is here characterised by 
brevity and lack of order. It is felt that this is a barrier to reaching any of the six 
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documentation purposes identified earlier. Allowing myself another look at these 
documentation purposes, I feel that it is a matter of major concern that such 
minimalistic documentation may then be the local driving force of care evaluation 
and planning, communication about the care receiver’s recovery journey and quality 
assurance. Furthermore, this proves a challenge to education since as stated earlier, 
healthcare students are encouraged to seek these records.  The knowledge that these 
records may also need to be used in legal situations poses another risk that can be 
associated to numerous negative consequences particularly for the professional.  
 
Still, the emphasis in this thesis is the therapeutic alliance and so at this point, it may 
serve to slightly re-shift the focus and explore the link of the minimalistic discourse 
to the alliance and its implications on it. Primarily, it has to be acknowledged that 
this writing style may or may not reflect the professional’s actual behaviour within 
the alliance because the professional may be restricting the use of this minimalism 
solely to record-writing and not to the actual practical interaction with the care 
receiver.  Therefore, it would be erroneous to automatically assume that the 
professionals’ minimalistic documentation style necessarily reflects the nature of the 
therapeutic alliance or the knowledge-power interface within it.  However, let us 
momentarily borrow an important statement that commonly features as one of the 
basic principles of health care management.  This simply reads as: “Not written, not 
done” (Morrissey-Ross, 1988, p.363). Here one can indulge in a debate about the 
extent of information that written words can convey in their attempted reflection of 
practice.  Indeed, it has to be acknowledged that documentation often does not do 
total justice for the totality of practice carried out. However, at least it should attempt 
to capture a good part of the practical experience and to describe it in a realistic 
manner (Parkinson & Brooker, 2004, p.46). On applying this management principle 
to some of the medical/nursing records located, another major concern is identified, 
particularly by looking at the chain of nursing reports related to eight out of the ten 
care receivers included in the study (nursing reports pertaining to Care Receivers 6 
and 9 being the exceptions). On excluding the plethora of automatic wording 
(described in Theme 1) that clutters these reports, one may attempt to identify 
information about the therapeutic alliance and activities/ interactions that reflect the 
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formation and maintenance of this alliance.  It is disheartening to realize that the 
only therapeutic activities written as being done are exclusively: 
Treatment given/ Treatment given as prescribed/ Treatment given as per 
chart/ Depot injection given and charted [NR5:22] [NR8:22] [NR4:1] 
[NR2:36] [NR3:8] 
Level 1 supervision maintained [NR1:31] 
Referral for rehabilitation done [NR1:10] 
Blood pressure checked [NR7:9] 
Here it has to be noted that each entry in the nursing report may be written by a 
different nurse and so this documentation-style does not appear to be simply 
attributed to just one nurse but may be widespread across different nurses and 
settings within the hospital. It is felt that the above finding is a prime reflection of 
custodial and defensive care that is aimed at addressing the basic medical care and 
protecting the day-to-day running of the ward and the psychiatric system. If this was 
a study concerning a general medical hospital, the above documented care would 
probably still be considered as being minimalistic. However, it is even more 
alarming to realise that this is a psychiatric setting – a discipline that is expected to 
dedicate intense focus on the individual’s thoughts, feelings, behaviour and 
perceptions with routine medical tasks such as the ones seen in the excerpts, 
occupying a second place. With reference to some of the professionals whose texts 
were included in the study, especially the nurses, it is quite inevitable to follow this 
reflection by questions such as: 
- What kind of therapeutic interventions are actually being carried out? 
- What is being done within the alliance to promote recovery and reach 
therapeutic outcomes? 
- Is the therapeutic alliance being considered as an important platform that 
roots all interventions or is it simply an accidental alliance that holds a 
custodial scope and structure? 
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It is a pity indeed to have to ask these questions particularly if the failure is the lack 
of appropriate documentation rather than the actual practice itself. Perhaps the 
problem lies in the fact that nurses are the professionals who spend the longest time 
with care receivers on a daily basis (Wright, 2012, sec.6). This may render the 
therapeutic alliance to be more informal than that seen with other professionals and 
consequently, the interactions within it may be perceived as not needing to be strictly 
and formally documented.  However, it is still felt to be a failure to negate the 
professionalism and importance of such an alliance. Contrastingly, Westbrook, 
Duffield, Li and Creswick (2011) identified the length of time spent with care 
receivers as one of the greatest strengths of the nurse-care receiver alliance since it 
may provide ample time for maintaining the alliance and hence reaching therapeutic 
goals (p.319). In this light, failing to provide a formal documented structure of the 
alliance and the interactions within it is indeed a loss for care receiver-care as well as 
for the mental health nursing profession. A myriad of other possibilities can be 
explored if the identified problem is simply the lack of proper documentation – these 
include time-management difficulties, staff shortage, alienation, working on auto-
pilot and attitude/ motivation problems. 
Still, the concerns do not halt here since other aspects of the analysis of the data may 
introduce caution against firmly writing off this minimalistic approach as being a 
problem that is solely linked to the documentation procedure rather than the actual 
nursing practice. For instance, when asked about their interaction with different 
professionals and the activities that are carried out within the alliance, most of the 
care receivers were clearly at a loss to describe the therapeutic activities that they do 
with nurses. A look at the interview excerpts that describe nursing interactions show 
that most of the care receiver statements feature custodialism or lack of therapeutic 
activities:  
I feel well when I am with the nurses. We share jokes. They take me out to 
the main garden. [CR2:28] 
I relate to nurses when for instance, I ask them for some hot water to make 
coffee. Nothing special. Nurses do not offer any treatment or try to help with 
the symptoms. I never had any relationship with any nurse where I disclosed 
my feelings or talked about my symptoms. We just speak about stuff related 
to computers. [CR1:59] 
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My relationship with the nurses: When I speak to the nurses about my 
medication, they inform me that they have to do what the doctor says. They 
say that the doctor wants me to have it and so they will give it to me even if I 
do not want to. [CR4:22] 
Mostly it is “Hello” and “Thank you” with the nurses. Sometimes I open up 
with them but they say: “You will get better. You have a husband who loves 
you and respects you.  Be brave so that you get out of here.” [CR5:31] 
What do you mean? I do not have sessions with the nurses. The nurses are 
here all day and so am I. So sometimes we speak..or if I need to ask anything, 
I go to the nurses’ room. I approach them and ask whatever I need to ask. 
Usually it is about permission to do something. Or to ask about what is going 
to happen. [CR10:34-35] 
Contrastingly, but to a lesser extent, some of the participants did refer to nurses who 
gave prominence to therapeutic activities such as Care Receiver 4 who stated that: 
There are some nurses who give you psychological therapy themselves 
because they explain to you, speak to you gently and make sure that you 
understand. Even during their break time. [CR4:23] 
Care Receiver 7 made a similar reference by pointing out that: 
The nurses are very good, very nice….they try to discipline you slightly. And 
they are right, you know. Nurse X tries to do it. We hate it but at the same 
time it is good, you know. She tells us to get the heck out of our bed and 
we’re all trying to find our way around. She helps us to get our act together. 
So she’s good, you know. [CR7:25] 
Another aspect of the analysis which may give rise to speculations about the 
therapeutic alliance in practice involves notable discrepancies that were evident 
between the nursing reports and the medical reports relating to the same care 
receiver during the same period. For instance, in the medical file, one doctor 
described a series of events related to Care Receiver 1 by writing that: 
 
Patient after ward round is getting verbally aggressive.  
Threatening ++ 
Says he wants to die + slash his neck 
Plan: 1). Level 1 supervision 
          2). If space available, kindly transfer patient to Ward X   [MR1:E1] 
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Contrastingly, the day and night nursing reports of the same care receiver on the 
same day did not report any of these events and simply stated: 
Day report: Level 1 converted as per protocol and maintained by Nurse X. 
Treatment given.  
Night report: Slept well. Level 1 covered by Nurse X. Slept well. [NR1: 23-
24] 
Another example was the day nursing report related to Care Receiver 2: 
Seen by Dr.X. Treatment reviewed. Repeat serum Epilim next Sunday. 
Review next Saturday to consider leave. Main Garden permission + OT 
accompanied. OT informed. [NR2:8] 
On the other hand, the medical report on the same day mentioned additional 
observations such as: 
(Care receiver) remains slightly elated, overtalkative with paranoid ideation 
Thoughts of revenge/ harming others [MR2:E3] 
These are only two examples out of many comparisons between nursing reports (that 
describe a quasi-eventless care receiver existence consisting of comfortable days and 
nights) and the counterpart medical records that despite still being considered as 
minimalistic in nature, at least include some other details pertaining to the care 
receiver’s state. Once more, the three questions that I asked earlier shift back in 
focus and sadly have to remain linked to postulations rather than to definite answers 
within the perimeters of this research study. A final glance at the minimalistic 
discourse-type and its subject positions does not fail to outline the knowledge-power 
interface that may shape the therapeutic alliance.  This is due to the fact that being 
minimalistic is not simply the act of being brief. More importantly, it embodies the 
professional with the privilege and luxury of selecting the content - that which is to 
be included or excluded within the confinements of the therapeutic alliance.  As an 
example, on referring to the last excerpt that has just been presented, we can note 
that the nurse who wrote the report decided to omit the fact that during the same day 
that is being described, the care receiver may have had thoughts of revenge and 
harming others in view of paranoid ideations.  Once again, I speculate how such 
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information, which may be deemed as being considerably important in the provision 
of appropriate nursing care, failed to merit an inclusion in the report. Foucault 
(1974/2008) may have proposed an answer to this question when he stated that by 
functioning as a disciplinary system, the psychiatric hospital may commonly exclude 
the “crisis of madness”: “The main instruction, the main technique of this asylum 
discipline is: Don’t think about it. Don’t think about it; think about something else; 
read, work, go into the fields, but anyway, don’t think about your madness” (p.249). 
 
Thus, the nurse who wrote this report may have preferred to ignore the care 
receiver’s crisis and opted for “ethical uniformity”– a term used by Foucault in his 
reference to the practice of encouraging uniformity and routine amongst subjects 
within a disciplinary system (Foucault, 1961/2001, p.244). Moreover there was no 
indication of the way that this care receiver state was being addressed within the 
nurse-care receiver alliance.  In this manner, the nurse was using his/ her superior 
power linked to his/her knowledge (or lack of) about the person’s state to convey 
information that would inevitably shape care. This is felt to outline a serious 
knowledge/ power imbalance in the associated alliance since the professional seems 
to hold the veto on what to report, sometimes trading off the importance of the care 
receiver’s voice and personal experience in the process.  On reflection, I view these 
subject positions and consequences within the alliance as being directly linked to 
those present within depersonalising discourse which shall now be explored.  
 
The main subject position occupied by the professional who indulges in 
depersonalising discourse features him/her in instances whereby s/he knowingly or 
unknowingly removes the person out of the care receiver.  Perhaps this leads to 
feelings such as those expressed by one of the care receivers during the interview: 
I feel as if I am not treated as a person.  I wish that they would speak TO ME. 
Explain TO ME. Show ME, tell ME where I’m not acting as I should, what I 
am doing that’s wrong…To treat me like an intelligent human being, which I 
think I am. [CR9:21] 
When I reflect upon those excerpts in the medical/nursing records that are 
characterised by depersonalising discourse, my main concern arises from the fact 
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that the professionals’ written words were so lacking in their portrayal of the care 
receiver as a unique human being. I would like to highlight this problem by 
comparing and contrasting an excerpt from one of the nursing records to an excerpt 
from a technician’s report about a car.  Let us then start by first reviewing the 
excerpt taken from the technician’s report: 
Let’s start with the looks. It may be the first MINI measuring over four 
metres and the first modern MINI with four doors, but there’s no doubt 
which family the Countryman belongs to, thanks to the cartoonish face and 
those familiar proportions. The roof looks stuck on, which is a MINI 
trademark, but the glasshouse is unique. It’s as though there are two 
segments – front and rear – merging at the C pillars. Our Cooper S test car 
wore 17-inch rims. The controls are all brilliantly intuitive, so much so that 
we’re trying hard to refrain from using motoring cliches such as ‘extension of 
your limbs’. The zero slack steering is very quick and the resulting turn in 
response sharp, and yet it retains enough composure and stability at high 
speeds to not feel nervous. There’s a constant supply of feedback, too, and 
torque steer isn’t that big a distraction, just little tugs at full throttle. The 
brake pedal feels natural, is easy to modulate and the stopping power is 
strong (Tan, 2011, para. 5-18). 
The question that can be asked here is: What do the written words indicate about the 
qualities and uniqueness of the car under observation? As an answer, it can be 
stated that the technician dedicated considerable effort in describing the intricate 
details of the car’s appearance, performance and security, to mention but a few of the 
areas that are explored in the full review. Moreover, just by reading the above 
excerpt, one can easily realise, even if not informed by other sources, that the object 
in discussion is a car. This identification is possible due to the description of those 
combined details that make up a car such as: the type of outer body, the steering 
wheel, the rims, the doors and the brake pedals. One can also tell that the specific 
type of car is a MINI Cooper, as noted in the report by the writer’s specific 
references to the car by its actual brand name. 
 
On the same lines, we can now repeat this exercise by looking at most of the content 
of the majority of the Nursing Reports included in this study (Care Receivers 6 and 9 
being the exceptions). The following is a typical 3-day excerpt taken from one of the 
reports: 
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Night report: New patient admitted today at 8pm informally by Dr.X. Seen 
by Dr.X. Valium regime as per chart. Routine bloods (no forms filled). 
Alcohol withdrawal charting. Review by firm. 
Day report: Treatment given. 
Night report: Treatment given. Slept well. 
Day report: Treatment given. Seen by social worker (from rehab unit) today. 
Night report: Comfortable night. 
Day report: Treatment given as prescribed. Comfortable day. 
Night report: Comfortable night. [NR3:1-7] 
As in the car exercise, the question that is being asked is: What do the written words 
indicate about the qualities and uniqueness of the person under observation? The 
answer outlines an immediate contrast between the two reports. Primarily, it is felt 
that the above excerpt which incidentally, is a typicality and not an exception of the 
information provided by most nursing reports in this study, fails to clearly indicate 
whether the object in discussion is a person or not. Thus, for example, one can easily 
apply the above report to veterinary medicine where the entity under observation 
would be an animal rather than a person. I feel that the alarming and painful 
conclusion that emerges from this comparative exercise is that whilst an inanimate 
object such as a car can be afforded such rich and detailed wording, a human being 
can be reduced to crude descriptions that hardly provide anything more than very 
basic information. Needless to say, in the excerpt from the nursing report, there was 
no reference to the specific person due to lack of reference to the person’s actual 
name and his/her unique characteristics. The almost complete lack of use of the care 
receivers’ names in the records located was surprising to me.   During the interviews, 
one of the care receivers, whose name did not feature in any of her medical/nursing 
records, referred to this when she spoke about the name usage by different 
professionals:  
The nurses call me by my surname not by my name. It is: “Hey hey 
*surname*, come here.” I do not care, I just get on. The occupational 
therapists refer to me by my name, yeah they do. The psychiatrist refers to 
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me by my name too. It is just the nurses who refer to me by one of my 
surnames. And a couple of patients do that too. It doesn’t bother me because 
I know who I am. And I do not care who thinks what and who doesn’t think 
what. I am just as good as anybody else here. [CR7:37] 
Interestingly, despite the care receiver’s stated conviction that she is not bothered by 
the fact that the nurses refer to her by the use of her surname instead of her name, her 
non-verbals indicated otherwise. Moreover, as the interview progressed, the care 
receiver declared that out of the three professional-types mentioned in the excerpt 
above, she perceives the greatest power imbalance to be present in her alliances with 
the nurses. I wonder then whether the lack of use of a person’s name may be 
associated with a barrier that serves to separate the two entities within the alliance by 
creating different power levels. 
 
Similar findings were presented in an analytic study of nursing documentation by 
Heartfield (1996, p.101). The researcher noted that on admission to a hospital, the 
individual seems to lose part of his/her identity. This can be seen by the assignment 
of labels such as “patient” or any other description that omits the actual name of the 
person. In Foucault’s world, this would be the person who is being recreated as a 
passive object in the face of subjugation: “We can say that disciplinary 
power…fabricates subjected bodies: it pins the subject function exactly to the 
body…the individual is nothing other than the subjected body” (Foucault, 
1973/2008, p.55). 
 
On reviewing the medical records that were characterized by depersonalisation 
discourse, it can be noted that at least, and in contrast to the majority of the content 
of the nursing reports located, one can tell that the entity in discussion is a person. 
However, it is still felt that reference to the individuality of the person features 
poorly and is instead engulfed by writing that is governed by pathological discourse. 
Hence, in his description of a particular interaction with Care Receiver 5, a doctor 
reported that: 
Patient is in a low mood 
Concerned because husband threw out her clothes and she feels she has lost 
part of her. 
Has death wishes but no suicidal thoughts 
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Plan: A clear programme should be established with OT about how the 
patient spends her day [MR5:E1] 
 
Perhaps this may shed light on why during the interviewer, Care Receiver 5 
expressed her discontentment with the alliance that she has with her psychiatrist due 
to the feeling of fear that he instils in her. She described how she will do whatever 
the doctors suggests without any questions or doubts since she is too scared to do 
otherwise. Similarly, the full report of one of Care Receiver 7’s medical reviews was 
presented as follows: 
Ward round with consultant psychiatrist 
Patient complaining of memory loss, fatigue 
Stable, euthymic 
 
Plan: Bloods, Bio, ESR, B12, Folate 
MMSE  
TFT s, VDRL, Ca 2+, Phosphate [MR7:E3] 
 
On a similar basis as that highlighted in the section related to minimalistic discourse-
type, one cannot automatically assume that a writing manner characterized by 
depersonalisation is a direct reflection of the same style of therapeutic alliance.  As a 
discourse-type, depersonalization may be linked to various possible rationales such 
as learned ways of writing/practice, time management, mindlessness, lack of 
knowledge and attitude /motivational issues. Hence, the experience of the 
professional occupying this position may be one characterized by professionalism, 
expertise and efficiency if, for instance, the rationale is related to learned ways of 
practice/writing and time management.  If the reason for indulgence in this 
discourse-type is lack of knowledge, then the professional may be limiting 
himself/herself to the wording and practice that s/he is familiar with and this may 
perhaps lead to a custodial and defensive type of alliance. Similarly if 
depersonalising discourse is a direct result of an attitude/motivational issue, it may 
be the case that in the face of suffering and in an environment that can be 
psychologically distressing for the professional, s/he opts to deal with what s/he 
perceives as a ‘non-person’. As discussed in the first theme that featured in this 
section, the latter may very well be an example of a self-protecting mechanism in an 
attempt to prevent one’s burn out. Finally, it may be useful to reflect on the cultural 
contribution that may be affecting the professionals’ perception of the care receivers 
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in their care. As discussed in the introductory part of this thesis, in Malta, mental 
distress is nowadays much more accepted than it had been before the past decade. 
However, I still feel as if the general view is that this type of distress is mostly linked 
to the lower social class or to individuals who have not managed their life in an 
appropriate manner. This often seems to drive a wedge between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – 
the ‘mad people locked up in the asylum with no real hope of a successful future’ 
and ‘us who are out here behaving normally and managing our life as we should be 
managing it’. I believe that these are dangerous views that may lead to the separation 
of the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’ and to rather rigid ways of determining the 
characteristics which one needs to have to be classified as human and be treated as 
such. 
Conclusion 
Conclusively, it is felt to be rather odd for a professional to indulge in such a cold 
and mechanical manner of writing whilst describing an alliance that is supposedly 
care receiver-centered and targeted towards independence and recovery.  In actual 
practice, is the care receiver simply a chess pawn who is transferred to other wards, 
sent on leave and brought back as necessary? Is this Foucault’s subjected body? 
 
Perhaps some of the themes that emerged from the care receivers’ interviews, 
particularly those which form the Resentment-Opposition alliance type could be a 
result of the use of depersonalising discourse from the professionals’ part. 
Surprisingly though, it has to be mentioned that out of 27 identified alliances by the 
care receivers, only five were categorized underneath the Resentment-Opposition 
alliance-type, which is the only type where care receivers are dissatisfied with the 
power-balance in the alliance. Perhaps this relates to Foucault’s contention that 
power may not necessarily be negative and it does not automatically lead to 
repression. This is because it can also produce reality, ritual and knowledge 
(Foucault, 1978/1990, p.93). Consequently, this may indicate that depersonalising 
discourse does not necessarily result in care receiver dissatisfaction. However, it is 
important to note that care receiver satisfaction with the knowledge-power balance 
may not be the sole indicator of positive therapeutic outcomes or a definite track to 
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recovery. This has been explored in more detail in Section 4.2 that was dedicated to 
the discussion and analysis of the interviews transcripts. 
Theme 3: The Humanistic Approach 
Introduction 
The third theme that was identified from the medical and nursing records may be 
perceived as a stark contrast to the two other discursive themes that emerged from 
the professionals’ texts. In this context, humanism describes a professional’s 
approach which, to an extent, places emphasis on the value of individuality, personal 
meaning and holistic care. On the same note, in the humanistic approach, there is 
less preoccupation with pathological and depersonalising discourse which 
subsequently leads to less evidence of authoritarian discourse in the texts. It has to 
be noted that this discursive theme is the theme that featured the least in the records 
reviewed and it presented with a similar frequency in both medical and nursing 
records within this study. 
Description 
On exploring those professionals’ texts which contributed to this theme, it could be 
noted that the alliance was being constructed through a number of direct and indirect 
references. One nurse’s report about care planning with Care Receiver 6 implied the 
practice of shared decision making or mutual involvement within the alliance by 
stating that: 
Plan: Patient agreed to above plan - leave for 1 week from today. To come 
next Wednesday evening and to sleep here. To give feedback on Thursday to 
firm. [NR6:4] 
Similarly, another nurse hinted at an alliance that is, at least partially, constructed on 
collaboration by reporting that: 
Patient agreed and went on leave with her husband this afternoon - to return 
on Sunday evening. [NR6:7] 
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Finally, in this theme, the therapeutic alliance appears to be characterised by a 
professional who affords considerable importance to the care receiver’s subjective 
experience and wishes. For instance, a doctor described Care Receiver 5’s state and 
actions by documenting that: 
Patient is being empowered through cooking. Visited daily by her husband. 
Went to visit her house and she was much less anxious. Feels she lacks 
motivation, wants to go home but claims she needs to feel better before. 
Feels afraid with low mood at times. Has started seeing the psychologist. 
[MR5:E5] 
Following a review of the constructions of the alliance within the humanistic niche, 
three main discourse-types appear to be contributing to the existence of this theme. 
The first discourse that can be identified is that of equality discourse. This features 
as a way of writing about the therapeutic alliance in a manner that indicates a 
balance of knowledge and power in the interactions described.  In this way, it 
appears as if the care receiver’s feedback has weight and is at times taken on board 
in care planning. This discourse-type is reflected in some of the texts written by 
professionals, such as: 
Patient agreed to be transferred to Ward X as space is now available as 
planned by firm. [MR1:E2] 
Patient says that he has been going to OT every day.....says he is fed up about 
being in the ward. [MR2:E6] 
Patient would not approve of increase in treatment. Plan: To offer 
psychotherapy. Behavioural advice given regarding coping with bullying, 
continue same treatment. [MR5:E4] 
In a parallel manner, humanistic discourse is also being employed. This can be 
contrasted with the depersonalising and minimalistic discourse types that have been 
discussed in the previous two themes within this section. Incidentally, the 
terminology used within this discourse-type tends to be less clinical and more 
informative as well as being based on a humane approach that more or less addresses 
the care receiver as a unique and valuable figure. It seems as if this resembles 
normalising approaches such as that advised by Romme (2007): “Accepting is not 
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concretely accepting everything…but it is the beginning of looking differently, 
creating hope and opening personal possibilities.” (sec.3). 
 
In particular, this is the only discourse identified within the texts which featured the 
use of the care receiver’s actual name rather than references by use of the third 
person, as seen in the following excerpt: 
 
Medical officer on call at hospital 
 
(Care receiver´s name) has come back early from leave. 
Husband: (Care receiver´s name) has been agitated at home for the past 2 
days since she went out on leave. Not sleeping. Depressed, crying. No 
paranoia.  
(Care receiver´s name): Feels depressed but can´t explain why. Anegia, 
anhedonia. Hopelessness, decreased appetite. Not sleeping. Bed seeking 
behaviour. No psychotic features, no death wishes, no suicidal wishes. 
[MR6:E1] 
 
The care receiver who features in the above excerpt is one who spoke about her 
psychiatrist in a positive manner and indicated her overall satisfaction with the 
alliance – in fact this led to the alliance being classified as a Satisfaction-Alliance 
type. Perhaps then it may be suggested that there is a link between the professional’s 
way of writing (mentioning the person’s actual name and elaborating on the care 
receiver’s subjective experiences) and the care receiver’s positive perception of the 
alliance. On reflection, it seems as if the humanistic discursive theme is also hosting 
a recovery discourse-type by presenting a professional who is walking alongside 
the care receiver rather than walking the care receiver or walking over the care 
receiver. This can be likened to descriptions of care models that are based on the 
Recovery Model – these focus on the individual’s abilities rather than the disabilities 
related to symptoms of mental illness (Allott, Loganathan & Fulford, 2002, p.13). 
On looking at excerpts that are characterised by this discourse, it can be noted that to 
some extent, the care receiver is being regarded as an able individual who is 
expected to participate in care as an active stakeholder. Moreover, in one of the 
excerpts, the professional transcribed the care receiver’s own words: 
Talks about her husband, hurt that he threw away her things but then justified 
his actions and anger. When he brought her home, his friends were telling 
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him: “Ghalfejn gibtha lura? Ghax ma hallejtiex fejn kienet?” (Why have you 
brought her back? Why didn´t you leave her where she was?)  When she 
envisions her future going back home, she feels anxious. [MR5:E3] 
Interestingly, this is the only example of direct use of the care receiver’s voice that 
could be located in the medical and nursing records included in this study. 
On dedicating attention to the positions offered by these three discourse-types, 
equality discourse may primarily be explored. In this case, despite the obvious 
difference that the professional is providing a service and the care receiver is the 
recipient of this service, there seems to be little more to distinguish between the two 
entities. As a prime example, it may be insightful to consider the responsibility for 
care outcomes – in fact, it can be contended that in this equalitarian system, both 
parties are responsible to ‘make it work’.  Moreover, it seems to be mutually agreed 
that all knowledge is considered, irrelevant of the source, and hence, this is felt to be 
what makes the alliance a place for practice, a safe area. Although the professionals 
were not interviewed, the main feelings that could be elicited from reviewing the 
excerpts from the records were those of humbleness, readiness for collaboration and 
comfort in one’s professional skin.  
 
The second discourse-type identified, namely the humanistic discourse, gives rise to 
a number of positions that are felt to complement the concept of equality that has 
just been discussed. Figuratively speaking, equalitarian discourse may be viewed as 
being a platform for humanistic discourse since probably, the latter would not be 
meaningful without the former.  In practical terms, this implies that the alliance can 
only be built on a holistic approach if both entities within it hold an equal seat in the 
turntable of events. The professional who indulges in humanistic discourse may be 
seen as being in a position where the illness is not the governing body of the alliance 
and the care receiver is much more than the sum of his psychiatric symptoms. This 
type of discourse may be similar to that advocated by Deegan (1996): “Rooted in the 
simple yet profound realization that people who have been diagnosed with mental 
illness are human beings” (p.92). 
 
Rather than viewing the illness as a set diagnosis that requires a standard treatment 
package, the scope of the alliance goes beyond and attempts to target recovery in 
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wider terms rather than simply as a resolution of the symptoms.  Here an element of 
confusion may prevail because this seems to overlap on the recovery discourse that 
has been alluded to earlier. In fact, this is understandable because the positions 
offered by these two discourse-types share many similarities and are in fact 
constructed on each other. In a collective look at the positions offered by these two 
discourse-types, the professionals seem to be unearthing what is felt to be an 
important aspect in the mechanism of the system.  This refers to the recognition that 
the aim of the therapeutic alliance is not only to provide a medical answer to a 
clinical question. Rather, it is a tool that facilitates a journey of self-growth by the 
care receiver and professional alike. As a result, this may lead to discoveries, new 
knowledge and venues that are unlike those encountered prior to embarking onto this 
recovery path. It is a journey that most importantly, is not thoroughly pre-planned on 
basis of previous experiences (of the professional) within other alliances. In his 
guidebook about recovery-based care, Slade (2009) differentiated between clinical 
recovery – referring to getting rid of symptoms; and personal recovery – relating to 
the attainment of meaning, vales and personal goals irrelevant of whether the 
symptoms of mental illness have resolved or not (p.4). Furthermore, the author 
discussed how personal recovery is specific and unique to every individual. In 
addition, I contend that the meaning of recovery is specific not only to each care 
receiver but also to the therapeutic alliance itself as formed by two entities during the 
process of being allies. This suggests unity – not simply in the face of mental illness- 
but more of a positive process that leads to a higher level - a better place.  
Conclusion 
Notably, this is the only occasion in the data collected where the care receiver’s 
actual name and direct words found their way in the medical and nursing records. 
Perhaps for some, like myself, this adds colour to a black and white portrait and a 
breath of life to what may otherwise be a cold and pathological scripture. But then 
for others, this writing style and attitude may be deemed as unprofessional, maybe 
too personal or generally undesirable.  This may explain its minimal appearance 
within the medical and nursing records that were examined. 
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4.3.4 Conclusion 
The findings that emerged from the analysis and discussion of the medical and 
nursing records have helped to explore some of the discourses related to the ways 
that different care providers may perceive the knowledge-power balance in the 
therapeutic alliance.   
 
On a final note, it seems as if the findings that emerged from this part of the study 
may bear resemblance to those reported in a study carried out by Bjorkdahl, 
Palmstierna and Hansebo (2010). In their study, the researchers explored caring 
aspects of nursing care in acute psychiatric settings and classified the two main 
caring approaches that emerged as the ballet dancer and the bulldozer. The ballet 
dancer approach signified a caring approach that emphasised the cultivation of safety 
and trust. The sub-themes identified were: signalling a caring approach, putting 
yourself in the care receiver’s shoes and using yourself as a finely tuned instrument 
(p.512). This may reflect the third theme that emerged from the professionals’ 
written records in the current study – the Humanistic Approach. Bjorkdahl et al. 
(2010) described the bulldozer approach as a type of care that tends to treat the care 
receiver as an object that can be controlled by the bulldozer (p.513). In this case, 
some of the sub-themes identified were: guarding the ward from chaos, ensuring 
sufficient power, justifying the use of controlling actions and keeping a critical mind. 
This approach may bear some resemblance to the first and second discursive themes 
that I have identified in the medical and nursing records – The Pathological Lens and 
Depersonalisation. 
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4.4 Developing the effectiveness of the therapeutic alliance 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter concerns the identification of direct and indirect references 
in the findings to knowledge required by both entities in the alliance for power to be 
managed in a manner that enhances therapeutic outcomes.  This is intended to 
generate information for answering the second sub-question leading this study while 
simultaneously allowing recommendations to be made in view of the findings as 
perceived by the researcher. 
 
During the interviews that took place in the first phase of the study, the care 
receivers were asked specific questions that were targeted to elicit information about 
the type of knowledge required by care providers and by themselves for power to be 
managed in a manner that enhances therapeutic outcomes (Refer to Appendix 1). 
Furthermore, useful information in this regard could also be extrapolated from other 
areas within the coded interview transcripts that were not specifically related to 
direct questions about the perceived knowledge required.    
 
Since the second phase of the study consisted of document analysis, a direct answer 
regarding the knowledge required could not be obtained from this source in the same 
way that it had been obtained by means of the direct questions posed during the 
interviews with the care receivers. Nonetheless, data relevant to answer this research 
sub-question could be extrapolated from the medical and nursing records that were 
reviewed. In this regard, the excerpt examples that have been presented in this part of 
the chapter may help to clarify and link these extrapolations to my interpretation and 
recommendations.  
 
This chapter has been divided into two main sections which explore the knowledge 
needs of the care receivers and the care providers within the alliance, respectively. 
Within each of the sections, the discussion has been structured by a thematic 
approach as follows:  
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Care receiver knowledge needs: 
- Theme 1: Empowerment 
 
Care provider knowledge needs: 
- Theme 1: Humanism 
- Theme 2: A Tailor-Made Approach 
 
Each of these two sections shall be addressed by using data collected from both of 
the data sources in the study. Thus, for instance, information about the knowledge 
required by the care receivers was provided by the care receivers themselves as well 
as extrapolated by the researcher from the medical and nursing records. Similarly 
both sources provided valuable data on the knowledge that may be required by the 
care providers.   
 
The following table depicts the sections and their themes, a brief descriptor of each 
theme and a number of excerpts which highlight the rationale for each of the themes. 
The final column depicts the areas of knowledge that may need to be developed in 
training and practice in relation to each respective theme. More excerpts have also 
been included in the discussion that follows. 
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Table 5: Summary of findings and recommendations related to knowledge required by care receivers and care providers 
Entity  Theme Excerpt examples that highlight rationale for theme related 
to type of knowledge required 
Areas of knowledge that 
need development 
 
Care receivers 
 
Empowerment 
 
This theme is concerned 
with the need of knowledge 
related to self-empowerment. 
It may involve learning how 
to acknowledge inherent 
resources, being aware of the 
current situation as well as 
communicating assertively 
within therapeutic alliances. 
 
I do not know anything - like when I´m going on leave, how much 
time I will be spending here - I do not know anything. [CR1:27] 
 
Professionals cannot learn from me. I am zero, stupid. How can 
they learn from me? [CR5:34] 
 
With the psychiatrist, the power imbalance is there because I am 
the crazy one with no knowledge at all, I do not know. His 
opinion is that since I did such an overdose, he cannot discuss 
with me. And so I reflect that I may have brought this onto myself 
and so I have to be submissive. [CR9:35] 
 
 
‘Amour de soi’ 
 
Mindfulness 
 
Assertiveness 
 
Care providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanism 
 
This features the need for 
some of the care providers to 
learn how to engage in 
behaviour that places the 
care receiver at the forefront 
by actions that are targeted 
towards the individual’s 
personal recovery.  
 
I am not satisfied. I wish that before they prescribe medicine, 
they ask the patient whether he wants it or not.  And the patient 
has every right...the patient can decide what type of treatment he 
wants to have and the doctor has to co-operate with him not just 
force him to take medication. [CR4:30] 
 
I feel as if I am not treated as a person.  I wish that they would 
speak TO ME. Explain TO ME…to treat me like an intelligent 
human being, which I think I am. [CR9:21] 
 
 
Civil behaviour 
 
Mindfulness 
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Care providers 
contd. 
 
 
 
 
 
The nurses need to be educated - basic education about how to 
interact with people, people who are at our level, who suffer from 
depression…patients do not speak because nurses snap at them 
and that destroys all the trust. They (the nurses) need to speak to 
you not tell you the contrary. [CR6:34] 
 
 
 
 
A Tailor-Made Approach 
(Based on multiple 
treatment options 
stemming from orthodox & 
complementary/alternative 
modalities) 
 
This concerns that type of 
knowledge that may be 
required by some care 
providers in relation to the 
need to embrace the 
concepts of individualism 
and diversity whilst building 
alliances with different care 
receivers. 
 
Professionals need to learn that not everyone is the same…. 
Because here they have different types of patients. And sometimes 
it seems as if all patients are the same.  [CR3:39] 
 
Professionals need to realise that everyone’s mind is different - a 
mind problem is worse than having cancer. [CR1:73] 
 
 
Individualism 
 
Diversity 
234 
 
4.4.2 Potential knowledge that may be required by care receivers 
 
Theme 1: Empowerment 
Introduction 
This theme is concerned with the potential need of some of the care receivers to 
acquire more knowledge about self-empowerment. This may involve learning how to 
acknowledge inherent resources, being aware of their current position as well as 
communicating assertively within therapeutic alliances. 
Discussion 
The care receivers’ knowledge needs in relation to this theme have been constructed 
in a number of ways. At times, the data collected implied that some of the care 
receivers may benefit from enhanced awareness of their self-worth: 
The hospital was the only option that I had. I did not know about anything 
else - I had always been in the fields, I did not know about anything. [CR5:9] 
I am fine with the idea that I have less power than they (the nurses) do. It is 
how things should be. This is because they are the ones in charge and know 
how things should be done, not me. [CR1:67] 
In this manner, the knowledge required is being constructed as the need for some of 
the care receivers to acknowledge and use their expertise within the alliance. 
 
Knowledge required by some of the care receivers may have also been constructed in 
terms of the need for enhanced awareness about the current moment: to capture the 
here and now as opposed to automatically drifting along the recovery journey: 
I do not know anything - like when I´m going on leave, how much time I will 
be spending here - I do not know anything. [CR1:27] 
I do not think that I am involved in my care planning but I do not have any 
will to be involved. [CR5:20] 
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Another construction of the knowledge needed may pertain to clearer awareness of 
one’s rights and the ability to stand up for oneself within therapeutic alliances: 
During the ward round, they just tell you what is going to happen, what you 
are going to do. [CR6:16] 
With the psychiatrist, the power imbalance is there because I am the crazy 
one with no knowledge at all, I do not know. His opinion is that since I did 
such an overdose, he cannot discuss with me. And so I reflect that I may have 
brought this onto myself and so I have to be submissive. [CR9:35] 
These descriptions of the knowledge required may be perceived as being linked to 
three main areas which need to be developed in training and practice. These are: 
‘amour de soi’, mindfulness and assertiveness – these shall now be explored. 
 
‘Amour de soi’ is the first knowledge need that I have identified from the findings. 
This concept, which is one of the principal elements in Rousseau’s moral 
psychology, refers to a natural sentiment that involves self-love, self-preservation 
and self-importance (Rousseau, 1754, p.73). This can be contrasted with ‘amour 
propre’ which refers to the “social sentiment which moves us to seek the good 
opinion of others and to value our status relative to others” (Bertram, 2010, para.6). 
In the context of this study, discourse may have highlighted some of the care 
receivers’ need to acquire knowledge about self-worth and to acknowledge their 
important position within the alliance. For instance, this was identified when Care 
Receiver 5 stated: 
Professionals cannot learn from me. I am zero, stupid. How can they learn 
from me? [CR5:34] 
Care Receivers 1 and 9 expressed similar views: 
I am not at all an expert in my own care…I wish! I do not have enough 
knowledge. [CR9:36] 
I do not know much about pills, I am not an expert in my care. I do not think 
that professionals can learn anything from me. [CR1:68,69] 
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The second knowledge need that may be seen as emerging from the data is related to 
mindfulness. This refers to some of the care receivers’ need to acquire knowledge on 
how to focus attention and reflect on the present moment (Black, 2011, p.1). The 
importance of this kind of knowledge may be seen in the need to empower some of 
the care receivers to have more awareness of their current position, rationale behind 
actions carried out and consequences of these actions on self and others.  I feel that 
enhanced mindfulness in relation to these actions may then limit some of the 
passivity and compliance that were at times detected in the data collected from some 
of the care receivers: 
Regarding symptoms: I still do not know exactly what I have. [CR9:9] 
I do not know what the plan is but I guess that in 2 weeks’ time I will be out. 
[CR2:16] 
They need to teach me about the treatment, about life. This would make me 
more aware of what I should or should not do. [CR2:34] 
In his report about Care Receiver 2, a doctor may have also identified the need for 
care receive knowledge about mindfulness when he wrote: 
Patient and friend do not know exactly how he takes his medication. 
[MR2:E1] 
Contrastingly, some of the care receivers who were interviewed seemed to grasp the 
importance of mindfulness by actively incorporating it in their recovery: 
There is something which has been on my mind for a long time and I have 
tested it to see if it is true or not. When you get a wallop of depression, and 
you go to lie down. Before you lie down, something in your mind says: “Are 
you going to lie down or are you going to fight it? Are you going to lie down 
for 11 hours or are you going to fight it? Are you going to have something to 
eat and fight it?” So you have a choice. So you may say: “I will eat 
something later to watch my weight. As long as I do not lie down.” Because 
once I lie down, I am in bed for 24 hours sometimes. But I have to control it 
and let myself know that this is it. I have a choice. I can either lie down in 
bed or I am going to cope with it. [CR7:15] 
But I believe that you need to pass through phases. Here I have learned 
certain things - there is cure here, not cure as such because there is nothing 
much to do here apart from sitting down and watching TV, no activities. So I 
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just need to spend a few days here to get clean, take the medication and get 
on with my life. [CR3:15] 
You need to know yourself..what is happening to you. You need to read up 
about your illness because only then you can get an idea of what is 
happening. That can be a problem because not everyone has access to the 
internet or to books and some of the information is a bit too complicated. 
[CR10:46] 
The third knowledge need identified is related to assertiveness. This refers to some 
of the care receivers’ need to acquire knowledge on exhibiting behaviour 
characterized by a confident assertion of one’s rights or perception. This is done 
without aggressively imposing upon the rights of others or submissively allowing 
others to deny one's rights or perception (Willett, 2009, p.83). This need was 
identified from excerpts such as the one from the interviews with Care Receivers 1 
and 9: 
Then as I said, my husband intervened and said that he agrees with the option 
that I do not take any pills this week. And this is what happened. I did not 
really have a choice then. Because since that was what my husband wanted, 
obviously, the psychiatrist would be listening to him and doing as he said. 
[CR9:18] 
With the psychiatrist, the power imbalance is there because I am the crazy 
one with no knowledge at all, I do not know. His opinion is that since I did 
such an overdose, he cannot discuss with me. And so I reflect that I may have 
brought this onto myself and so I have to be submissive. [CR9:35] 
They had stopped the Effexor and started to get its generic instead. From then 
onwards, I had started to deteriorate. I had once discussed this with someone 
but nothing was done. I could not do anything else then. If he (the consultant 
psychiatrist) said that I need to take it, I have to take it. [CR1:52] 
But it is obvious that they know much more than I do. That is why they work 
here. They run the hospital and the hospital is theirs. That is why they are in 
charge of what happens to the hospital, to me and to the other patients. It is 
life, eh? Like if you are a student and you go to school, your teachers are 
much more powerful than you are. But then the head teacher is more 
powerful than THEY are. And whilst I am living in Malta, the prime minister 
is more powerful than I am. It is the natural way of things, I think. [CR10:38] 
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Additionally, some of the medical and nursing records included provided examples 
that may serve to highlight the need for care receivers’ knowledge about 
assertiveness: 
Dr.X came to see patient and wanted to send her back on leave but patient 
refused and instead went running to the Occupational Therapy premises but 
was brought back to the nursing staff.  Dr.X was again informed and decided 
to send her for 3 days on leave. [NR6:7] 
Conversely, descriptions provided by some of the care receivers showed awareness 
and practice of assertive behaviour: 
I formed this care plan - this was what I had told my doctor and social worker 
- what care plan I wanted..not going out of hospital to my home and then the 
programme - I want to go to the programme directly from here. I will get 
back into the programme - not continue from where I left because you cannot 
do that if you stopped. You have to start all over again. I do not mind - 
instead of spending a year in the programme, I will spend more in total. That 
is a bonus for me. It was all my decision. [CR3:23] 
I wouldn’t be afraid of asking questions, whoever the professional is, it can 
be the prime minister! [CR3:35] 
If I give suggestions, I get feedback, good, bad - it was never bad. Then I 
have to accept. Not ‘accept’ because ‘accept’ can imply that I just submit to 
everything but in the situation of a patient, she is not going to say something 
that will hurt me. She will lay out the options and feedback and ask me what 
I think about it. I have time to discuss. I am not presented with a rigid 
answer. [CR3:30] 
I do not need any support. I can support myself. But I need legal help to help 
me with this medication issue. [CR4:34] 
The doctor had wanted to admit me to this hospital but I had refused since I 
was pregnant. And I did not feel as if I required treatment here.  [CR5:1] 
But you also have to be confident and have the guts and energy to speak for 
yourself and participate.  [CR10:46] 
Since these three main types of knowledge needs are felt to be overlapping and 
complementary, their characteristics are now going to be discussed collectively. 
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As a starting point, it seems to me as if the three areas identified can be viewed as 
describing a step-by-step approach in addressing the knowledge that may be required 
by some care receivers to manage the knowledge-power balance within the alliance. 
In this manner, the type of knowledge described by ‘amour de soi’ may be seen as 
being the first that may be provided as this may help to enhance the individual’s self-
importance and self-love. Knowledge related to mindfulness may then follow with 
the main aim of prompting the person to focus on the present moment and then 
situate his/her current situation within plans for the future. Finally, knowledge 
pertaining to assertiveness, may be offered as this may help the individual to be an 
active participant within the alliance by being able to communicate self-needs in 
relation to the current moment as well as to the future. 
 
A review of the literature shows that there are several available tools and techniques 
which can be used in the practical setting to guide care receivers in accessing the 
three different types of knowledge that have been identified. For instance, self-
awareness exercises may contribute to addressing knowledge related to ‘amour de 
soi’. This includes activities such as life-story work (See: Making Waves, 2009), 
SWOT analysis (See: Mindtools, 1996), Johari window (See: Chapman, 2003) and 
reflective writing (See: Bolton, 2010). As described by Slade (2009), the aim is to 
guide the care receiver in the creation of a positive identity that is based on strengths 
and resources, inherent knowledge, dreams, goals and aspirations rather than 
pathology and compliance (p.14). Other tools like the Strengths Model, the Tidal 
Model, the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths and Wellness Recovery Action 
Planning (WRAP) may also be useful in this regard and can be implemented in one-
to-one sessions or adapted to group work (Slade, 2009). During the interviews, it 
was noted that the majority of the care receivers were reluctant to view themselves as 
being experts although some were ready to concede that they may be partial knowers 
in the alliance. However, it may be the case that that some of the care receivers in 
my study may have understood the term ‘expertise’ as referring only to knowledge 
that originates from academia and professional experience whilst disregarding the 
type of expertise related to the personal experience of being a care receiver. 
Surprisingly, despite this apparent poor-moderate self-perception about expertise, 
most of the care receivers stated that they would be willing to share their knowledge 
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with the professionals. Furthermore they elaborated on the kind of knowledge that 
they may share: 
Professionals can learn from me and I would be willing to share with them. I 
can teach them how to treat patients because I am a patient. [CR6:36] 
My care providers can learn from me - about my past, what I’ve gone 
through. I would be willing to share this knowledge with them. [CR8:31] 
This may show that enhancing care receivers’ awareness of their unique position as 
an expert-by-experience may contribute to ‘amour de soi’.  Motivating them to share 
this knowledge with care providers may have an even greater impact on perceived 
self-worth.  This may be done through formal arrangements such as care receiver 
inclusion in care provider training and in service development strategies. 
 
The knowledge need related to mindfulness may be accessed through various ways. 
Here I perceive the main aim as being that of guiding the care receiver to: 
 
1). Be aware of why s/he is where s/he is at the present time 
2). Explore the meaning that this experience has for him/her 
3). Reflect on what s/he is getting, may get or wish to get out of the hospital and the 
different therapeutic alliances 
4). Be actively aware of actions that s/he does or doesn’t do and how these fit into 
his/her recovery and life plan 
 
Reflexivity and spirituality may be useful in this regard: 
But the way I behave - spiritually - I reflect…sometimes I like to stay alone 
and observe and reflect upon what other people need. This spirituality helps 
me to keep my relationships balanced. [CR3:38] 
However, what may be even more useful is the provision of information related to 
the care receiver’s symptoms, care plan, and the psychiatric system e.g. information 
about rights. These activities may be helpful in orienting the care receiver to the 
current situation and to add meaning to it: 
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I would like more information about my symptoms, the type of illness that I 
have, my drinking, my over spending. [CR2:11] 
Patients need to have knowledge about their symptoms, about the treatment, 
why certain rules are there, their rationale, information about what is going 
on. [CR9:43] 
Available resources such as the Recovery Star Approach may be useful to facilitate 
reflective activities as well as to enhance awareness about one’s position in the 
recovery plan (See: Outcomes Star, 2009). Thus, for some care receivers, 
hospitalisation may hopefully start to mean much more than a place for refuge in that 
the hospital may actually start being perceived as having an active therapeutic 
potential. Perhaps enhancing mindfulness may also help in addressing the Revolving 
Door Syndrome – a phenomenon which has been identified in some healthcare 
settings such as the psychiatric hospital involved in this study (Vella, 2009). 
 
Finally, the need for knowledge related to assertiveness may be addressed by the 
provision of care receiver training. This can be done on a one-to-one basis or during 
group work as facilitated by tools such as DESC script or Interpersonal Skills 
ToolClicks (Slade, 2009, p.19).  Motivational interviewing may be another useful 
technique to initiate change towards an approach that is more assertive and targeted 
towards recovery (Slade, 2009, p.20).  Furthermore, information about the current 
care plan, complementary/alternative recovery techniques to the medical model and 
legal rights may be useful in helping a care receiver to gain knowledge and 
communicate assertively.  
 
Having explored the knowledge areas related to the theme of empowerment, I am 
now going to examine the new positions that the acquisition of this type of 
knowledge may offer to care receivers and providers. As I glance at the area of  
‘amour de soi’, or self-worth, I realise that this may place the care receiver in a 
position where s/he acknowledges the fact that s/he is an expert – by experience and 
by virtue of being the care receiver and hence in a position of being the most 
knowledgeable entity in terms of what s/he is actually feeling. Subsequently, this 
makes him/her an important member within the alliance and gives him/her the right 
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as well as the duty to manage the knowledge-power balance in the therapeutic 
alliance. 
 
On the other hand, acquisition of knowledge about mindfulness or awareness of the 
here and now, may give rise to a position where the care receiver is acutely aware of 
the purpose of his/her stay within the psychiatric hospital as well as the scope of 
each of the therapeutic alliances that s/he is part of. More importantly, this may 
allow the care receiver to link his/her current situation and experience to current and 
future plans.  
 
The provision of knowledge about assertiveness may be seen as offering a care 
receiver position that complements the previous ones that have just been described. 
This may feature active involvement and positivity as brought about by a care 
receiver’s acquired knowledge in relation  of his/her self-worth (‘amour de soi’) and 
acute awareness of his/her current situation (mindfulness). The extra factor that may 
be added by assertiveness knowledge is the ability to act and communicate in a 
manner that has the potential to manage the knowledge-power balance in alliances in 
an effective manner that is targeted towards personal (as opposed to clinical) 
recovery. 
 
On shifting to the collective positions that these three discourses may offer to the 
care provider, it can be noted that probably, the professional may find himself/herself 
in an alliance with a care receiver who is not a passive entity but who is willing to 
engage in a dialogue and to be an equal partner in care. This may be an attitude that 
the care provider may welcome, encourage, ignore or resist depending on the 
discourses that govern his/her professional approach, as described in Section 4.3 of 
this chapter. 
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Conclusion 
In this theme, I have explored three complementary areas of knowledge needs that I 
have perceived as constructing the overarching theme of empowerment.  Care 
receivers’ knowledge needs identified through the areas of ‘amour de soi’, 
mindfulness and assertiveness have been addressed and practical ways of guiding 
care receivers to acquire these knowledge-types have also been postulated.  As 
discussed, it is felt that the provision of this knowledge may empower care receivers 
to manage the knowledge-power nexus in therapeutic alliances in a manner that is 
based on a recovery approach and that is likely to enhance therapeutic outcomes. 
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4.4.2 Potential knowledge that may be required by care providers 
 
Theme 1: Humanism 
Introduction 
The theme of humanism emerged from some of the data that showed knowledge 
requirements in terms of a humane approach within the alliance. This features the 
need for some of the care providers to exhibit an attitude that places the care receiver 
at the forefront by actions that are targeted towards the individual’s personal 
recovery.  
Discussion 
The knowledge needs that have been identified as falling underneath the theme of 
humanism have been constructed in a number of ways in the interview transcripts 
and in the professional records included. During certain instances, the data collected 
indicated that some care receivers may be feeling as if they are invisible and ignored 
by their care providers. This may show that the type of knowledge needed by some 
care providers was constructed as being based on regarding the care receiver as a 
person who has the capacity to think and feel: 
My role in the multidisciplinary team is to dread each ward round because it 
means a change in medication.  I do not have any importance within this 
team. [CR4:21] 
I feel as if I am not treated as a person.  I wish that they would speak TO ME. 
Explain TO ME…to treat me like an intelligent human being, which I think I 
am. [CR9:21] 
At times, the data showed that some care providers may require knowledge in terms 
of addressing the care receiver as an equal partner within the alliance.  In this 
manner, the knowledge required was constructed as being related to the need for care 
receiver inclusion and involvement in care - a collaborative approach: 
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I did not know that he (the psychiatrist) had increased my pills because he 
informed the Nursing Officer only. [CR2:26] 
I am not satisfied. I wish that before they prescribe medicine, they ask the 
patient whether he wants it or not.  And the patient has every right...the 
patient can decide what type of treatment he wants to have and the doctor has 
to co-operate with him not just force him to take medication. [CR4:30] 
Finally, care provider knowledge-needs were also constructed as the requirement to 
learn how to offer a range of care options instead of restricting treatment to the 
biomedical model, in particular psychiatric admission and psychiatric drugs: 
I was not offered any other options apart from admissions. [CR6:7] 
I did not have any choices about treatment. No one offered me any choices. 
[CR1:34] 
The constructions that have been discussed in relation to the theme of humanism 
may be seen as falling within the remit of two knowledge areas that may be required 
by care providers in the study. The first one that has been identified is knowledge 
related to behaving in a civil manner. Gergen (2001) described this as the act of 
learning how to show respect for others (p.71). In the context of this discussion, this 
refers to the need for some care providers to enhance their knowledge of how to treat 
care receivers in a manner that is more civilised, as indicated by Care Receiver 6: 
The nurses need to be educated - basic education about how to interact with 
people, people who are at our level, who suffer from depression…patients do 
not speak because nurses snap at them and that destroys all the trust. They 
(the nurses) need to speak to you not tell you the contrary. [CR6:35] 
For some care receivers, this may necessitate the provision of options and choices 
(rather than impositions) as well as active involvement in care planning: 
I was not involved in the care plan.  Actually, he just changed my pills 
without informing me about it. I wish that I´m involved. Because they think 
that you do not know how to do anything. [CR1:32] 
Professionals need to know how to deal with care receivers: to advise but not 
impose. [CR5:36] 
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The second knowledge need identified centered on the area of mindfulness. This 
describes some of the care providers’ possible need to acquire knowledge on how to 
focus attention on the present moment (Black, 2011, p.1). In this context, this refers 
to more awareness of the implications of what one says and does especially in terms 
of its potential impact on care receivers. In particular, this relates to words and 
actions that may be used automatically without much consideration of their effect: 
When I ask the professionals about what is wrong with me, they answer: 
"That´s life.” [CR5:14] 
Sometimes I do ask about why I am taking the pills and the answer is: 
“Because you need them”. [CR2:20] 
They (the nurses) are ok but I think that most of them are not really 
interested..you sort of realise when they speak to you..even the way they 
speak, the tone of voice. Like I am bothering them and they want me to leave 
them in peace. That is not nice, it makes me feel uncomfortable. [CR10:33] 
Mindfulness has also been discussed in relation to the knowledge required by the 
care receivers. Whilst the same definition applies for both entities in the alliance, its 
manifestation is different – this shall be discussed in a later part within this theme. 
Each of these two required areas of knowledge shall now be explored in more detail.  
 
In a summary of the main points that emerged from excerpts that highlight the need 
for knowledge related to civil behaviour, it seems as if some care providers may 
require knowledge in relation to the following areas: 
 
1). Perception of the care receiver as a person who may require information and 
different care options to choose from rather than imposition of treatment types: 
I tell the professionals that I am not happy and they answer that I should go 
to another ward - you go to another ward which is worse than this one. 
[CR1:42] 
But they do not talk a lot in front of you. First they decide and then they ask 
you to enter the ward round room. Sometimes my parents go in alone and 
then they let me in afterwards. [CR1:45] 
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My psychiatrist does not give me enough information on my symptoms. Now 
just because this morning he told me : “We’re not going to do the ECT and 
we’re going to stay without the pills and you need to make an effort.” TELL 
ME WHAT I HAVE! No, I did not ask him what am I suffering from - what I 
have. [CR9:10] 
At the moment, I have a nurse who is with me all the time because I told 
them that I wish to die. Sometimes I would not even know who the nurse 
allocated to me is. They do not let you know, they do not say anything. Then 
I realise who it is because this nurse keeps following me. [CR1:58] 
2). Recognition that a particular care receiver is different than other care receivers 
hence respect for a person’s uniqueness needs to be demonstrated: 
One: Speak to me not just to my husband as if I do not have any worth. Two:  
Explain to me. You have to be intelligent enough to understand how much I 
can understand. Because not everyone understands in the same way and at 
the same level. I am not better than anyone else, do not get me wrong please. 
But if I am able to understand and I would like to have more knowledge and I 
can understand, explain to me then. In their training, they need to have an 
experienced trainer who will demonstrate how to do this. But at the end of 
the day, it is a question of personality. After they are shown how to, some 
will do it, others will not. Because some think that they reach god-like status 
when they qualify. [CR9:42] 
3). The therapeutic milieu and the therapeutic alliance are not automatic happenings 
and need to be shaped in order to enhance a care receiver’s recovery. Moreover, the 
alliance is a very important building block for therapeutic outcomes and so it needs 
to be exploited: 
Now the way the doctors are behaving, they are being carnivorous.  Why are 
they being carnivorous? Because they said that they will treat me first and 
then I will get married. They lied. [CR4:9] 
Professionals, especially the doctor, need to know how to co-operate. 
[CR4:35] 
4). The care provider’s behaviour in the context of the alliance may influence not 
only the management of the knowledge and power balance but also the overall 
effectiveness of the same alliance and the care provided. Hence the way one speaks 
to and about the care receiver as well as the way in which one writes about the care 
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receiver may be imperative in the management of the knowledge-power balance in 
care: 
You need to go down to their (the patients’) level and make the time to speak 
to them, even if it is just for 30 minutes. You inform the patient that you only 
have 30 minutes. And that is ok. As long as you explain.  This is part of their 
work. And you cannot really tell a patient: "Hey at 11am, I have my break." 
They need to speak to the patients. As a patient, you cannot really change the 
nurses. But someone needs to speak to them (the nurses). Someone who 
manages them and tells them these things, patients need to speak. [CR6:34-
35] 
5. The acknowledgement that there may be a difference between what the care 
receiver means and the care provider’s interpretation. The overuse of medical jargon, 
automatic wording and clinical formality may widen the gap between the care 
receiver’s meaning and the re-constructed understanding: 
Serenace is a treatment used for the voice…that is what the doctor said. He 
said:  “It is ´Serenace´ by Claudio Villa!” The song ´Serenata´ by the singer 
Claudio Villa. He did not give me any other information so I assumed that it 
is used for the voice. And so I started to sing during the ward round. 
[CR2:22] 
Medical officer of firm. 
Patient reviewed. History noted.  
Wants to go home for a weekend. 
Currently slightly elated and overtalkative. 
Suspicion of possible alcohol use if leaves. 
In this instance, only permission for Main Garden accompanied. To review 
permission in next ward round. [MR2:E3] 
They do not tell me anything about my symptoms. They write in Greek or 
Latin and I do not understand. [CR2:9] 
When they are talking directly to me, I understand what they are saying 
obviously. But sometimes when the doctor talks to the young doctor or even 
to the nurse or social worker..it changes. The manner of the doctor 
changes..he speaks in a different way and uses a different language..like a lot 
of medical words that I do not understand. Sometimes this irritates me 
because this is ME that they are talking about so why cannot they keep it 
simple? [CR10:26] 
When I enter the room and sit in front of the doctor and all the other 
professionals, it makes me feel anxious and I forget most of what I would 
have wanted to say…the ward round is usually over in 10 minutes unless 
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there are any big problems. That is not enough for me to relax and start 
talking some sense. Especially if there are a lot of people in the room…the 
air is kind of heavy...then I do not feel very comfortable and just do what it 
takes to get it over and done with.  [CR10:28-29] 
The points that have been mentioned above are not a novelty finding that has 
emerged out of this study since major contributions to this area have been made by 
key figures like Carl Rogers, Peter Breggin and Hildegard Peplau (See: Breggin, 
Breggin & Bemak, 2001; Rogers, 1961 & Peplau, 1952). Thus the emergence of care 
provider knowledge needs in relation to civil behaviour is not surprising since the 
importance of a civil (and person-centered) approach has been addressed in detail by 
various theorists over the years. However what is surprising to me is the awareness 
that there may still be the need for this type of care provider knowledge in a civilised 
21st century country.  This finding is even more surprising when I realise that most 
likely, the professional training undertaken by the care providers who were included 
in the study had already included these areas within the training. This leads me to 
ask: Why is this knowledge not being applied in practice by some of the care 
providers? 
 
This question has been partially answered in the discussion pertaining to the themes 
of The Pathological Lens and Depersonalisation in Section 4.3 of this chapter. In 
particular, I referred to time-management issues, staff shortage, burn-out, alienation, 
working on auto-pilot and attitude/ motivation problems as potential explanations for 
uncivil care provider behaviour. This highlights the need for future studies that 
explore these issues in detail especially with regards to the support (and knowledge) 
that care providers may need in order to enhance the quality of their professional life. 
It is felt that in view of these findings, the first step towards enhancing person-
centeredness and an approach towards care that is more civil consists of an 
exploration of these issues.  It may also be beneficial to explore how civility is 
taught in undergraduate courses.  Russell (2014) described how in the literature, very 
few effective strategies have been proposed as to how to teach students to be civil 
and respectful in professional relationships (p.313). Perhaps it may be useful to 
strengthen the teaching structure in this area by applying a philosophical framework 
such as the use of virtue ethics as suggested and described by Russell (2014). 
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Basing therapeutic interactions on civil behaviour may give rise to a position within 
the therapeutic alliance that is characterised by respect for the care receiver’s 
uniqueness as a person. It is felt that this may consequently lead to more effective 
management of the knowledge-power balance within the alliance since the care 
receiver may be viewed as being an expert-by-experience, a partial knower and a 
partner in care.   In this manner, some care receivers may feel more valued and 
empowered which may in turn enhance therapeutic outcomes. At the same time, this 
may place the care providers in a position where the alliance is viewed in a more 
positive light, which may be a factor that contributes to professional satisfaction as 
found in a review carried out by Hayes, Booner and Pryor (2010, p.808). 
 
The second type of knowledge need that I have identified from the findings is related 
to mindfulness. As stated earlier, this refers to some of the care providers’ potential 
need to acquire knowledge on how to focus attention on the actions being carried out 
at the present moment. Importantly, this refers to reflection on the rationale for these 
actions as well as potential consequences on self and others. 
A review of the interview transcripts shows examples of instances where care 
providers may be engaged in mindless practice or behaviour that can be described as 
automatic - as if they are on auto-pilot. An example of this is the plethora of 
automatic wording that has been encountered in some of the records - this was 
discussed in further detail in Section 4.3 of this chapter: 
 
Day report: Comfortable day. Level 1 supervision not covered. Treatment as 
per chart. 
Night report: Comfortable night. Treatment given as per chart: Level 1 
covered by Nurse X. [NR1:13-14] 
 
Day report: Comfortable day. 
Night report: Comfortable night. Treatment given as per chart. [NR2:24-25] 
 
Day report: House chores done. Treatment given as prescribed. 
Night report: Good night. Treatment given as per list. Took part in pm 
chores.  [NR5:2-3] 
 
Remains slightly elated, overtalkative with paranoid ideation 
Denies suicidal wishes, Thoughts of revenge/ harming others 
Coping well on ward  
No problems.   [MR2:E2] 
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Similarly, some care receivers have described situations which suggest that they may 
have been subjected to a care provider attitude that lacks mindfulness: 
I told him that the pills are tiring me and I am oversleeping. His response was 
to add other pills. I had started to joke around with him and he said that I am 
high and that is why he prescribed more pills. [CR2:26] 
I try to speak to the doctor about it but he ignores me. He does not wish to 
speak to me. Nothing. He does not pay attention. [CR4:16] 
The doctor that I had before used to tell me that the psychiatric hospital 
would harm me... He used to tell me - that place would harm you because the 
reputation spreads round very quickly and that will not be beneficial for your 
workplace. So he always discouraged me from going there. [CR9:8] 
The reasons for an approach that lacks mindfulness may echo the same reasons that 
have been identified earlier as possible causes for lack of a civil approach and so I 
reiterate my earlier recommendation for research that focuses on causation and 
deeper exploration of these issues. It is felt that this lack of knowledge about 
mindfulness may be one of the factors that may lead to alliances such as the 
Resentment-Opposition type identified by some of the participants as well as to the 
discursive theme of Depersonalisation that emerged from some of the medical and 
nursing records, as discussed in Section 4.3. During an interview with Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1982), Foucault may have referred to this when he alluded that: “People 
know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they 
don't know is what what they do does” (p.187). 
Hence, applying Foucault’s assertion to the therapeutic alliance, it may be the case 
that some care providers may not realise what mindlessness can do to the alliance 
and the care receiver in it.  For example, in the latter excerpt that has been presented, 
the care receiver described how her previous doctor used to warn her that the 
psychiatric hospital may harm her due to the stigma involved in being hospitalised – 
one may wonder whether there had been any consideration on the implications that 
this may have if the care receiver in question would need to be admitted to this 
hospital. Furthermore, such statements by the doctor may contribute to stigma 
towards the psychiatric hospital and the care receivers in it.  During the interview, 
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Care Receiver 5 may have provided another example of the need for knowledge 
about mindfulness: 
When I am with the nurses, I feel quite ok. Not with all of them though.  
Mostly it is “Hello” and “Thank you” with the nurses. Sometimes I open up 
with them but they say: ‘You will get better. You have a husband who loves 
you and respects you.  Be brave so that you get out of here.” [CR5:31] 
In this example, the nurses’ intention was probably based on benevolence and aimed 
to instil hope in the care receiver. However, on deeper analysis, a tone of 
patronisation and inaccurate assumptions may be detected – this was probably 
unintentional and due to mindless statements. For instance, in this excerpt, the care 
providers are described as having prompted the care receiver to be brave - the 
problem that I relate to this statement is that the degree of recovery and discharge 
from the hospital may be related to many other factors other than bravery. Thus I 
feel that the nurses’ assertion may easily and inaccurately imply that failure to 
recover may equate to cowardice on behalf of the care receiver. This identifies the 
need for care providers to have knowledge about the concept of mindfulness and its 
practical application to clinical practice. At this point, a difficulty that may arise is 
how to teach mindfulness in relation to humanism, if it can indeed be taught: 
I am not sure if this is something that can be learnt during their studies. It is 
something that has got to do with the character of the nurse or the doctor. For 
example if the nurse or the doctor show that they are interested in what you 
are saying and do something about it..then that is good and the power is 
being used in a good way. That would be the ideal balance and you would 
feel comfortable. But isn’t that the personality of the doctor or the nurse? I do 
not know if that can be taught at university. [CR10:48] 
Literature on mindfulness presents a range of techniques that may be useful in 
education such as training in reflexivity and meditation (Harvard Health 
Publications, 2013).  I feel that these areas may be adapted for use in enhancing care 
provider’s knowledge in this area. Perhaps the knowledge required about 
mindfulness may also be incorporated in training related to the use of emotional 
intelligence. Mayer and Salovey (1997, p.10/11) defined emotional intelligence as 
the ability to: 
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- accurately perceive emotions in oneself and others 
- use emotions to facilitate thinking 
- understand emotional meanings 
- manage emotions 
 
I feel that this may bear resemblance to the need for mindfulness in practice since 
awareness about emotions and their ongoing assessment and management may 
prevent a care provider from entering into a state of auto-pilot. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the application of the concept of emotional intelligence to 
the therapeutic alliance has been elaborated by Poullis (2007) who noted that 
research on the subject may be lacking (p.5). Furthermore, he explored the 
competencies that may be needed by care providers in order to use emotions in an 
intelligent manner within the therapeutic alliance. The competencies identified are 
similar to those identified by Goleman (2005) and Bar-On (1997) and involve an 
array of intrapersonal skills (e.g. self-awareness, self-regulation, stress management, 
adaptability, the ability to manage heavy feelings and motivation) and interpersonal 
skills (e.g. empathy and social skills) (Poullis, 2007, p.110). Whilst I feel that these 
areas were probably a part of the training undergone by some of the care providers in 
my study, it could be that various factors in their professional life may have led to 
emotional blunting and so continuous professional development in this area may be 
required. The care receivers who participated in this study unearthed another 
valuable resource that may be useful for this purpose: eight out of the ten care 
receivers who were interviewed clearly stated that they are willing to share their 
knowledge with professionals in order to contribute to their understanding of 
experiences of individuals under their care: 
The professionals can learn a lot from me - about medications, about human 
traits and behaviour. [CR4:33] 
I think that professionals can learn from me and I would be happy to share 
my knowledge with them. [CR3:37] 
I feel that this may also be fruitful in enhancing care provider mindfulness by 
enhancing awareness of the care receiver’s experience and consequences especially 
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in relation to care outcomes. In local healthcare, uni- and multidisciplinary case 
conference reviews are a common teaching practice in hospital settings. Perhaps it 
may beneficial to start including care receivers within these sessions – this time in 
the role of a teacher.  
 
A number of positions may result if care provider knowledge about mindfulness is 
present in the alliance.  For instance, it is possible that some care receivers may feel 
less invisible due to a mindful attitude from the care providers’ side.  This may also 
lead some care receivers to manage the knowledge-power balance in a more 
effective manner due to less passivity and/or anger in view of the fact that they are 
receiving their care provider’s mindful attention. On the other hand, knowledge 
about mindfulness may place the care provider in a position where s/he is able to 
reflect on actions and to question their rationale.  This may serve as an opportunity 
to evaluate practice and develop it accordingly.  In addition, it may also lead to 
professional growth and may potentially add meaning to an otherwise boring 
professional life that may be characterised by automatic and routine tasks. 
Conclusion 
In this theme, I have explored emerging knowledge needs related to the concept of 
humanism. Knowledge pertaining to civil behaviour and mindfulness were identified 
and I described how care provider training in areas related to mindfulness and 
emotional intelligence may be useful. In addressing civil behaviour, the need for care 
provider support was suggested since knowledge may not be the only lacking factor 
in this regard.  The need for exploratory research was also recommended in view of 
the two main knowledge areas that were discussed in this theme. 
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Theme 2: A Tailor-Made Approach 
Introduction 
This theme concerns the type of knowledge that may be required by some care 
providers in relation to the need to embrace the concepts of individualism and 
diversity whilst building alliances with different care receivers.  
Discussion 
Knowledge with regards to this overarching theme was constructed through several 
ways in the interview transcripts and the medical and nursing records. For instance, 
one construction that emerged from the data may present a possible need for 
knowledge about person-centered care rather than a one-size-fits-all perception: 
I would like to have information that is more objective. And if I really do 
exhibit this cheeky behaviour and I am at fault, then explain it to me, give me 
further detail and tell me about what I am really doing wrong. Explain to me, 
don’t just tell me: “You need to fight.”  Explain to me how I can fight this 
and what am I fighting against. [CR9:14] 
Similarly, the data collected may indicate that care providers may require knowledge 
about the fact that care receivers vary from one another and these differences need to 
be addressed within each specific therapeutic alliance. For instance, this may refer to 
variations between care receivers in their understanding of the symptoms and the 
experience that they bring: 
I am not sick or mental. Mental implies that you are weak. I do not have any 
symptoms. [CR4:7] 
The symptoms that were listed in the online forum are a match with what I 
am feeling. That you lose interest in everything, even in things that you used 
to like. That is the main symptom. [CR1:21] 
Additionally, care receivers may vary in their perception and acceptance of 
treatment:  
I am satisfied with the treatment - I used to take a lot but now it is down to 
just two: two in the morning and two in the evening. Last week they took 
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another one off me - the one in the afternoon. At first I was shaking a bit but 
now I am getting used to it. [CR8:17] 
Now the doctor had informed me that he can give me Viagra so that I can 
have an erection.  But the problem is, and I discussed this with the 
psychiatrist, that Viagra is contraindicated for people who take medications 
for high blood pressure. I have been impotent for 20 years. [CR4:20] 
Day report: Treatment given as prescribed. Seen by Dr.X. Doctor made note 
in file to increase Modecate to 150mg. Dr.X contacted and informed that the 
patient is refusing to take depot. Dr.X will contact Dr.Y for further 
instructions. [NR4:37] 
On examination of the different constructions of the knowledge required by the care 
providers, I view the need of care provider knowledge related to individualism and 
diversity. Individualism refers to the knowledge that some care providers may need 
in order to pay attention to the fact that each care receiver has a sense of inner self 
with rich thoughts and feelings. This also includes recognition of the care receiver’s 
perspectives, attuning to his/her needs, importance of his/her rights, fair treatment, 
and respect of his/her self-worth (Lyons & Coyle, 2007, p.124). In the findings that 
emerged from this study, the relation of individualism to the knowledge required by 
providers, features in the implication that an individualistic approach to the alliance 
and the care receiver may be fruitful in the management of the power balance.  This 
highlights the need for an approach that features each alliance and the entities within 
it as unique and as being characterised by specific needs and knowledge-power 
balance. Care Receiver 7 may have referred to the need for this approach (and the 
knowledge related to it) when she referred to her perception that her own perspective 
and needs may not be getting acknowledged: 
Right now, I need to be in an acute ward and not a rehabilitation one because 
it is dangerous keeping me here but they do not realise it. I am afraid that I 
may smash a few windows if they do not help me. The kind of help that I 
need is: I need to have a rest, I do not want to be with men. I just need to rest 
for a couple of days. Not see people, I do not want to see anyone. I want to 
have my cosmetics and my change of clothes and I am quite happy. I do not 
want to smoke cigarettes. I do not want to be involved with people. I want to 
have a good sleep. I don’t want to eat too much. I want to get myself under 
control. I am in the wrong place here, it is not helping me. [CR7:7] 
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A documented clinical assessment that formed part of one of the medical reports in 
the study may have similarly portrayed the need for knowledge on how to place 
more importance on individualistic care receiver traits rather than sole focus on a 
description of pathological symptoms. As an example, the following excerpt on the 
mood/thought content assessment of the care receiver may be providing valuable 
pathological information but at the same time, it may be omitting the person’s 
individualistic meaning and experience of the symptoms described: 
Mood: Neutral mood - congruent affect 
Thought content: No paranoia, no delusions                                         
Feelings of hopelessness at times                                                                               
No current thoughts of suicidality   [MR9:45-48] 
On the other hand, knowledge related to diversity refers to the need of care providers 
to learn how to address variations between care receivers. Whilst noting that this 
may overlap with knowledge on individualism, I perceive these two areas as being 
related in a consecutive manner. This is due to the fact that as discussed, an 
individualistic stance is aimed at identifying the unique characteristics of every 
person. Successively, an approach that acknowledges diversity is targeted at the 
ability to identify and distinguish the differences in these unique characteristics 
between care receivers. Care Receiver 3 may have identified the need for care 
provider knowledge in this aspect when he stated that: 
Professionals need to learn that not everyone is the same….I think this nurse 
would learn a lot if he were to spend some one-to-one time with the patients. 
That will teach him that not all patients are the same. Because here they have 
different types of patients. And sometimes it seems as if all patients are the 
same.  [CR3:39] 
Similarly, Care Receiver 1 asserted that: 
Professionals need to realise that everyone’s mind is different. [CR1:73] 
Perhaps the need for care provider knowledge about diversity also featured in the 
different care receiver approaches to recovery, as they emerged from the findings. 
For instance, the following excerpts depict diverse care receiver approaches in the 
quest to obtain information: 
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I got the knowledge from myself, sometimes I read about alcohol. [CR3:18] 
I have checked about it on the internet and my symptoms form part of 
Borderline Personality Disorder. [CR1:21] 
I never searched elsewhere for information. You start learning on your own. 
Like certain symptoms, or if a doctor comes to see me and prescribes a drug. 
And this drug does not agree with you and he sends you home. [CR6:11] 
Similarly, when some care receivers discussed their coping mechanisms, important 
differences were noted: 
I hear voices, you know. I have a row with them (the voices) and they go 
away. If I tell the doctor that I hear voices, he will just bong me up with more 
medication, he will give me a needle which I do not need. Luckily enough, I 
am not taking any needle. Sometimes I feel like a needle but I do not take a 
needle. I order the voices to go away. [CR7:9] 
I write in my diary how I am feeling every day. [CR8:9] 
Following the identification of these main knowledge areas, they shall now be 
explored in further detail.  In an approach that addresses the two areas of 
individualism and diversity simultaneously, I am going to use Garner’s Theory of 
Multiple Intelligences as the base of my argument. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Gardner (1983) argued against the notion that there is only one type of intelligence 
by contending that apart from the form of intelligence that may be assessed by IQ 
testing, other areas or types of intelligence may also exist (p.xv). In view of this, he 
proposed nine abilities or intelligence subtypes, these being: Musical–rhythmic and 
harmonic, Visual–spatial, Verbal–linguistic, Logical–mathematical, Bodily–
kinaesthetic, Interpersonal, Intrapersonal, Naturalistic and Existential. A review of 
the literature shows that Gardner’s theory has been extensively applied to the 
discipline of education in terms of the employment of flexible teaching methods to 
address the multiple intelligence-types.  Pearson (2011) discussed how this theory 
may hold promise for application to the therapeutic alliance albeit the paucity of 
research in this area (p.20).  In fact, a literature search on the topic shows that the 
application of the Theory of Multiple Intelligences to therapy is practically restricted 
to the counselling of children and it still finding its way into adult counselling. 
Importantly, the use of the theory has been linked to favourable outcomes and in 
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terms of the therapeutic alliance, it may enhance flexibility and better representation 
of the care receiver’s preferences (Pearson, 2011, p.1). 
It may be that the knowledge needs identified in my study in relation to 
individualism and diversity may be an echo of Garner’s view as well as Pearson’s 
contentions in relation to the presence of multiple intelligences within therapeutic 
alliances.  This is due to the fact that the need for individualism may be pointing 
towards an individualistic way of how each entity within the alliance acquires and 
manages knowledge whereas an approach that respects diversity complements this 
view by adding that there are variations in how these entities may do this. However, 
on reflecting upon the application of the Multiple Intelligences Theory to the 
therapeutic alliance, I feel that the word intelligence may not be an adequate or 
comprehensive representation with regards to issues related to individualism and 
diversity within therapeutic alliances. Subsequently, I am going to substitute 
Gardener’s use of the word intelligence with way of being. Here I am contending that 
each entity in the therapeutic alliance has a particular way of being:  an 
individualistic style that results not only from the person’s intelligence/learning type 
but also from his/her cognitive style, personality type and overarching take or 
preference to viewing and living life as well as to perceiving experiences. 
Consequently, this way of being may be governing the person’s perception of 
recovery and treatment modalities as framed within the alliance. In a similar manner 
to Gardner’s multiple intelligences, there may be multiple ways of being and each 
individual may have one or more preferred modes. This culminates in the argument 
that since the goal of the therapeutic alliance is to facilitate a care receiver’s personal 
recovery process, then the care provider may need to: 
 
1). Have knowledge about multiple ways of being and how to identify them 
2). Be aware of his/her own way/s of being  
3). Acknowledge that the other member in the alliance may have a different way of 
being and that this may create conflict and a detrimental imbalance of knowledge 
and power within the alliance if not managed properly 
4). Direct the alliance so that it is in tune with the care receiver’s way of being 
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The question that may follow is: How then would a care provider attempt to identify 
a care receiver’s way of being? A useful starting point may be to categorise ways of 
being under the same categories that Gardner has used to classify the different 
multiple intelligences. Gardner contented that if, for example, an individual’s 
intelligence-type is logical-mathematical, then s/he may prefer a learning approach 
that requires numbers, reasoning and critical thinking. On a similar note, I am 
postulating that if a care receiver has a logical-mathematical way of being, this may 
imply that the person may have a tendency to live his/her life under an umbrella of 
reasoning, numbers and critical thinking and the care provider needs to identify this 
mode of being and center the therapeutic alliance on it. In reference to the 
identification of different types of intelligence in counselling, Pearson (2011) 
presented similar ideas and presented existing assessment tools for multiple 
intelligences that can be introduced in therapy (p.11). He also identified how a 
counsellor may use the resulting information to shape the therapeutic alliance and 
care: 
(Narrative therapy) may be preferred by clients who think and learn through 
written and spoken words, and have the ability to memorise facts, fill in 
workbooks, respond to written tasks, and enjoy reading…the 
musical/rhythmic intelligence is ideal for clients who can recognise tonal 
patterns and environmental sounds, and who learn through rhyme, rhythm 
and repetition…(clients who prefer) bodily/kinaesthetic intelligence can learn 
through physical movement and body wisdom, and may have a sense of 
knowing through body memory (pp.6-7). 
However, I believe that the identification of a person’s way of being goes beyond the 
sole use of the same classification system that is used to identify multiple 
intelligences. This is because a comprehensive assessment that includes a personality 
assessment, a bio-psycho-social-spiritual history and the person’s current preferences 
and plans for the future, may provide further valuable information about the person’s 
way of being. Until this point, I have presented my perception of the need to identify 
the way of being of each entity within the alliance. Here I add that it may also be 
important to assess for counter-ways of being. This refers to ways of being that may 
repel an individual and which, if not identified, may act as a barrier within the 
therapeutic alliance. For instance, if the verbal-linguistic sub-type is identified as 
being a care receiver’s counter-mode, then probably a therapeutic approach that is 
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based on reading, writing and narrative work may be met with resistance. Similarly, 
if a person is, by nature, slightly messy, it may not be realistic, or even fair, if the 
care provider attempts to impose strict orderliness and neatness within the 
therapeutic alliance and care plan.  
 
Basing therapeutic interactions on a multiple ways of being approach, which has 
originated from the identified knowledge needs related to individualism and 
diversity, may give rise to important positions within the therapeutic alliance. It is 
felt that if the care receiver’s way of being is identified accurately and the alliance is 
tuned accordingly to his/her preferences or natural tendencies, then this may act to 
empower him/her to manage the knowledge-power balance within the alliance more 
effectively. This is brought about by the fact that the act of adhering to a care 
receiver’s way of being may be viewed as allowing him/her to undertake his/her 
recovery journey in familiar territory. For example, if a care receiver has a 
musical/rhythmic way of being and thus has particular sensitivity to music, then a 
therapeutic activity such a lyric analysis may be more familiar and hence more 
empowering to him/her than life-story work.  
 
This highlights the possible need for care providers to be knowledgeable in the 
application of the Multiple Intelligences (or Ways of Being) Theory to use within the 
therapeutic alliance. In academic training this may feature as knowledge in relation 
to familiarity with the different ways of being, the ability to identify them and to use 
them in facilitating recovery, as explored in a comprehensive paper presented by 
Pearson (2012). This may place the care provider and receiver in a situation where 
they are both partial knowers – whilst the care provider may be empowered as s/he 
has the knowledge of applying the multiple ways of being approach, the care 
receiver may also be on an equal level since s/he is being guided to recover in 
familiar territory that is congruent with his/her natural living tendency.
262 
 
Conclusion 
On a concluding note, the knowledge areas related to individualism and diversity 
have been categorised and discussed underneath this theme. An exploration of these 
two areas has evolved into the recommendation of a therapeutic alliance that features 
a multiple ways of being approach. Such an approach is based on Garner’s Theory of 
Multiple Intelligences as well as Pearson’s work on the application of this theory to 
the therapeutic alliance.  This highlights the need for care provider knowledge on 
this approach as well as its potential use in managing the knowledge and power 
balance within the therapeutic alliance in a more effective manner.  
4.4.3 Conclusion 
This part of the chapter was dedicated to the knowledge needs that some care 
receivers and providers may have in relation to the management of the knowledge-
power balance in the therapeutic alliance. These needs were identified from the 
participants’ direct or indirect references and have been perceived as being based on 
three main themes. The first theme discussed was related to those care receivers who 
may need knowledge about self-empowerment – this emerged from a requirement 
for knowledge about appreciation of self-worth, mindfulness and assertiveness. 
Recommendations for activities and resources which may be used for enhancing this 
knowledge have been identified. Examples include reflection, meditation, 
assertiveness training and tools such as the Johari window and the Recovery Star. 
Subsequently, the discussion evolved into the knowledge needs of care providers – 
here the discussion was led by the main themes of Humanism and a Tailor-Made 
Approach.  The theme of Humanism was constructed by the need for care provider 
knowledge pertaining to civil behaviour and mindfulness – involving the act of being 
mindfully aware of words and actions in an effort to interact with care receivers in a 
manner that is more humane and person-centered. This was followed by the Tailor-
Made Approach.theme which depicted the knowledge needs with regards to 
individualism and diversity amongst care receivers. In relation to these two areas, 
recommendations for providing the care provider knowledge that may be required 
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included reflective practice, care receiver involvement in education and basing 
interactions within the therapeutic alliance on a Multiple Ways of Being model. 
 
In view of the knowledge needs that have been discussed, I postulate that providing 
the knowledge required may be beneficial in the management of the knowledge-
power balance within the alliance.  This may enhance therapeutic outcomes by 
possibly contributing towards care receiver recovery and care provider job 
satisfaction. 
4.5 Chapter conclusion 
The discussion and analysis of the findings that emerged from the two data sources 
in this study may have helped in enhancing the understanding of the knowledge -
power balance in the therapeutic alliance in mental health services. Furthermore, this 
chapter may have been useful in placing the findings of this study within the context 
of the theoretical and empirical knowledge that can be found in literature on the 
topic. 
 
Notably, I belief that since the medical and nursing records that were included 
pertained to the same care receivers who were interviewed in the first phase of the 
study, the data from the two different sources may have helped in enhancing 
understanding of each other’s findings. In this manner, each source may have been 
useful in offering tentative explanations to counterpart findings from the other 
source.  In fact, cross-reference between the two parts was often done and the 
findings arising from the two sources may be described as being quite 
complementary to each other. This may confirm the importance of the use of 
triangulation in the method of this study.  
 
Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss the findings of the study in relation 
to therapeutic outcomes.  It would be erroneous to state that therapeutic outcomes 
have been investigated in this study – this is because the main aim of this research 
endeavour was to explore the different discourses, their effect on practice and 
potential knowledge needs. However, an important link between my findings and 
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therapeutic outcomes may have been identified.  This is based on the awareness that 
various research efforts have already been dedicated to an exploration of care 
provider and care receiver characteristics that may enhance therapeutic outcomes in 
care. In my study, some of these characteristics described in the literature have also 
featured as factors that may be playing a role in making the knowledge-power 
balance as it is in each specific alliance. Thus, for example, factors such as the 
presence of equality, attention to care receiver individuality and active involvement 
in care have been identified in the literature as being factors associated with positive 
therapeutic outcomes (Moore, 2006; Sharpley, Jeffrey & McMah, 2006, Sullivan, 
Skovholt, & Jennings, 2005). In my study, these same factors have been identified 
within the Collaboration alliance type. Contrastingly, some research has shown that 
factors such as care receiver exclusion, expectation of submission and a patronising 
attitude may be related to negative therapeutic outcomes (Fauth, Gates, Vinca, Boles 
& Hayes, 2007; McCarthy & Frieze, 1999) – similarly these are some of the same 
factors identified in the Resentment-Opposition alliance type in my study. In view of 
this, it can be tentatively suggested that different alliances, as distinguished by their 
different types of knowledge-power nexus, may be related to positive or negative 
therapeutic outcomes. This link may be quite visible and straightforward in alliance-
types such as the Collaboration and the Resentment-Opposition but perhaps not quite 
so in the Satisfaction-Acceptance and the Dissatisfaction-Compliance. This is 
because most of the care receivers in the Satisfaction-Acceptance model seemed to 
be satisfied with the knowledge-power imbalance in the alliance as well as showing 
overall satisfaction with the alliance.  Yet most of them exhibited a degree of 
compliance in the context of the alliance.  On reverting to existing literature, it can 
be seen that while care receiver satisfaction within the alliance may be linked to 
positive therapeutic outcomes, compliance (as opposed to collaboration) may be less 
so (Bachelor, Laverdiere, Gamache & Bordeleau, 2007; McCarthy & Frieze, 1999). 
Thus it is not clear whether the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance in my study may be 
linked to positive therapeutic outcomes despite the apparent care receiver satisfaction 
that featured in it. Similarly, most of the care receivers in the Dissatisfaction-
Compliance alliance seemed to be quite compliant as well as satisfied with the 
knowledge-power imbalance in the alliance. However, in contrast to the Satisfaction-
Acceptance alliance, this satisfaction did not necessarily lead to overall satisfaction 
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with the alliance. Once again, this leads to questions about the potential degree of 
effectiveness of this alliance type. Hence, the relationship between these two 
alliance-types and therapeutic outcomes needs further investigation. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Headlines of the study 
As this thesis nears its conclusion, it may be useful to engage in a final reflective 
exercise by attempting to combine the main outcomes in a succinct summary. Thus I 
feel that the following issues are the ones which are at the forefront of the research 
that I have undertaken, and that may need to be considered in the application to 
practice in the setting explored: 
 
- Equalisation of knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance 
- The need to include and emphasise the care receiver’s voice 
- The need to promote the therapeutic alliance in the light of the ordinary 
 
On reflecting upon the first point, I am reminded of Zur’s contention that little 
research has been carried out beyond the seemingly forgranted notion that 
therapeutic alliances are characterized by a power imbalance (Zur, 2009, p.163). In 
this regard, this study has provided useful information since those alliances classified 
underneath the Collaboration alliance-type were not perceived by most of the 
participants as having a power imbalance. However, all the other alliance-types 
seemed to be characterised by a power imbalance. Whilst acknowledging that my 
research study was not aiming to explore the direct link between different alliance 
types and therapeutic outcomes, it can be tentatively suggested that some of the 
characteristics found in the different types of alliances may also link that particular 
alliance to positive or negative therapeutic outcomes.  In particular, the majority of 
the alliances that were characterised by a power imbalance were linked to care 
receiver anger, resistance, fear and covert institutionalisation. In relation to the 
psychiatric setting explored in this study, I feel that this calls for the need to re-think 
the construction of some of the alliances. This may be done in order to focus on a 
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knowledge-power balance – a situation where care receivers and providers behave as 
partial knowers, as discussed by Brown (2007, p.12). 
 
The second point is particularly linked to my personal satisfaction in knowing that 
this study gave a voice to care receivers. During the data collection, I was pleased 
and surprised by the fact that some of the care receivers thanked me for listening and 
for providing the opportunity for them to speak. On further reflection, I realized that 
this may be highlighting the need for similar opportunities to be provided within the 
hospital setting that has been explored in this study. In this regard, I strongly feel that 
it is empirical to start including care receivers in seminars, care planning, the 
implementation of new acts (such as the new Mental Health Act which is currently 
being introduced in Malta) and the auditing of care. Here I emphasise that inclusion 
does not refer to simply asking care receivers to come forward  - this may be 
challenging for a care receiver who is situated in a setting where custodial care and 
power imbalances are in play. Rather this may necessitate reaching out to care 
receivers and providing non-threatening opportunities for them to voice their 
opinion. Perhaps the one-to-one qualitative method employed in this research study 
may be a good example.  
 
The final point culminates in the simple yet profound awareness that perhaps it may 
be more useful to view the therapeutic alliance as a rather ordinary relationship – 
indeed a template for other relationships that the care receiver may form during and 
after his/her recovery journey. This is a shift from a perception of the therapeutic 
alliance as a complex system that has to be technically manoeuvred by highly skilled 
professionals by the application of specific advanced skills. Instead it may be more 
beneficial to focus on building a civil humane relationship that is based on anything 
that may help a person during his/her recovery: this may be a mix of ordinary stuff 
and professional knowledge (as an ‘invited guest and not as an overarching 
paradigm’ – Higgins, 2008, p.11) 
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5.2 A review of the information generated in relation to the 
research questions 
At the beginning of this study, one research question and two sub-questions were 
posed. In this concluding part of the thesis, these questions are going to be reviewed 
again and discussed in terms of the knowledge that was attained during the study.  
5.2.1 Discursive themes and the role of dominant discourses 
The first two questions that were addressed were: 
 
What is the nature of the combination of knowledge and power in therapeutic 
alliances in a mental health in-patient setting in Malta?  (Main question) 
What role do dominant discourses play in the positions occupied by care 
providers and care receivers in therapeutic alliances in a mental health in-
patient setting in Malta? (Sub-question 1) 
 
The findings related to these two questions have been categorized underneath the 
discourses arising from the interview transcripts and those that emerged from the 
medical and nursing records included in the study. They have been summarised as 
follows. 
 
Care receivers 
 
The dominant discourses that were identified from the care receivers’ transcripts 
have been classified underneath four main discursive themes. Furthermore each of 
these themes also acted as a classification system of the alliances based on the type 
of knowledge-power balance in each alliance, as described by respective dominant 
discourses. 
 
The first theme and type of alliance identified was Satisfaction-Acceptance. This 
featured an alliance which may be characterized by a knowledge-power balance in 
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favour of the care provider. Most of the care receivers were satisfied with the 
imbalance and with the alliance. The majority were also seen to be compliant but at 
the same time they were also quite active in care by eagerly following professional 
guidance.  The dominant discourses within this theme were those of romantic 
discourse and compliance discourse. 
 
On the other hand, the Dissatisfaction-Compliance alliance-type features a care 
receiver who may be quite passive and dependent on his/her care providers. In a 
similar way to the first type of alliance discussed, this alliance may be characterized 
by a power imbalance in favour of the care provider. Most of the care receivers 
seemed satisfied with this power imbalance yet this satisfaction did not extend to 
general satisfaction with the alliance.  The dominant discourses that emerged were 
compliance discourse and discontentment discourse. 
 
The third theme and type of alliance, namely the Resentment-Opposition, featured 
most of the care receivers in it as being angry and irritated due to a knowledge-
power imbalance in the alliance which they perceive as being detrimental to them. 
Hence this may be viewed as the care provider being commonly perceived as having 
full control of the alliance, much to the care receiver’s resentment. In this regard, the 
dominant discourses were those of anarchist discourse and discontentment 
discourse. 
 
The final theme and alliance type was that of Collaboration. This depicts the care 
provider and the care receiver as being on the same level with no significant 
knowledge-power imbalance in favour of one or the other. Contrastingly, both 
stakeholders may be seen as contributing to the alliance and collaborating to 
facilitate the recovery journey. This type of alliance may bear resemblance to the 
contentions of the Recovery Model and features most of the care receivers in it as 
being satisfied with the knowledge-power balance and with the alliance. The 
dominant discourses were those of assertiveness and equality. 
 
As already alluded to in Chapter 4, in practice, these alliance-types may feature as 
being on a continuum rather than being clearly distinguishable as they may have 
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been in the theoretical description offered in this thesis.  One may argue that the care 
receiver’s personality and pathology may have determined his/her perception of the 
knowledge-power balance in the therapeutic alliance. Whilst acknowledging this 
possibility, it has to be noted that the potential effect of these factors may not have 
really affected the care receivers’ perception to a large extent. This is due to the fact 
that each care receiver was able to delineate clear differences amongst the multiple 
alliances that s/he was a part of. Hence each care receiver in this study was part of 
several alliances, each of which was associated with one of the four different types 
or themes, according to my interpretation. 
 
Care providers 
 
The dominant discourses that emerged from the Medical and Nursing Records were 
also categorized underneath discursive themes. Three discursive themes were 
perceived as being constructed, namely the Pathological Lens, Depersonalization and 
Humanistic themes. 
 
The Pathological Lens theme featured some of the care providers who wrote about 
the care receiver and the interactions within the therapeutic alliance in a way that 
tended to be clinical and shaped by the Medical Model. This was likened to a 
metamorphosis where most of what the care receiver did and said was then 
restructured to fit a pathological understanding. In particular, this refers to the 
overuse of medical jargon and to a phenomenon which I termed as automatic 
wording. The latter refers to words that feature with a high frequency in the records 
reviewed and that may be a result of professional auto-piloting – such terms include 
“comfortable day/night” and “treatment given as per chart” – terms that may not 
really be providing any valuable information about the alliance or care receiver. The 
dominant discourses in this theme were: authoritarian, conservatist and 
pathological.  
 
The theme of Depersonalisation described those professional texts which tended to 
remove the person out of the patient. This may have resulted in a care provider’s 
perception that s/he has an alliance with a non-person, with all the negative 
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consequences that this may have brought about. For instance, it could be noted that 
the words written by some of the professionals did not provide any information that 
indicates that the patient being described is in fact a person and not an object. The 
lack of use of the person’s name in the records was also observed with most of the 
professionals opting to use the word patient or use of the third person instead of the 
person’s actual name. Minimalistic and depersonalising discourses were the 
dominant discourses in this theme. 
 
The final theme of Humanism involved those discourses that to an extent seem to be 
describing an alliance that is based on a somewhat holistic and person-centered 
approach. This shows a degree of importance being given to the use of the care 
receiver’s name and his/her words rather than attempting to restructure the whole 
rapport. In this manner, collaboration rather than compliance may be the guiding 
model for interactions within the alliance. The dominant discourses in this theme 
were those of equality, humanistic and recovery discourses. 
 
Although definite correlations cannot be made, it can be tentatively suggested that 
the two sources in the study may have complemented each other in describing the 
knowledge-power balance in the therapeutic alliances in the study. For instance, the 
professional theme of depersonalization may shed light on alliances such as the 
Resentment-Opposition type. Similarly the professional theme of humanism may be 
related to alliances such as the Collaboration alliance-type.   
 
5.2.2 Knowledge required by care providers and care receivers 
The last sub-question leading this study was: 
 
What type of knowledge is required by care providers and care receivers for 
power to be managed in a manner that may enhance therapeutic effects in this 
setting? (Sub-question 2) 
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In the analysis section, this research question was addressed by exploring that 
separate and specific knowledge that may be required by care receivers and other 
knowledge that may be required by care providers. The knowledge types that may be 
required by the care receivers were incorporated in one overarching theme, namely 
the theme of Empowerment. On the other hand, two themes led the discussion 
pertaining to the knowledge that may be required by care providers. The first theme 
that was discussed was that of Humanism. The second theme that was presented was 
that of Humanism followed by the final theme: A Tailor-Made Approach.  
 
In the literature, there are several techniques that may be useful in addressing the 
different types of knowledge that may be required – in fact some of these were 
included in the analysis section. However, here I re-iterate the crucial need to view 
these skills and techniques as examples and options that may be occasionally 
applied to some therapeutic alliances. The emphasised words in the previous 
sentence are intended to highlight the risk of alternatively viewing my 
recommendations as prescriptive – ‘grand narratives’ (Timimi, 2013) or new dogmas 
of care that have to be applied religiously and routinely. If this were the case, it 
would indeed be a poor outcome of this study since it would probably simply 
instigate the repetition of more of the same – the replacement of the medical model 
with yet another framework that may be applicable and beneficial to some but most 
definitely not across different situations and cultures.  Instead I am recommending 
that it may be more useful for care receivers and care providers to become familiar 
with different options and approaches that have worked for others and explore their 
application throughout the recovery journey. Timimi (2013) described this concept 
as a tool box which (during professional and personal endeavours/ experiences) 
gradually becomes filled with mainstream, alternative and complementary skills/ 
frameworks that one may pick up and use according to the circumstance.  
 
5.3 Strengths, limitations and final words 
As described in Chapter 3, several measures have been taken in an attempt to 
enhance the trustworthiness of this study. However, I acknowledge that some 
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limitations were present. The major limitation could have been related to my 
familiarity with the research setting which may have affected the interviewee’s 
responses.  Luckily, I had never been in a therapeutic alliance with any of the care 
receivers that participated in the study so this may have limited this effect. 
Furthermore, my own beliefs have inevitably shaped my interpretation of the 
findings despite the measures taken to limit the extent of this possible bias. Despite 
the usefulness of an interview technique, this was associated with a lack of care 
receiver anonymity which could have also affected the findings. I feel that the 
document analysis of the medical and nursing records was an important and 
insightful part of the research. The limitation with the use of this technique was that 
since there was no direct interaction with the care providers themselves, no 
explanations about the written words could be given. In view of the concerns that 
resulted from the analysis of these records, there is a need for further research 
including interviews with care providers and observational techniques.  
 
Although the aim of my study was to explore the knowledge-power nexus in the 
therapeutic alliance, I realise that at times, especially during the analysis and 
discussion, it also served as a clinical appraisal.  Having unintentionally undertaken 
this appraisal exercise as part of my study, I feel that I can recommend the inclusion 
of care receivers and professional records in actual clinical appraisals in the local 
setting as these sources hold valuable clues to the quality of care being offered.  On 
the same note, I believe that this thesis needs to be considered not only with regards 
to implications for education and the curriculum but also to the need of a new form 
of professional practice in the setting where the study took place. In fact, the 
participants in this study have explained what this new practice should consist of.  
As a conclusion, I cannot help but to remember how intrigued I was by the valuable 
information that the care receivers shared with me during the interviews. Their 
insight and articulation of thoughts are a real find. Foucault (1990/1978) stated that 
“power is everywhere…because it comes from everywhere” (p.93). I feel that the 
therapeutic alliances that I have explored in this study are a reflection of this 
statement. This is because whilst it was obvious that a lot of power was coming from 
the care providers, I feel that my research has exposed another incredible source of 
power and raw knowledge - this emerged from the care receivers. Fortunately, these 
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care receivers have stated that they are willing to share this knowledge with their 
care providers. They just need to be given the opportunity to do so.  
275 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ackermann, E. (2001). Piaget’s constructivism, Papert’s constructionism: What’s the 
 difference?  Future of Learning Group, 5(3), 438-450. Retrieved from: 
 http://learning.media.mit.edu/content/publications/EA.Piaget%20_%20Papert
 .pdf 
 
Ackerman, S. & Hilsenroth, M. (2003). A review of therapist characteristics and 
 techniques  positively  impacting the therapeutic alliance. Clinical 
 Psychology Review, 23 (1),  1-33.  DOI:10.1016/S0272-7358(02)00146-0 
 
Allott, P., Loganathan, L. & Fulford, K. (2002). Discovering hope for recovery: a 
 review of a  selection  of recovery literature, implications for practice 
 and systems change.  Canadian Journal of  Community Mental Health, 
 21(2),13-34. Retrieved from: 
 http://recoverydevon.co.uk/download/Discovering_Hope_for_Recovery_CJC
 MH_13_06_05_ESC_CD.pdf 
 
Alonso, J., Angermeyer, M., Bernert, S., Bruffaerts, R., Brugha, T., Bryson, H., et al. 
 (2004).  Prevalence  of mental disorders in Europe: results from the 
 European Study of the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders (ESEMeD) 
 project. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 109 (s420), 21-27. 
 DOI:10.1111/j.1600-0047.2004.00327.x 
 
American Psychiatric Association (APA). (2013). Frequently asked questions. 
 Retrieved August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/faq.aspx 
 
Anderson, H. & Goolishian, H. (1992). The client is the expert: a not-knowing 
 approach to therapy. In S. McNamee & K. Gergen (Eds.), Social 
 construction and the  therapeutic process (pp.25-39). Newbury Park, 
 California: SAGE. 
 
Angell, M. (2011). The New York review of books. Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
 from: http://www.nybooks.com/issues/2011/jul/14/ 
 
Anonymous user in a medium-secure unit. (2011). The consequences of psychiatric 
 misunderstanding. Asylum, 18(4), 1-26. 
 
Appiah, A. (2003). Thinking it through. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Aristotle. (1989). Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols. 17, 18 (H.Tredennick Trans.) 
 London, UK:  William Heinemann Ltd. (Original work published c384–322 
 B.C.). 
 
276 
 
Aristotle. (1999). Nicomachean ethics. 2nd edition. (T. Irwin Trans.). Indianapolis, 
 Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published c350BC). 
 
Arribas-Ayllon, M. & Walkerdine, V. (2008). Foucauldian discourse analysis. In C. 
 Willig, & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.), Qualitative research in psychology 
 (pp.91-108).  London, UK: SAGE. 
 
Athanasiadis, L. (1997). Greek mythology and medical and psychiatric terminology. 
 Psychiatric Bulletin. 21 (12), 781-782. DOI:10.1192/pb.21.12.781 
 
Bachelor, A., Laverdière, O., Gamache, D. & Bordeleau, V. (2007). Clients' 
 collaboration in therapy: self-perceptions and relationships with client 
 psychological functioning, interpersonal relations, and motivation. 
 Psychotherapy, 44(2), 175-92. DOI: 10.1037/0033-3204.44.2.175 
 
Baldwin, S., Wampold, B. & Imel, Z. (2007). Untangling the alliance-outcome 
 correlation: Exploring the relative importance of therapist and patient 
 variability in the alliance. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 75 
 (6), 842-852. DOI:10.1037/0022-006X.75.6.842 
 
Bar-On, R. (1997). The emotional intelligence inventory. Toronto, Canada : Multi-
 Health Systems. 
 
Barclay, W. (2001). Corinthians 5 - William Barclay's Daily Study Bible. Retrieved, 
 August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.studylight.org/commentaries/dsb/view.cgi?bk=45&ch=5 
 
Barker, P. (2001). The Tidal Model: developing a person-centered approach to 
 psychiatric and mental health nursing. Perspectives in Psychiatric Care, 37 
 (3), 79-87. DOI:10.1111/j.1744-6163.2001.tb00631.x 
 
Barker, P. & Buchanan-Barker, P. (2005). The tidal model. Hove, UK: Brunner-
 Routledge. 
 
Barletta, J. & Fuller, S. (2002). Counselling outcomes attributable to the working 
 alliance. The Australian Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 12(1), 41-49. 
 Retrieved from:  
 http://ezproxy.acu.edu.au/login?url=http://search.informit.com.au/fullT
 ext;dn=123990;res=AEIPT 
 
Barroso, J. (2009). Chapter 5: Qualitative approaches to research. In G. Lobiondo-
 Wood & J.Haber (Eds.), Nursing Research: Methods and Critical Appraisal 
 for Evidence-Based Practice (pp.100-125). Laffengwell Ave, St. Louis: 
 Mosby. 
 
Basaglia, F. (1964). The destruction of the mental hospital as a place of 
 institutionalization – thoughts caused by personal experience with the open 
 door system and part time service. Paper presented at the Congress of Social 
277 
 
 Psychiatry, 1964, World Association of Social Psychiatry. London, UK. 
 Retrieved from:                  
 http://www.psychodyssey.net/wp- content/uploads/2011/05/The-
 Destruction-of-the-Mental-Hospital-as-a-Place-of-Institutionalisation.pdf 
 
Basaglia, F. (1968). L'istituzione negata. Milan, Italy: Dalai Editore. 
 
Basaglia, F. (1979). Introduction. In R.Cortina (Ed.), Proceedings of the Conferenze 
 Brasiliane, 1979, Franco Basaglia (p.18). Milano, Italy.  Retrieved from 
 http://anarcosurrealisti.noblogs.org/files/2010/10/Franco-Basaglia-
 Conferenze-brasiliane.pdf 
 
Bateson, G., Jackson, D., Haley, J. & Weakland, J. (1956) Toward a theory of 
 schizophrenia. Behavioral science, 1(4), 251-264. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.psychodyssey.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/TOWARD-A-
 THEORY-OF-SCHIZOPHRENIA-2.pdf 
 
Beck, A., Ward, C., Mendelson, M., Mock, J. & Erbaugh, J. (1962). Reliability of 
 psychiatric diagnoses: 2. A study of consistency of clinical judgments and 
 ratings. American Journal of Psychiatry, 119 (4), 351-357. Retrieved from: 
 http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleID=148746 
 
Becker, H. (1991). Outsiders; studies in the sociology of deviance. 3rd edition. 
 London, UK: Free Press of Glencoe. 
 
Bennett, J. (2001). Learning from six philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, 
 Locke,Berkeley, Hume. Vol. 1. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Berlim, M., Fleck, M. & Shorter, E. (2003). Notes on antipsychiatry. European 
 archives of psychiatry and clinical neuroscience, 253(2), 61-67. 
 DOI:10.1007/s00406-003-0407-8 
 
Berman, A. & Snyder, S. (2007).  Clinical handbook for Kozier & Erb's 
 fundamentals of nursing, 8th Edition: concepts, process, and practice. 8th 
 edition. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
Bertram, C. (2010). Why Rousseau still matters. Retrieved August 15, 2014 
 from: http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=879 
 
Bertram, G. & Stickley, T. (2005). Mental health nurses, promoters of inclusion or 
 perpetuators of exclusion? Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 
 12 (4), 387-395. DOI:10.1111/j.1365-2850.2005.00849.x 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism (R. Bhaskar Trans.). Oxfordshire, 
 UK: Routledge. (Original work published 1979). 
 
Bhaskar, R. (2002). From east to west. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
278 
 
Bhaskar, R. (2008a). A realist theory of science (R. Bhaskar Trans.). Oxfordshire, 
 UK: Routeledge. (Original work published 1975). 
 
Bhaskar, R. (2008b). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Oxon, UK: Routledge. 
 
Bible Study Tools. (2014). Deuteronomy 9 (NIV). Retrieved August 15, 2014 from: 
 http://www.biblestudytools.com/deuteronomy/9.html 
 
Bilgrami, A. (2002). Realism and relativism. Philosophical Issues, 12(1), 1-25. 
 DOI:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s1-1.1 
 
Bjorkdahl, A., Palmstierna, T. & Hansebo, G. (2010). The bulldozer and the ballet 
 dancer: aspects of nurses' caring approaches in acute psychiatric intensive 
 care. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 17(6), 510-518. 
 DOI:10.1111/j.1365-2850.2010.01548.x 
 
Black, D. (2011). A brief definition of mindfulness. Retrieved August 15, 2014 
 from: http://www.mindfulexperience.org/resources/brief_definition.pdf 
 
Blaikie, N. (2000). Designing social research: the logic of anticipation. Malden, 
 USA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Blaxer, L., Huges, C. & Tight, M. (2006). How to research. Buckingham, UK: Open 
 University. 
 
BMJ Group & Royal Pharmaceutical Company of Great Britain. (2014). British 
 National Formulary (BNF) 67. London, UK: BMJ Group & Royal 
 Pharmaceutical Company of Great Britain 
 
Bolton, G. (2010). Reflective practice. 3rd edition. London, UK: SAGE. 
 
Bordin, E. (1979). The generalizability of the psychoanalytic concept of the working 
 alliance. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 16 (3), 252-260. 
 DOI:10.1037/h0085885 
 
Boswell, J., Gallagher, M., Sauer-Zavala, S.,Bullis, J., Gorman, J., Shear, M., et al. 
 (2013) Patient characteristics and variability in adherence and competence in 
 cognitive-behavioral therapy for panic disorder. Journal of Consulting and 
 Clinical Psychology, 81 (3), 443-454. DOI:10.1037/a0031437 
 
Bowden, C., Calabrese, J., McElroy, S., Gyulai, L., Wassef, A., Petty, F., et al. 
 (2000). A randomized, placebo-controlled 12-month trial of divalproex and 
 lithium in treatment of outpatients with bipolar I disorder. Archives of 
 general psychiatry, 57 (5), 481-489. DOI:10.1001/archpsyc.57.5.481 
 
Brace, R. (2006). The failure of Freud. Retrieved August 15, 2014 from: 
 http://www.ukapologetics.net/22truthaboutfreud.html 
 
279 
 
Bracken, P. (2012). Psychiatric power: A personal view. Irish Journal of 
 Psychological Medicine, 29 (1), 55-58. DOI:10.1017/S0790966700017638 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (1999a). Let’s scrap schizophrenia. Retrieved August 15, 
 2014, from:  
 http://www.criticalpsychiatry.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
 rticle&id=62:lets-scrap-schizophrenia&catid=34:members-
 publications&Itemid=56 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (1999b). The value of advocacy: putting ethics into 
 practice. Psychiatric Bulletin, 23, 327-329 DOI: 10.1192/pb.23.6.327 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (2001). Postpsychiatry: a new direction for mental health. 
 British Medical Journal, 322 (7288), 724-727.  
 DOI:10.1136/bmj.322.7288.724 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (2004). Postpsychiatry is not another model. Openmind, 
 125, Jan/Feb, 6-7. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.criticalpsychiatry.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
 rticle&id=140:postpsychiatry-is-not-another-model-p-bracken-a-p-
 thomas&catid=34:members-publications&Itemid=56 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (2010).  From Szasz to Foucault: On the role of critical 
 psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 17(3), 219-228. 
 DOI:10.1353/ppp.2010.0007 
 
Bracken, P., Thomas, P., Timimi, S., Asen, E., Graham, B. & Beuster, C., et al. 
 (2012). Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm. The British Journal of 
 Psychiatry, 201 (6), 430-434. DOI:10.1192/bjp.bp.112.109447 
 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
 research in psychology, 3 (2), 77-101. DOI:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
 
Breggin, P. (2006). Intoxication anosognosia: the spellbinding effect of psychiatric 
 drugs. Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry, 8(3), 201-215. Retrieved 
 from: http://breggin.com/spellbinding_psychiatric_drugs.pdf 
 
Breggin, P. (2013). Psychiatric drug withdrawal. Broadway, New York: Springer. 
 
Breggin, P., Breggin, G. & Bemak, F. (2001). Dimensions in empathic therapy. 
 Broadway, New York: Springer. 
 
Brody, H. (1992). The healer’s power. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University.  
 
Brown, L. (1994). Boundaries in feminist therapy: a conceptual formulation. In N. 
 Gartrell (Ed.), Bringing ethics alive: feminist ethics in psychotherapy practice 
 (pp. 29-38). Binghamton, New York: Haworth Press. 
 
280 
 
Brown, C. (2003). Narrative therapy: reifying or challenging dominant discourse. In 
 W. Shera (Ed.), Emerging perspectives on anti-oppressive practice (pp. 223–
 245). Toronto, Canada: Canadian Scholar’s Press. 
 
Brown, C. (2007). Situating knowledge and power in the therapeutic alliance. In C. 
 Brown & T. Augusta-Scott (Eds.), Narrative therapy - Making meaning, 
 Making lives (pp. 3-22). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
 
Buchanan-Barker, P. & Barker, P. (2009). The convenient myth of Thomas Szasz. 
 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 16(1), 87-95. 
 DOI:10.1111/j.1365-2850.2008.01310.x 
 
Burman, E. (1992). Feminism and discourse in developmental psychology: power, 
 subjectivity and interpretation. Feminism & Psychology, 2(1), 45–59. DOI: 
 10.1177/0959353592021004 
 
Burman, E. (1996). Constructing and deconstructing childhood: images of children 
 and charity appeals. In J. Haworth (Ed.), Psychological Research (pp. 170–
 194). London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Cacioppo, J., Semin, G. & Berntson, G. (2004). Realism, instrumentalism, and 
 scientific symbiosis: psychological theory as a search for truth and the 
 discovery of solutions. American Psychologist, 59(4), 214-223. 
 DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.59.4.214 
 
Calleja, S. (2012, September 13). Should Religion classes focus only on 
 Catholicism?. Malta Independent. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.independent.com.mt/mobile/2009-09-13/news/should-religion-
 classes-focus-only-on-catholicism-263204/ 
 
Cambridge Dictionaries. (2014). Illusion noun - definition in the British English 
 Dictionary & Thesaurus - Cambridge Dictionaries Online. Retrieved August 
 14, 2014 from: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/illusion 
 
Caplan, P. (2012, April 27). Psychiatry’s bible, the DSM, is doing more harm than 
 good. The Washington Post.  Retrieved from:  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/psychiatrys-bible-the-dsm-is-
 doing-more-harm-than-good/2012/04/27/gIQAqy0WlT_story.html 
 
Castonguay, L., Constantino, M. & Holtforth, M. (2006). The working alliance: 
 Where are we and where should we go? Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, 
 Practice, Training, 43 (3), 271-279. DOI:10.1037/0033-3204.43.3.271 
 
Celenza, A. (2007). Sexual boundary violations. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
 Littlefield publishers 
 
Cervellati, M. & Vanin, P. (2013). “Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation 
 and moral values. Journal of Public Economics, 103(C), 15-28. Retrieved 
281 
 
 from: 
 https://www.udesa.edu.ar/files/UAEconomia/Seminarios/2010/Vanin.pdf 
 
Chapman, A. (2003). Johari Window Model. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 https://www.usc.edu/hsc/ebnet/Cc/awareness/Johari%20windowexplain.pdf 
 
Cherry, K. (2014). Which Type of Intelligence Do You Have? Retrieved August 15, 
 2014, from:  
 http://psychology.about.com/od/educationalpsychology/ss/multiple-intell.htm 
 
Children’s Services Council. (2007). Research review: evidence-based programs and 
 practices: what does it all mean? Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.evidencebasedassociates.com/reports/research_review.pdf 
 
Citizens Commision for Human Rights. (2006). Psychiatry: An industry of death. 
 [Media Clip]. Retrieved from: http://www.cchr.org/videos/psychiatry-an-
 industry-of-death-1.html 
 
Cole, M. (2006). Power over therapy? Mental health nursing in the Royal Navy. 
 Mental Health Practice, 9(9), 28-32. DOI:10.7748/mhp2006.06.9.9.28.c1914 
 
Cooper, D. (1967). Psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. London, UK: Tavistock 
 Publications. 
 
Cooper, D. (1980). The Language of madness. Manhattan, New York: Penguin 
 books. 
 
Coulter, J. (1979). The social construction of mind. London, UK: Macmillan. 
 
Creaven, S. (2010). Against the spiritual turn. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Creswell, J. (2003). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method 
 approaches. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
 
Culliford, L. (2002). Healing from Within: Spirituality and Mental Health. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.miepvideos.org/Healing%20From%20within.pdf 
 
Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L. & Karlsson, J. (2005). Explaining society: 
 critical realism in the social sciences.Oxfordshire, UK; Madison Ave, New 
 York: Routledge. 
 
Davidson, D. (1973). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In American 
 Philosophical Association (Ed.), Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
 Philosophical Association, 1973, University of Delaware (pp.5-20). 
 Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3129898 
 
282 
 
Debono, J. (2013, May 13). 1,017 students reject religion classes. Malta Today. 
 Retrieved from: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/26708/1-017-
 students-reject-religion-classes-20130512#.U-nqqmNqMy5 
 
Decker, H. (2007). How kraepelinian was Kraepelin? How kraepelinian are the neo-
 Kraepelinians?—from Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III. History of Psychiatry, 18 
 (3), 337-360. DOI: 10.1177/0957154X07078976 
 
Deegan, P. (1996). Recovery as a journey of the heart. Psychiatric Rehabilitation 
 Journal, 19(3), 91-97. Retrieved from:  
 http://toronto.cmha.ca/files/2012/11/Deegan1996-Recovery-Journey-of-the-
 Heart1.pdf 
 
Deegan, P. (2007). The lived experience of using psychiatric medicine in the 
 recovery process and a shared decision making program to support it. 
 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal, 31(1), 62–69. Retrieved from: 
 http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/25799920/lived-experience-using-
 psychiatric-medication-recovery-process-shared-decision-making-program-
 support-it 
 
Derksen, M. (2010). Realism, relativism, and evolutionary psychology. Theory & 
 Psychology, 20(4), 467-487. DOI: 10.1177/0959354309350245 
 
Desai, N. (2005). Antipsychiatry: Meeting the challenge. Indian Journal of 
 Psychiatry, 47 (4), 185-187. DOI:10.4103/0019-5545.43048 
 
Double, D. (2001). Integrating critical psychiatry in psychiatric training. In  C. 
 Newnes & G. Holmes, (Eds.), This is Madness Too: Critical Perspectives on 
 Mental Health Services (Critical Psychology Division) (pp.23-34). Ross-On-
 Why, UK: PCC Books. 
 
Double, D. (2002). The limits of psychiatry. British Medical Journal, 324 (7342), 
 900-904. DOI:10.1136/bmj.324.7342.900 
 
Double, D. (2010). The overemphasis on diagnosis in psychiatry. Retrieved August 
 15, 2014, from: http://www.critpsynet.freeuk.com/Overemphasis.htm 
 
Dreyfus, H., Rabinow, P. & Foucault, M. (1982). Michel Foucault, beyond 
 structuralism and hermeneutics. Illinois, Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press. 
 
Duncan, B., Miller, S., Sparks, J. and Claud, D., Reynolds, L., Brown, J., et al. 
 (2003). The Session Rating Scale: Preliminary psychometric properties of a 
 “working” alliance measure. Journal of Brief Therapy, 3(1), 3-12. Retrieved 
 from: 
 https://www.myoutcomes.com/documents/The_Session_Rating_Scale_Psych
 ometric_Properties_of_a_Working_Alliance_Scale.pdf 
 
283 
 
Dziopa, F. & Ahern, K. (2009). What Makes a Quality Therapeutic Relationship in 
 Psychiatric/Mental Health Nursing: A Review of the Research Literature. 
 The Internet Journal of Advanced Nursing Practice, 10(1). Retrieved from: 
 http://ispub.com/IJANP/10/1/7218. 
 
Ebert, A. & Bar, K. (2010). Emil Kraepelin: A pioneer of scientific understanding of 
 psychiatry and psychopharmacology. Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 52 (2), 
 191-192. DOI:10.4103/0019-5545.64591 
 
Eddy, D. (2005). Evidence-based medicine: a unified approach. Health Affairs, 24 
 (1), 9-17. DOI:10.1377/hlthaff.24.1.9 
 
Edwards, D., Ashmore, M. & Potter, J. (1995). Death and Furniture: the rhetoric, 
 politics and theology of. History of the Human Sciences, 8(2), 25-49. 
 Retrieved from: http://10.1177/095269519500800202 
 
Eisenberg, L. & Guttmacher, L. (2010). Were we all asleep at the switch? A personal 
 reminiscence of psychiatry from 1940 to 2010. Acta Psychiatrica 
 Scandinavica, 122 (2), 89-102. DOI:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2010.01544.x 
 
El-Shinqiti, M. (2010). Wikileaks: The Clash of Knowledge and Power. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/contemporary-issues/human-
 conditions-and-social-context/450062-wikileaks-the-clash-of-knowledge-
 and-power.html?Social_Context 
 
Escher, S., Delespaul, P., Romme, M., Buiks, A. & Van Os, J. (2003). Coping 
 defence and depression in adolescents hearing voices. Journal of Mental 
 Health, 12 (1), 91-99. DOI:10.1080/09638230021000058 
 
Evans, D. (2004). Placebo. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fauth, J., Gates, S., Vinca, M., Boles, S. & Hayes, J. (2007). Big ideas for 
 psychotherapy training. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 
 44 (4), 384. DOI:10.1037/0033-3204.44.4.384 
 
Feighner, J., Robins, E., Guze, S.,Woodruff, R., Winocur, G. & Munoz, R. (1972). 
 Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research. Archives of General 
 Psychiatry, 26 (1), 57-63. DOI:10.1001/archpsyc.1972.01750190059011 
 
Fendler, L. (2010). Michel Foucault. (Continuum Library of Educational Thought). 
 London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Flaskas, C. & Humphreys, C. (1993). Theorizing about power: Intersecting the ideas 
 of Foucault with the “problem” of power in family therapy. Family Process, 
 32 (1), 35-47. DOI:10.1111/j.1545-5300.1993.00035.x 
 
Fonagy, P. & Kurtz, A. (2005). What works for whom? Third Avenue, New York: 
 Guilford Press. 
284 
 
Forchuk, C. (1995). Development of Nurse-Client Relationships: What Helps? 
 Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association, 1 (5), 146-153. 
 DOI:10.1177/107839039500100503 
 
Foster, M. (Producer). (2013). Critical Realism. [Media Clip]. Retrieved from: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bHeCBKITPo 
 
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language. 
 London, UK: Tavistock Publications Limited. 
 
Foucault, M. (1973). The order of things. An archaeology of the human sciences. 
 (Vintage Books Trans.). Broadway, New York: Random House. (Original 
 work published 1966). 
 
Foucault, M. (1981). So is it important to think? In P. Rabinow & J. Faubion, (Eds.), 
 The essential works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. (pp. 454-458). New 
 York, New Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1982). Technologies of the self. In L.Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton, 
 (Eds.), Technologies of the self: a seminar with Foucault.  (pp. 1-176). 
 Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality: volume one. (R. Hurley Trans.). 
 Broadway, New York: Random house. (Original work published 1978). 
 
Foucault, M. (1992). The use of pleasure. The history of sexuality: volume two. (R. 
 Hurley Trans.). Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books. (Original work published 
 1984). 
 
Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison (A. Sheridan 
 Trans.). Toronto, Canada: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1979). 
 
Foucault, M. (2001). Madness and civilisation. (R. Howard Trans.). Oxon, UK: 
 Routeledge Classics. (Original work published 1961). 
 
Foucault, M. (2008). Psychiatric Power. (G. Burchell Trans.). Fifth Avenue, New 
 York: Palgrave MacMillan. (Original works published in 1973 & 1974). 
 
Foucault, M. & Gordon, C. (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other 
 writings, 1972-1977. Broadway, New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Frances, A. (2009). A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of Its 
 Unintended Consequences. Psychiatric Times, 26 (8), 1-4. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/warning-sign-road-dsm-v-beware-
 its-unintended-consequences#sthash.aVxsWDMC.dpuf 
 
Franco, Z., Blau, K. & Zimbardo, P. (2011) Heroism: A conceptual analysis and 
 differentiation between heroic action and altruism. Review of General 
 Psychology, 15 (2), 99. DOI: 10.1037/a0022672 
285 
 
Freud, S. (1989). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. (J. Strachey Trans.). Fifth 
 Avenue, New York: Liveright. (Original lectures delivered in 1915). 
 
Fulford, K., Broome, M., Stanghellini, G. & Thornton, T. (2005). Looking with both 
 eyes open: fact and value in psychiatric diagnosis? World Psychiatry, 4 (2), 
 78-86. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1414736/ 
 
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: the theory of multiple intelligences. Suite, New 
 York: Basic Books. 
 
Gaston, L. (1990). The concept of the alliance and its role in psychotherapy: 
 Theoretical and empirical considerations. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, 
 Practice, Training, 27 (2), 143-153. DOI:1990-28956-001 
 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. Suite, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gergen, K. (2001). Social construction in context. London, UK: SAGE. 
 
Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121-123. 
 Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922 
 
Gilburt, H., Rose, D. & Slade, M. (2008). The importance of relationships in mental 
 health care: A qualitative study of service users' experiences of psychiatric 
 hospital admission in the UK. BioMed Central Health Services Research, 8 
 (92), 1-12. DOI:10.1186/1472-6963-8-92 
 
Gillam, B. (2000). The research interview. Eastbourne, UK: Continuum. 
 
Gilquin, G.(2012). Transcription Guidelines. Retrieved May 20, 2014, from:  
 http://www.uclouvain.be/en-307849.html 
 
Goleman, D. (2005). Emotional intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ.  
 Broadway, New York: Bantam Books. 
 
Goleman, D. (2013, October 7). Rich People Just Care Less. New York Times. 
 Retrieved from: http://www.reckonings.net/reckonings/2013/10/turning-a-
 blind-eye-or-a-cold-shoulder.html 
 
Goodley, D. (2001). Learning Difficulties, the Social Model of Disability and 
 Impairment: challenging epistemologies. Disability & Society, 16 (2), 207-
 231. DOI:10.1080/09687590120035816 
 
Goodley, D. (2011). Disability studies – an interdisciplinary introduction. London, 
 UK: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
 
Gorski, P. (2013). What is Critical Realism? And Why Should You Care? 
 Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 42(5), 658-670. 
 DOI:10.1177/0094306113499533 
286 
 
Gottman, J. & DeClaire, J. (1997) Raising an emotionally intelligent child. 
 Manhattan, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Government of Malta. (1964). Constitution of Malta. Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
 from: 
 http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=85
 66 
 
Government of Malta. (2013). Hospitals. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 https://www.gov.mt/en/Services-And-Information/Business-
 Areas/Health%20Services/Pages/Hospitals.aspx 
 
Graham, L.J. (2005). Discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault. Paper 
 presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Association for 
 Research in Education, 2005, Queensland University of Technology. Sydney, 
 Australia. Retrieved from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/2689/1/2689.pdf 
 
Grech, S. (2012a). Researcher brings hope to disabled living in poverty.  Interview 
 by Claudia Calleja for Times of Malta, July. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120729/local/Researcher-
 brings-hope-to-disabled-living-in-poverty.430504 
 
Grech, S. (2012 b). (Speaker). (2012, November). The Grounded Academic: 
 Disability, Poverty and Health Care- Action research in rural Guatemala 
 [Media clip]. Retrieved from:   
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CYhKFmlvSk 
 
Gutheil, T. & Brodsky, A. (2008). Preventing boundary violations in clinical 
 practice. Manhattan, New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Guyatt, G., Sackett, D., Sinclair, J., Hayward, R., Cook, D & Cook, R. (1995). 
 Users’ guides to the medical literature - IX. A method for grading health care 
 recommendations. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 274 
 (22), 1800-04. DOI:10.1001/jama.1995.03530220066035 
 
Hacking, I. (2013). Lost in the forest - DSM-5: Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
 mental disorders, fifth edition by the American Psychiatric Association. 
 London Review of Books, 35 (15), 7-8. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n15/ian-hacking/lost-in-the-forest 
 
Haig, B. (2005). An abductive theory of scientific method. Psychological Methods, 
 10 (4),371-388. DOI:10.1037/1082-989X.10.4.371 
 
Hall, S. (2001). Foucault: power, knowledge and discourse. In M. Wetherell, S. 
 Taylor & S. Yates (Eds.), Discourse theory and practice: a reader. (pp.72-
 81). London,UK: SAGE. 
 
287 
 
Hanna, E. (1911). The sacrament of penance. In K. Knight (Ed.), The Catholic 
 Encyclopedia. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11618c.htm 
 
Harris, D. (2012). The residents: stories of Kingsley Hall, East London, 1965–1970 
 and the experimental community of RD Laing. London, UK: Dominic Harris. 
 
Harvard Health Publications (2013). Positive psychology: harnessing the power of 
 happiness, mindfulness, and personal strength. Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
 from: http://www.health.harvard.edu/special_health_reports/Positive-
 Psychology?utm_source=helpguide.org&utm_medium=website&utm_campa
 ign=psychology 
 
Hayes, B., Bonner, A. & Pryor, J. (2010). Factors contributing to nurse job 
 satisfaction in the acute hospital setting: a review of recent literature. Journal 
 of Nursing Management, 18 (7), 804-814. DOI:10.1111/j.1365-
 2834.2010.01131.x 
 
Healy, D. (2009). Are Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors a risk factor for 
 adolescent suicides? Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 54 (2), 69–71. 
 Retrieved from: http://publications.cpa-apc.org/media.php?mid=786 
 
Heartfield, M. (1996). Nursing documentation and nursing practice: a discourse 
 analysis. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24 (1), 98-103. DOI:10.1046/j.1365-
 2648.1996.15113.x 
 
Heitler, S. (2012). Psychological diagnosis: dangerous, desirable, or both. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/resolution-
 not-conflict/201202/psychological-diagnosis-dangerous-desirable-or-both 
 
Hersoug, A., Høglend, P., Monsen, J. & Havik, O. (2001). Quality of working 
 alliance in psychotherapy: therapist variables and patient/therapist similarity 
 as predictors. The Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research, 10(4), 
 205-16. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3330657/ 
 
Heterington, S. (2012). Knowledge. In: J. Fieser & B. Dowden (Eds.), Internet 
 Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ 
 
Higgins, A. (2008). A recovery approach within the Irish Mental Health Services: A 
 framework for development. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.mhcirl.ie/File/framedevarecov.pdf 
 
Hinshelwood, R. (2001). Pathology and the postmodern: mental illness as discourse 
 and experience. British Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 286-287. 
 DOI:10.1192/bjp.178.3.286 
 
288 
 
Hippius, H., Peters, H. & Ploog, D. (Eds.) (1987). Emil Kraepelin – Memoirs. (C. 
 Wooding-Deane Trans.). Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag. 
 
Hjorland, B. (2011). Evidence-based practice: An analysis based on the philosophy 
 of science. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
 Technology, 62 (7), 1301-1310. DOI:10.1002/asi.21523 
 
Holland, K. & Blood, R. (2009).Tensions between activism and advocacy in the 
 mental health field: Identifying some tactical differences. Paper presented at 
 the Annual meeting of the International Communication Association, 2009, 
 Marriott, Chicago. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/9/8/4/7/
 pages298470/p298470-19.php 
 
Hougaard, E. (1994). The therapeutic alliance-a conceptual analysis. Scandinavian 
 Journal of Psychology, 35(1), 67-85. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-
 9450.1994.tb00934.x 
 
House, R. & Loewenthal, D. (2008). Against and for CBT. Ross-on-Wye, UK: 
 PCCS. 
 
Howgego, I., Yellowlees, P., Owen, C., Meldrum, L. & Dark, F. (2003). The 
 therapeutic alliance: The key to effective patient outcome? A descriptive 
 review of the evidence in community mental health case management. 
 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 37 (2), 169-183. 
 DOI:10.1046/j.1440-1614.2003.01131.x 
 
Hubbard, R. (Producer). (1967). Ron’s journal no.67. [Media Clip]. Retrieved from:  
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRQm-NE6ZtI 
 
Huddleston, J. (2006). Anti-Psychiatry. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.soteria.freeuk.com/Anti-Psychiatry6.htm 
 
Huibers, M. & Wessely, S. (2006). The act of diagnosis: pros and cons of labelling 
 chronic fatigue syndrome. Psychological Medicine, 36 (7), 895-900. 
 DOI:10.1017/S0033291705006926 
 
Hyman, J. (2005). ii*—realism and relativism in the theory of art. In Aristotelian 
 Society (Ed.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2004, Senate House 
 105 (1), 25-53. London, UK: The Aristotelian Society. DOI:10.1111/j.0066-
 7373.2004.00101.x 
 
Ingleby, D. (1981). Understanding 'Mental Illness'. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.critpsynet.freeuk.com/InglebyCritical.htm 
 
International Centre for Critical Realism (n.d.). Dialectical Critical Realism. 
 Retrieved, May 25, 2014, from: 
 http://international-criticalrealism.com/about-critical-realism/dialectical-
 critical-realism/ 
289 
 
Irwin, E., Mitchell, L., Durkin, L. & Douieb, B. (2011). The need for a mental 
 patients union – some proposals. In T. Curtis, R. Dellar & L. Esther (Eds.), 
 Mad Pride.  Retrieved from:  
 http://books.google.com.mt/books?id=GZ_Ww0-D7 
 QC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&
 q&f=false 
 
Jabr, F. (2012). Psychiatry's "bible" gets an overhaul. Scientific American Mind, 
 23(2) Retrieved from: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/redefining-
 mental-illness/ 
 
Jakovljevic, M. (2013). Theoretical psychiatry: Missing link between academic and 
 clinical psychiatry for further scientific and professional maturation of 
 psychiatry. Psychiatria Danubina, 25 (3), 203-206. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.hdbp.org/psychiatria_danubina/pdf/dnb_vol25_no3/dnb_vol25_n
 o3_203.pdf 
 
Jamison, K. (1995). An unquiet mind. Broadway, New York: A.A. Knopf. 
 
Johansson, H. & Eklund, M. (2003). Patients’ opinion on what constitutes good 
 psychiatric care. Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences, 17 (4), 339-346. 
 DOI:10.1046/j.0283-9318.2003.00233.x 
 
Jones, E. & Lorne, M. (1999). Assessing the decade of the brain. Science, 284 
 (5415), 739. DOI: 10.1126/science.284.5415.739 
 
Kallista, V. (2004). R.D. Laing (1967): The Politics of Experience and The Bird of 
 Paradise Penguin, England. 1967. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://thehealingproject.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/R.D.-Laing.-The-
 Politics-of-Experience.pdf 
 
Kant, I. (2010). Critique of pure reason. (J. Meiklejohn Trans.). Cambridge, UK: 
 Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1781). Retrieved 
 from: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/critique-pure-
 reason6x9.pdf 
 
Kecmanovic, D. (2009). Postpsychiatry: How to throw out the baby with the 
 bathwater. Psychiatria Danubina, 21(3), 276-282. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.hdbp.org/psychiatria_danubina/pdf/dnb_vol21_no3/dnb_vol21_n
 o3_276.pdf 
 
Kendall, G. & Wickham, G. (1999). Using Foucault's methods. London, UK: SAGE. 
 
Kendler, K., Munoz, R. & Murphy, G. (2009). The development of the Feighner 
 criteria: a historical perspective. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(2), 
 134-142. DOI:10.1176/appi.ajp.2009.09081155. 
 
Kirsch, I. (2009) Antidepressants and the placebo response. Epidemiologia e 
 Psichiatria Sociale, 18 (4), 318-322. DOI: 10.1017/S1121189X00000282 
290 
 
Kirsch, I. (2010). The emperor's new drugs. Suite, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Klerman, G. (1978). The evolution of a scientific nosology. Schizophrenia: science 
 and practice. In: J. Shershow (Ed.), Schizophrenia: science and practice (pp. 
 99-121). Cambridge, Massachusettts, Harvard University. 
 
Knight, T. (2006). Beyond belief - alternative ways of working with delusions, 
 obsessions and unusual experiences. Berlin, Germany: Peter Lehman. 
 
Knight, T. & Kierans, C. (2011). The mental health user and survivor movement - 
 what do people get from being involved? Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:98P09v9Nb8IJ:ww
 w.rhodrihuws.plus.com/CPN/asylum%2520talk1.pptx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=cl
 nk&gl=mt 
 
Kohler, S., Gaus, S. & Bschor, T. (2014). The challenge of treatment in bipolar 
 depression: evidence from clinical guidelines, treatment recommendations 
 and complex treatment situations. Pharmacopsychiatry, 47(2), 53-59. 
 DOI:10.1055/s-0033-1364004 
 
Kraepelin, E. (1883). Compendium der Psychiatrie. Leipzig, Germany: Abel. 
 
Kraepelin, E. (1962). One hundred years of psychiatry. New York, Philosophical 
 Library. 
 
Kraepelin, E. & Diefendorf, A. (1902). Clinical psychiatry; a text-book for students 
 and physicians. Fifth Avenue, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Kumar, C. (2007). Analytical Marxism and Foucault’s Theory of ‘Disciplinary 
 Power’. Imprints, 10(2), 1-30. Retrieved from: 
 http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/imprints.html 
 
Laing, R. (1960). The divided self. London, UK: Penguin Books. 
 
Laing, R. (1961). Self and others. London, UK: Tavistock Publications Limited. 
 
Laing, R. (1967). The politics of experience. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. 
 
Laing, R. & Esterson, A. (1964). Sanity, Madness and the Family. London, UK: 
 Penguin Books. 
 
Lambert, M., Naber, D., Schacht, A., Wagner, T., Hundemer, H. & Karow, A. 
 (2008). Rates and predictors of remission and recovery during 3 years in 392 
 never-treated patients with schizophrenia. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 
 118(3),220-9. DOI: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.2008.01213.x 
 
Lebeaune, R. (2012). Smiling depression – nothing to smile about. Retrieved August 
 15, 2014, from: http://www.frccla.com/rita-labeaune-psyd/los-angeles-
 psychologist/ 
291 
 
Lehmann, P. (2009). A snapshot of users and survivors of psychiatry on the 
 international stage. Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and 
 Psychotherapy, 9(1), 32-42. Retrieved from: http://www.peter-lehmann-
 publishing.com/articles/lehmann/pdf/inter2008e.pdf 
 
Lemke, T. (2011). Critique and experience in Foucault. Theory, Culture & Society, 
 28 (4), 26-48. DOI:10.1177/0263276411404907 
 
Lessa, I. (2006). Discursive struggles within social welfare: restaging teen 
 motherhood. British Journal of Social Work, 36(2), 283-298. 
 DOI:10.1093/bjsw/bch256 
 
Leucht, S., Hierl, S., Kissling, W. and Dold, M. & Davies, J. (2012). Putting the 
 efficacy of psychiatric and general medicine medication into perspective: 
 review of meta-analyses. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 200 (2), 97-106. 
 DOI:10.1192/bjp.bp.111.096594 
 
Lewis, B. (2006). Moving beyond Prozac, DSM, & the new psychiatry. Ann Arbor, 
 Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Lieberman, J., Drake, R., Sederer, L., Belger, A., Keefe, R., Perkins, D., et al. 
 (2008). Science and recovery in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Services, 59 (5), 
 487-496. DOI:10.1176/appi.ps.59.5.487 
 
Locke, J. (1999). An Essay concerning human understanding. (The Pennsylvania 
 State University Trans.). Centre County, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania 
 State University.   (Original work published 1690). Retrieved from: 
 ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/ia005/humanund.pdf 
 
Loudon, I. (2002). Western medicine - An illustrated history. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Lyons, E. & Coyle, A. (2007). Analysing qualitative data in psychology. Los 
 Angeles, California: SAGE. 
 
Macapline, I. & Hunter, R. (1974). The pathology of the past. Times Literary 
 Supplement, March 15, 256-257. 
 
Maher, A., Maglione, M., Bagley, S., Suttorp, M., Hu, J. Ewing, B., et al. (2011). 
 Efficacy and comparative effectiveness of atypical antipsychotic medications 
 for off-label uses in adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis. The 
 Journal of the American Medical Association, 306 (12), 1359-1369. 
 DOI:10.1001/jama.2011.1360 
 
Making Waves Ltd. (2009). Making Waves. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.makingwaves.org/ 
 
 
 
292 
 
Maltese Association of Psychiatric Nurses (2013). Mental Health Act Survey: 
           Preliminary Report November 2013. Malta. 
 
Mayer, J. & Salovey, P. (1997). What is Emotional Intelligence? In P. Salovey & 
 D.Sluyter (Eds.), Emotional development and emotional intelligence: 
 educational implications (pp. 10-11). Suite, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Markie, P. (2013). Rationalism vs. Empiricism. In E. Zalta (Ed.). The Stanford 
 Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ 
 
Markova, I. & Berrios, G. (1992). The meaning of insight in clinical psychiatry. The 
 British Journal of Psychiatry, 160 (6), 850-860. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1617369 
 
Martin, D., Garske, J. & Davis, M. (2000). Relation of the therapeutic alliance with 
 outcome and other variables: a meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting 
 and Clinical Psychology, 68 (3), 438-450. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10883561 
 
Maturana, H. (1985). Humberto Maturana – Interview. Retrieved, August 15, 2014, 
 from: http://www.oikos.org/maten.htm 
 
Maududi, S., Mawdudi, S., Muran, K. & Ahmad, K. (1986). The Islamic way of life. 
 Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/6686659/Maulana-Maududi-the-Islamic-Way-of-
 Life 
 
Maxwell, J. (2012). A realist approach for qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, 
 California: SAGE. 
 
May, R. (2005). Rufus May - Compassion not Compulsion. Retrieved August 
 15, 2014, from:  
 http://rufusmay.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37&Ite
 mid=33 
 
May, T. (2001) Social research. 3rd edition. Buckingham, England: Open 
 University Press. 
 
McCarthy, W. & Frieze, I. (1999). Negative aspects of therapy: client perceptions of 
 therapists' social influence, burnout, and quality of care. Journal of Social 
 Issues, 55 (1), 33-50. DOI:10.1111/0022-4537.00103 
 
McLaughlin, H. (2009). What's in a  name:  ‘client’, ‘patient’, ‘customer’, 
 ‘consumer’, ‘expert by experience’, ‘service  user’—what's next? British 
 Journal of Social Work, 39 (6), 1101-1117.  DOI:10.1093/bjsw/bcm155 
 
Mental Health Services. (2011). A practical guide to the mental health services. 
 Attard, Malta: Mental Health Services. 
293 
 
Merali, Z. (2013). Do we live in the matrix? Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://discovermagazine.com/2013/dec/09-do-we-live-in-the-
 matrix#.UvdBnbTjmM8 
 
Merlau-Ponty, M. (1962).The phenomenology of perception. (C. Smith Trans.) 
 London, UK: Routledge (Original work published 1945). 
 
Meyer, A. (1951). Collected Papers (Volumes I-III). Baltimore, Maryland: John 
 Hopkins University Press. 
 
Meyer, A. (1952). Collected Papers (Volume IV). Baltimore, Maryland: John 
 Hopkins University Press. 
 
Middleton, H. & Shaw, I. (2007). A utilitarian perspective of social and medical 
 contributions to three illustrative conditions, and recent UK NHS policy 
 initiatives. Journal of Mental Health, 16 (3), 291-305. 
 DOI:10.1080/09638230701299202 
 
Miller, J. (2010). Ontology, epistemology, & methodology. Retrieved August 15, 
 2014, from: http://jlmillersnotes.wordpress.com/2010/06/19/ontology-
 epistemology-methodology/ 
 
Mind Tools, (1996). SWOT analysis: discover new opportunities, manage and 
 eliminate threats. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_05.htm 
 
Ministry for Health. (2014). Securing our health system for future generations: A 
 national health systems strategy for Malta 2014-2020. Retrieved from: 
 https://ehealth.gov.mt/HealthPortal/default.aspx 
 
Moncrieff, J. (1995). Lithium revisited. A re-examination of the placebo-controlled 
 trials of lithium prophylaxis in manic-depressive disorder. British Journal of 
 Psychiatry, 167 (5), 569-573. DOI:10.1192/bjp.167.5.569 
 
Moncrieff, J. (2007). Diagnosis and drug treatment. Psychologist, 20 (5): 296 - 297. 
 Retrieved from:  
 http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/archive/archive_home.cfm?volumeID=20
 &editionID=147&ArticleID=1185 
 
Moncrieff, J. (2009). A critique of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and 
 psychosis. Harvard review of psychiatry, 17(3), 214-225. 
 DOI:10.1080/10673220902979896 
 
Moncrieff, J. (2010). Psychiatric diagnosis as a political device. Social Theory & 
 Health, 8 (4), 370-382. DOI:10.1057/sth.2009.11 
 
Moncrieff, J. (2013a). The bitterest pills. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
294 
 
Moncrieff, J. (2013b). Long-term antipsychotics: making sense of the evidence in the 
 light of the Dutch follow-up study. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 https://www.madinamerica.com/2013/08/long-term-antipsychotics-making-
 sense-of-the-evidence-in-the-light-of-the-dutch-follow-up-study/ 
 
Moncrieff, J. & Cohen, D. (2005). Rethinking models of psychotropic drug action. 
 Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 74(3), 145-153. 
 DOI:001:10.1159/000083999 
 
Moncrieff, J. & Cohen, D. (2009). How do psychiatric drugs work? British Medical 
 Journal, 338, b1963. DOI:10.1136/bmj.b1963 
 
Moncrieff, J. & Timimi, S. (2013). The social and cultural construction of 
 psychiatric knowledge: an analysis of NICE guidelines on depression and 
 ADHD. Anthropology and Medicine, 20 (1), 59-71. DOI: 
 10.1080/13648470.2012.747591 
 
Moore, L. (2006). Empathy: A clinician' s perspective. Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
 from: http://www.asha.org/Publications/leader/2006/060815/f060815e.htm 
 
Morrissey-Ross, M. (1988). Documentation. If you haven't written it, you haven't 
 done it. The Nursing clinics of North America, 23 (2), 363-371. Retrieved 
 from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3368397 
 
Murphy, S. (2012). Lisa McPherson. Retrieved, January 5, 2013, from: 
 http://www.lisamcpherson.org/ 
 
Nelson, A. (2005). A companion to rationalism. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell. 
 
Newton, M. (2004). Savage girls and wild boys: A history of feral children. Fifth 
 Avenue, New York: Picador. 
 
Noorani, T. (2013). Service user involvement, authority and the ‘expert-by-
 experience’ in mental health. Journal of Political Power, 6(1), 49-68. 
 DOI:10.1080/2158379X.2013.774979 
 
Norcross, J. (2002). Psychotherapy relationships that work. Oxford, New York: 
 Oxford  University Press. 
 
O’Hagan, S. (2012, September 2). Kingsley Hall: RD Laing's experiment in anti-
 psychiatry. The Observer. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/sep/02/rd-laing-mental-health-
 sanity 
 
Offredy, M.& Vickers, P. (2010). Developing a healthcare research proposal. West 
 Sussix, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
295 
 
Oliver, D., Serovich, J. & Mason, T. (2005). Constraints and opportunities with 
 interview transcription: towards reflection in qualitative research. Social 
 Forces, 84 (2), 1273-1289. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1400594/ 
 
Orcutt, J. (2012). Deviance & social control: online review. Retrieved August 15, 
 2014, from: http://deviance.socprobs.net/ 
 
Orlinsky, D., Ronnestad, M. & Willutzki, U. (2004). Fifty Years of Psychotherapy 
 Process-Outcome Research: Continuity and Change. In M. Lambert (Ed.), 
 Bergin and Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behaviour Change 5th 
 edition (pp. 307-390). Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley 
 
Outcomes Star. (2009). Mental health recovery star - Outcomes Star. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from: http://www.outcomesstar.org.uk/mental-health/ 
 
Oxford Dictionaries. (2013). Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
 
Parker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: critical analysis for social and individual 
 psychology. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Parker, I. (1994). Discourse analysis. In P. Banister, E. Burman, I. Parker, M. Taylor, 
 & C. Tindall (Eds.), Qualitative methods in psychology: A research guide 
 (pp. 92–107). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Parker, I. (2005). Qualitative psychology. Maidenhead, England: Open University 
 Press. 
 
Parkinson, J. & Brooker, C. (2004).  Everyday English for international nurses. 
 Edinburgh, Scotland: Churchill Livingstone. 
 
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Pearson, M. (2011). Multiple intelligences and the therapeutic alliance:  
 incorporating multiple intelligence theory and practice in counselling. 
 European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 13(3), 259 – 274. 
 Retrieved from:  
 http://www.markpearson.com.au/pdf/pearson_multiple_intelligences_2011.p
 df 
 
Pearson, M. (2012). Multiple intelligences, eclecticism and the therapeutic alliance: 
 new possibilities in integrative counsellor education. Paper presented at 
 BeyondSCAPE: Possibility and necessity in counselling and psychotherapy 
 education, 2012, University of Notre Dame. Sydney, Australia. Retrieved 
 from: 
 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=ar
 ts_conference 
 
296 
 
Pearson, A., Wiechula, R. Court, A. & Lockwood, C. (2007). A re-consideration of 
 what constitutes “evidence” in the healthcare professions. Nursing Science 
 Quarterly, 20 (1), 85-88. DOI:10.1177/0894318406296306 
 
Peplau, H. (1952). Interpersonal relations in nursing. Manhattan, New York: G.P. 
 Putnam and Sons. 
 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B.  (2005). The psychology of the child.  (H.Weaver Trans.). 
 France, Paris: Basic Books. (Original work published 1969). 
 
Pilgrim, D. & Rogers, A. (2005). The troubled relationship between psychiatry and 
 sociology. International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 51, 228 – 241. DOI: 
 10.1177/0020764005056987 
 
Plato. (1997). Theatetus. In J. Cooper & D. Hutchinson, (Eds.), Plato: Complete 
 works (pp.157-234). Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishers. (Original 
 work published c360 B.C.) 
 
Pojman, L. (2002). The theory of knowledge: classic and contemporary readings. 3rd 
 edition. Belmont, Canada: Wadsworth Publishing. 
 
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge - Towards a post-critical philosophy. 
 London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Poullis, J. (2007).  The therapist emotional experience of the therapeutic relationship 
 and its links to emotional intelligence theory. (Masters thesis, City 
 University, London, UK). Retrieved from 
 http://www.academia.edu/4963344/The_therapist_emotional_experience_of_
 the_therapeutic_relationship_and_Its_links_to_emotional_intelligence_theor
 y_A_Dissertation_Submitted_in_Partial_Fulfilment_of_the_MA_in_Counsel
 ling 
 
Proctor, J. (2002). The dynamics of power in counselling and psychotherapy: ethics, 
 politics and practice. Herefordshire, UK: PCCS Books. 
 
Psychiatry Central. (2006). Introduction to mental health medications - Psych 
 Central. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://psychcentral.com/lib/introduction-to-mental-health-
 medications/000446 
 
Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (19), 699-
 711. Retrieved from: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
 362X%2819731108%2970%3A19%3C699%3AMAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 
 
Putnam, H. (1990). Realism with a human face. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
 University Press. 
 
Rabinow, P. (1991). The Foucault reader: an introduction to Foucault's thought. 
 London, UK: Penguin Books. 
297 
 
Reid, I. (2013). Are antidepressants overprescribed? No. British Medical Journal, 
 346, f190. DOI:10.1136/bmj.f190 
 
Reisman, J. (1991). A history of clinical psychology. Westbury, New York: 
 Hemisphere Pub. Corp. 
 
Richter, L. (2010). Finding parallels between Aristotle’s virtues and Minger’s 
 classification of knowledge. Journal of Information, Control and 
 Management Systems, X (X 7), 1-9. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.lukasrichter.sk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Richter-Finding-
 parallels-between-Aristotles-virtues-and-Mingerss-classification-of-
 knowledge.pdf 
 
Rivett, M. (2008). Towards a metamorphosis: Current developments in the theory 
 and practice of family therapy. Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 13(3), 
 102-106. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-3588.2008.00491.x 
 
Roberts, G. (2011). The roots of the recovery movement in psychiatry: lessons 
 learned. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 198(6), 497-498. 
 DOI:10.1192/bjp.bp.110.080127 
 
Rogers, C. (1961). On becoming a person. Houghton, Michigan: Mifflin Company. 
 
Romme, M. (2009). Living with voices. Herefordshire, UK: PCCS Books in 
 association with Birmingham City University. 
 
Romme, M. (2007). Marius Romme: recovery from hearing voices. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from: http://www.voicesireland.com/marius-romme-
 recovery-from-hearing-voices/ 
 
Romme, M. & Escher, S. (1993). Accepting voices. London, UK: Mind Publications. 
 
Romme, M. & Escher, S. (2000). Making sense of voices. London, UK: Mind 
 Publications. 
 
Rosenhan, D. (1973.) On being sane in insane places. Science, 179 (4070), 379-399. 
 Retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/3 
 
Rousseau, J. (1754). Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les 
 hommes. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Marc-Michel Rey. 
 
Rothkopf, D. (2008). Superclass. Manhattan, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Routh, D. (2000). Clinical psychology training: a history of ideas and practices prior 
 to 1946. American Psychologist, 55 (2), 236-241. DOI:10.1037/0003-
 066X.55.2.236 
 
Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group 
 Executive Committee (2013). Spirituality and mental health. Retrieved from: 
298 
 
 http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/mentalhealthinformation/therapies/spiritualityand
 mentalhealth.aspx 
 
Russell, B. (2008). The problems of philosophy. Radford, Virginia: Wilder 
 Publications. (Original work published 1959). 
 
Russell, M. (2014). Teaching civility to undergraduate nursing students using a 
 virtue ethics-based curriculum. The Journal of Nursing Education, 53(6), 
 313-319. DOI:10.3928/01484834-20140512-03 
 
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London, UK: Hutchinson's University 
 Library. 
 
Sandifer, M., Pettus, C. & Quade, D. (1964). A study of psychiatric diagnosis. The 
 Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 139 (4), 350-356. Retrieved from: 
 http://journals.lww.com/jonmd/Citation/1964/10000/A_STUDY_OF_PSYC
 HIATRIC_DIAGNOSIS_.6.aspx 
 
Sankey, H. (2008). Scientific realism and the rationality of science. Aldershot, UK: 
 Ashgate. 
 
Sass, L. (1992). Madness and modernism. Suite, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Sass, L. (1994). The paradoxes of delusion. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
 Press. 
 
Savona Ventura, C. (2004). Mental Diseases in Malta. Malta. 
 
Schafer, K. (2013). Knowledge and two forms of non-accidental truth. Philosophy 
 and Phenomenological Research, [Early View] DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12062 
 
Scheff, T. (1966). Being mentally ill. 3rd edition. Piscataway, New Jersey: Aldine 
 Publishers. 
 
Schmidt, H. & Fonda, C. (1956). The reliability of psychiatric diagnosis: a new look. 
 The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52 (2), 262-267. 
 DOI:10.1037/h0046289 
 
Schore, A. (2002). Advances in neuropsychoanalysis, attachment theory, and trauma 
 research: implications for self psychology. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 22 (3), 
 433-484. DOI:10.1080/07351692209348996 
 
Scientology.org. (2014). Why is Scientology opposed to psychiatric abuses? 
 Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.scientology.org/faq/scientology-in-society/why-is-scientology-
 opposed-to-psychiatric-abuses.html 
 
Scull, A. (1990). Michel Foucault's history of madness. History of the Human 
 Sciences, 3 (1), 57-67. DOI:10.1177/095269519000300109 
299 
 
Sharpley, C., Jeffrey, A. & Mcmah, T. (2006). Counsellor facial expression and 
 client-perceived rapport. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 19 (4), 343-356. 
 DOI:10.1080/09515070601058706 
 
Shenton, A. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research 
 projects. Education for Information, 22 (2), 63-75. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.crec.co.uk/docs/Trustworthypaper.pdf 
 
Shorter, E. (1997). A history of psychiatry. Fourth Avenue, New York: Wiley. 
 
Sims-Schouten, W., Riley, S. & Willig, C. (2007). Critical realism in discourse 
 analysis: a presentation of a systematic method of analysis using women's 
 talk of motherhood, childcare and female employment as an example. Theory 
 & Psychology, 17 (1), 101-124. DOI:10.1177/0959354307073153 
 
Slade, M. (2009). 100 ways to support recovery - A guide for mental health 
 professionals: Rethink recovery series: volume 1. London, UK: Rethink. 
 
Smith-Hansen, L. (2008). Patient interpersonal factors and the therapeutic alliance in 
 two treatments for Bulimia Nervosa. (Masters thesis, University of 
 Massachusetts, Amherst, USA). Retrieved from: 
 http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=th
 eses 
 
Society for Humanistic Psychology. (2012). Open Letter to the DSM-5. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from: http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/dsm5/ 
 
Spitzer, R. & Fleiss, J. (1974). A re-analysis of the reliability of psychiatric 
 diagnosis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 125, 341-437. Retrieved 
 from:http://www.wpic.pitt.edu/research/biometrics/Publications/Biometrics%
 20Archives%20PDF/614Spitzer&Fleiss1974.pdf 
 
Sullivan, M., Skovholt, T. &  Jennings, L. (2005). Master therapists' construction of 
 the  therapy  relationship. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 27 
 (1), 48-70. Retrieved  
 from:http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/15682676/master-therapists-
 construction-therapy-relationship 
 
Summerfield, D. (2008). How scientifically valid is the knowledge base of global 
 mental health?. British Medical Journal, 336 (7651), 992-994. 
 DOI:10.1136/bmj.39513.441030.AD 
 
Sutherland, O. (2007). Therapist positioning and power in discursive therapies: a 
 comparative analysis. Contemporary Family Therapy, 29 (4), 193-209. 
 DOI:10.1007/s10591-007-9050-2 
 
Szasz, T. (1960). The myth of mental illness. American Psychologist, 15 (2), 113-
 118. Retrieved from:  
 
300 
 
 http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace/w1001/readings/szasz.pdf 
 
Szasz, T. (1970). The manufacture of madness. Manhattan, New York: Harper & 
 Row. 
 
Szasz, T. (1973). The second sin. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press. 
 
Szasz, T. (1974a). The myth of mental illness. Manhattan, New York: Harper & 
 Row. 
 
Szasz, T. (1974b). Ceremonial chemistry. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press. 
 
Szasz,T.(1998). Manifesto. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.szasz.com/manifesto.html 
 
Szasz, T. (2000). Thomas Szasz on Freedom and Psychotherapy. Interview by 
 Randall C. Wyatt for Psychotherapy.net, December. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.psychotherapy.net/interview/thomas-szasz#section-the-right-to-
 use-drugs 
 
Szasz, T. (2006). "My madness saved me". New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
 Transaction Publishers. 
 
Szasz, T. (2007). The medicalization of everyday life. Syracuse, New York: 
 Syracuse University Press. 
 
Szasz, T. (2009). Antipsychiatry. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Szasz, T. (2010). Coercion as cure. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 
 Publishers. 
 
Tan, D. (2011). MINI Countryman test drive report from Hamburg, Germany. 
 Retrieved March 2, 2014, from: http://paultan.org/2011/03/21/mini-
 countryman-test-drive-report-from-hamburg-germany / 
 
Taylor, S. (2004). Researching educational policy and change in 'new times': using 
 critical discourse analysis. Journal of Education Policy, 19(4), 433-451. 
 DOI:10.1080/0268093042000227483 
 
Taylor, D., Paton, C. & Kapur, S. (2009). The Maudsley prescribing guidelines. 10th 
 edition. London, UK: Informa Healthcare. 
 
Teddlie, C. & Yu, F. (2007). Mixed methods sampling a typology with examples. 
 Journal of mixed methods research, 1(1), 77-100. 
 DOI:10.1177/2345678906292430 
 
Thase, M. (1999). When are psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy combinations the 
 treatment of choice for major depressive disorder? The Psychiatric Quarterly, 
 70(4), 333-46. DOI: 10.1023/A:1022042316895 
301 
 
The Ministry of Health and Te Ao Maramatanga. (2012). Guidelines for mental 
 health nursing assessment and reports. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.nzcmhn.org.nz/files/file/22/Guidelines%20for%20MH%20assess
 ments%20and%20reports%20January%202012%20signed.pdf 
 
Thomas, P. (2013). What is Critical Psychiatry? Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 https://www.madinamerica.com/2013/01/what-is-critical-psychiatry/ 
 
Thomas, P. & Bracken, P. (1999). The value of advocacy: putting ethics into 
 practice. Psychiatric Bulletin, 23: 327-329. DOI: 10.1192/pb.23.6.327 
 
Thomas, P., Bracken, P. & Timimi, S. (2012). The limits of evidence-based 
 medicine in psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 19 (4), 295-
 308. Retrieved from: 
 https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5cLaT3gdm9NT1BBMDlFa19jMVk/edit?p
 li=1 
 
Thornley, B. & Adams, C. (1998). Content and quality of 2000 controlled trials in 
 schizophrenia over 50 years. British Medical Journal, 317 (7167), 1181-1184. 
 Available at: DOI: 10.1136/bmj.317.7167.1181 
 
Thurmond, V. (2001). The point of triangulation. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 33 
 (3), 253-258. DOI:10.1111/j.1547-5069.2001.00253.x 
 
Tilsen, J. & Nylund, D. (2008). Psychotherapy research, the recovery movement and 
 practice-based evidence in psychiatric rehabilitation. Journal of Social Work 
 in Disability & Rehabilitation, 7(3-4), 340-354.  
 DOI: 10.1080/15367100802487663 
 
Timimi, S. (2011). No more psychiatric diagnosis: campaign to abolish psychiatric 
 diagnostic systems such as ICD and DSM. Retrieved, March 14, 2013, from: 
 http://www.criticalpsychiatry.net/?p=527&nbsp; 
 
Timimi, S. (2013). Non-diagnostic practice. Context, June 2013, 21-26. 
 
Treanor, B. (2001). God and the other person: Levinas’s appropriation of 
 Kierkegaard’s encounter with otherness. In American Catholic Philosophical 
 Association. (Ed.), Soul and Immorality: Proceedings of the American 
 Catholic Philospohical Association, 2001, Vol.75, (pp. 313-324). New York: 
 American Catholic Philosophical Association. 
 
Trochim, W. (2006). Positivism & post-positivism. Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
 from: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/index.php 
 
Truncellito, D. (2007). Epistemology. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden, (Eds.), Internet 
 Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ 
 
302 
 
Turri, J. (2013). Unreliable knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
 [Early View] DOI:10.1111/phpr.12064 
 
Unger, R. (2013). Madness and play: Exploring the Boundary Retrieved August 15, 
 2014, from: http://www.madinamerica.com/2013/06/madness-and-play-
 exploring-the-boundary/ 
 
Vallejo, C. & Dooly, M. (2008). Educational policies that address social inequality – 
 country report: Malta. Barcelona, Spain: European Commission. 
 
Vella, M. ( 2009). The nurses’ perceptions regarding the causes of the revolving door 
 syndrome. (Bachelor of Science thesis, University of Malta, Malta). 
 Retrieved from http://map-n.net/Nursing%20Reseach.php 
 
Verhaagen, D. (2010). Therapy with young men. Madison Avenue, New York: 
 Routledge. 
 
Vieta, E., Locklear, J., Gunther, O., Ekman, M., Miltenburger, C., Chatterton, M., et 
 al. (2010). Treatment options for bipolar depression: a systematic review of 
 randomized, controlled trials. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 30 
 (5), 579-590. DOI:10.1097/JCP.0b013e3181f15849 
 
Wade, N. (Producer).  (2008). The doctor who hears voices. [Media Clip]. Retrieved 
 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ffw0pyAjiCw 
 
Walker, M. (2006). The social construction of mental illness and its implications for 
 the recovery model. International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, 10 
 (1), 71-87. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.psychosocial.com/IJPR_10/Social_Construction_of_MI_and_Im
 plications_for_Recovery_Walker.html 
 
Wallcraft, J. & Bryant, M. (2003). The mental health service user movement in 
 England. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/pdfs/policy_paper2_service_user_
 movement.pdf 
 
Wallcraft, J., Reed, J. & Sweeney, A. (2003) On our own terms. London, UK: The 
 Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. 
 
Wampold, B. (2001). The great psychotherapy debate. Mahwah, New Jersey: L. 
 Erlbaum. 
 
Warner, R. (2010). Does the scientific evidence support the recovery model? The 
 Psychiatrist, 34 (1), 3-5. DOI:10.1192/pb.bp.109.025643 
 
Westbrook, J., Duffield, C., Li, L. & Creswick, N. (2011). How much time do nurses 
 have for patients? A longitudinal study quantifying hospital nurses' patterns 
 of task time distribution and interactions with health professionals. BMC 
 Health Services Research, 11 (1), 319. DOI:10.1186/1472-6963-11-319 
303 
 
White, M. (1994). The politics of therapy: Putting to rest the illusion of neutrality. 
 Adelaide, Australia: Dulwich Centre Publications. 
Willett, J. (2009). Easy ways to build assertiveness, confidence and self-esteem. 
 Raleigh, North Carolina: lulu.com. 
 
Willig, C. (2008). Introducing qualitative research in psychology. Maidenhead, UK: 
 McGraw Hill/Open University Press. 
 
Willig, C & Stainton-Rogers, W. (2008). Qualitative research in psychology. 
 London, UK: SAGE. 
 
World Health Organisation (WHO). (2007) “Mental health services will lessen 
 social exclusion”, says WHO. [Online]. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: 
 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2007/np25/en/ 
 
Wright, R. (2012). Effective communication skills for the ‘caring’ nurse. Retrieved 
 August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.pearsonlongman.com/tertiaryplace/pdf/ros_wright_effective_com
 m_skills_for_the_caring_nurse_aug2012.pdf 
 
Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology and health, 
 15 (2), 215-228. DOI:10.1080/08870440008400302 
 
Zur, O. (2009). Power in psychotherapy and counseling: exploring the "inherent 
 power differential" and related myths about therapists' omnipotence and 
 clients' vulnerability. Independent Practitioner, 29, (3), 160-164. Retrieved 
 from: http://www.zurinstitute.com/power_in_therapy_counseling.pdf 
 
Zur, O. (2014). Power in psychotherapy and counseling including issues of undue 
 influence. Retrieved August 15, 2014, from:  
 http://www.zurinstitute.com/power_in_therapy.html 
 
304 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Guide for semi–structured interview: English 
version 
 
The majority of the questions within this guide have been linked to each of the 
research questions, as depicted in table 1.  However some of the questions are 
targeted at eliciting background information in order to enhance the individuals’ 
narrative and allow for better understanding of the area under study. 
 
Table 1: Link between research questions and interview guide questions 
Research question Code 
What is the nature of the combination of knowledge and power in therapeutic 
alliances in an in-patient mental health setting in Malta? 
A 
What role do dominant discourses play in the positions occupied by care 
providers and care receivers in therapeutic alliances in an in-patient mental 
health setting in Malta? 
B 
What type of knowledge is required by care providers and care receivers for 
power to be managed in a manner that enhances therapeutic effects in this 
setting?  
C 
 
 
Please describe the events that led to your first contact with mental health services.  
(Intro. and background) 
 
Did you decide that you needed psychiatric help or was this decided by someone 
else? (Intro. and background) 
 
If this was decided by someone else: (Intro. and background) 
- How did you feel?  
- What did you think? 
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- How were you informed – what did they tell you? 
 
Did you choose the type of mental health service?  e.g. admission to psychiatric 
hospital, psychiatric outpatients appointment or community services   (Intro. and 
background) 
 
On which basis did you make this choice? (C) 
 
If someone else made the choice for you, did you agree with this decision? (A, B) 
 
What do you know about your symptoms? (C) 
 
Where did you get this knowledge from? (C) 
 
What kind of information regarding your symptoms have you been given by the 
professionals that you have been involved with in the hospital? (C) 
 
Do you feel as if you know enough about your symptoms? (A, C) 
 
If not, what kind of knowledge do you think you need? (C) 
 
What is the plan for your care? (C) 
 
How was this plan formed? (B) 
 
Were you involved in the formation of this plan? (B) 
 
If not, did you wish to be involved? Why?  (A, B) 
 
What treatment are you receiving? (Here referring to psychological, complementary 
& alternative or pharmacological interventions) (C) 
 
Have you been provided with available treatment options? (B, C) 
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How is the final choice of treatment done? (B) 
What information were you given about the treatment from the person who 
prescribed it? (B, C) 
 
Are you satisfied with your treatment? (Background) 
 
If you were ever unsatisfied, what would you do? Why would you do this? (A, B, C) 
How easy is it for you to understand the meaning of the language of your care 
providers? (A, C) 
 
Describe your perception of your role within the multidisciplinary team. (Or: What is 
your role in the team of professionals who you have a working relationship with?) 
(A, B) 
 
What influences the way that you perceive your role in this team? (A) 
 
What are the professions of the psychiatric care-providers that you have a working 
relationship with? (emphasis on no need to mention actual name)  (Background) 
 
How do you feel when you are with ______________ (to fill in blank with each 
professional type consecutively e.g. with your psychologist)  (A, B) 
 
Describe what happens in a typical session with __________________(to fill in 
blank with each professional type consecutively)  (A + background) 
 
What happens/ think would happen, if /when you give feedback and suggestions to 
______________ (to fill in blank with each professional consecutively) regarding 
your treatment and care plan?  (B) 
 
Do you feel as if you have less, equal or more power / say in your relationship with 
______________ (to fill in blank with each professional consecutively)  (B) 
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Are you satisfied with the balance of power in your relationship with 
______________ (to fill in blank with each professional consecutively) (A, B) 
Why? (A, B) 
 
If not, what would you change?  (C) 
 
What do you think are the factors that make this power balance as it is? (A) 
 
In general, do you feel as if your suggestions and feedback are considered and used 
to change your care plan if necessary?  (B) 
 
You are the expert of your own care. What do you think about this? (Or: Do you see 
yourself as having knowledge about your response to the symptoms and then using 
this knowledge to work with your care providers? (A, B, C) 
 
Do you think that your care providers can learn from you?  (A, B, C) 
 
If yes, what type of knowledge do they need to obtain from you? (A, B, C) 
 
Do you think that your care providers wish to learn from you? How do you know 
this?  (A, B, C) 
 
How comfortable would you feel in sharing your knowledge with ______________ 
(to fill in blank with each professional type consecutively?)  (A, B) 
 
What kind of knowledge do you think a care receiver needs in order to be able to 
manage power effectively with a care provider in a professional relationship?  (C) 
 
What kind of support do you think a care receiver needs in order to be able to 
manage power effectively with a care provider in a professional relationship?   (C) 
 
What kind of knowledge do you think a care provider needs in order to be able to 
manage power effectively with a care receiver in a professional relationship?    (C) 
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What kind of support do you think a care provider needs in order to be able to 
manage power effectively with a care receiver in a professional relationship?    (C) 
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Appendix 2: Ethical approval 
 
(i). University of Malta Ethics Committee 
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(ii). University of Sheffield Ethics Review Panel 
 
 
Paulann Spiteri 
 
  
 
 
 
Head of School 
Professor Cathy Nutbrown 
Department of Educational Studies 
388 Glossop Road 
Sheffield  
S10 2JA 
  
 
 
Telephone: +44 (0114) 222 8185 
Fax: +44 (0114) 222 8105 
Email: D.Goodley@sheffield.ac.uk 
Dear Paulann, 
 
ETHICAL APPROVAL LETTER 
 
We are happy to accept the ethical clearance for your research project 
that you have gained from the University of Malta as required 
documentation for our Ethical checks in the School of Education. 
Please feel free to begin your empirical work.  
 
If you do make any substantive changes to the fieldwork please can 
you contact me to inform of these changes  
 
Good luck with your research.   
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Dr Dan Goodley 
Chair of the School of Education Ethics Review Panel 
 
cc  Tom Billington  
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(iii). Care Receivers’ Consent Form 
 
Consent Form: The Therapeutic Alliance in Mental Health Services: A Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
                           
                           I am following a PhD in Education which involves the undertaking of a research 
study.  My chosen study is: The Therapeutic Alliance in Mental Health Services: A Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis. You have been identified as a potential participant for this study. Please note the 
following points regarding the study: 
 
- Participation involves one interview which lasts for 45-60 minutes and which will be carried 
out at a place of your preference.  
 
- With your permission, I would like to audio record these interviews as well as to write down 
notes during the interview. This makes it easier for me to record information.  
 
- With your permission, I would like to access the notes that doctors and nurses write about 
you in order to explore what is written about the relationships that you have with your health 
carers. These notes are found in the medical and nursing records. 
 
- Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without providing a reason. Withdrawing from the study will not have any effect on the 
quality of care that you are being given.  
 
- No one but myself shall have access to the information so that anything that is said during 
the interviews remains strictly confidential.  
 
- Your identity will not be revealed in the study report as pseudonyms will be used instead of 
names.  
 
- Audio-recordings and transcriptions shall be stored securely and password protected. They 
shall be destroyed on successful completion of the study. 
 
I have read and understood the information given to me about the research study. I hereby, give my 
consent for participation in the study. 
 
                                 
Signature: ____________________                                       
 
Name: _______________________                   Date:_______________________ 
 
 
To the best of the researcher’s  knowledge, the interview questions should not evoke harmful 
emotions. However, if following the interview, psychological assistance is required, this shall be 
offered by Dr. Michael Galea who can be contacted on 99262452 or mgalea00@yahoo.com 
 
Any queries regarding the study can be discussed by contacting Paulann Spiteri on 2340 1180 or 
79730509 and paulann.spiteri@um.edu.mt or her supervisor at T.Billington@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
___________________________       _________________ 
 
Paulann Spiteri     Professor Tom Billington 
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Appendix 3: Care receivers’ primary and secondary 
analysis 
(i). Primary codes 
The primary thematic coding process of the interview transcripts led to the 
identification of fifty nine codes, each of which described the data related to it in a 
particular way. In this manner, some of the codes were directly related to specific 
knowledge/power themes in the data (e.g. Code: Dissatisfaction with power-balance 
type in alliance).  In contrast, other codes that emerged described the data in a non-
specific manner (e.g. Code: Interaction with the Nurses). The following list presents 
the primary codes and their definition: 
 
Ability to understand professionals 
 
A care receiver’s ability to understand the language and the meaning of 
communication by care providers. 
 
Acceptance 
 
A care receiver’s behaviour that shows him/her accepting to do what 
professionals say because s/he accept and agree with what is being said. 
 
Active involvement in care 
 
A care receiver’s perception of being directly involved by professionals in 
his/her care 
 
Anger 
 
Expression or implication of feeling angry. 
 
Assertive behaviour 
 
A care receiver’s ability to speak up for himself/herself and to behave in a goal-
oriented way that is not aggressive. 
 
Boundaries in alliance 
 
A care receiver’s perception or perception of influences of/on boundaries with 
care providers. 
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Care/treatment choice offered 
 
The experience of being provided with care/treatment options and/or the type of 
options that were offered. 
 
Compliance 
 
Care receiver behaviour that shows him/her doing what others say without 
questioning and irrelevant of whether s/he agree or disagree with what is being 
said. 
 
Defensive care 
 
Perceived subjection of a care receiver to that type of care that is mainly aimed at 
safeguarding safety and tradition rather than promoting recovery and 
independence. 
 
Depersonalisation 
 
The act of removing a care receiver’s identity. 
 
Determination 
 
A care receiver’s intent to stick to plan by knowing what s/he wants and doing 
his/her utmost to get it. 
 
Disagreement with professionals/care plan 
 
A care receiver’s thoughts/actions that imply that s/he does not agree with 
professionals or with the care plan. 
 
Discomfort 
 
A care receiver’s reported feeling in a particular situation which is not 
emotionally comfortable for the individual. 
 
Discreditation 
 
A care provider’s attitude that devalues a care receiver’s opinion. 
 
Displeasure 
 
A care receiver’s perception of not being pleased with aspects of care/treatment. 
 
Dissatisfaction with power-balance type in alliance 
 
A care receiver’s implied or stated dissatisfaction with the power-balance type in 
a particular alliance. 
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Events leading to hospitalisation 
 
A description of events that led to a care receiver’s admission to the psychiatric 
hospital. 
 
Exclusion 
 
A situation which portrays the care receiver as not being included in 
decisions/care. 
 
Experience of symptoms 
 
The narrated experience of a care receiver’s symptoms related to mental illness. 
 
Expression of trust in professionals 
 
Stated or implied trust by care receivers in care providers. 
 
Fear 
 
An emotion felt by care receivers in relation to the consequences of their actions 
and the feared care providers’ reaction. 
 
Feeling misunderstood by professionals 
 
The feeling that was described by care receivers when they perceived themselves 
as being misunderstood by professionals. 
 
Hopelessness 
 
A care receiver who loses hope in himself/herself and recovery. 
 
Information required 
 
Information that was seen or implied as being required by care receivers. 
 
Information seeking 
 
The act of care receivers seeking for information about treatment, care or 
symptoms. 
 
Interaction with nurses  
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with the nurses. 
 
Interaction with occupational therapists 
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with the occupational therapists. 
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Interaction with other professionals 
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with other professionals apart from 
nurses, occupational therapists, social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists. 
 
Interaction with psychiatrist 
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with his/her psychiatrist. 
 
Interaction with psychologist 
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with his/her psychologist. 
 
Interaction with social worker 
 
Care receiver descriptions of interactions with his/her social worker. 
 
Intermediate compliance 
 
The act of a care receiver who is being compliant as an intermediate step to an 
identified goal. 
 
Involuntary decision 
 
A decision that was taken against a care receiver’s will. 
 
Involvement in care 
 
A care receiver’s perception of being involved in care. 
 
Knowledge about care plan 
 
A care receiver’s knowledge about his/her care plan. 
 
Knowledge about medication/treatment 
 
A care receiver’s knowledge about his/her medication/treatment. 
 
Knowledge about symptoms 
 
A care receiver’s knowledge about his/her symptoms. 
 
Lack of information-giving 
 
Care receivers’ perception of a lack of information being given by professionals. 
 
Patronisation/Paternalism 
 
The action of talking/looking down on someone and to treat him/her as childlike 
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or inferior. 
 
Perception of additional/alternative treatment required 
 
A care receiver’s perception of that additional/alternative treatment required to 
facilitate recovery. 
 
Perception of knowledge and support required by care providers and care 
receivers 
 
A care receiver’s perception of the knowledge and support required to manage 
knowledge-power in the therapeutic alliance in a way that enhances therapeutic 
outcomes. 
 
Perception of mental illness and of the psychiatric hospital 
 
A care receiver’s views on the concept of mental illness and the psychiatric 
setting. 
 
Perceived power balance in the alliance 
 
An identified or implied power-balance in a therapeutic alliance. 
 
Perceived power imbalance in the alliance 
 
An identified or implied power imbalance in a therapeutic alliance. 
 
Perceived reasons for power-balance type in alliance 
 
A care receiver’s perception of the reason of the type of power-balance interface 
in a particular alliance. 
 
Perceived side effects of medication 
 
Side effects of medication as identified by the care receiver. 
 
Perceived subjection to expected submission 
 
A care receiver who perceives that s/he is being expected (by care providers) to 
follow and obey orders and decisions irrelevant of his/her opinion. 
 
Readiness to address disagreement/ give feedback 
 
A care receiver’s readiness to show and convey disagreement with any issue in 
care and to give feedback to care providers. 
 
Reference to Traditional Medical Hierarchy 
 
References to traditional ranking of professionals according to the medical model 
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with the doctor on top of the hierarchy and the others in the levels below.  
 
Resistance 
 
A care receiver’s resistance to aspects of care or to a particular care provider. 
 
Reported information given by professionals 
 
Care receivers’ report of the information that was given to them by their care 
providers in relation to admission, treatment and the care plan. 
 
Reported language used by professionals 
 
Care receivers’ description of language used by their care providers. 
 
Satisfaction 
 
A care receiver’s implied or stated overall satisfaction with care. 
 
Satisfaction with balance of power in alliance 
 
A care receiver’s implied/stated satisfaction with the power-balance type in a 
particular alliance. 
 
Self-perception of one´s knowledge 
 
A care receiver’s perception about his/her own knowledge about symptoms, 
medication, care and recovery. 
 
Sense of competing 
 
Implied/visible sense of competition between parties in a therapeutic alliance. 
 
Sharing of patient knowledge 
 
Perceived readiness of professionals to learn from care receivers and the care 
receivers’ readiness to share their knowledge. 
 
Treatment/care perceived as being effective 
 
A care receiver’s perception of the effectiveness of treatment/care. 
 
Treatment/care perceived as being ineffective 
 
A care receiver’s perception of the effectiveness of treatment/care. 
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(ii). Worked examples of primary and secondary analysis 
In the following page, Figure 14 shows some excerpts that describe Care Receiver 
5’s alliance with the social worker. The excerpts have been coded during the primary 
analysis process using Atlas.ti. 
When all the transcripts had been coded, secondary analysis was undertaken during 
which data was compared and patterns could be identified. This led to the grouping 
of the alliances into the four discursive themes/ alliance types that were described in 
Chapter 4: 
Satisfaction-Acceptance 
Dissatisfaction-Compliance 
Resentment-Opposition 
Collaboration 
 
For instance, Care Receiver 5’s alliance with the social worker was one of the 
alliances that gave rise to the Satisfaction-Acceptance alliance type/discursive theme. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this alliance type can be briefly described as: 
an alliance where the care receiver perceives the professional as being the entity in 
the lead and of creating a power imbalance within the alliance. Most of the 
participants appear to be satisfied with the alliance and seem to be accepting the 
power imbalance as an automatic and even welcomed state. These individuals often 
seek active involvement and are ready to provide feedback in the context of the 
alliance. 
 
The primary codes which gave rise to this alliance-type were:  
 
Perceived power imbalance in alliance 
Acceptance 
Satisfaction with power-balance type in alliance 
Active involvement in care 
Reference to Traditional Medical Hierarchy 
Determination 
Expression of trust in professionals 
Perceived subjection to expected submission 
Ready to address disagreement/ give feedback 
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Figure 14: Excerpts from the interview with Care Receiver 5 
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Similarly, in the next page, Figure 15 shows excerpts that describe Care Receiver 4’s 
alliance with the psychiatrist, as coded during the primary analysis process using 
Atlas .ti. 
In the secondary analysis process, this was one of the alliances that gave rise to the 
Resentment-Opposition alliance type. As discussed in Chapter 4, this alliance 
type/discursive theme:   
depicts a group of individuals who seemed to be displeased due to the perceived 
power imbalance in their alliances with some of the professionals. Most of these 
individuals showed clear disagreement with the professional involved in the alliance 
and felt as if their rights were not being respected. Resistance and anger were 
commonly identified as a result of this alliance-type. 
 
The primary codes which gave rise to this alliance-type were:  
 
Perceived power imbalance in alliance 
Resistance 
Dissatisfaction with power-balance type in alliance 
Anger 
Displeasure 
Discomfort 
Perceived subjection to patronising/paternalistic attitudes 
Exclusion 
Disagreement with professionals and/or care plan 
Perceived subjection to expected submission 
Perceived subjection to discrediting attitude 
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Figure 15: Excerpts from the interview with Care Receiver 4 
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Appendix 4: Primary and secondary analysis of medical 
and nursing records 
(i). Primary codes 
The primary thematic coding process of the medical and nursing records led to the 
identification of fourteen codes, each of which described the data related to it in a 
particular way. In this manner, some of the codes were directly related to specific 
knowledge/power themes in the data (e.g. Code: Authoritative terminology).  In 
contrast, other codes that emerged described the data in a non-specific manner (e.g. 
Code: Treatment/Care description). The following list presents the primary codes 
and their definition: 
Automatic wording 
 
This refers to terms that have found their way into the psychiatric system and 
tend to feature routinely and at times, aggressively in written records. These 
are often found as standalone statements in the records included in the study 
e.g. Comfortable night. 
 
Authoritative terminology 
 
These are commanding terms that are characterised by a tone that suggests a 
high expectation of compliance and conformity from the care receiver.  
 
Custodial approach 
 
This refers to a way of writing that depicts the care receiver as a vulnerable 
individual who must be protected and ‘mothered’ with little focus, if any, on 
promoting autonomy and independence. This writing manner often features 
statements that describe how things are being done for the care receiver 
rather than with him/her. 
 
Description of care receiver’s state/progress/actions 
 
Statements that describe the care receiver’s state, progress or actions carried 
out. 
 
Feedback from care receiver 
 
Statements that reflect feedback that has been obtained from the care 
receiver. 
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Feedback from care receiver’s significant others 
 
Statements that reflect feedback that has been obtained from the care 
receiver’s significant others. 
 
Medical terminology 
 
This consists of wording that is characterised by medical jargon that attempts 
to describe the care receiver’s state/progress/actions or the treatment/care 
provided. 
 
Care receiver involvement 
 
Statements that indicate that an effort is being made to involve the care 
receiver in his/her care plan. 
 
Care receiver-oriented approach 
 
A way of writing that indicates that the care provider is focussing on the care 
receiver’s needs and wishes and treating him/her as a unique individual with 
unique needs. 
  
Reference to feedback from other professionals 
 
Statements that reflect feedback that has been obtained from other 
professionals. 
 
Task orientation 
 
A way of writing that indicates that the care provider is focussing on 
completion of routine tasks with little regard for the care receiver’s unique 
needs and wishes. 
 
Treatment/Care description  
 
Statements that describe the treatment/care that is being provided. 
 
Use of the care receiver’s actual name 
 
Statements that mention the care receiver’s actual name rather than referring 
to him/her as ‘patient’ or in the third person. 
 
Use of the care receiver’s actual words 
 
Statements that include the care receiver’s actual words rather than a care 
provider’s reconstruction of the words said. 
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(ii). Worked examples of primary and secondary analysis 
In the following page, Figure 16 shows an excerpt from Medical Record 9 that has 
been coded during the primary analysis process using Atlas.ti. 
When all the transcripts had been coded, secondary analysis was undertaken during 
which data was compared and patterns could be identified. This led to the 
identification of the three discursive themes that were described in Chapter 4: 
The Pathological Lens 
Depersonalisation 
Humanism 
 
For instance, the excerpt in Figure 16 was one of those which gave rise to the 
discursive theme named The Pathological Lens. As discussed in Chapter 4, this 
alliance type can be briefly described as: 
discourse that is mainly dominated by the use of technical or pathological terms. 
 
 
The primary codes which gave rise to this alliance-type were:  
 
Medical terminology 
Automatic wording 
Custodial approach 
Authoritative terminology 
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Figure 16: Excerpt from Medical Record 9  
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Similarly, in the next page, Figure 17 shows an excerpt from Nursing Record 1, as 
coded during the primary analysis process using Atlas .ti. 
In the secondary analysis process, this was one of the excerpts that gave rise to the 
discursive theme of Depersonalisation. As discussed in Chapter 4, this discursive 
theme:   
features a way of referring to the therapeutic alliance in terms that tend to 
mechanicalise the interactions and the entities within it.  As a direct consequence, it 
is felt that the person factor is being removed from the equation by excluding the 
specific qualities, experiences and other characteristics that contribute to the 
uniqueness of each individual. 
 
The primary codes which gave rise to this alliance-type were:  
 
Task orientation 
Automatic wording 
Medical terminology 
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Figure 17: Excerpt from Nursing Record 1 
 
  
 
  
 
 
